National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
MobileIron
415 East Middlefield Road
Mountain View, CA 94043
MobileIron Platform Version 9.0
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10584-2016
Dated: June 14, 2016
Version: 0.1
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
MobileIron Platform Validation Report Version 0.1, June 14, 2016
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Kenneth Elliott
Meredith Hennan
Luke Florer
Jerome Myers
Kenneth Stutterheim
Aerospace Corporation
Sheldon Durrant
MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Cornelius Haley
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 4
3.2 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 4
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 4
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 5
4.2 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 5
4.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 5
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 6
4.5 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 6
4.6 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 6
4.7 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 6
5 Assumptions................................................................................................................ 7
6 Clarification of Scope ................................................................................................. 7
7 Documentation............................................................................................................ 7
8 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 8
8.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 9
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 9
9 TOE Evaluated Configuration .................................................................................... 9
10 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 10
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE).......................................................... 10
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)............................................................ 11
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................... 11
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ................................... 11
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 11
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 12
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 12
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 12
12 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 13
13 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 13
14 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 13
15 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 13
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of MobileIron Platform solution provided by
MobileIron It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance
results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any
agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and
was completed in June 2016. The information in this report is largely derived from the
proprietary Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by
Gossamer Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common
Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the MobileIron Platform Version 9.0. The product is
composed of MobileIron Core and the MobileIron Client also known as Mobile@Work for
Android, Version 8.6. The MobileIron Core defines security and management policies for
mobile apps, content and devices independent of the mobile device operating system.
MobileIron Client automatically configures the device to function in an enterprise
environment by enforcing the configuration and security policies set by the IT department.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). This Validation Report applies only to the
specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results
are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the MobileIron
Platform (MDMPP20/MDMAEP20) Security Target, Version 1.0, May 27, 2016 and
analysis performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this
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program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products against
Protection Profile containing Assurance Activities that are interpretation of Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) work units specific to the technology described by the PP
and in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP)
accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation.
Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated
Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE: MobileIron Platform Version 9.0
Protection Profile
(Specific models identified in Section 3.1)
Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management, Version 2.0, 31 December
2014 (MDMPP20)
Extended Package for Mobile Device Management Agents, Version 2.0, 31
December 2014 (MDMAEP20)
ST: MobileIron Platform (MDMPP20/MDMAEP20) Security Target, Version 1.0,
May 27, 2016
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for MobileIron Platform, Version 1.0, May 27, 2016.
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor MobileIron
Developer MobileIron
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
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Item Identifier
CCEVS Validators Kenneth Elliott, Luke Florer, Meredith Hennan, Jerome Myers, Kenneth
Stutterheim, The Aerospace Corporation
Sheldon Durrant, MITRE Corporation
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) the MobileIron Core server and associated MobileIron
Client (also referred to as Mobile@Work) agents for Android devices, both of which are
part of their MobileIron Platform. Note that the MobileIron Platform consists of other
components (MobileIron Sentry and additional mobile device applications, e.g.,
Web@work, Docs@work, AppConnect container and Secure Application Manager) that do
not play a role in enforcing the security functions included in the MobileIron Platform
(MDMPP20/MDMAEP20) Security Target and were not evaluated.
The TOE is an MDM solution where the claimed security functions are implemented in a
central MDM server – MobileIron Core - and distributed MDM agents – MobileIron
Client.
MobileIron Core (http://www.mobileiron.com/en/products/core) integrates with backend
enterprise IT systems and enables IT to define security and management policies for mobile
apps, content and devices independent of the operating system. MobileIron Core enables
mobile device, application, and content management.
 Mobile device management capabilities are the primary focus of this evaluation and
enable IT to securely manage mobile devices across mobile operating systems and
provide secure corporate email, automatic device configuration, certificate-based
security, and selective wiping of enterprise data from both corporate-owned as well
as user-owned devices.
 Mobile application management capabilities are a secondary focus of this
evaluation and help IT manage the entire application lifecycle, from making the
applications available in the enterprise app storefront, facilitating deployment of
applications to mobile devices, and retiring applications as necessary. Note that this
capability is referred to as MAS – Mobile Application Store – Server in the Security
Target.
 Mobile content management functions are included in the MobileIron Platform, but
no claims are made about those capabilities in the Security Target.
MobileIron Client (http://www.mobileiron.com/en/products/client) – also known as
Mobile@Work – is an app downloaded by end users onto their mobile devices. It
automatically configures the device to function in an enterprise environment by enforcing
the configuration and security policies set by the IT department. Once installed, it creates a
secure MobileIron container to protect enterprise data and applications.
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 The MobileIron Client works with MobileIron Core to configure corporate email,
Wi-Fi, VPN, and security certificates and to create a clear separation between
personal and business information. This allows IT to selectively wipe only the
corporate data on the device if the user leaves the company, if the device falls out of
compliance, or is lost.
 The MobileIron Client also enables additional enterprise device controls that are not
subject to security claims and hence are outside the scope of the evaluation related
to the Security Target.
3.1 TOE Architecture
MobileIron offers a MobileIron Platform solution comprised of MobileIron Core,
MobileIron Sentry, MobileIron Client, and mobile end user products (e.g., smartphones).
Of these components, the TOE is a central MobileIron Core server and MobileIron Clients
installed on distributed end user mobile Android devices. MobileIron Sentry is another
security product not within scope of this evaluation (i.e., the MDMPP20 requirements are
not applicable), but can freely be used with the TOE in its evaluated configuration.
3.2 Physical Boundaries
The TOE consists of two software components: MobileIron Core and MobileIron Client.
MobileIron Core is a server that is deployed on a CentOS 6.7 Linux operating system (OS)
that runs on an Intel x64 architecture server platform. MobileIron supports the MobileIron
Core operating on one of three physical server appliances: Mobile Iron M2100, M2200, or
M2500, as well as virtual deployments in VMWare ESXi (5.1, 5.5, or 6.0) and Microsoft
Hyper-V (Server 2008 R2 or Server 2012 R2).
The Mobile Iron appliances are all based on Intel Xeon CPUs (E3-1200 or E5-2670) and
utilize Intel network adapters (82579LM GbE, 82574L GbE, or Quad I350 GbE) along
with SATA disk drives and DRAM from 32-64 GB. Virtual deployments must use a 64-bit
x86 virtual machine and an E1000 network adapter. The vendor recommends at least 8 Gb
RAM and 80 Gb storage.
MobileIron Client consists of apps deployed on Android mobile devices. There are a
number of evaluated Samsung Galaxy mobile Android devices (including Galaxy S4,
Galaxy Note 3, Galaxy S5, Galaxy Note 4, and Galaxy S6 models) ranging from Android
version 4.4 to 5.0.2 that can be used with the Android version of the MobileIron Client.
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security Management
5. Protection of the TSF
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6. TOE access
7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The MDM Server can generate and store audit records for security-relevant events as they
occur. These events are stored and protected by the MDM Server and can be reviewed by
an authorized administrator. The MDM Server can be configured to export the audit
records in either in CSV (comma separated values) format, text format, or a compressed
archive format utilizing TLS for protection of the records on the network. The MDM
Server also supports the ability to query information about MDM agents and export MDM
configuration information.
The MDM Agent includes the ability to indicate (i.e., respond) when it has been enrolled
and when policies are applied to the MDM Agent. The MDM Server can be configured to
alert an administrator based on its configuration. For example, it can be configured to alert
the administrator when a policy update fails or an MDM Agent has been enrolled.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The MDM Server and MDM Agent both include and/or utilize cryptographic modules or
libraries with National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP)
Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) validated algorithms for a wide
range of cryptographic functions including: asymmetric key generation and establishment,
encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing and keyed-hash message authentication.
These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation, initialization vector
generation, secure key storage, and key and protected data destruction.
The primitive cryptographic functions are used to implement security communication
protocols: TLS, HTTPS, and SSH used for communication between the MDM Server and
MDM Agent and between the MDM Server and remote administrators.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The MDM Server requires mobile device users (MD users) and administrators to be
authenticated prior to allowing any security-related functions to be performed. This
includes MD users enrolling their device in the MDM Server using a corresponding MDM
Agent as well as an administrator logging on to manage the MDM Server configuration,
MDM policies for mobile devices, etc.
In addition, both the MDM Server and MDM Agent utilize X.509 certificates, including
certificate validation checking, in conjunction with TLS to secure communications between
the MDM Server and MDM Agents as well as between the MDM Server and
administrators using a web-based user interface for remote administrative access.
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4.4 Security management
The MDM Server is designed to include at least two distinct user roles: administrator and
mobile device user (MD user). The former interacts directly with the MDM Server while
the latter is the user of a mobile device hosting an MDM Agent. The MDM Server further
supports the fine-grain assignment of role (access to management function) to defined users
allowing the definition of multiple user and administrator roles with different capabilities
and responsibilities.
The MDM Server provides the functionality necessary to manage its own security
functions as well as to manage mobile device policies that are sent to MDM Agents. In
addition, the MDM Server ensures that security management functions are limited to
authorized administrators while allowing MD users to perform only necessary functions
such as enrolling in the MDM Server.
The MDM Agents provide the functions necessary to securely communicate with and
enroll in a MDM Server, implement policies received from and enrolled MDM Server, and
report the results of applying policies.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The MDM Server and MDM Agent work together to ensure that all security related
communication between those components is protected from disclosure and modification.
Both the MDM Server and MDM Agent include self-testing capabilities to ensure that they
are functioning properly. The MDM Server also has the ability to cryptographically verify
during start-up that its executable image has not been corrupted.
The MDM Server also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of
each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will
not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.
4.6 TOE access
The MDM Server has the capability to display an advisory banner when users attempt to
login in order to manage the TOE using the web-based and command-line based user
interfaces.
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The MDM Server uses TLS/HTTPS to secure communication channels between itself and
remote administrators accessing the TOE via a web-based user interface. In addition, the
MDM Server implements a restricted shell (CLISH) that is accessible via SSH to provide
access to low level management functions.
It also uses TLS to secure communication channels between itself and mobile device users
(MD users). In this latter case, the protected communication channel is established between
the MDM Server and applicable MDM Agent on the user’s mobile device.
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5 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
 Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management, Version 2.0, 31 December 2014
(MDMPP20) with the following extended package:
 Extended Package for Mobile Device Management Agents, Version 2.0, 31
December (MDMAEP20)
That information has not been reproduced here and the MDMPP20 and MDMAEP20
should be consulted if there is interest in that material.
6 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and
clarifications of this evaluation.
Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the Mobile Device Management Protection Profile and
Extended Package for Mobile Device Management Agents and performed by the
evaluation team).
 This evaluation covers only the specific software components as identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the MDMPP20, MDMAEP20, and applicable Technical
Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were
not covered by this evaluation.
7 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
 MobileIron® MobileIron Core and Android Client Mobile Device Management
Protection Profile Guide, Document version 1.2, May 4, 2016
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 MobileIron® On-Premise Installation Guide For MobileIron Core, Sentry, and
Enterprise Connector, Core Version 9.0, Revised March 21, 2016
 MobileIron Core 9.0.0.0 Upgrade Guide, March 29, 2016.
 MobileIron® Core Device Management Guide For Android Devices, Core 9.0,
Revision March 21, 2016
 MobileIron® Apps@Work Guide, MobileIron Core version 9.0, February 29, 2016
 MobileIron® Core System Manager Guide, Core version 9.0, February 26, 2016
 MobileIron® Core Command Line Interface (CLI) Reference, Core Version 9.0,
February 26, 2016
 MobileIron® Core Delegated Administration, Version 9.0, February 26, 2016
Any additional customer documentation delivered with the product or available through
download was not included in the scope of the evaluation and hence should not be relied
upon when using the products as evaluated.
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the Detailed Test Report (MDMPP20/MDMAEP20)
for MobileIron Platform, version 0.3, May 27, 2016, and summarized in the Assurance
Activity Report (MDMPP20/MDMAEP20) For MobileIron Platform, version 0.3, May 27,
2016 (AAR), which is publically available.
The following diagram depicts the test environments used by the evaluators.
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Figure 1 Test Setup
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to the documents provided with the
product as listed above, and performed the tests specified in the MDMPP20 and
MDMAEP20 including the tests associated with optional requirements.
9 TOE Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the following series and models:
 MobileIron Core, Version 9.0
o Deployed on a CentOS 6.7 Linux operating system (OS) that runs on an
Intel x64 architecture server platform
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o Operating on one of three physical server appliances Mobile Iron M2100,
M2200, or M2500. The Mobile Iron appliances are all based on Intel Xeon
CPUs (E3-1200 or E5-2670) and utilize Intel network adapters (82579LM
GbE, 82574L GbE, or Quad I350 GbE) along with SATA disk drives and
DRAM from 32-64 GB
o Virtual deployments in VMWare ESXi (5.1, 5.5, or 6.0) and Microsoft
Hyper-V (Server 2008 R2 or Server 2012 R2)
 MobileIron Client – Mobile@Work for Android, Version 8.6
o NIAP requires that MDM agents be installed on NIAP-evaluated mobile
devices. At present there are evaluated Samsung Galaxy mobile Android
devices including Galaxy S4, Galaxy Note 3, Galaxy S5, Galaxy Note 4,
and Galaxy S6 models ranging from Android version 4.4 to 5.0.2 that can be
used with the Android version of the MobileIron Client.
 To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured
as specified in the accompanying MobileIron® MobileIron Core and Android
Client Mobile Device Management Protection Profile Guide, Document version
1.2, May 4, 2016
10 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to
the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon
CC version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the
MobileIron Platform TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet all applicable assurance
requirements outlined by the MDMPP20 and MDMAEP20.
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the MobileIron Platform Version 9.0
products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function
descriptions that support the requirements.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
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10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team assessed the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in
understanding how the TSF provides the security functions. The design documentation
consists of a functional specification contained in the Security target and Guidance
documents. Additionally the evaluator performed the assurance activities specified in the
MDMPP20 and MDMAEP20 related to the examination of the information contained in
the TSS.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use
the operational TOE. Additionally, the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the
administrator guidance in describing how to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides
were assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were
complete.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team found that the TOE was identified.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team ran the set of tests specified by the assurance activities in the
MDMPP20 and MDMAEP20 and recorded the results in an evaluation sensitive
proprietary Test Report; those results are summarized in the Assurance Activities Report.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
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10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
proprietary Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability
analysis includes a public search for vulnerabilities including the following terms:
MobileIron, Mobile@work, Crypt-J, OpenSSH, OpenSSL, and CentOS 6. The public
search for vulnerabilities and did not discover any public issues with the TOE.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) with the following search terms: "MobileIron",
"Mobile@work", "Crypt-J", "OpenSSH", "OpenSSL", and "CentOS 6".
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validators suggest that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated
configuration of the device(s). The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the
security functional requirements specified in the Security Target, and only the functionality
implemented by the SFR’s within the Security Target was evaluated.
All other functionality provided by the MobileIron Platform, to include software that was
not part of the evaluated configuration, needs to be assessed separately and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness. Specifically, MobileIron Sentry and
additional mobile device applications, e.g., Web@work, Docs@work, AppConnect
container and Secure Application Manager are not covered by the evaluation, nor are
applications that may be provided with the Android mobile platforms.
Additionally, the validators advise that administrators carefully review and understand the
audit process and actions required to establish and maintain audit as the TOE includes
several repositories for audit data, and the export of each is accomplished separately.
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12 Annexes
Not applicable.
13 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: MobileIron Platform (MDMPP20/MDMAEP20)
Security Target, Version 1.0, May 27, 2016.
14 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims
made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common
Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is
complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor
or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or
an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
15 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
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[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2102.
[4] Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management, Version 2.0, 31 December 2014
[5] Extended Package for Mobile Device Management Agents, Version 2.0, 31
December 2014
[6] MobileIron Platform (MDMPP20/MDMAEP20) Security Target, Version 1.0, May
27, 2016 (ST)
[7] Assurance Activity Report (MDMPP20/MDMAEP20) for MobileIron Platform,
version 0.3, May 27, 2016 (AAR)
[8] Detailed Test Report (MDMPP20/MDMAEP20) for MobileIron Platform, version
0.3, May 27, 2016 (DTR)