1
Australasian Information Security
Evaluation Program
Certification Report
Cyxtera AppGate SDP version 4.3
Version 1.0, 13 August 2019
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Table of contents
Executive summary 4
Introduction 5
Overview 5
Purpose 5
Identification 5
Target of Evaluation 7
Overview 7
Description of the TOE 7
TOE Functionality 7
TOE physical boundary 7
TOE Architecture 7
Clarification of scope 8
Non-evaluated functionality and services 8
Security 8
Usage 8
Evaluated configuration 8
Secure delivery 8
Software delivery procedures 8
Installation of the TOE 9
Version verification 9
Documentation and guidance 9
Secure usage 9
Evaluation 10
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Overview 10
Evaluation procedures 10
Functional testing 10
Penetration testing 10
Certification 11
Overview 11
Assurance 11
Certification result 11
Recommendations 11
Annex A – References and abbreviations 13
References 13
Abbreviations 13
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Executive summary
This report describes the findings of the IT security evaluation of Cyxtera AppGate SDP version 4.3 against Common
Criteria EAL2+ALC_FLR.1.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Cyxtera AppGate SDP version 4.3. The TOE provides capabilities to control access of
network-based users to network resources in physical, cloud-based and hybrid environments, using the approach to
computer security known as the Software Defined Perimeter (SDP).
This report concludes that the TOE has complied to the Common Criteria (CC) evaluation assurance level EAL2
augmented with ALC_FLR.1 and that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria and the
requirements of the Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program (AISEP).
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria and the requirements of the Australasian
Information Security Evaluation Program. The evaluation was performed by Teron Labs and was completed on 7 July
2019.
With regard to the secure operation of the TOE, the Australasian Certification Authority (ACA) recommends that:
 that the TOE is operated in the evaluated configuration and that assumptions concerning the TOE security
environment are understood
 configure and operate the TOE according to the vendor’s product administrator guidance
 the users should make themselves familiar with the guidance provided with the TOE and pay attention to all
security warnings.
 the passwords for all identities should be handled securely. Multi-factor authentication should be considered for
all admin users for additional security.
 the system auditor should review the audit trail generated and exported by the TOE periodically
 the use of SSH for administration of the TOE was out of the scope this evaluation and should be disabled by the
administer after initial configuration and not be used
 the users should verify the integrity of the TOE software prior to installation by comparing the fingerprint of the
downloaded software against the value available from Cyxtera’s support portal.
Potential purchasers of the TOE should review the intended operational environment and ensure that they are
comfortable that the stated security objectives for the operational environment can be suitably addressed.
This report includes information about the underlying security policies and architecture of the TOE, and information
regarding the conduct of the evaluation.
It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that the TOE meets their requirements. For this reason, it is recommended
that a prospective user of the TOE refer to the Security Target and read this Certification Report prior to deciding
whether to purchase the product.
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Introduction
Overview
This chapter contains information about the purpose of this document and how to identify the Target of Evaluation
(TOE).
Purpose
The purpose of this Certification Report is to:
 report the certification of results of the IT security evaluation of the TOE against the requirements of the Common
Criteria
 provide a source of detailed security information about the TOE for any interested parties.
This report should be read in conjunction with the TOE’s Security Target [7] which provides a full description of the
security requirements and specifications that were used as the basis of the evaluation.
Identification
The TOE is Cyxtera AppGate SDP version 4.3.
Description Version
Evaluation scheme Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program
TOE Cyxtera AppGate SDP
Software version 4.3
Security Target Cyxtera AppGate SDP, v1.0, dated June 24, 2019
Evaluation Technical Report Evaluation Technical Report v1.0, dated 31 July 2019
Document reference EFT-T003-ETR 1.0
Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2
Extended and Part 3 Conformant, April 2017, Version 3.1 Rev 5
Methodology Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, April 2017
Version 3.1 Rev 5
Conformance EAL 2 Augmented with ALC_FLR.1
Developer Cyxtera Technologies, Inc.
Drakegatan 7
412 50 Göteborg
Sweden
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Evaluation facility Teron Labs Pty Ltd
Level 7
221 London Circuit
Canberra, ACT 2601
Australia
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Target of Evaluation
Overview
This chapter contains information about the Target of Evaluation (TOE), including a description of functionality
provided, the scope of evaluation, its security policies and its secure usage.
Description of the TOE
The TOE is Cyxtera AppGate SDP version 4.3.
Cyxtera AppGate SDP provides capabilities to control access of network-based users to network resources in physical,
cloud-based and hybrid environments, using the approach to computer security known as the Software Defined
Perimeter (SDP).
The principle of operation is that Gateways are deployed in front of networked resource (application and server)
infrastructure, effectively making it invisible on the network. A Controller defines access rights for users and devices
(collectively, the Clients) on an individual basis. A Client establishes a secure TLS tunnel to the Controller, which
authenticates the user. This process is based on verifying user claims within each session—including device posture and
identity—before issuing Entitlement tokens to the user. The Client passes the issued Entitlement tokens on to the
Gateways, which provision a firewall instance just for that user. The Gateway then translates the Entitlements into a set
of individualized firewall rules. For each packet received from the Client, the correct rules allow, conditionally allow or
block access to the network resources protected by the Gateway.
TOE Functionality
The TOE functionality that was evaluated is described in section 2 of the Security Target [7].
TOE physical boundary
The TOE physical boundary is described in section 2.3 of the Security Target [7].
TOE Architecture
AppGate SDP comprises an appliance component and a client software component installed on a user’s device, such as
a workstation, laptop, or mobile platform.
The AppGate SDP appliance is a stateless, configurable component that can operate in the following roles:
 Controller—the central point of administration for the AppGate SDP deployment. It includes an internal database
for the storage of system configuration data and provides the following capabilities:
 Certificate Authority (CA) for the deployment
 Creation and signing of tokens used for authentication, authorization, and Policy distribution
 Authentication of administrators logging in via the Admin User Interface (UI) and REST API, and users logging
in via the Client
 Assignment of Policies to users and creation of the list of Entitlements for each user
 Assignment of roles to administrators and enforcement of privileges
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 Gateway—the policy enforcement point, responsible for controlling user access to network resources. The
Gateway uses Claims and Entitlement information from each user to manage firewall rules and provide real-time
access control.
 LogServer—collects logs from the Controllers and Gateways to provide an audit trail of actions and user access. A
LogServer is typically configured on an existing Controller appliance but can also be stand-alone where Controller
performance is critical. Alternatively, log files can be exported using rsyslog to an external log server. Note,
the LogServer role is excluded from the evaluated configuration.
Clarification of scope
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria and associated methodologies.
The scope of the evaluation was limited to those claims made in the Security Target [7].
Non-evaluated functionality and services
Potential users of the TOE are advised that some functions and services have not been evaluated as part of the
evaluation. Potential users of the TOE should carefully consider their requirements for using functions and services
outside of the evaluated configuration.
Australian Government users should refer to the Australian Government Information Security Manual [4] for policy
relating to using an evaluated product in an unevaluated configuration. New Zealand Government users should consult
the New Zealand Information Security Manual [5].
Security
The TOE Security Policy is a set of rules that defines how information within the TOE is managed and protected. The
Security Target [7] contains a summary of the functionality that are evaluated.
Usage
Evaluated configuration
The evaluated configuration is based on the default installation of the TOE with additional configuration implemented
as per operational guidance documentation [6].
Secure delivery
Software delivery procedures
The TOE is exclusively distributed from Cyxtera’s Support portal. The download links are password protected with a
username and password and using an encrypted link
https://sdpdownloads.cyxtera.com/AppGate-SDP-4.3/bin/AppGate-SDP-4.3.1.iso
There is a SHA256 hash which can be found for each released on the support website. Beside the hash method for
ensuring the authenticity of the software, there is a digital signature as well, using GPGv1. The signature and the hash
are checked during the upgrade process to guarantee the integrity of the AppGate SDP downloaded software.
The update images are also downloadable from the Cyxtera support website. When a new release is published, Product
Management sends an e-mail out to our customers to notify them of the new release and the corresponding release
notes, together with highlighted features or critical fixes.
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Installation of the TOE
The operational guidance documentation [6] contains all relevant information for the secure configuration of the TOE.
Version verification
AppGate SDP is distributed software, and it is assumed all software components to run the same version as the scope
for this document.
An overview of the AppGate SDP appliance software versions can be found in the AppGate SDP admin UI, which runs on
any of the controller nodes. The dashboard appliance widget will show a list of all registered appliances and reports
their corresponding version number. Also via console or SSH the command cz-config status (run as sudo user) will show
the version number of the appliance.
The version of the AppGate Client software can be found by clicking on the AppGate SDP icon in the tray menu and click
in the upper right corner the 3 dot’s to open up the menu. About will tell the client version of the software.
Documentation and guidance
The guidance documentation included in the TOE is available on-line at the following URL:
https://sdphelp.cyxtera.com/adminguide/v4.3/introduction.html [6]
The user guide for Clients can be found here:
https://sdphelp.cyxtera.com/userguide/v4.3/ [6]
All Common Criteria guidance material is available at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Australian Government Information Security Manual is available at https://www.cyber.gov.au/ism [4]. The New
Zealand Information Security Manual is available at https://www.gcsb.govt.nz/ [5].
Secure usage
The evaluation of the TOE took into account certain assumptions about its operational environment. These
assumptions must hold in order to ensure the security objectives of the TOE are met:
 There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE and the security of the information
it contains.
 The TOE components critical to security policy enforcement will be protected from unauthorized physical
modification.
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Evaluation
Overview
This chapter contains information about the procedures used in conducting the evaluation, the testing conducted as
part of the evaluation and the certification result.
Evaluation procedures
The criteria against which the Target of Evaluation (TOE) has been evaluated are contained in the Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Revision 5, Parts 2 and 3 [1, 2].
Testing methodology was drawn from Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, April 2017 Version
3.1 Revision 5 [3].
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the operational procedures of the Australasian Information Security
Evaluation Program [10].
In addition, the conditions outlined in the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field
of Information Technology Security were also upheld [9].
Functional testing
To gain confidence that the developer testing was sufficient to ensure the correct operation of the TOE, the evaluators
analysed the evidence of the developer’s testing effort. This analysis included examining the test coverage, test plans
and procedures, and expected and actual results. The evaluators drew upon this evidence to perform a sample of the
developer tests in order to verify that the test results were consistent with those recorded by the developers.
These tests are designed in such a way as to provide a full coverage of testing for all security functions claimed by the
TOE. All Security Functional Requirements listed in the Security Target were exercised during testing.
Penetration testing
A vulnerability analysis of the TOE was conducted in order to identify any obvious vulnerability in the product and to
show that the vulnerabilities were not exploitable in the intended environment of the TOE.
The developer performed a vulnerability analysis of the TOE in order to identify any obvious security vulnerability in the
product, and if identified, to show that the security vulnerabilities were not exploitable in the intended environment of
the TOE. This analysis included a search for possible security vulnerabilities in publicly-available information.
The following factors have been taken into consideration during the penetration tests:
 time taken to identify and exploit (elapsed time)
 specialist technical expertise required (specialist expertise)
 knowledge of the TOE design and operation (knowledge of the TOE)
 window of opportunity
 IT hardware/software or other equipment required for the exploitation.
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Certification
Overview
This chapter contains information about the result of the certification, an overview of the assurance provided and
recommendations made by the certifiers.
Assurance
EAL2 provides assurance by a full security target and an analysis of the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) in that
ST, using a functional and interface specification, guidance documentation and a basic description of the architecture of
the TOE, to understand the security behaviour.
The analysis is supported by independent testing of the TOE Security Functionality (TSF), evidence of developer testing
based on the functional specification, selective independent confirmation of the developer test results, and a
vulnerability analysis (based upon the functional specification, TOE design, security architecture description and
guidance evidence provided) demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with a basic attack potential.
EAL2 also provides assurance through use of a configuration management system and evidence of secure delivery
procedures.
This EAL represents a meaningful increase in assurance from EAL1 by requiring developer testing, a vulnerability
analysis (in addition to the search of the public domain), and independent testing based upon more detailed TOE
specifications.
Certification result
Teron Labs has determined that the TOE upholds the claims made in the Security Target [7] and has met the
requirements of Common Criteria EAL2+ALC_FLR.1.
After due consideration of the conduct of the evaluation as reported to the certifiers, and of the Evaluation Technical
Report [8], the Australasian Certification Authority certifies the evaluation of the Cyxtera AppGate SDP version 4.3
performed by the Australasian Information Security Evaluation Facility, Teron Labs.
Certification is not a guarantee of freedom from security vulnerabilities.
Recommendations
Not all of the evaluated functionality present in the TOE may be suitable for Australian and New Zealand Government
users. For further guidance, Australian Government users should refer to the Australian Government Information
Security Manual [4] and New Zealand Government users should consult the New Zealand Information Security Manual
[5].
Potential purchasers of the TOE should review the intended operational environment and ensure that they are
comfortable that the stated security objectives for the operational environment can be suitably addressed.
In addition to ensuring that the assumptions concerning the operational environment are fulfilled, and the guidance
document is followed, the Australasian Certification Authority also recommends:
 that the TOE is operated in the evaluated configuration and that assumptions concerning the TOE security
environment are understood
 configure and operate the TOE according to the vendor’s product administrator guidance
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 the users should make themselves familiar with the guidance provided with the TOE and pay attention to all
security warnings.
 passwords for all identities should be handled securely. Multi-factor authentication should be considered for all
admin users for additional security.
 the system auditor should review the audit trail generated and exported by the TOE periodically
 the use of SSH for administration of the TOE was out of the scope this evaluation and should be disabled by the
administer after initial configuration and not be used
 the users should verify the integrity of the TOE software prior to installation by comparing the fingerprint of the
downloaded software against the value available from Cyxtera’s support portal.
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Annex A – References and abbreviations
References
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components April
2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components April
2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5
3. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, April 2017,
Version 3.1 Revision 5
4. Australian Government Information Security Manual: https://www.cyber.gov.au/ism
5. New Zealand Information Security Manual: https://www.nzism.gcsb.govt.nz/ism-document/
6. Guidance documentation:
The admin guide (AppGate SDP appliance): https://sdphelp.cyxtera.com/adminguide/v4.3/
The user guide (AppGate SDP client): https://sdphelp.cyxtera.com/userguide/v4.3/
7. Security Target - Cyxtera AppGate SDP,v1.0, dated June 24, 2019
8. Evaluation Technical Report - EFT-T003 ETR v1.0, dated 31 July 2019
9. Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of Information Technology
Security, 2-July-2014
10. AISEP Policy Manual (APM): https://www.cyber.gov.au/publications/aisep-policy-manual
Abbreviations
AISEP Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program
ASD Australian Signals Directorate
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
TOE Target of Evaluation