National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Boeing Secure Network Server (SNS-3010, SNS-3110,
and SNS-3210)
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10292-2011
Dated: 18 April 2011
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Ken Elliott
Aerospace Corporation
Shaun Gilmore
NIAP CCEVS
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Science Applications International Corporation
Columbia, Maryland
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 3
3.1 Security Audit..................................................................................................... 4
3.2 User Data Protection........................................................................................... 4
3.3 Identification and Authentication ....................................................................... 4
3.4 Security Management ......................................................................................... 4
3.5 Protection of the TOE Security Functions.......................................................... 4
4 Security Environment ................................................................................................. 5
4.1 Threats................................................................................................................. 5
4.2 Assumptions........................................................................................................ 5
4.3 Security Objectives for the TOE......................................................................... 5
4.4 Security Objectives for the Environment............................................................ 6
5 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 6
6 Documentation.......................................................................................................... 10
7 IT Product Testing .................................................................................................... 11
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................. 11
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................. 11
7.3 Highly Resistant Vulnerability Analysis .......................................................... 11
8 Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 12
9 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 12
9.1 Evaluation of the Configuration Management Capabilities (ACM)................. 12
9.2 Evaluation of the Delivery and Operation Documents (ADO)......................... 13
9.3 Evaluation of the Development (ADV) ............................................................ 13
9.4 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................... 14
9.5 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ................................... 14
9.6 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 14
9.7 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (AVA)....................................................... 15
9.8 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 15
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 15
11 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 16
12 National and International Interpretations and Precedent Decisions........................ 16
13 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 16
14 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 16
15 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 17
[1] Boeing Secure Network Server (SNS-3010, SNS-3110, and SNS-3210) Security
Target, Version 2.5, 2/3/11. .............................................................................................. 17
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC), Version
2.3, August 2005 (aligned with ISO/IEC 15408). ............................................................ 17
[3] Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security – Part 1:
Introduction and general model, dated 1 November 1998, version 0.6............................ 17
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[4] Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security – Part 2:
Evaluation Methodology, dated August 2005, version 2.3............................................... 17
[5] Evaluation Technical Report for Boeing Secure Network Server (SNS-3010,
SNS-3110, and SNS-3210) EAL 5 Evaluation Part II version 1.0, February 6, 2007...... 17
[6] NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme for IT Security,
Guidance to Common Criteria Testing Laboratories, Version 1.0, March 20, 2001........ 17
1
1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Boeing Secure Network Server (SNS-3010,
SNS-3110, and SNS-3210) (henceforth referred to as SNS). It presents the evaluation
results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an
endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no
warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Science Applications International Corporation
(SAIC) Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, Maryland, United
States of America, and was completed in May 2007. The information in this report is
largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all
written by SAIC. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria
version 2.3, Part 2 Conformant and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance
requirements of EAL 5 augmented with ACM_AUT.2, ACM_CAP.5, ADO_DEL.3,
ADV_HLD.4, ADV_IMP.3, ADV_INT.3, ADV_LLD.2, ADV_RCR.3, ALC_DVS.2,
ALC_FLR.2, ALC_LCD.3, ALC_TAT.3, ATE_COV.3, ATE_DPT.3, ATE_FUN.2,
AVA_CCA.2, and AVA_MSU.3.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Boeing Secure Network Server (SNS), versions 3010,
3110, and 3210. Each version of the TOE utilizes the same software and bios; the primary
differences being physical. The 3010 version includes a 4U rack-mountable chassis and the
3210 version includes a 2U rack-mountable chassis. The 3110 version includes a 2U flight-
worthy chassis that, unlike the other two versions, utilizes a solid-state hard drive. It is
capable of controlling information flows based on information in packet headers, packet
contents, and security labels associated with packets and the subscribers. Each subscriber is
configured with a sensitivity label range that limits (via Mandatory Access Controls
(MAC)) the labels that can be associated with information that can come from or go to a
given subscriber. In addition to MAC, the SNS can be configured to limit the flow of
information based on packet attributes (e.g., addresses), contents, and other datagram
characteristics as well as to constrain the flow of information to mitigate the potential for
covert channels. The information flow policies are managed by defined administrators that
can manage subscriber devices and the policy rules to affect an information flow policy
suitable for their specific application.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 1.0) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 2.3). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with
the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with
the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, observed evaluation
testing activities, provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and
reviewed the individual work units and successive versions of the ETR. The validation
2
team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the functional
requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Therefore the
validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are accurate, the
conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the
testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
produced.
The SAIC evaluation team concluded that the Common Criteria requirements for EAL 5
augmented with ACM_AUT.2, ACM_CAP.5, ADO_DEL.3, ADV_HLD.4, ADV_IMP.3,
ADV_INT.3, ADV_LLD.2, ADV_RCR.3, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.2, ALC_LCD.3,
ALC_TAT.3, ATE_COV.3, ATE_DPT.3, ATE_FUN.2, AVA_CCA.2, and AVA_MSU.3
have been met. The Embedded OS Team in the Operating Systems and Embedded
Technology Division and the Enterprise Application Division at NSA augmented the
evaluation by performing an examination of evidence, vulnerability analysis, and
penetration testing for the requirements in AVA_CCA.2 and AVA_VLA.3.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) for EAL 1 through 4 in accordance with National
Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation.
Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated
Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
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Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluated Product:
TOE Identification:
Boeing Secure Network Server (SNS-3010, SNS-3110, and SNS-3210)
Boeing SNS-3010, SNS-3110, SNS-3210
Boeing SNS Custom Transaction Kernel
Secure Network Server COTS Hardware
Custom BIOS
Sponsor &
Developer:
Common Criteria
Testing Lab
(CCTL):
Validation Team:
Protection Profile:
The Boeing Company
P.O. Box 3999, M/S 88-12
Seattle, Washington 98124-2499
Science Applications International Corporation,
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
7125 Columbia Gateway Drive, Suite 300
Columbia, MD 21046
Ken Elliott, Aerospace Corporation
Shaun Gilmore, NIAP CCEVS
None
ST Title: Boeing Secure Network Server (SNS-3010, SNS-3110 and SNS-3210)
Security Target, Version 2.5, 2/3/2011
CC Version:
Conformance
Claims:
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version
2.3, August 2005
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2
conformant
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3
conformant
Assurance Level: EAL 5 augmented with ACM_AUT.2, ACM_CAP.5, ADO_DEL.3,
ADV_HLD.4, ADV_IMP.3, ADV_INT.3, ADV_LLD.2, ADV_RCR.3,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.2, ALC_LCD.3, ALC_TAT.3, ATE_COV.3,
ATE_DPT.3, ATE_FUN.2, AVA_CCA.2, and AVA_MSU.3
3 Security Policy
The Security Functional Policies (SFPs) implemented by Boeing SNS are based upon the
basic set of security policies that include policies that permit protection of user data,
provide for authenticated user access, provide accountability for actions, and protect the
mechanism that provides the security policies.
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Note: Much of the description of the Boeing SNS security policy has been extracted and
reworked from the Boeing SNS Security Target.
3.1 Security Audit
The Boeing SNS generates audit events for security relevant events, including covert
channel indicators. The audit events are stored and protected, and forwarded to the NM for
review and archival purposes. The SNS sends warning when the audit storage capacity is
nearing or has exceeded its capacity and it can be configured to automatically overwrite
events or to stop operations altogether until the situation is remedied.
3.2 User Data Protection
The Boeing SNS is designed primarily to control the flow of information between
subscriber devices. It enforces a rich set of information flow policies including mandatory
access controls based on subscriber sensitivity labels, packet filtering, and content filtering.
It also provides routing and processing functionality to offer static routing, multicast
support, and ICMP.
3.3 Identification and Authentication
While all users (administrators) and subscriber devices are identified by the SNS, it also
requires that administrators are authenticated at an appropriate management console prior
to offering management functions. This is accomplished by managing user definitions,
including user identities, roles, and associated authentication data (i.e., passwords).
In order to help mitigate attempts to bypass the authentication mechanisms, the Boeing
SNS informs users each time they log in of the last time they successfully logged in, the
number of unsuccessful logins that have occurred since the last successful login, and the
time of the last unsuccessful login attempt.
3.4 Security Management
The Boeing SNS offers command line interfaces for the management of the TOE Security
Functions. There are three defined roles: Network Administrator (NA), Security
Administrator (SA), and Super-SA. The Super-SA primarily manages the administrator
accounts, the SA primarily manages the security functions, and the NA primarily manages
the general operational capabilities of the TOE. Each administrator must log into the
appropriate console before applicable functions can be accessed.
3.5 Protection of the TOE Security Functions
The Boeing SNS is designed around a custom operating kernel that makes use of the ring
architecture offered by Intel Pentium 4 processors to protect itself and to separate itself to
implement a least privilege principle. All traffic flowing through the TOE is subject to its
5
security policies. Furthermore, the TOE includes self tests that run at initial start-up and
also periodically when the TOE is operational. The TOE also includes failure detection and
recovery features to ensure that it continues to operate correctly when recoverable failures
occur and to ensure that it shuts down when necessary when manual recovery becomes
necessary.
The Boeing SNS is designed so that a given part of a distributed SNS system can continue
to operate properly when some other system components (i.e., other SNSs) fail. It is also
designed to limit the throughput of a given device to protect itself and other network
components as may be necessary.
4 Security Environment
4.1 Threats
T.AUDIT Attempts to violate TOE security policies may go undetected or users may not be accountable for
security-relevant actions they perform.
T.FILTER Inappropriate network traffic may enter or leave a protected network.
T.I&A Unauthorized users may be able to inappropriately configure the TOE or access sensitive TOE
data.
T.MAC Classified information may be inappropriately accessed by entities that do not have appropriate
clearances.
T.OPERATE The TOE may fail to provide or enforce its security functions due to failure or malicious attacks
against its security mechanisms.
4.2 Assumptions
A.ADMIN The TOE administrators are competent, adhere to the applicable guidance, and are not willfully
negligent or malicious.
A.COMMS The TOE is able to communicate with its attached subscriber devices.
A.FLOW Protected information does not flow among the network subscribers unless it passes through the
TOE.
A.PHYSEC The TOE is physically secure; specifically it, including the communication media among distributed
parts of the TOE, is protected from physical tampering of itself or its physical connections to its
environment (subscriber devices).
A.SUBSCRIBE A process outside the scope or control of the TOE is used to determine the attributes (e.g.,
sensitivity ranges) of attached subscriber devices.
4.3 Security Objectives for the TOE
The security requirements enforced by the TOE were designed based on the following
overarching security policies:
O.AUDLOS The TSF shall be configurable to limit the potential loss of audit information.
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O.AUDREC The TOE shall provide a means to record an audit trail of security-related events, with accurate
dates and times.
O.AUDREV The TSF shall protect the audit trail so that only an authorized administrator can access the audit
trail.
O.AUDTHR The TSF shall allow audit thresholds to be defined that will trigger alarms when attempted policy
violations exceed the defined thresholds.
O.FILTER1 The TOE shall allow (only) an authorized administrator to explicitly define information filtering rules.
O.FILTER2 The TOE shall restrict the flow of information among subscriber devices based on filtering rules
based on information headers and content established by the authorized administrator.
O.IDAUTH The TOE shall uniquely identify and authenticate the claimed identity of all administrators before
granting access to TOE functions related to the assumed administrator role.
O.IMPEXP The TOE shall import and export labeled and unlabelled data according to the sensitivity labels
associated with attached subscriber devices.
O.MAC1 The TOE shall allow (only) an authorized administrator to assign sensitivity labels to subscriber
devices.
O.MAC2 The TOE shall restrict the flow of information between attached subscriber devices so that
information from one subscriber can be sent to another subscriber only if the sensitivity level of the
information is within the range of sensitivity labels the receiving subscriber device is allowed to
process.
O.PROTECT The TOE shall ensure that its functions are always invoked and that it is resistant to potential
attacks against its security functions.
O.RECOVER The TOE shall secure and be able to recover from failure conditions and will continue to operate
when possible.
O.SELFTEST The TOE shall test its own operation in order to detect potential failures.
4.4 Security Objectives for the Environment
OE.ADMIN The TOE administrators will be competent, adhere to the applicable guidance, and will not be
willfully negligent or malicious.
OE.COMMS The TOE will be able to communicate with its attached subscriber devices.
OE.FLOW Protected information does not flow among the network subscribers unless it passes through the
TOE.
OE.PHYSEC The TOE, and the communication media among distributed parts of the TOE, will be physically
protected from physical tampering of itself or its physical connections to its environment.
OE.SUBSCRIBE A process outside the scope or control of the TOE will be used to determine the attributes (i.e.,
sensitivity ranges) of attached subscriber devices.
5 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
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The Boeing SNS is a network appliance running on a custom kernel that runs on COTS
hardware (with a custom BIOS) based on the Intel Pentium 4 processor. The SNS utilizes
the Intel Pentium 4 ring architecture to separate its own functions resulting in a well-
layered design that implements a least privilege principle. Each appliance supports serial
devices (management consoles) and network devices (subscriber devices).
The TOE consists of hardware and firmware, composing one or more Boeing SNS
appliances with one acting as a Network Management (NM) appliance. The distributed
TOE components are always synchronized with the NM and are managed from the central
NM appliance. Also, the connections among the distributed TOE components must be
distinct from the connections to the subscriber devices since the entire connection media
must be protected to protect sensitive TOE communications. The TOE boundary is
everything inside the NTCB as shown in Figure 2.
Physically, there may be three consoles (connected via serial ports): utility, SA, and NA.
Alternately, a single console (or attached keyboard and monitor) can be configured with
control keys used to logically switch between three consoles. The other important
interfaces are a dedicated Ethernet port for SNS-to-SNS communication and additional
Ethernet ports to the subscriber devices outside the TOE. The consoles offer management
functions and the subscriber interfaces internal to the TOE offer controlled information
flow among the attached subscriber devices outside the TOE. Figure 1 shows a sample SNS
configuration. Figure 2 shows the major architectural components and the TOE boundary.
8
EAL-3 Workstation
Network
Management
Node
EAL-7
Network
EAL-3 Host
Computer
Secure
Network
Server
Secure
Network
Server
Secure
Network
Server
EAL-7 Host
Computer
Multilevel CIPSO Labeling
IP Host Interface
Single-level IP Host Interface
SA Console
NA Console
UTY Console
EAL-3
Network
Secure
Network
Server
Secure
Network
Server
Secure
Network
Server
Multilevel CIPSO Labeling
IP Router Interface
Single-level IP Router
Interface
Figure 1 Sample SNS Configuration
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SNS Virtual
Processor
SNS
Management
Exec
Monitor
Secure Network Server (SNS)
802.3 Cat 5 Trunk
NTCB Operating System Software
NTCB Application Software
Non-NTCB Software
Executive
I/O System
File System
TCP Gates
Audit/Monitor Gates
Audit
Manager
Utility
Manager
SNS
Manager
NA
Manager
SA
Manager
Peripheral
Manager
IP
IP Virtual Processor
Network
Interface
SA
Console
NA
Console
Utility
Console
Network
DVD
NM Virtual Processor
SCSI Virtual
Processor
Proxy
Proxy
Proxy
Proxy
Filter
Filter
Web Server File Mover
Figure 2 System Components
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6 Documentation
The following documentation was used as evidence for the evaluation of the Boeing SNS:1
Assurance
Class
Document Title
ASE  Boeing Secure Network Server (SNS-3010, SNS-3110, and SNS-3210)
Security Target, Version 2.5, 2/3/2011
ACM  Boeing SNS Configuration Management Plan, D658-10972-1
 Rating Maintenance Plan, D658-10971-1
 Boeing SNS Configuration Item List SNS-3010/3110,/3210, 900-18729
 Indentured System List, Secure Network Server, 900-18724
ADO  Boeing SNS Operation and Maintenance Manual, SNS – 3010/3110,/3210,
D658-10984-1
 Trusted Facility Manual, SNS – 3010/3110,/3210, D658-10974-1
ADV  Formal Specification, Multilevel Secure Local Area Network, D658-10983-1
 Interface Design Description Document, SNS – 3010/3110,/3210, D658-
10988-1
 Secure Network Server Security Design Concepts, D658-10976-1
 SNS–3x10 Requirements Mappings for ADV FSP.2, version 1, November 1,
2006
 Hardware Requirements Specification, SNS – 3010/3110/3210, D658-
10975-1
 Boeing SNS Source Code
AGD  Boeing SNS Trusted Facility Manual, SNS – 3010/3110/3210, D658-10974-
1
 Security Features User’s Guide, SNS – 3010/3110/3210, D658-10973-1
ALC  Boeing SNS Lifecycle Model, SNS – 3010/3110/3210, D658-10991-1
 Boeing SNS Development Environment Protection, SNS – 3010/3110/3210,
D658-10989-1
 Boeing Configuration Management Plan, D658-10972-1
 SNS Life-Cycle Definition, Version 1.0, December 9, 2006
 Trusted Facility Manual, SNS – 3010/3110/3210, D658-10974-1
ATE  Boeing SNS Test Plan, SNS – 3010/3110/3210, D658-10977-1
 Boeing SNS Test Procedures, SNS – 3010/3110/3210, D658-10978-1
 Boeing SNS Test Coverage and Depth Analysis
 Test Report, SNS – 3010/3110/3210, D658-10979-1
 Actual Test Results
AVA  Boeing SNS Penetration Test Plan, Section 4, Vulnerability Analysis
 Boeing SNS Covert Channel Analysis
 Misuse Analysis, SNS-3010/3110/3210, D658-10992-1
 Strength of Function Analysis, SNS – 3010/3110/3210, D658-10990-1
 Pen Test Plan/Report, SNS – 3010/3110/3020 EAL 5, D658-10980-2
1
This documentation list is based on the list provided in the Evaluation Technical Report, Part 1, developed
by SAIC.
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7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the Evaluation Team Test Plan for the Boeing SNS
Product, Version 1.0, 8 January 2007.
7.1 Developer Testing
At EAL 5, testing must demonstrate correspondence between the tests and the functional
specification and high level design. The vendor testing was extensive and covered all of the
security functions identified in the ST and interfaces identified in the design. These security
functions include:
 Identification and Authentication
 User Data Protection
 Security Audit
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
The developer also performed a vulnerability analysis of the product. Boeing performed a
search of all public domain sources for known vulnerabilities and performed a flaw
hypothesis strategy to identify potential product vulnerabilities. No residual vulnerabilities
remain in the product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified that the TOE was installed as is specified in the secure
installation procedures, reran all developer tests and verified the results, then developed
and performed functional and vulnerability testing that augmented the vendor testing by
exercising different aspects of the security functionality. The team performed twelve team
tests that addressed audit, user data protection, identification and authentication, security
management, and resource utilization. In addition to team testing, the evaluation team
performed seven penetration tests focused around self-protection, network interface attacks,
and password attacks.
7.3 Highly Resistant Vulnerability Analysis
Evaluation team testing at NSA was completed in November 2010. Using the results of the
evaluation by the CCTL evaluation team, the NSA evaluation team installed the TOE
evaluated configuration and conducted AVA_CCA.2 and AVA_VLA.3 vulnerability
testing. The NSA team utilized the same category of tools used by the CCTL for
penetration testing, as well as in-house developed tools, which enabled the team to
determine that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker
possessing a high attack potential.
12
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration, as defined in the Security Target, is Boeing Secure Network
Server (SNS-3010, SNS-3110, and SNS-3210). The product must be installed in its
evaluated configuration identified in:
 Operation and Maintenance Manual, SNS – 3010/3110/3210, Document Number
D658-10984-1
 Trusted Facility Manual, SNS – 3010/3110/3210, Document number D658-10974-1
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
EAL 5 augmented with ACM_AUT.2, ACM_CAP.5, ADO_DEL.3, ADV_HLD.4,
ADV_IMP.3, ADV_INT.3, ADV_LLD.2, ADV_RCR.3, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.2,
ALC_LCD.3, ALC_TAT.3, ATE_COV.3, ATE_DPT.3, ATE_FUN.2, AVA_CCA.2, and
AVA_MSU.3 work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to
the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon
CC version 2.3] and CEM version 1.0 [5], [6]. The evaluation determined the Boeing SNS
TOE to be Part 2 conformant and to meet the Part 3 EAL 5 augmented with ACM_AUT.2,
ACM_CAP.5, ADO_DEL.3, ADV_HLD.4, ADV_IMP.3, ADV_INT.3, ADV_LLD.2,
ADV_RCR.3, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.2, ALC_LCD.3, ALC_TAT.3, ATE_COV.3,
ATE_DPT.3, ATE_FUN.2, AVA_CCA.2, and AVA_MSU.3.
Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Boeing SNS product that are consistent
with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the
requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.1 Evaluation of the Configuration Management Capabilities (ACM)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 5 ACM CEM work unit. The ACM evaluation
ensured the TOE is identified such that the consumer is able to identify the evaluated TOE.
The evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the procedures used by the developer to
13
accept, control and track changes made to the TOE implementation, design documentation,
test documentation, user and administrator guidance, security flaws and the CM
documentation. The evaluation team ensured the procedure included automated support to
control and track changes to the implementation representation. The procedures reduce the
risk that security flaws exist in the TOE implementation or TOE documentation. To
support the ACM evaluation, the evaluation team received Configuration Management
(CM) records from Boeing and performed a CM audit.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Delivery and Operation Documents (ADO)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 5 ADO CEM work unit. The ADO evaluation
ensured the adequacy of the procedures to deliver, install, and configure the TOE securely.
The evaluation team ensured the procedures addressed the detection of modification, the
discrepancy between the developer master copy and the version received, and the detection
of attempts to masquerade as the developer. The evaluation team followed the
Configuration Guide to test the installation procedures to ensure the procedures result in the
evaluated configuration.
The Validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 5 ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team
assessed the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the
TSF provides the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional
specification, a high-level design document, a low-level design document, and a security
policy model. The evaluation team also ensured that the correspondence analysis between
the design abstractions correctly demonstrated that the lower abstraction was a correct and
complete representation of the higher abstraction.
Additionally, the evaluation team ensured that the security policy model document clearly
describes the security policy rules that were found to be consistent with the design
documentation.
The Validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
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9.4 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 5 AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team
ensured the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE.
Additionally, the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in
describing how to securely administer the TOE. Both of these guides were assessed during
the design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 5 ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team
ensured the adequacy of the developer procedures to protect the TOE and the TOE
documentation during TOE development and maintenance to reduce the risk of the
introduction of TOE exploitable vulnerabilities during TOE development and maintenance.
The evaluation team ensured the procedures described the life-cycle model and tools used
to develop and maintain the TOE.
In addition to the EAL 5 ALC CEM work units, the evaluation team applied the
ALC_FLR.2 work units from the CEM supplement. The flaw remediation procedures were
evaluated to ensure that flaw reporting procedures exist for managing flaws discovered in
the TOE.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 5 ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team
ensured that the TOE performed as described in the design documentation and
demonstrated that the TOE enforces the TOE security functional requirements.
Specifically, the evaluation team ensured that the vendor test documentation sufficiently
addresses the security functions and TSFI as described in the functional specification and
high level design specification. The evaluation team performed a sample of the vendor test
suite, and devised an independent set of team test and penetration tests. The vendor tests,
team tests, and penetration tests substantiated the security functional requirements in the
ST.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
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9.7 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (AVA)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 5 AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team
ensured that the TOE did not contain exploitable flaws or weaknesses in the TOE based
upon the developer strength of function analysis, the developer vulnerability analysis, the
developer misuse analysis, and the evaluation team’s misuse analysis and vulnerability
analysis, and the evaluation team’s performance of penetration tests.
The Embedded OS Team in the Operating Systems and Embedded Technology Division
and the Enterprise Application Division at NSA augmented the evaluation by performing
an examination of evidence, vulnerability analysis, and penetration testing for the
requirements in AVA_CCA.2 and AVA_VLA.3.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.8 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s performance of a subset of the
vendor tests suite, the independent tests, and the penetration test also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The Validation Team observed that the evaluation and all of its activities were performed
in accordance with the CC, the CEM, and CCEVS practices. The Validation Team agrees
that the CCTL presented appropriate rationales to support the results and conclusions
presented in the Evaluation Technical Report for Boeing Secure Network Server, Part 2
Version 3.0, April 20, 2007.
The Embedded OS Team in the Operating Systems and Embedded Technology Division
and the Enterprise Application Division at NSA concluded that the Boeing SNS passes the
AVA_VLA.3 and AVA_CCA.2 requirements outlined in the Security Target at EAL 5.
This determination was based upon a lengthy investigation and thorough analysis of
evidence. The results of the formal modeling and verification (including assumptions),
SNS source code, and SNS documentation greatly assisted the analysis and testing. As a
result, the evaluation successfully searched many details of the Boeing SNS for weaknesses
and vulnerabilities. This effort revealed no exploitable vulnerabilities in the Boeing SNS.
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The Validation Team, therefore, concludes that the Pass result for the Boeing Secure
Network Server (SNS-3010, SNS-3110, and SNS-3210) EAL 5 evaluation is complete and
correct.
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
12 National and International Interpretations and Precedent
Decisions
The evaluation team performed an analysis of the international interpretations and
identified that none are applicable to the Boeing SNS evaluation.
Neither the Security Target nor the vendor’s evidence identified any national
interpretations. As a result, since national interpretations are optional, the evaluation team
did not consider any national interpretations as part of its evaluation. Likewise, the
evaluation team did not consider anything from the precedent database.
13 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as Boeing Secure Network Server (SNS-3010, SNS-3110,
and SNS-3210) Security Target, Version 2.5, 2/3/2011.
14 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Attribute. A characteristic or trait of an entity that describes the entity; for example,
the telephone number of an employee is one of that employee's attributes. An attribute
may have a type, which indicates the range of information given by the attribute, and a
value, which is within that range.
 Audit Trail. Data, in the form of a logical path that links a sequence of events, used for
tracing the transactions that affected the contents of a record.
 Authentication. Verification of the identity of a user or the user's eligibility to access
an object.
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
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 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims
made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common
Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is
complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor
or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or
an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.

15 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Boeing Secure Network Server (SNS-3010, SNS-3110, and SNS-3210) Security Target,
Version 2.5, 2/3/11.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3, August
2005 (aligned with ISO/IEC 15408).
[3] Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security – Part 1:
Introduction and general model, dated 1 November 1998, version 0.6.
[4] Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security – Part 2: Evaluation
Methodology, dated August 2005, version 2.3
[5] Evaluation Technical Report for Boeing Secure Network Server (SNS-3010, SNS-3110, and
SNS-3210) EAL 5 Evaluation Part II version 1.0, February 6, 2007.
[6] NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme for IT Security, Guidance to
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories, Version 1.0, March 20, 2001.