Certificate Report
Version 1.0
19 September 2023
CCA_CC_20004
For
SecureData version 8.0
From
SecureAge Technology Pte Ltd
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 2
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Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 3
Foreword
Singapore is a Common Criteria Certificate Authorizing Nation, under the
Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA). The current list of signatory
nations and approved certification schemes can be found at the CCRA portal:
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Singapore Common Criteria Scheme (SCCS) is established for the info-
communications technology (ICT) industry to evaluate and certify their IT products
against the requirements of the Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1 (ISO/IEC 15408) and Common
Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM) Version 3.1
(ISO/IEC 18045) in Singapore.
The SCCS is owned and managed by the Certification Body (CB) under the ambit
of Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA).
The SCCS certification signifies that the target of evaluation (TOE) under
evaluation has been assessed and found to provide the specified IT security
assurance. However, certification does not guarantee absolute security and
should always be read with the particular set of threats sought to be addressed
and assumptions made in the process of evaluation.
This certification is not an endorsement of the product.
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 4
Amendment Record
Version Date Changes
0.1 21 August 2023 Draft
1.0 19 September 2023 Released
NOTICE
The Cyber Security Agency of Singapore makes no warranty of any kind with
regards to this material and shall not be liable for errors contained herein or
for incidental or consequential damages in connection with the use of this
material.
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 5
Executive Summary
This report is intended to assist the end-user of the product in determining the
suitability of the product in their deployed environment.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the SecureData, version 8.0 and has
undergone the CC certification procedure at the Singapore Common Criteria
Scheme (SCCS). The TOE comprises of the following components:
Identifier Version
Software Windows\System32\drivers\SecureData.sys
Windows\System32\drivers\SdsPscA.sys
Windows\System32\drivers\SdsPscB.sys
Windows\System32\drivers\SdsPscC.sys
Windows\SdsCfg.dat
Table 1 - TOE components identifier
The list of guidance documents to use with the product in its certified
configuration is as follows.
Name Version Method of
Delivery
SecureAge 8.0 Administrator Guide Jan 2022 CD or
download link
SecureAge 8.0 Installation Guide Sep 2021 CD or
download link
SecureAge 8.0 User Guide Jun 2022 CD or
download link
SecureAge 8.0 Uninstallation Guide Jun 2021 CD or
download link
SecureData 8.0 Operational User Guidance
and Preparative Procedures Supplement
Ver 0.8, 26
Jun 2023
PDF by Email
Table 2 - List of guidance documents
SecureData is one of the tools within the SecureAge Security Suite (Suite),
providing the user endpoint with automatic file and folder encryption for
seamless security of all user files. SecureData helps to enforce data security
requirements in preventing data loss and data leakage of sensitive personal
information and valuable enterprise information assets. The Suite is an
endpoint license-based application, which provides the essential components
necessary for complete protection against intentional or accidental data loss or
breach. The Suite needs to be installed as one application; it comprises four
components (SecureData, SecureFile, SecureDisk, and SecureEmail) and
each component can be activated individually by providing valid license code.
The main security function of SecureData is to provide automatic encryption for
user data/file(s) regardless of its storage media. Any data/file(s) that are
created, edited, moved, or copied to any local, external, or network storage
devices, such as fileserver, are automatically encrypted based on pre-defined
policies. Even if the local drive of a machine is shared across the network, the
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 6
transmission of the user data/file(s) will remain encrypted over the network and
only authorized recipients can decrypt the data/file(s).
There are two types of TOE usage:
I. Normal file operation: the TOE is designed and registered as one of
Windows OS system driver, each time when user conducts the
operation, such as read, write, or copy, Windows OS will invoke TOE to
complete the operation. This usage is integrated into Windows file
operation process without changing the user method of use toward their
computers, transparently ensures all important data/file(s) are stored in
encrypted format.
II. Background encryption: this refers to operation of file sharing, initial
background encryption after successful TOE installation and manual
encryption. Different from normal file operation, user needs to invoke
TOE via right click menu in Windows (initial background encryption is
automatically triggered after the user’s SecureAge profile has been
created). During this usage, if there is a power failure or physical
anomaly inflicting temporary failure of disk operation, only the temporary
file created by TOE will be affected or corrupted, thus protecting the
original file.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by UL Verification Services Pte
Ltd, an approved CC test laboratory, at the assurance level CC EAL 2
augmented with ALC_FLR.2 and completed on 14 September 2023.
The certification body monitored each evaluation to ensure a harmonised
procedure and interpretation of the criteria has been applied.
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 7
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following
TOE Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality
File Encryption
TOE provides the capability in performing file encryption and decryption.
- Create Encrypted File
- Read Encrypted File
- Write Encrypted File
Security Functional Requirements: FCS_COP.1, FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4
Fault Tolerance
TOE has the capability in operate during failure in which the TOE operations
in secure state if there were a power failure or physical anomaly inflicting
temporary failure of disk operation during the process of TOE background
encryption. If there were a failure of TOE operations, this only will be affecting
the temporary file(s), and not the original file.
Security Functional Requirements: FPT_FLS.1, FRU_FLT.1
Table 3: TOE Security Functionalities
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 8
Please refer to the Security Target [1] for more information.
The assets to be protected by the TOE has been defined. Based on these
assets, the TOE Security Problem Definition has been defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisation Policies. These are outlined in Chapter
3 of the Security Target [1]
This Certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in Chapter
5.3 of this report.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate applies only to the specific version and
release of the IT product in its evaluated configuration. This certificate is not an
endorsement of the IT product by SCCS, and no warranty of the IT product by
SCCS, is either expressed or implied.
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 9
Table of Contents
1 CERTIFICATION .....................................................................................10
1.1 PROCEDURE........................................................................................10
1.2 RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS.................................................................10
2 VALIDITY OF THE CERTIFICATION RESULT ....................................... 11
3 IDENTIFICATION ....................................................................................12
4 SECURITY POLICY ................................................................................14
5 ASSUMPTIONS AND SCOPE OF EVALUATION...................................14
5.1 ASSUMPTIONS .....................................................................................14
5.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE.....................................................................15
5.3 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION.................................................................16
5.4 NON-EVALUATED FUNCTIONALITIES .......................................................16
5.5 NON-TOE COMPONENTS .....................................................................16
6 ARCHITECTURE DESIGN INFORMATION............................................18
7 DOCUMENTATION .................................................................................19
8 IT PRODUCT TESTING ..........................................................................19
8.1 DEVELOPER TESTING (ATE_FUN)........................................................19
8.1.1 Test Approach and Depth............................................................19
8.1.2 Test Configuration .......................................................................19
8.1.3 Test Results ................................................................................19
8.2 EVALUATOR TESTING (ATE_IND)..........................................................20
8.2.1 Test Approach and Depth............................................................20
8.2.2 Test Configuration .......................................................................20
8.2.3 Test Results ................................................................................20
8.3 PENETRATION TESTING (AVA_VAN)......................................................20
8.3.1 Test Approach and Depth............................................................20
9 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION ..........................................................22
10 OBLIGATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE USAGE OF
THE TOE .......................................................................................................23
11 ACRONYMS.........................................................................................24
12 BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................25
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 10
1 Certification
1.1 Procedure
The certification body conducts the certification procedure according to the
following criteria:
▪ Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5 [2] [3] [4];
▪ Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
Revision 5 [5]; and
▪ SCCS scheme publications [6] [7] [8]
1.2 Recognition Agreements
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based
on the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement had been ratified on 2 July
2014. The arrangement covers certificates with claims of compliance against
collaborative protection profiles (cPPs) or evaluation assurance levels (EALs)
1 through 2 and ALC_FLR. Hence, the certification for this TOE is fully covered
by the CCRA.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement mark printed on the certificate
indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement
by all signatory nations listed on the CC web portal
(https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org).
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 11
2 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the TOE as indicated.
The Certificate is valid till 19 September 20281.
In cases of changes to the certified version of the TOE, the validity may be
extended to new versions and releases provided the TOE sponsor applies for
Assurance Continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the revised TOE,
in accordance with the requirements of the Singapore Common Criteria
Scheme (SCCS).
The owner of the Certificate is obliged:
▪ When advertising the Certificate or the fact of the product’s certification,
to refer to and provide the Certification Report, the Security Target and
user guidance documentation herein to any customer of the product for
the application and usage of the certified product;
▪ To inform the SCCS immediately about vulnerabilities of the product that
have been identified by the developer or any third party; and
▪ To inform the SCCS immediately in the case that relevant security
changes in the evaluated life cycle has occurred or the confidentiality of
documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure where the certification of the
product has assumed this confidentiality being maintained, is no longer
valid.
1 Certificate validity could be extended by means of assurance continuity. Certificate could also
be revoked under the conditions specified in SCCS Publication 3 [8]. Potential users should
check the SCCS website (https://www.csa.gov.sg/our-programmes/certification-and-labelling-
schemes/singapore-common-criteria-scheme/product-list) for the up-to-date status regarding
the certificate’s validity.
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 12
3 Identification
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is: SecureData version 8.0.
The physical deliverable of the TOE comprised of the following items:
TOE software installation file (SecureAge Security Suite installation package)
delivered to the customer in the form of CD or unique download link.
Unique Identifier Version Method of delivery
SecureAge Security Suite
Installation Package
8.0.7 CD or download link
The files and their respective hashes in the installation package are listed
below:
Filename SHA 256
autoconf.ini
93a15db1597987f259eef01d7a55dd8244e540cfcc93ffd97d4460de89f69785
CusWiz64.exe
33c2ec9d61a66be4fd15d6556342988e0b9413de786252632a86af744ccfbba7
DRMEncryptedSecretKey.bin
521906dacc570cc89b784af8a782cb777fc78287f014b533a3eddd3cea8a0483
DRMExpiredBody.txt
91f033be557de1bb7cf8060ecea97be8ee11093c8c00e6d14e1f58371ad51201
DRMExternalBody.txt
dbd3a94058d5ac8ad2fa1341da81ac3e2e9be2b33aad086c0432e7abfbe9feea
hcode.txt
793b2168f98fe148522ced95283c0c80afdfdd373b4e0682b7ddb57f6909a3f6
readme.txt
ce5285c647989ef60a86688ad4bdf61d2590c0518a0aac0479c6db1dc83ca4b2
saconfig.ini
29a1387f7f371545b62a40b048272e60f67cbf8fd8aebfa3ee79c9c734bbad76
sage8017.exe
44b701a01b8759dc4450ce1f276a819e6daa2a795a532c648586a43932a8f180
sage_ca2cert.der
fe6103c05f95f61acf3aa3dabfab34024246527c6d5b2b2c66e7078941b5d12f
SecureAge Admin Guide.pdf
f0c48759c7f84b3c9f4ff1f67032a47c06573c14d930aa30f368d1ba93854a4b
SecureAge Installation Guide.pdf
80a379ffa273276938aeda9dfa32af72b3ff335c3dd9ab6a2279abcc90664c76
SecureDataCfg64.exe
ab6439df5c6fe40831694bbe6a3f8a6f3e73c5c439349bcf26e702d7c12cc43f
SecurePDFExternalBody.txt
5ecc768cec1f9c4db519c38ce317fd42db9b8c9a117f1c377629ccb3c3cd295b
SecurePDFExternalBodyWithUR
L.txt
5df1844ed175921c1be1b6783c1c9fca831e931d9da5130d543ffe3c4422b3f9
SecurePDFPswdServCfg.json
a91009c6ad0b450eb26773a7b8aa01ba6ee55ebd39cf51064cfca4e776e29551
setup64.exe
8608570120dc127ef41ce1efa54cd487e90d753dc77ef147a1c0ddd15758d0cb
Table 4 - TOE Deliverables
The guide for receipt and acceptance of the above-mentioned TOE are
described in the set of guidance documents.
Name Version Method of
Delivery
SecureAge 8.0 Administrator Guide Jan 2022 CD or
download link
SecureAge 8.0 Installation Guide Sep 2021 CD or
download link
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 13
SecureAge 8.0 User Guide Jun 2022 CD or
download link
SecureAge 8.0 Uninstallation Guide Jun 2021 CD or
download link
SecureData 8.0 Operational User Guidance
and Preparative Procedures Supplement
Ver 0.8, 26
Jun 2023
PDF by Email
Table 5 - Guidance Document (part of TOE deliverables)
Additional identification information relevant to this Certification procedure as
follows:
TOE SecureData 8.0
Security Target SecureData 8.0 Security Target
Developer SecureAge Technology Pte Ltd
Sponsor SecureAge Technology Pte Ltd
Evaluation Facility UL Verification Services Pte Ltd
Completion Date of
Evaluation
14 September 2023
Certification Body Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA)
Certificate ID CSA_CC_20004
Certificate Validity 5 years from date of issuance
Table 6: Additional Identification Information
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 14
4 Security Policy
The TOE’s Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional
Requirements listed and implemented by the TOE.
The TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security functional
classes:
• Cryptographic Support
• Fault Tolerance
Specific details concerning the above-mentioned security policy can be found
in Chapter 6 of the Security Target [1].
5 Assumptions and Scope of Evaluation
5.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target [1] and some aspects of Threats
and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These
aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE
environment and are listed in the tables below:
Environmental Assumptions Description
OE.OPERATIONAL_GUIDANCE
TOE administrator must ensure that the
TOE is delivered, installed, configured,
administered and operated in a manner
that were advised by the TOE
Developer to maintains its integrity,
include providing a secure and
malware-free operating system.
OE.USER_GUIDANCE
TOE user should be provided
documentation containing sufficient
information to guide in operating the
TOE.
OE.THIRD_PARTY_PKI_SYSTEM
TOE administrator must ensure that
only trusted third-party PKI system will
be used to generate TOE user digital
ID.
OE.NO_EVIL
TOE administrator roles should be
adequately trained, responsible and
honest individuals who are not
motivated to disable, degrade or
subvert the operation of the TOE in the
environment for personal gain or other
purposes that contradict the security
policies of the organization.
OE.SEC_AWARE
TOE user and TOE administrator
should be properly trained in
organizational security policy and have
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 15
awareness of security procedures.
Thus, TOE user should not share their
password and abide to the rules and
regulations of the organization when
using the TOE.
OE.WINDOWS
Windows security policy of the
organization should be configured to
allow only administrator to be able to
install the TOE.
Table 7: Environmental Assumptions
Details can be found in section 4.3 of the Security Target [1].
5.2 Clarification of Scope
The scope of evaluation is limited to the claims made in the Security Target [1].
Users are reminded to set up the TOE as per guidance. Users are reminded to
set up the TOE as per guidance documents to correctly deploy and use the
TOE in the evaluated configuration.
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 16
5.3 Evaluated Configuration
SecureData is one of the tools of SecureAge Security Suite (Suite), providing
the user endpoint with automatic file and folder encryption for security of all user
files. SecureData helps to enforce data security requirements in preventing data
loss and data leakage of sensitive personal information and valuable enterprise
information assets. The Suite is an endpoint license-based application, which
provides the essential components necessary for complete protection against
intentional or accidental data loss or breach. The Suite needs to be installed as
one application; it comprises four components (SecureData, SecureFile,
SecureDisk, and SecureEmail) and each component can be activated
individually by providing valid license code.
The main security function of SecureData is to provide automatic encryption for
user data/file(s) regardless of its storage media. Any data/file(s) that are
created, edited, moved or copied to any local, external or network storage
devices, such as fileserver, are automatically encrypted based on pre-defined
policies. Even If the local drive of a machine is shared across the network, the
transmission of the user data/file(s) will remain encrypted over the network and
only authorised recipients could decrypt the data/file(s). Refer to Section 1.6.3
for details of file encryption/decryption process.
There are 2 types of TOE usage:
I. Normal file operation: the TOE is designed and registered as one of
Windows OS system driver, each time when user conduct the operation,
such as read, write, copy, Windows OS will invoke TOE to complete the
operation. This usage is integrated into Windows file operation process,
without changing the user method of use toward their computers,
transparently ensures all important data/file(s) are stored in encrypted
format.
II. Background encryption: this refers to operation of file sharing, initial
background encryption after successful TOE installation and manual
encryption. Different from normal file operation, user needs to invoke
TOE via right click menu in Windows (initial background encryption is
automatic triggered after user’s SecureAge profile has been created).
During this usage, if there is a power failure or physical anomaly inflicting
temporary failure of disk operation, only the temporary file created by
TOE will be affected or corrupted, which is to protect the original file.
5.4 Non-Evaluated Functionalities
There are no non-evaluated functionalities within the scope as clarified in
section 5.2.
5.5 Non-TOE Components
The TOE requires the following non-TOE components for its operation.
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 17
Minimum System Requirements
Operating Systems Microsoft Windows 10
Processor x86/x64 architecture
Memory (RAM) 1 GB
Hard disk 300MB
Application SecureAge Security Suite 8.0.x
Remarks:
On top of four separate components (SecureData, SecureFile, SecureDisk
and SecureEmail), SecureAge Security Suite provides some shared general
functions, they are not within this evaluation. Below are the general
security functions provided by Suite and needed for TOE operation.
• Identification & Authentication
• Key pair generation
• User Key generation
Refer to Section “Evaluated Configuration” below for any specific setup
requirement for Suite.
Table 8: Minimum System Requirements
Evaluated Configuration:
The following installation and configuration options must be used:
i. Computer used to install TOE needs to enable Secure Boot.
ii. TOE user will login to Windows OS with a non-system administrator role.
iii. Prior to installation, the administrator can perform modification on the
TOE policy via Configuration tool. It is noted that the Organisation
Security Policy shall be configured to allow only administrator to install
the TOE
iv. User with administrator privilege can configure the TOE policy through
the TOE Policy Configuration file (SecureDataCfg64.exe), under
SecureData Options, set below fields to ‘No’:
a. CopyInPlainTo
b. CopyInPlain
c. ManualDecrypt
v. The TOE policy changes only take place upon installation / reinstallation
of the TOE. User will only use reliable PKI system to generate
SecureAge user profile digital ID, such as build-in SecureAge CA.
vi. In SecureAge’s configuration file, autoconf.ini under TOE installation
folder, set field of ‘Link To Windows Login’ value to zero. This will disable
‘Link to Windows Login’ feature.
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 18
6 Architecture Design Information
TOE design is analysed in detail in Single Evaluation Report (SER) – ADV
Class. A brief overview is presented in this section. In order to provide above
security functions, there are 3 subsystems designed within TOE as below:
• Configuration Management subsystem: responsible for the
management of TOE security features;
• System Control subsystem: fault tolerance; and
• File Encryption subsystem: responsible for cryptographic operations
during read / write file.
The subsystems of the TOE and the TSF role of each subsystem is summarized
in the table below:
Subsystem TSF
Subsystem
Category Interaction
with
Evaluator Notes
System
Control
Yes SFR-
enforcing
File Encryption This subsystem
provides fault
tolerance function.
File
Encryption
Yes SFR-
enforcing
System
Control
This subsystem
provides file encryption
function during file
operation.
Table 9: Analysis of TOE subsystems
The logical architecture of the TOE in its operational environment is shown in
the figure below:
-
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 19
Figure 1 TOE subsystem logical architecture
SecureData Driver is registered as one of Windows OS File System Drivers.
Every time user conducts a file operation within Windows OS, TOE will be
invoked via this Windows Operating System interface to complete the process
by performing encryption/decryption of the file content. In order to get the user
key from SecureAge Security Suite, TOE communicate with the suite vis
SecureData System Control interface. And each time when update the TOE
configuration, TOE will load the latest configuration via SecureData config file
interface.
7 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as listed in
Name Version Method of
Delivery
SecureAge 8.0 Administrator Guide Jan 2022 CD or
download link
SecureAge 8.0 Installation Guide Sep 2021 CD or
download link
SecureAge 8.0 User Guide Jun 2022 CD or
download link
SecureAge 8.0 Uninstallation Guide Jun 2021 CD or
download link
SecureData 8.0 Operational User Guidance
and Preparative Procedures Supplement
Ver 0.8, 26
Jun 2023
PDF by Email
Table 5 - Guidance Document (part of TOE deliverables)
is being provided with the product to the customer. These documentations
contain the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance
with the Security Target.
8 IT Product Testing
8.1 Developer Testing (ATE_FUN)
8.1.1 Test Approach and Depth
The evaluator sampled and repeated the developer’s testing to validate the
correctness of the TSF at the TSFI and the subsystem level.
8.1.2 Test Configuration
The TOE used for testing is configured according to the TOE guidance
document [9] [10] [11] [12] [13].
8.1.3 Test Results
The test results provided by the developer covered all operational functions as
described in the Security Target [1].
All test results from all tested environment showed that the expected test results
are identical to the actual test results.
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 20
8.2 Evaluator Testing (ATE_IND)
8.2.1 Test Approach and Depth
The evaluator devised a test subset sampling and repeating developer’s tests
and included additional test cases:
• To make sure that the tests cover all the SFR-enforcing TSFIs.
• To make sure that the TSF is operate as per functional specification
described.
8.2.2 Test Configuration
A detailed test description was provided in the ATE document. The evaluator
set up their own test environment following the developer’s guidance
documents Prior to running tests, the evaluator performed identification of the
test environment and verification of the TOE.
8.2.3 Test Results
The developer’s test reproduced were verified by the evaluator to conform to
the expected results from the test plan.
8.3 Penetration Testing (AVA_VAN)
8.3.1 Test Approach and Depth
The evaluator conducted a vulnerability search online using public sources of
information, including National Vulnerability Database (NVD by NIST), cve.org
and exploit-db.com etc. The following search term were used:
Search Terms
• SecureAge exploit
• SecureAge vulnerability
• SecureAge CVE
• SecureData exploit
• SecureData vulnerability
• SecureData CVE
• Encryption software exploit
• Encryption software vulnerability
Combined with the analysis of the TOE, the evaluator then identified potential
vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational environment. Attack
scenarios were then devised and a theoretical analysis of the attack potentials
for the scenarios were performed. Penetration tests were conducted for
scenarios where the attack potentials were Basic.
The approach chosen by the evaluator is commensurate with the assurance
component chosen (AVA_VAN.2) treating the resistance of the TOE to an attack
with the Basic attack potential.
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 21
Penetration Test Description
Test 1 – Process memory disclosure
in SecureAge authentication process
This test is to ensure that sensitive
information such as SecureAge
Profile’s Password and Private Key
that used during authentication are
not being cached in cleartext inside of
process memory.
Test 2 – Hardcoded strings in
SecureAge binaries
This test is to ensure no hardcoded
sensitive strings in the binaries that
will leak useful information to
attackers.
Test 3 – Sensitive information in
kernel memory dump
This test is supplement of test 1,
which is focus on kernel memory
dump file.
This test is used to verify that
sensitive information, such as
SecureAge Profile’s Password, User
Key and mask, that are being used
not retrievable from kernel memory
dump.
Test 4 – Underlying OS registry
analysing
This test is used to assess if any
sensitive information such as system
keys and user keys stored in registry.
Test 5 – System file analysis for hash
values
This test is supplement of test 2,
which is focus on TOE system files’
hash values.
This test case is to check if the hash
values that being saved in system file
can be found.
Test 6 – Hardcoded strings in
SecureData driver
This test is supplement test 2, which
is to test SecureData driver file.
This test is to ensure no hardcoded
sensitive strings in the driver file that
will leak useful information to
attackers.
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 22
Table 10 - Penetration Test Case
Vulnerabilities discovered during the penetration testing have been resolved.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) was provided by the CCTL in
accordance with the CC, CEM and requirements of the SCCS. As a result of
the evaluation, the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
▪ All components of the EAL 2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.2
assurance package
This implies that the TOE satisfies the security requirements specified in the
Security Target [1].
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 23
10 Obligations and recommendations for the usage of
the TOE
The documents as outlined in Table 2 - List of guidance documents contain
necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein
have to be considered. In addition, all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and
OSPs as outlined in the Security Target [1] that are not covered by the TOE
shall be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
Potential user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within
his/her system risk management process. As attack methods and techniques
evolve over time, he/she should define the period of time whereby a re-
assessment of the TOE is required and convey such request to the sponsor of
the certificate.
Users are reminded to set up the TOE as per guidance documents to correctly
deploy and use the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
The following is provided by the evaluator to highlight features and
requirements that are critical to the secure operation of the TOE. This is by no
means an exhaustive list of the documents to securely use the TOE. Refer to
product guidance documentation for a complete pre-operation and user
guidance.
TOE is running on Windows Operating System, therefore maintain OS security
is important for TOE to maintain secure operation. TOE user will need to
consider hardening the OS based on well-known guide, such as Microsoft
recommendation or CIS Benchmarks. The Windows security policy of the
organisation will need to be configured to allow only the administrator to install
the TOE.
TOE will conduct background encryption immediately and automatically after
the user profile has been created. Without proper setup, it might result in OS
not working properly, therefore it is strongly recommended to have qualified
administrator to conduct the whole TOE setup, configuration and verify it is
working before releasing to end user.
As TOE design is focus on protecting data confidentiality, TOE user is strongly
advised to backup critical data and ensure the data can be retrieved when
needed.
User key pair is the only key to decrypt the encrypted data, TOE user is strongly
advised to protect it.
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 24
11 Acronyms
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CCTL Common Criteria Test Laboratory
CSA Cyber Security Agency of Singapore
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCCS Singapore Common Criteria Scheme
SFR Security Functional Requirement
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
Certification Report Version 1.0 Page 25
12 Bibliography
[1] SecureAge Technology Pte Ltd, “SecureData 8.0 Security Target, Version
1.0,” 12 April 2023.
[2] Common Criteria Maintenance Board (CCMB), “Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction and
general model [Document Number CCMB-2017-04-001]. Version 3.1
Revision 5,” 2017.
[3] Common Criteria Maintenance Board (CCMB), “Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security functional
components [Document Number CCMB-2017-04-002], Version 3.1
Revision 5,” 2017.
[4] Common Criteria Maintenance Board (CCMB), “Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security assurance
components [Document Number CCMB-2018-04-003] Version 3.1
Revision 5,” 2017.
[5] Common Criteria Maintenance Board (CCMB), “Common Methodology for
Information Technology Security Evaluation - Evaluation Methodology
[Document Number CCMB-2017-04-004], Version 3.1 Revision 5,” 2017.
[6] Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA), “SCCS Publication 1 -
Overview of SCCS, Version 5.0,” 2018.
[7] Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA), “SCCS Publication 2 -
Requirements for CCTL, Version 5.0,” 2018.
[8] Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA), “SCCS Publication 3 -
Evaluation and Certification, Version 5.0,” 2018.
[9] SecureAge Technology Pte Ltd, “SecureAge 8.0 Administrator Guide
Based on SecureAge Version 8.0,” January 2022.
[10] SecureAge Technology Pte Ltd, “SecureAge 8.0 Installation Guide Based
on SecureAge Version 8.0,” September 2021.
[11] SecureAge Technology Ptd Ltd, “SecureAge 8.0 User Guide Based on
SecureAge Version 8.0,” June 2022.
[12] SecureAge Technology Pte Ltd, “SecureAge 8.0 Uninstallation Guide
Based on SecureAge Version 8.0,” June 2021.
[13] SecureAge Technology Pte Ltd, “SecureAge 8.0 Operational User
Guidance and Preparative Procedures Supplement, Version 0.8,” 26 June
2023.
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