National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Apple iOS and iPadOS 13 Safari
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11060-2020
Dated: 5 June 2020
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Sheldon Durrant
John Butterworth
Lisa Mitchell
Patrick Mallett PhD
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Kenji Yoshino
Danielle F Canoles
Rutwij Kulkarni
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 5
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 6
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 7
4.1 Cryptographic Support..................................................................................................................................7
4.2 User Data Protection ......................................................................................................................................7
4.3 Security Management ....................................................................................................................................7
4.4 Privacy.............................................................................................................................................................7
4.5 Protection of the TSF .....................................................................................................................................7
4.6 Trusted Path/Channels ..................................................................................................................................7
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ................................................................. 8
5.1 Assumptions....................................................................................................................................................8
5.2 Threats.............................................................................................................................................................8
5.3 Clarification of Scope.....................................................................................................................................9
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 10
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 11
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................11
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 14
8.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................14
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................14
8.3 TOE Testing Timeframe and Location.......................................................................................................14
8.4 Debug Version...............................................................................................................................................14
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 15
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................15
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................15
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................15
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................16
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................16
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................16
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................17
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 18
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 19
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 20
13 Glossary ................................................................................................................................ 21
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 22
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology (IT)
product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is where specific
security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those security claims were
tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration. Prospective users should
carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5 and the Validator Comments in
Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the Apple iOS and iPadOS 13 Safari Target of Evaluation (TOE). It presents the evaluation
results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an endorsement of the TOE by
any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This VR
applies only to the specific version and configuration of the product as evaluated and documented in the
ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in June 2020. The information in this report is
largely derived from the proprietary Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report, all
written by Acumen Security as summarized in the Apple iOS and iPadOS 13 Safari Assurance Activity
Report. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part
3 Extended, and meets the assurance requirements defined in the Protection Profile for Application
Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP] and Application Software Extended Package for
Web Browsers, Version 2.0, dated 16 June 2015 [WEBBROWSEREP].
The TOE identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria
Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5), as interpreted by
the Assurance Activities contained in the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated
01 March 2019 [SWAPP]and Application Software Extended Package for Web Browsers, Version 2.0,
dated 16 June 2015 [WEBBROWSEREP] and all applicable NIAP technical decisions for the technology.
This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has
been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and reviewed the
individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report (AAR). The validation
team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and
assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Based on these findings, the validation team
concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the
conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical
report are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products against Protection Profile
containing Assurance Activities, which are interpretation of CEM work units specific to the
technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency
across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security evaluation
contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the
evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Product Compliance List.
The target of evaluation is the Apple iOS and iPadOS 13 Safari and the associated TOE guidance
documentation.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
 The conformance results of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1 - Identification
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Apple iOS and iPadOS 13 Safari
Protection Profile • Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019
[SWAPP]
Application Software Extended Package for Web Browsers, Version 2.0, dated
16 June 2015 [WEBBROWSEREP]
Security Target Apple iOS and iPadOS 13 Safari Security Target Version 1.1
Evaluation
Technical Report
Apple iOS and iPadOS 13 Safari Assurance Activity Report, Version 1.3
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Extended
Sponsor Apple Inc.
Developer Apple Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security, LLC
CCEVS Validators Sheldon Durrant
John Butterworth
Patrick Mallett
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the Security
Target.
The TOE is the Apple iOS and iPadOS Safari application which runs on iPad and iPhone devices. The
product provides access to HTTPS/TLS connections via a browser for user connectivity.
Note: The TOE is the Safari software only. The Apple iOS and iPadOS operating systems are undergoing
evaluation separately and will be posted to the Product Compliant List when successfully completed.
The TOE is an application on a mobile operating system. The Apple iOS and iPadOS operating systems are
being separately validated against the Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals Version 3.1. The
mobile operating system and hardware platforms are part of the TOE environment. The evaluated version
of the TOE is version 13.4.1.
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4 Security Policy
The TOE is comprised of several security features, as identified below.
 Cryptographic Support
 User Data Protection
 Security Management
 Privacy
 Protection of the TSF
 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE provides the security functionality required by [SWAPP] and [WEBBROWSEREP].
4.1 Cryptographic Support
The platform provides TLS/HTTPS connectivity for users attempting to communicate with secure URLs.
The TOE does not directly perform any cryptographic functions. The TOE invokes the platform
cryptography for secure credential storage.
4.2 User Data Protection
The TOE requests access to network connectivity, camera, microphone, location services, and address
book, and communicates with the wireless network when invoked by the user. The TOE runs inside of a
sandbox where each browser tab is isolated. In addition, the TOE supports blocking of third-party
cookies. When a cookie has been set with the ‘secure’ attribute, the TOE will only send the cookie over
HTTPS.
4.3 Security Management
The platform provides the ability to configure the TOE. No credentials are installed by default.
4.4 Privacy
If the user logs into iCloud Account on two or more devices, two devices within Bluetooth range of each
other have the ability to automatically “continue” browsing with the same URL provided via iCloud.
The TOE does not specifically request PII from the user. Any information provided by the user is entered
without prompting from the TOE.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE does not permit automatic downloads. All downloads are at the request of a user and require
approval. The TOE does not support add-ons. The only supported mobile code is signed JavaScript. No
third-party libraries are leveraged by the TOE. The TOE platform verifies all software updates via digital
signature.
4.6 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE is a software application. The TOE leverages the platform to establish HTTPS/TLS protected
communications.
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5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE security
requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
Table 2 – Assumptions
ID Assumption
A.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform with a reliable time clock for
its execution. This includes the underlying platform and whatever runtime
environment it provides to the TOE.
A.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the
software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
A.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or
hostile, and administers the software in compliance with the applied enterprise
security policy.
5.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The assumed level of
expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
Table 3 - Threats
ID Threat
T.NETWORK_ATTACK An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the
network infrastructure. Attackers may engage in communications with the
application software or alter communications between the application software and
other endpoints in order to compromise it.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the
network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access to data exchanged
between the application and other endpoints.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK An attacker can act through unprivileged software on the same computing platform
on which the application executes. Attackers may provide maliciously formatted
input to the application in the form of files or other local communications.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS An attacker may try to access sensitive data at rest.
T.FLAWED_ADDON Web browser functionality can be extended through the integration of third-party
utilities and tools. Malicious or vulnerable add-ons could result in attacks against the
system. Such attacks can allow unauthorized access to sensitive information in the
browser, unauthorized access to the platform's file system, or even privilege
escalation that enables unauthorized access to other applications or the operating
system.
T.SAME-
ORIGIN_VIOLATION
Violating the same-origin policy is a specialized type of network attack (covered
generally as T.NETWORK_ATTACK in the App PP) which involves web content
violating access control policies enforced by a web browser to separate the content
of different web domains. It is specifically identified as a threat to web browsers,
since they implement the access control policies that are violated in these attacks.
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ID Threat
Attacks which involve same origin violations include:
 Insufficient protection of session tokens can lead to session hijacking,
where a token is captured and reused in order to gain the privileges of the
user who initiated the session.
 Cross-site scripting (XSS) and Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks are
methods used to compromise user credentials (usually by stealing the
user's session token) to a web site. These attacks are more likely a result of
server security problems, but some browsers incorporate technologies that
try to detect the attacks.
 Inadequate sandboxing of browser windows/tabs or a faulty cross domain
communications model can lead to leakage of content from one domain in
one window/tab to a different domain in a different window/tab. Such
attacks leverage the ability of browsers to display content from multiple
domains simultaneously.
5.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation.
Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the
security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this evaluation
is defined within the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March
2019 [SWAPP] and Application Software Extended Package for Web Browsers, Version 2.0,
dated 16 June 2015 [WEBBROWSEREP].
 Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not specifically
search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or
vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as
one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical
sophistication and resources.
 The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality specified
in the claimed PP and applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional
capabilities that may be included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
10
6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
 Apple iOS and iPadOS 13 Safari Common Criteria Configuration Guide, Version 1.5 [AGD]
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online was not
included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied upon when configuring or
operating the device as evaluated.
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7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is an application on a mobile operating system. The TOE is the Safari browser application only.
The Apple iOS and iPadOS operating systems have been separately validated against the Protection
Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals Version 3.1. The mobile operating system and hardware
platforms are part of the TOE environment. The evaluated version of the TOE is version 13.4.1.
As evaluated, the TOE software runs on the following devices,
Device Name Model OS Processor WiFi Bluetooth
iPhone 11 Pro Max A2161
A2218
A2219
A2220
iOS A13 Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac/ax 5.0
iPhone 11 Pro A2160
A2215
A2216
A2217
iOS A13 Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac/ax 5.0
iPhone 11 A2111
A2221
A2222
A2223
iOS A13 Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac/ax 5.0
iPhone SE (2nd Gen) A2275
A2296
A2298
iOS A13 Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac/ax 5.0
iPhone Xs Max A1921
A2101
A2102
A2103
A2104
iOS A12 Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 5.0
iPhone Xs A1920
A2097
A2098
A2099
A2100
iOS A12 Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 5.0
iPhone XR A1984
A2105
A2106
A2107
A2108
iOS A12 Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 5.0
iPhone X A1865
A1901
A1902
A1903
iOS A11 Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 5.0
iPhone 8 Plus A1864
A1897
iOS A11 Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 5.0
12
Device Name Model OS Processor WiFi Bluetooth
A1898
A1899
iPhone 8 A1863
A1905
A1906
A1907
iOS A11 Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 5.0
iPhone 7 Plus A1661
A1784
A1785
A1786
iOS A10 Fusion 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
iPhone 7 A1660
A1778
A1779
A1780
iOS A10 Fusion 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
iPhone 6S Plus A1634
A1687
A1690
A1699
iOS A9 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
iPhone 6s A1633
A1688
A1691
A1700
iOS A9 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
iPhone SE A1662
A1723
A1724
iOS A9 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
iPad Pro 12.9” (4th gen) A2229
A2232
A2069
A2233
iPadOS A12Z Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac/ax 5.0
iPad Pro 11” (2nd gen) A2228
A2068
A2230
A2331
iPadOS A12Z Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac/ax 5.0
iPad Pro 12.9-inch
(3rd gen)
A1876
A1895
A1983
A2014
iPadOS A12X Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 5.0
iPad Pro 11-inch A1980
A1934
A1979
A2013
iPadOS A12X Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 5.0
iPad Air (3rd gen) A2123
A2152
A2153
A2154
iPadOS A12 Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 5.0
13
Device Name Model OS Processor WiFi Bluetooth
iPad mini (5th gen) A2124
A2125
A2126
A2133
iPadOS A12 Bionic 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 5.0
iPad Pro (12.9-inch 2nd
Gen)
A1670
A1671
A1821
iPadOS A10X Fusion 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
iPad Pro (10.5-inch) A1701
A1709
A1852
iPadOS A10X Fusion 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
iPad (7th gen) A2197
A2198
A2199
A2200
iPadOS A10 Fusion 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
iPad (6th gen) A1893
A1954
iPadOS A10 Fusion 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
iPad Pro (12.9) A1584
A1652
iPadOS A9X 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
iPad Pro (9.7-inch) A1673
A1674
A1675
iPadOS A9X 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
iPad (5th gen) A1822
A1823
iPadOS A9 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
iPad Air 2 A1566
A1567
iPadOS A8X 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
iPad mini 4 A1538
A1550
iPadOS A8 802.11a/b/g/n 4.2
Table 4 IT Environment Components
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived from
information contained in Evaluation Test Report for the Apple iOS and iPadOS 13 Safari, which is not
publicly available. The Assurance Activities Report provides an overview of testing and the prescribed
assurance activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the vendor-provided guidance documentation and
ran the tests specified in the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March
2019 [SWAPP] and Application Software Extended Package for Web Browsers, Version 2.0, dated 16
June 2015 [WEBBROWSEREP]. The Independent Testing activity is documented in the Assurance
Activities Report, which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here. Multiple test beds were
constructed to exercise Application Software capabilities and claimed security functionality. The
following tooling was used as part of the test activities:
 macOS Safari v13.0.5
 Wireshark v2.6.9
 OpenSSH v7.9p1
 QuickTime Player v10.15
 nmap v7.80
8.3 TOE Testing Timeframe and Location
 The TOE specific testing was conducted during the timeframe of October 2019 through June
2020.
 The TOE specific testing was conducted at Acumen Security CCTL located at Rockville, MD and
Apple Inc. headquarters in Cupertino, CA.
8.4 Debug Version
 Testing was conducted on vendor provided mobile devices with developer access.
15
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented in
detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR) and as summarized in the Apple iOS and iPadOS 13 Safari Assurance Activity Report. The reader of
this document can assume that activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1 rev
5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Apple iOS and iPadOS 13 Safari to be Part 2
extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally the evaluator performed the Assurance
Activities specified in the SWAPP.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains a
description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security
requirements claimed to be met by the Apple iOS and iPadOS 13 Safari that are consistent with the
Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
Additionally, the evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities specified in the
Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP] and Application
Software Extended Package for Web Browsers, Version 2.0, dated 16 June 2015 [WEBBROWSEREP].
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team assessed the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding
how the TSF provides the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional
specification contained in the Security Target's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator
performed the Assurance Activities specified in the SWAPP related to the examination of the
information contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was
justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the
operational TOE. Additionally, the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance
in describing how to securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and
testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed
the Assurance Activities specified in the SWAPP related to the examination of the information contained
16
in the operational guidance documents.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was
justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team found that the TOE was identified. Additionally, the team verified that both the
TOE and its supporting documentation consistently reference the same version and use the same
nomenclature. The evaluation team also verified that the vendor website identified the TOE version
accurately.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team ran the set of tests specified by the Assurance Activities in the SWAPP and
recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the Evaluation Technical Report and Assurance
Activities Report.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities in
the SWAPP, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team performed a public search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and
did not discover any issues with the TOE.
The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) was searched for publicly reported CVEs.
The following components of the TOE were searched:
Component CPE
Apple iOS 13.4.1 cpe:2.3:*:apple:iphone_os:13.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Apple iOS 13.4 cpe:2.3:*:apple:iphone_os:13.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Apple iOS 13.3.1 cpe:2.3:*:apple:iphone_os:13.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Apple iPadOS 13.4.1 cpe:2.3:*:apple:ipad_os:13.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
17
Apple iPadOS 13.4 cpe:2.3:*:apple:ipad_os:13.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Apple iPadOS 13.3.1 cpe:2.3:*:apple:ipad_os:13.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
The TOE (Application), underlying platform OS, and all platform libraries/frameworks are distributed
together, and vulnerabilities are reported under the platform OS CPE. CPEs for Apple Safari and Webkit
were examined and determined to be for much older versions (e.g. iOS 9).
No publicly known vulnerabilities were discovered in the TOE version or the two prior versions.
The evaluator also scanned the TOE using McAfee Mobile Security: Privacy App v4.2
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the SWAPP and WEBBROWSEREP, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are
met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in
the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the SWAPP and
WEBBROWSEREP, and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
18
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being configured
per the evaluated configuration instructions in the CC Guide document. No versions of the TOE and
software, either earlier or later were evaluated. Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped
exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the Security Target. Other functionality
included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation.
19
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
20
12 Security Target
Please see the Apple iOS and iPadOS 13 Safari Security Target, Version 1.1 [ST].
21
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility accredited by the
National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS
Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation
is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common
Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or
the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common
Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound
and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be
evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT product,
and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a
Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for
overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme.
22
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security functional
requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security assurance
requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5.
5. Apple iOS and iPadOS 13 Safari Security Target, Version 1.1 [ST]
6. Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP]
7. Application Software Extended Package for Web Browsers, Version 2.0, dated 16 June 2015
[WEBBROWSEREP]
8. Apple iOS and iPadOS 13 Safari Assurance Activity Report, Version 1.3 [AAR]
9. Apple iOS and iPadOS 13 Safari Guidance Documentation, Version 1.5 [AGD]