Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 13FMV5047-44:1
Dokument ID FMVID-297-738
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2015-06-17
Country of origin: Sweden
Försvarets materielverk
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report Färist 4
Issue: 1.0, 2015-jun-17
Authorisation: Jerry Johansson, Lead Certifier , CSEC
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report Färist 4
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification 4
3 Security Policy 5
3.1 VPN 5
3.2 Audit 5
3.3 Management 5
3.4 Automatic Update 6
3.5 Self-test 6
4 Assumptions and Clarifications of Scope 7
4.1 Usage Assumptions 7
4.2 Environmental Assumptions 7
4.3 Clarification of Scope 7
5 Architectural Information 9
6 Documentation 10
7 IT Product Testing 11
7.1 Developer Testing 11
7.2 Evaluator Testing 11
7.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing 11
8 Evaluated Configuration 12
9 Results of the Evaluation 13
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 14
11 Glossary 15
12 Bibliography 16
Appendix A - QMS Consistency 17
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report Färist 4
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation, TOE, is the VPN firmware part of a complete appliance.
The hardware, and a Linux operating system for the administrative subsystem, are out-
side the scope of the TOE. The product can be extended with a filter providing fire-
wall functionality to the VPN channel. In the evaluated configuration a filter without
firewall functionality was used. Also, please note that the correct usage of crypto-
graphic functions is covered by the evaluation, but the implementation of the crypto-
graphic module is not.
The TOE is available in two different versions, the Färist and the Färist Micro. The
Färist supports both IPSec and MACSec, the Färist Micro only supports IPSec. The
main purpose of the product is to connect two networks securely, on OSI level 2 or 3,
i.e. the Färist will work as a router or a bridge, the Färist Micro as a router, where the
data is encrypted during transport between the networks.
The evaluation covers the VPN functionality, auditing, management of the security
functions, automatic updating, and self-test.
The TOE is delivered pre-installed on an appliance, along with the user guidance.
The ST does not claim conformance to any Protection Profile.
The evaluation has been performed by atsec information security AB in their premises
in Danderyd, Sweden, and was completed on the 27th of May 2015. The evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of Common Criteria, version 3.1,
release 4, and the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, version 3.1, re-
lease 4. The evaluation was performed at the evaluation assurance level EAL 5, aug-
mented by ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation.
atsec information security AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria
under the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. atsec in-
formation security AB is is also accredited by the Swedish accreditation body
SWEDAC according to ISO/IEC 17025 for Common Criteria evaluation.
The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
sions of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results
confirm the security claims in the Security Target [ST], and have been reached in
agreement with the requirements of the Common Criteria and the Common Methodol-
ogy for evaluation assurance level:
EAL 5 + ALC_FLR.1.
The certification results only apply to the versions of the products indicated in the
certificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target [ST]
are met.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other
organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of
the IT product by CSEC or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect
to this certificate is either expressed or implied.
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2 Identification
Certification Identification
Certification ID CSEC2013002
Name and version of the Färist 4.0.1 and Färist Micro 4.0.1
certified IT product and with the Färist 4.0.1 firmware
the TOE
Security Target Färist 4 - Security Target, Tutus AB, 2015-06-08,
document version 2.0
Assurance level EAL 5 + ALC_FLR.1
Sponsor Tutus AB
Developer Tutus AB
ITSEF atsec information security AB
Common Criteria version 3.1 release 4
CEM version 3.1 release 4
Recognition scope CCRA, SOGIS, EA/MLA
Certification date 2015-06-17
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3 Security Policy
The TOE provides the following security services:
- VPN
- Audit
- Management
- Automatic Update
- Self-test
3.1 VPN
The VPN functionality is the main security functionality of the Färist. It creates pri-
vate networks over public networks using encryption.
The key exchange and authentication is done with the SKUT protocol using an RSA-
signed Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Encryption is done using either IPSec ESP in
tunnel mode or MACSec with the AES encryption algorithm.
The cryptographic library for the VPN functionality is implemented in a proprietary
library provided by the Swedish NCSA.
3.2 Audit
Audit records that are created in different components are sent to a log daemon,
which will forward the audit records to one or more remote log servers.
If the log servers are not reachable the log will be kept in RAM until it can be sent.
A smaller number of the latest log events are also kept in a local audit file.
3.3 Management
The TOE supports the following administrative roles:
• Administrator
- Remote administrator
The remote administrator can perform all administrative tasks. Changing
keys however requires local access to the machine, which means that by not
allowing the administrator local access, key management can be handled
solely by the key manager.
The remote administrator is authenticated through his certificate.
- Local administrator
The local administrator can perform the basic administrative tasks using the
front panel. The local administrator is authenticated through organizational
means, by allowing only authorized personnel physical access to the TOE.
• Operator
The (remote) operator can perform the same tasks as the remote administrator
but cannot perform any changes, such as changing configuration. The operator
is authenticated through his certificate.
• Key manager
The key manager can change cryptographic keys by either changing the smart
card or reading a new key from the USB memory.
Remote management requires authentication using X.509 certificates.
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Note that the environment must ensure that physical access are provided only to the
local administrators and the key managers.
3.4 Automatic Update
The TOE has an automatic update functionality that checks for new firmware updates,
downloads, verifies the origin and integrity of the update and ensures that the update is
newer than the current version before the update is installed. Note that after an update,
the Färist version will not be the certified version anymore.
3.5 Self-test
The TOE has built-in functionality self tests that are run both at startup and at regular
intervals. Self tests verify the integrity of the system files and ensure the proper work-
ing of the encryption engine. If a self test fails the TOE will preform a restart.
If the USB-memory or smart card holding the RSA certificate/private key is removed,
the TOE will also restart.
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4 Assumptions and Clarifications of Scope
4.1 Usage Assumptions
The Security Target [ST] makes one assumption on the usage of the TOE.
A.NOEVIL - Authorised administrators given privileges, are competent, nonhostile
and follow all their guidance; however, they are capable of error.
4.2 Environmental Assumptions
Seven assumptions on the environment are made in the Security Target.
A.AUDIT - The TOE environment must be able to receive, store and protect the audit
records generated by the TOE and provide the means for audit analysis.
A.DHPARA - The Diffie-Hellman parameters of the TOE and the remote host are of
good quality.
A.KEYS - It is assumed that private RSA keys used for remote administration and the
VPN tunnel are of high quality and not disclosed.
A.NOEMA - Interception of emanation of any kind is addressed by environmental
controls that reduce the signal to noise ratio for an interceptor to a level that prohibits
useful evaluation of the intercepted signals.
A.PHYSEC - The TOE is physically secure, i.e. no unauthorised persons have physi-
cal access to the TOE and its underlying system.
A.RELHARD - The underlying hardware, firmware (BIOS and device drivers) and the
operating system functions needed by the TOE to guarantee secure operation, are
working correctly and have no undocumented security critical side effect on the func-
tions of the TOE.
A.TIME - The TOE environment provides the TOE with a reliable time stamp.
4.3 Clarification of Scope
The Security Target [ST] contains eight threats, which have been considered during
the evaluation.
T.DISCLOSE - An external attacker gains unauthorised access to information trans-
mitted between the TOE and a remote trusted network.
T.CHANNEL - An external attacker gain unauthorized access to information or re-
sources in the trusted network by breaking out of the secure channel over the trusted
network.
T.INISEC - For configuration settings which are not provided by an administrator, in-
secure default values may be set by the TOE.
T.MEDIATE - An attacker on the clear interface sends information through the TOE
to the crypto interface without sending it through the trusted channel; and an attacker
using the trusted tunnel on the crypto interface will break out of the trusted channel
and generate traffic on the crypto interface outside of the trusted channel.
T.MODIFY - The attempts of an external attacker to modify data transmitted between
the TOE and a remote trusted network goes undetected.
T.ADMIN - An attacker may be able to perform administration or configuration of the
TOE, or gain access to administration information and configuration data, such as se-
cret keys or audit records, or may be able to modify such data.
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T.SELPRO - An attacker may read, modify, or destroy TOE internal data by transmit-
ting data to the TOE via one of its network connections that causes modification or de-
letion of TOE internal data.
T.UPDATE - Attacker may provide malicious TOE updates or old versions of the
TOE software to introduce back-doors or exploitable weaknesses into the TOE.
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5 Architectural Information
The TOE consists of two subsystems, the control plane and the data plane. The data
plane is further subdivided into a “local traffic” and a “bulk traffic” part. The control
plane runs on top of a Linux kernel while the data plane operates directly on top of the
hardware. All packets are received by the data plane and a check is first made to see if
the packet is directed to the TOE itself, in which case the traffic is filtered before it is
sent to the control plane. All other traffic is sent to the crypto engine and filter system
in the data plane. The components of all subsystems are described below.
Figure 1: Färist 4 Architecture
The network interfaces for user traffic are designated “crypto” (i.e. carrier network)
and “clear” (i.e. tunnelled network). The designation indicates which kind of infor-
mation is flowing through them.
The roles of the individual parts are explained in the ST.
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6 Documentation
The following document is included in the scope of the TOE:
Färist 4 Administrator's manual [Admin]
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7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Testing
The developer performed extensive testing of all functionality, using a proprietary au-
tomated test framework. The framework contains physical instances and virtualized
instances of Färist, hosts, and clients, enabling highly complex network environments.
Some manual testing was done to cover features that are difficult to automate. The
testing of the security features is a subset of the developer testing.
The Färist 4.0.1 was tested using the R200 and H300 hardware platforms, the Färist
Micro 4.0.1 was tested using the C200 hardware platform.
7.2 Evaluator Testing
The evaluators repeated all automated developer test cases, using the developer's
framework. The evaluators found that the developer's testing had good coverage of
TSFI and modules, and mainly added manual negative test cases for the independent
testing.
The evaluator's testing was done using the R200 hardware platform.
7.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluators performed portscans, tests for some specific vulnerabilities, automated
fuzz testing of many of the exposed protocols. Code review was used instead of fuzz-
ing for the remaining accessible protocols. Testing was focussed on the protocols that
are visible for an attacker.
The fuzz testing was done using one Färist on the R200 and one Färist Micro on the
C200 platform.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The Färist 4.0.1 is delivered as a complete appliance, comprised of the TOE, a Linux
operating system, and either the R200 or the H300 hardware platform.
The Färist Micro 4.0.1 is also delivered as a complete appliance, comprised of the
TOE, a Linux operating system, and the C200 hardware platform.
The software is pre-installed, and guidance for secure configuration is found in the
Administrator Guide [Admin].
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within
the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives
stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Moderate.
The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluator and determined that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].
The evaluators overall verdict is PASS.
The verdicts for the respective assurance classes and components are summarised in
the following table:
Assurance Class/Family Short name Verdict
Development ADV PASS
Security Architecture ADV_ARC.1 PASS
Functional Specification ADV_FSP.5 PASS
Implementation Representation ADV_IMP.1 PASS
TSF Internals ADV_INT.2 PASS
TOE Design ADV_TDS.4 PASS
Guidance Documents AGD PASS
Operational User Guidance AGD_OPE.1 PASS
Preparative Procedures AGD_PRE.1 PASS
Life-cycle Support ALC PASS
CM Capabilities ALC_CMC.4 PASS
CM Scope ALC_CMS.5 PASS
Delivery ALC_DEL.1 PASS
Development Security ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Flaw Remediation ALC_FLR.1 PASS
Life-cycle Definition ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Tools and Techniques ALC_TAT.2 PASS
Security Target Evaluation ASE PASS
ST Introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Conformance Claims ASE_CCL.1 PASS
Security Problem Definition ASE_SPD.1 PASS
Security Objectives ASE_OBJ.2 PASS
Extended Components Definition ASE_ECD.1 PASS
Security Requirements ASE_REQ.2 PASS
TOE Summary Specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Tests ATE PASS
Coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Depth ATE_DPT.3 PASS
Functional Tests ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent Testing ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability Assessment AVA PASS
Vulnerability Analysis AVA_VAN.4 PASS
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10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
The evaluators do not have any comments or recommendations concerning the prod-
uct or using the product.
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11 Glossary
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload (IPsec)
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
IP Internet Protocol
IPSec Internet Protocol Security
MAC Message Authentication Code
MACSec MAC Security
NTP Network Time Protocol
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SKUT Simple key-exchange using TLS
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
USB Universal Serial Bus
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12 Bibliography
ST Färist 4 - Security Target, Tutus AB, 2015-06-08,
document version 2.0
Admin Färist 4 Administrator's manual, Tutus AB, 2014-11-14,
document version 1.0.2
CCpart1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 1, version 3.1 revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-001
CCpart2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 2, version 3.1 revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-002
CCpart3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 3, version 3.1 revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-003
CC CCpart1 + CCpart2 + CCpart3
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, version 3.1 revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-004
SP-002 SP-002 Evaluation and Certification, CSEC, 2014-12-12, document
version 22.0
SP-188 SP-188 Scheme Crypto Policy, CSEC, 2013-06-18, document
version 4.0
SN-11 Scheme Note 11, CSEC, 2013-01-31, document version 1.0
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Appendix A - QMS Consistency
During the certification project, the following versions of the quality management sys-
tem (QMS) have been applicable since the certification application was received
2013-05-20:
QMS 1.14 valid from 2013-02-22
QMS 1.15 valid from 2013-10-23
QMS 1.16 valid from 2014-02-13
QMS 1.16.1 valid from 2014-03-27
QMS 1.16.2 valid from 2014-07-07
QMS 1.17 valid from 2014-11-20
QMS 1.17.1 valid from 2014-12-02
QMS 1.17.2 valid from 2015-01-13
QMS 1.17.3 valid from 2015-01-29
In order to ensure consistency in the outcome of the certification, the certifier has ex-
amined the changes introduced in each update of the quality management system.
The changes between consecutive versions are outlined in “Ändringslista QMS
1.17.3”.
The certifier concluded that, from QMS 1.14 to the current QMS 1.17.3, there are no
changes with impact on the result of the certification.