# Common Criteria

# Certification Report

Pivot3, Inc. vSTAC OS v7.5

383-4-411

8 May 2017

**Version 1.0**

## Foreword

This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security Establishment (CSE). Suggestions for amendments should be forwarded through departmental communications security channels to your Client Services Representative at CSE.

The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility – established under the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme – using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4. This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian CC Scheme, and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by the Communications Security Establishment, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by the Communications Security Establishment, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.

If your department has identified a requirement for this certification report based on business needs and would like more detailed information, please contact:

ITS Client Services   
Telephone: (613) 991-7654   
E-mail: [itsclientservices@cse-cst.gc.ca](mailto:itsclientservices@cse-cst.gc.ca)

Overview

The Canadian Common Criteria Scheme provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Evaluation Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Communications Security Establishment.

A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025:2005, the General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories. Accreditation is performed under the Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories - Canada (PALCAN), administered by the Standards Council of Canada.

The CCEF that carried out this evaluation is CSC Security Testing/Certification Laboratories.

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCEF.

The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted to the Certified Products list (CPL) for the Canadian CC Scheme, and to the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common Criteria Project).

Table of Contents

**Executive Summary	1**

**1	Identification of Target of Evaluation	2**

1.1	Common Criteria Conformance	2

1.2	TOE description	2

1.3	TOE architecture	3

**2	Security policy	4**

**3	Assumptions and Clarifications of Scope	5**

3.1	Usage and Environmental assumptions	5

**4	Evaluated Configuration	6**

4.1	Documentation	6

**5	Evaluation Analysis Activities	7**

5.1	Development	7

5.2	Guidance Documents	7

5.3	Life-cycle Support	7

**6	Testing Activities	8**

6.1	Assessment of Developer Tests	8

6.2	Conduct of Testing	8

6.3	Independent Functional Testing	8

6.4	Independent Penetration Testing	9

**7	Results of the Evaluation	10**

7.1	Recommendations/Comments	10

**8	Supporting Content	11**

8.1	List of Abbreviations	11

8.2	References	13

## 

## List of Figures

Figure 1	TOE Architecture	3

## List of Tables

Table 1	TOE Identification	2

## 

## 

## Executive Summary

Pivot3, Inc. vSTAC OS v7.5 (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from Pivot3, Inc., was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. The results of this evaluation demonstrate that TOE meets the requirements of the conformance claim listed in Table 1 for the evaluated security functionality.

The TOE is a provider of Dynamic Hyperconverged Infrastructure (DHCI) solutions which combine VMware vSphere virtualization technology with a linear-scaling all-flash or hybrid-flash and traditional spinning disk storage array. The system is composed of COTS (Commercial off-the-shelf) enterprise hardware. The hardware is operated from a virtual machine running a heavily customized, Linux-based controller called vSTAC OS (Operating System). vSTAC maintains direct access to the underlying storage, bypassing the virtualization layer, and provides a storage cluster available to virtual machines running on any Pivot3 system (node) within a cluster. Each node contains a VMware ESXi hypervisor on which the VMs execute.

CSC Security Testing/Certification Laboratories is the CCEF that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 08 May 2017 and was carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme.

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements.  Consumers are advised to verify that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.

Communications Security Establishment, as the Certification Body, declares that the TOE evaluation meets all the conditions of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common Criteria Project).

## 1 Identification of Target of Evaluation

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:

- Table 1 **TOE Identification**
| TOE Name and Version   | Pivot3, Inc. vSTAC OS v7.5   |
|------------------------|------------------------------|
| Developer              | Pivot3, Inc.                 |
| Conformance Claim      | EAL 2 + (ALC_FLR.2)          |
### 1.1 Common Criteria Conformance

The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4.

### 1.2 TOE description

The TOE is a provider of Dynamic Hyperconverged Infrastructure (DHCI) solutions which combine VMware vSphere virtualization technology with a linear-scaling all-flash or hybrid-flash and traditional spinning disk storage array. The system is composed of COTS (Commercial off-the-shelf) enterprise hardware. The hardware is operated from a virtual machine running a heavily customized, Linux-based controller called vSTAC OS (Operating System). vSTAC maintains direct access to the underlying storage, bypassing the virtualization layer, and provides a storage cluster available to virtual machines running on any Pivot3 system (node) within a cluster. Each node contains a VMware ESXi hypervisor on which the VMs execute.

### 1.3 TOE architecture

A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:

- Figure 1 **TOE Architecture**
## 2 Security policy

The TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security functional classes:

- Security Audit;
- User Data Protection;
- Identification and Authentication;
- Security Management;
- Protection of the TSF;
- Resource Utilization; and
- Extended High Availability Functionality.

Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST) referenced in section 8.2.

## 3 Assumptions and Clarifications of Scope

Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the product’s installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.

### 3.1 Usage and Environmental assumptions

The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:

- The TOE environment provides a secure repository of users that are authorized to manage the TOE;
- The TOE environment provides the workstation used to manage the TOE that is free of malicious software;
- The physical environment must be suitable for supporting a computing device in a secure setting;
- There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE and the security of the information it contains;
- The TOE environment provides the network infrastructure required for its operation that is appropriately secured and protected from interference or tampering;
- The administrators who manage the TOE are non-hostile, appropriately trained, and follow all guidance;
- The TOE environment provides the hardware and hypervisor necessary for the operation of the TOE; and
- The TOE software will be protected from unauthorized modification.

## 4 Evaluated Configuration

The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:

- The evaluated configuration of the TOE, vSTAC OS v7.5, consists of the following components:
    - Pivot3 vSTAC OS pvt00.7.5.0.073E;
    - Pivot3 vCenter Plugin 7.5.0.1727 ; and
    - Pivot3 USB Key identified by unique serial number.
    ### 4.1 Documentation

The following documents are provided to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:

1. Pivot3 vCenter Plugin 7.5: A vSTAC OS Administration Tool, Document Version 1.0 November 1, 2016.
## 5 Evaluation Analysis Activities

The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE.  Documentation and process dealing with Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.

### 5.1 Development

The evaluators analyzed the TOE functional specification and design documentation; they determined that the design completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces, the TSF subsystems and how the TSF implements the security functional requirements (SFRs). The evaluators analyzed the TOE security architectural description and determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained. The evaluators also independently verified that the correspondence mappings between the design documents are correct.

### 5.2 Guidance Documents

The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance, and determined that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.

Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.

### 5.3 Life-cycle Support

An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.

The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all of the procedures required to maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.

The evaluators reviewed the flaw remediation procedures used by developer for the TOE. During a site visit, the evaluators also examined the evidence generated by adherence to the procedures. The evaluators concluded that the procedures are adequate to track and correct security flaws, and distribute the flaw information and corrections to consumers of the TOE.

## 6 Testing Activities

Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent functional tests, and performing penetration tests.

### 6.1 Assessment of Developer Tests

The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the ETR.

The evaluators analyzed the developer’s test coverage analysis and found it to be complete and accurate. The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer’s test documentation and the functional specification was complete.

### 6.2 Conduct of Testing

The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are documented in a separate Test Results document.

### 6.3 Independent Functional Testing

During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining design and guidance documentation.

All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and results. The following testing activities were performed:

1. Repeat of Developer's Tests:  The evaluator repeated a subset of the developers tests;
2. Erasure Coding Data Verification: The objective of this test goal is to ensure the TOE is capable of operating in various degraded states;
3. Management Roles: The objective of this test goal is to demonstrate the TOE provides or restricts access as specified in the ST; and
4. Audit Verification: The objective of this test goal is to verify that management actions performed through the vCenter Plugin interface will generate the appropriate audit messages.
#### 6.3.1 Functional Test results

The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.

### 6.4 Independent Penetration Testing

Subsequent to the independent review of public domain vulnerability databases and all evaluation deliverables, limited independent evaluator penetration testing was conducted. The penetration tests focused on:

1. Use of automated vulnerability scanning tools to discover potential network, platform and application layer vulnerabilities such as Heartbleed, Shellshock, FREAK, POODLE, and GHOST; and
2. iSCSI traffic sniffing: The objective of this test goal is to verify if a hostile VM Guest sharing hardware access with the TOE can gain access to the TOE.
#### 6.4.1 Penetration Test results

The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating environment.

## 7 Results of the Evaluation

This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Table 1. The overall verdict for the evaluation is **PASS** .  These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.

The IT product identified in this report has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility established under the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4. These evaluation results apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete certification report.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSE or by any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by CSE or by any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, is expressed or implied.

### 7.1 Recommendations/Comments

It is recommended that all guidance outlined in Section 4.1 be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.

## 8 Supporting Content

### 8.1 List of Abbreviations

| Term   | Definition                                             |
|--------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| CAVP   | Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program             |
| CCEF   | Common Criteria Evaluation Facility                    |
| CM     | Configuration Management                               |
| CMVP   | Cryptographic Module Validation Program                |
| COTS   | Commercial off-the-shelf                               |
| CPL    | Certified Products List                                |
| CSE    | Communications Security Establishment                  |
| DHCI   | Dynamic Hyperconverged Infrastructure                  |
| EAL    | Evaluation Assurance Level                             |
| ETR    | Evaluation Technical Report                            |
| F/O    | Failover VM                                            |
| GB     | Gigabit                                                |
| GC     | Government of Canada                                   |
| HDD    | Hard Disk Drive                                        |
| IT     | Information Technology                                 |
| ITS    | Information Technology Security                        |
| ITSET  | Information Technology Security Evaluation and Testing |
| iSCSI  | Internet small computer systems interface              |
| LUN    | Logical Unit                                           |
| OS     | Operating System                                       |
| PALCAN | Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories – Canada |
| PP     | Protection Profile                                     |
| SAN    | Storage Area Network                                   |
| SFR    | Security Functional Requirement                        |
| ST     | Security Target                                        |
| TOE    | Target of Evaluation                                   |
| TSF    | TOE Security Function                                  |
| VM     | Virtual Machine                                        |
|        |                                                        |

### 8.2 References

| Reference                                                                                                                                |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.                                  |
| Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.                          |
| Pivot3, Inc. vSTAC OS v7.5, version 1.3, April 19, 2017 Security Target                                                                  |
| Evaluation Technical Report Pivot3 vSTAC OS pvt00.7.5.0.073E, Pivot3 vCenter Plugin 7.5.0.1727, Pivot3 USB Key, version 1.0, May 8, 2017 |

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

© Government of Canada. This document is the property of the Government of Canada. It shall not be altered, distributed beyond its intended audience, produced, reproduced or published, in whole or in any substantial part thereof, without the express permission of CSE.

| Document Number   | 2   |
|-------------------|-----|

**UNCLASSIFIED**

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**UNCLASSIFIED**