JISEC-CC-CRP-C0694-01-2020
Certification Report
TOMITA Tatsuo, Chairman
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan
2-28-8 Honkomagome, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo
IT Product (TOE)
Reception Date of Application
(Reception Number)
2020-03-11 (ITC-0743)
Certification Identification JISEC-C0694
Product Name
SHARP BP-30C25 fax standard model with BP-
FR10U; and BP-30C25 fax option model with BP-
FR10U, MX-PK13 and MX-FX15
Version and Release Numbers 0110Uc00
Product Manufacturer SHARP CORPORATION
Conformance of Functionality PP conformant functionality, CC Part 2 Extended
Protection Profile Conformance
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0 dated S
eptember 10, 2015
(Certification Identification: JISEC-C0553)
Name of IT Security Evaluation
Facility
Information Technology Security Center Evaluation
Department
This is to report that the evaluation result for the above TOE has been certified as follows.
2020-12-04
YANO Tatsuro, Technical Manager
IT Security Technology Evaluation Department
IT Security Center
Evaluation Criteria, etc.: This TOE is evaluated in accordance with the following standards
prescribed in the "IT Security Evaluation and Certification
Scheme Document."
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Release 5
- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Release 5
Evaluation Result: Pass
"SHARP BP-30C25 fax standard model with BP-FR10U; and BP-30C25 fax option model
with BP-FR10U, MX-PK13 and MX-FX15, Version 0110Uc00" has been evaluated based on
the standards required, in accordance with the provisions of the "Requirements for IT
Security Certification" by Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, and has met
the specified assurance requirements.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0694-01-2020
Notice:
This document is the English translation version of the Certification Report published
by the Certification Body of Japan Information Technology Security Evaluation and
Certification Scheme.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0694-01-2020
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary ................................................................................................................ 1
1.1 Product Overview............................................................................................................. 1
1.1.1 Protection Profile or Assurance Package................................................................. 1
1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality.............................................................................. 1
1.1.2.1 Threats ............................................................................................................... 2
1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions ....................................................................... 2
1.1.3 Disclaimers................................................................................................................ 2
1.2 Conduct of Evaluation...................................................................................................... 3
1.3 Certification...................................................................................................................... 3
2 Identification............................................................................................................................ 4
3 Security Policy ......................................................................................................................... 5
3.1 Users.................................................................................................................................. 5
3.2 Assets ................................................................................................................................ 5
3.3 Threats.............................................................................................................................. 6
3.4 Organisational Security Policy........................................................................................ 7
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ................................................................................ 8
4.1 Usage Assumptions .......................................................................................................... 8
4.2 Environmental Assumptions ........................................................................................... 9
4.3 Clarification of Scope ..................................................................................................... 10
5 Architectural Information......................................................................................................11
5.1 TOE Boundary and Components ...................................................................................11
5.1.1 Security Functions ...................................................................................................11
5.2 IT Environment.............................................................................................................. 14
6 Documentation....................................................................................................................... 15
7 Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results ................................................ 16
7.1 Evaluation Facility......................................................................................................... 16
7.2 Evaluation Approach...................................................................................................... 16
7.3 Overview of Evaluation Activity.................................................................................... 16
7.4 IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................... 17
7.4.1 Developer Testing.................................................................................................... 17
7.4.2 Evaluator Independent Testing ............................................................................. 17
7.4.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing............................................................................... 20
7.5 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................... 22
7.6 Evaluation Results......................................................................................................... 22
7.7 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations ..................................................................... 23
8 Certification ........................................................................................................................... 24
8.1 Certification Result ........................................................................................................ 24
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0694-01-2020
8.2 Recommendations .......................................................................................................... 24
9 Annexes .................................................................................................................................. 25
10 Security Target................................................................................................................... 25
11 Glossary .............................................................................................................................. 26
12 Bibliography ....................................................................................................................... 28
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0694-01-2020
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report describes the content of the certification result in relation to IT
Security Evaluation of "SHARP BP-30C25 fax standard model with BP-FR10U; and BP-
30C25 fax option model with BP-FR10U, MX-PK13 and MX-FX15, Version 0110Uc00"
(hereinafter referred to as the "TOE") developed by SHARP CORPORATION, and the
evaluation of the TOE was finished on 2020-11 by Information Technology Security
Center Evaluation Department (hereinafter referred to as the "Evaluation Facility"). It is
intended to report to the sponsor, SHARP CORPORATION, and provide security
information to procurement entities and consumers who are interested in this TOE.
Readers of the Certification Report are advised to read the Security Target (hereinafter
referred to as the "ST") described in Chapter 10. Especially, details of security functional
requirements, assurance requirements and rationale for sufficiency of these requirements
of the TOE are described in the ST.
This Certification Report assumes "general consumers who purchase this TOE" to be
readers. Note that the Certification Report presents the certification result based on
assurance requirements to which the TOE conforms, and does not guarantee an
individual IT product itself.
1.1 Product Overview
An overview of the TOE functions and operational conditions is described as follows.
Refer to Chapter 2 and subsequent chapters for details.
1.1.1 Protection Profile or Assurance Package
The TOE conforms to the following Protection Profile [14][15] (referred to as the
"Conformance PP").
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0 dated September 10, 2015
(Certification Identification: JISEC-C0553)
1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality
This TOE is an IT product and a digital multifunction device (hereinafter referred to as
the "MFD") equipped not only with copy, printer, scanner and fax function, but also with a
function to save and retrieve documents (referred to as the "document filing function" in
this TOE).
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The TOE provides security functions required by the Conformance PP that is the
Protection Profile for the MFD, to prevent unauthorized disclosure and tampering of the
data handled by the MFD.
For these security functionalities, the validity of the design policy and the accuracy of the
implementation were evaluated within the scope of the assurance requirements required
by the Conformance PP.
The following show the threats and the assumptions that the TOE assumes:
1.1.2.1 Threats
The TOE presumes the following threats:
There is a threat of unauthorized disclosure or tampering of User Document Data and
data relevant to security functions which are the assets to be protected of the TOE by
operating the TOE and/or accessing the network to which the TOE is connected.
There is also a threat of compromising security functions of the TOE due to the failure of
the TOE itself or by installing unauthorized software.
1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions
The evaluated product is assumed to be operated in the following configuration and
assumptions.
It is assumed that the TOE is operated in the environment where unauthorized physical
access is restricted and it is connected to a LAN separated from the Internet.
The management and maintenance of the TOE under operation shall be appropriately
performed by an administrator trusted by the procurement entities in accordance with
the guidance documents. In addition, users of the TOE shall be trained to use the TOE
securely.
1.1.3 Disclaimers
In this evaluation, the following operations are outside the scope of assurance:
 Operations in the state where the operational environment of the TOE shown in
"4.3 Clarification of Scope" is not secure
 TOE's operations under conditions other than those indicated in "7.5 Evaluated
Configuration."
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1.2 Conduct of Evaluation
Under the IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme that the Certification Body
operates, the Evaluation Facility conducted IT security evaluation and completed in 2020-
11, based on functional requirements and assurance requirements of the TOE according
to the publicised documents "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme
Document"[1], "Requirements for IT Security Certification"[2], and "Requirements for
Approval of IT Security Evaluation Facility"[3] provided by the Certification Body.
1.3 Certification
The Certification Body verified the Evaluation Technical Report [13] and the Observation
Reports prepared by the Evaluation Facility as well as evaluation documentation, and
confirmed that the TOE evaluation was conducted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure.
The certification oversight reviews were also prepared for those concerns found in the
certification process.
The Certification Body confirmed that all the concerns were fully resolved, and that the
TOE evaluation had been appropriately conducted in accordance with the CC ([4][5][6] or
[7][8][9]) and the CEM (either of [10][11]).
The Certification Body prepared this Certification Report based on the Evaluation
Technical Report and fully concluded certification activities.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0694-01-2020
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2 Identification
The TOE is identified as follows:
TOE Name: SHARP BP-30C25 fax standard model with BP-FR10U; and BP-
30C25 fax option model with BP-FR10U, MX-PK13 and MX-FX15
TOE Version: 0110Uc00
The TOE name consists of the MFD main unit and mandatory option. TOE components
are shown in Table 2-1. The TOE with “standard” fax function is sold in Japan, and
“none” is sold outside Japan.
Table 2-1 TOE Components
Model number of Main unit Fax Mandatory option
BP-30C25 Standard BP-FR10U
BP-30C25 None BP-FR10U, MX-PK13 and MX-FX15
Users can verify that a product is the evaluated and certified TOE by the following
means.
The following information indicated on the casing of the TOE and the operation panel
should be confirmed in accordance with the description in the product guidance.
 Model number of Main unit
The model number of main unit indicated on the casing shall be the name
contained in "Model number of Main unit " of Table 2-1.
 Fax
If the “Fax” column of Table 2-1 is “Standard”, “STANDARD” is indicated in
the FAX field of the operation panel, and if it is “None”, “NONE” is
indicated.
 Mandatory option
The option name indicated on the operation panel shall be the name in
"Mandatory option" of Table 2-1.
 TOE version
The TOE version indicated on the operation panel shall match the TOE
identification version.
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3 Security Policy
The TOE provides MFD basic functions such as copy function, printer function, scanner
function, fax function and document filing function. It has the functions to store user's
document data inside the TOE as well as to communicate with user’s terminals and
various servers via the network.
The TOE provides the following security functions that satisfy the requirements of the
Conformance PP:
 A function to identify and authenticate users
 A function to control access to user data
 A function to encrypt and store user data
 A function to protect user data on the communication paths when using the LAN
 A function to restrict security management to the identified and authenticated users
 A function to log events related to security
 A function to verify and install updated firmware
 A function to verify normal operation of security functions at start-up
 A function to separate the PSTN and LAN
Details of the security functions of the TOE are shown in Section 5.1.
Details of the user roles, protected assets, threats, organisational security policy that the
TOE assumes are shown in Sections 3.1 to 3.4.
3.1 Users
For use of the TOE, users in Table 3-1 are assumed.
Table 3-1 User Categories
Designation Category Name Definition
U.NORMAL Normal User A User who has been identified and
authenticated and does not have an
administrative role
U.ADMIN Administrator A User who has been identified and
authenticated and has an administrative role
3.2 Assets
Assets to be protected in the TOE can be classified into two categories in Table 3-2. Out of
them, Table 3-3 shows user data, and Table 3-4 shows TSF data, each of which consists of
two types of assets.
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Table 3-2 Asset categories
Designation Asset category Definition
D.USER User Data Data created by and for Users that do not
affect the operation of the TSF
D.TSF TSF Data Data created by and for the TOE that might
affect the operation of the TSF
Table 3-3 User Data types
Designation User Data Type Definition
D.USER.DOC User Document
Data
Information contained in a User’s Document,
in electronic or hardcopy form
D.USER.JOB User Job Data Information related to a User’s Document or
Document Processing Job
Table 3-4 TSF Data types
Designation TSF Data Type Definition
D.TSF.PROT Protected TSF
Data
TSF Data for which alteration by a User who
is neither the data owner nor in an
Administrator role might affect the security of
the TOE, but for which disclosure is
acceptable
D.TSF.CONF Confidential
TSF Data
TSF Data for which either disclosure or
alteration by a User who is neither the data
owner nor in an Administrator role might
affect the security of the TOE
3.3 Threats
Table 3-5 shows the threats to be countered by the TOE.
Table 3-5 Threats
Designation Definition
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS An attacker may access (read, modify, or delete)
User Document Data or change (modify or delete)
User Job Data in the TOE through one of the TOE’s
interfaces.
T.TSF_COMPROMISE An attacker may gain Unauthorized Access to TSF
Data in the TOE through one of the TOE’s
interfaces.
T.TSF_FAILURE A malfunction of the TSF may cause loss of security
if the TOE is permitted to operate.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE An attacker may cause the installation of
unauthorized software on the TOE.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0694-01-2020
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Designation Definition
T.NET_COMPROMISE An attacker may access data in transit or otherwise
compromise the security of the TOE by monitoring
or manipulating network communication.
3.4 Organisational Security Policy
Table 3-6 shows organisational security policies required for use of the TOE.
Table 3-6 Organisational Security Policies
Designation Definition
P.AUTHORIZATION Users must be authorized before performing
Document Processing and administrative
functions.
P.AUDIT Security-relevant activities must be audited and
the log of such actions must be protected and
transmitted to an External IT Entity.
P.COMMS_PROTECTION The TOE must be able to identify itself to other
devices on the LAN.
P.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION If the TOE stores User Document Data or
Confidential TSF Data on Field-Replaceable
Nonvolatile Storage Devices, it will encrypt such
data on those devices.
P.KEY_MATERIAL Cleartext keys, submasks, random numbers, or
any other values that contribute to the creation of
encryption keys for Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile
Storage of User Document Data or Confidential
TSF Data must be protected from unauthorized
access and must not be stored on that storage
device.
P.FAX_FLOW If the TOE provides a PSTN fax function, it will
ensure separation between the PSTN fax line and
the LAN.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0694-01-2020
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
This chapter describes the assumptions and the operational environment to operate the
TOE as useful information for the assumed readers to determine whether to use the TOE.
4.1 Usage Assumptions
Table 4-1 shows assumptions to operate the TOE.
The effective performances of the TOE security functions are not assured unless these
assumptions are satisfied.
Table 4-1 Assumptions
Designation Definition
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the
TOE and the data it stores or processes, is assumed to be
provided by the environment.
A.NETWORK The Operational Environment is assumed to protect the
TOE from direct, public access to its LAN interface.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to administer the TOE
according to site security policies.
A.TRAINED_USERS Authorized Users are trained to use the TOE according
to site security policies.
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4.2 Environmental Assumptions
The TOE is installed in an office and connected with the PSTN and LAN which is the
internal network of the organization, and used with a client PC and various servers
similarly connected to the LAN.
Figure 4-1 shows the general operational environment as assumptions of the TOE.
Users use the TOE by operating the operation panel of the TOE or a PC connected to the
LAN.
Figure 4-1 Operational Environment of the TOE
The operational environment of the TOE consists of the following components.
(1) Client PC
It is a general PC used by users.
The following software are required for use of the TOE.
 Printer Driver
If the sales territory of main unit is except Japan, the name is “SHARP
BP-30C25 PCL6 driver”. If the sales territory is Japan, the name is
“SHARP BP-30C25 SPDL2 driver”.
 Web Browser
(2) Audit Server
It is an audit server to store the audit log generated by the TOE. It must use the
syslog protocol and support TLS 1.2. Installation of this server is mandatory.
Telephone network
External network (Internet)
Firewall
FTP server
Mail server
Audit server
Authentication
server
Internal network
(Local area network）
Fax
machine
Client PC
Fax line
TOE
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(3) Authentication Server
In the case of "external authentication method" shown in "Identification and
authentication function" in Section 5.1.1, an authentication server which supports
TLS 1.2 and of which authentication protocol is LDAP authentication method is
required.
(4) Mail Server
It is necessary to send user document data scanned using the "Scanner function" as
an E-mail attached file. It must support TLS 1.2.
(5) FTP Server
It is necessary to send user document data scanned using the "Scanner function" to
the specified FTP server. It must support TLS 1.2.
It should be noted that the reliability of the hardware and the software other than the
TOE shown in this configuration is outside the scope of this evaluation. Those are
assumed to be trustworthy.
4.3 Clarification of Scope
In the TOE, a server such as an authentication server may be installed in addition to the
audit server that is mandatory to install. In addition, it is necessary to install a firewall to
connect to the Internet which is an external network. It is the responsibility for the
operators that these servers and firewalls are operated securely.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0694-01-2020
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5 Architectural Information
This chapter explains the scope and the main components of the TOE.
5.1 TOE Boundary and Components
Figure 5-1 shows the composition of the TOE.
The area enclosed by the frame indicated as the "TOE" in Figure 5-1 is the TOE. It does
not include Audit server, Mail server, FTP server, Authentication server, Client PC, User
and External fax machine.
Figure 5-1 TOE boundary
The TOE function consists of security functions (functions shown in colored box) and basic
functions (functions shown in white box) in Figure 5-1.
The security functions are described below. For basic functions, see Chapter 11.
5.1.1 Security Functions
(1) Identification and authentication function
It is a function to identify and authenticate users of the TOE by login names and
passwords in the operation panel, the web browser of the client PC, and the printer
driver.
 It requests a password consisting of upper or lower case letters of the
alphabet, numbers, or special characters and having the number of
characters set by the administrator or more.
Security
management
function
Access control
function
Self-testing
function
Audit
function
Software
verification function
Identification and authentication function
User data TSF data
Internal storage
Stored data encryption function
Printer function
Document filing function
Scanner function
Copy function
Fax function
Basic
functions
Mail
server
FTP
server
Audit
server
Authentication
server
Client
PC User
External
fax
machine
Fax line
separation
function
TOE
Operation
panel
Network protection function
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0694-01-2020
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 It supports "internal authentication method" using user information stored
in the TOE and "external authentication method" using external
authentication server.
 When entering a password, it displays an asterisk instead of the input
character.
 It stops accepting authentication for 5 minutes if password authentication
has failed consecutively.
 After identification and authentication, the session is terminated if no
operation is performed for the time set by the administrator in the case of
the operation panel, or for 5 minutes in the case of the web browser.
(2) Access control function
It is a function to control access of user data when manipulating user data with the
basic functions of the TOE.
 It controls access to user data based on the policy defined for each type of
user such as owner of user data or user role.
(3) Stored data encryption function
It is a function to encrypt and store user data, etc., in the TOE.
 User data and TSF data are encrypted by AES CBC mode with a 256-bit key
and stored.
 An encryption key for encrypting user data, etc., is created by a random
number generator having sufficient entropy.
(4) Network protection function
It is a function to protect user data on the communication path when using the LAN.
 Encrypted communication by TLS 1.2 is used between the TOE and various
servers such as audit server.
 The encryption key used for encrypted communication is created by a
random number generator having sufficient entropy.
 In the communication between the client PC and the TOE, IPP over TLS
communication is used for the printer driver, and HTTPS communication is
used for the web browser.
(5) Security management function
It is a function to restrict the security management of the TOE to the identified and
authenticated users.
 Registration / deletion of internal authentication users, change of minimum
password length, setting of various servers, overwriting of user data and
TSF data, etc., are provided only to users with the administrator role.
 Inquiries about user login names and authority groups of the users
themselves, and change of passwords are provided to all internal
authentication users.
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(6) Audit function
It is a function to log events related to use of the TOE and security.
 In addition to the start and end of the audit, a log of the audit event such as
the end of the job and failure of identification and authentication is
generated as audit data. In the audit data, the event name, date and time of
occurrence, user login name, event result and additional information are
recorded.
 The generated audit data is sent to the audit server by using the syslog
protocol and TLS 1.2.
 The audit data generated by the TOE is encrypted and stored in the TOE
until it is successfully transmitted to the audit server. In the TOE, it is
possible to store 40,000 audit data. The audit data generated newly in excess
of 40,000 is not stored but is discarded.
(7) Software verification function
It is a function that the TOE verifies the update firmware and enables installation
of only legitimate firmware.
 It verifies that it is a legitimate firmware by checking the hash value of the
firmware with a digital signature provided at the same time as the firmware
and the hash value calculated by the TOE using SHA - 256.
 A user with the administrator role can acquire the version of the firmware.
(8) Self-testing function
It is a function to verify the normal operation of the security functions at the start-
up of the TOE.
 Verification that the security functions operate normally is done by the
entropy source health test of the random number generator, by the known
answer test of the encryption algorithm, and by confirming that the
firmware is not corrupted.
 In the verification, if any error is detected in all or in part, the TOE stops the
start-up and suspends any operation until the power is turned off.
(9) Fax line separation function
It is a function to separate the public switched telephone network (PSTN) and LAN.
 In order to protect the LAN against attacks from the PSTN, it restricts
inputs from the PSTN to fax reception and prohibits forwarding of the
received fax.
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5.2 IT Environment
The TOE communicates with various servers and client PCs via the LAN.
The TOE sends the generated audit data to the audit server. The administrator reads the
audit data from the audit server.
In the case of the external authentication method, the authentication server is used to
identify and authenticate users.
The TOE can send the scanned user document data to the mail server and FTP server.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0694-01-2020
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6 Documentation
Among the TOE, the identification of guidance attached to the TOE whose sales territory
is Japan is shown in Table 6-1, the identification of guidance attached to the TOE whose
sales territory is other than Japan is shown in Table 6-2.
TOE users are required to fully understand and comply with the following documents in
order to satisfy the assumptions.
Table 6-1 Attached Documents (1)
Name Version Language
スタートガイド TINSJ2375QSZZ HH1 Japanese
かんたん操作マニュアル 2020F-JP2 Japanese
ユーザーズマニュアル 2020F-JP2 Japanese
ユーザーズマニュアル(タッチパネル操作編) 2018H-JP1 Japanese
ユーザーズマニュアル(アドレス帳登録編) 2018H-JP1 Japanese
ユーザーズマニュアル(Webページ設定編) 2020C-JP1 Japanese
ソフトウェアセットアップガイド 2020C-JP1 Japanese
Q&A集(困ったときは) 2020C-JP1 Japanese
取扱説明書 データセキュリティキット BP-
FR10U
JP1 Japanese
注意書 データセキュリティキット BP-FR10U 1.0 Japanese
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices適合状
態でBP-FR10Uをご利用のお客様へ
V1.0 Japanese
Table 6-2 Attached Documents (2)
Name Version Language
Start Guide TINSM2376QSZZ HH1 English
Quick Start Manual 2020C-EX1 English
User’s Manual 2020C-EX1 English
User’s Manual (Touch Panel Operation) 2018H-EN1 English
User’s Manual (Address Book Registration) 2018H-EN1 English
User’s Manual (Web Page Settings) 2018H-EN1 English
Software Setup Guide 2020C-EN1 English
Troubleshooting 2020C-EN1 English
BP-FR10U Data Security Kit Operation Guide EX1 English
BP-FR10U Data Security Kit Notice 1.0 English
How to set up BP-FR10U to be the “Protection
Profile for Hardcopy Devices” compliant
V1.0 English
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0694-01-2020
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7 Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results
7.1 Evaluation Facility
Information Technology Security Center Evaluation Department that conducted the
evaluation as the Evaluation Facility is approved under JISEC and is accredited by NITE
(National Institute of Technology and Evaluation), the Accreditation Body, which joins
Mutual Recognition Arrangement of ILAC (International Laboratory Accreditation
Cooperation). It is periodically confirmed that the above Evaluation Facility meets the
requirements on the appropriateness of the management and evaluators for maintaining
the quality of evaluation.
7.2 Evaluation Approach
The evaluation was conducted on the assurance requirements in the CC Part 3 required
by the Conformance PP using the evaluation methods prescribed in the CEM and the
assurance activities of the Conformance PP.
Details for evaluation activities were reported in the Evaluation Technical Report.
The Evaluation Technical Report explains the summary of the TOE as well as the content
of the evaluation and the verdict for each work unit in the CEM and assurance activity of
the Conformance PP.
7.3 Overview of Evaluation Activity
The history of the evaluation conducted is described in the Evaluation Technical Report
as follows.
The evaluation started in 2020-03 and concluded upon completion of the Evaluation
Technical Report dated 2020-11.
The Evaluation Facility received a full set of evaluation deliverables necessary for
evaluation provided by the developer, and examined the evidence in relation to a series of
evaluation conducted.
Furthermore, the evaluators conducted the evaluator testing at the developer site in
2020-07.
Concerns found in evaluation activities were issued as the Observation Reports and
reported to the developer. Those concerns were reviewed by the developer, and all the
concerns were solved eventually.
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Concerns in the evaluation process that the Certification Body found were described as
the certification oversight reviews, and they were sent to the Evaluation Facility.
The Evaluation Facility and the developer examined them, which was reflected in the
Evaluation Technical Report.
7.4 IT Product Testing
As the verification results of the evidence shown in the evaluation process, the evaluators
performed the independent testing to ensure that the security functions of the product are
accurately implemented and penetration testing based on the vulnerability assessment.
7.4.1 Developer Testing
The developer testing is not included in the assurance requirements of this evaluation.
7.4.2 Evaluator Independent Testing
The evaluators conducted evaluator independent testing (hereinafter referred to as
"independent testing") based on the evidence presented during the evaluation to ensure
that the security functions of the product are accurately implemented.
The independent testing performed by the evaluators is explained as follows.
Independent Testing Environment
Configurations for the independent testing are based on the operational
environment of the TOE shown in Figure 4-1, and the components are as shown in
Table 7-1. Although there are differences in the following points, the evaluator also
evaluates that these configurations are equivalent to the configuration identified in
the ST, and there is no problem in checking the function of this TOE.
- Firewalls installed to protect the TOE against unauthorized access from the
external network do not exist in the testing environment because they do not
affect the operation of the TOE.
- The evaluator used a telephone line simulator (a pseudo exchanger), which can
emulate the same fax communication protocol as the PSTN, as an alternative to
the PSTN.
- In the TLS test, communication between the TOE and the server / client PC is
performed via the TLS testing tool created by the Evaluation Facility. Since the
TLS testing tool only modifies the packet data of the TLS handshake message,
it does not affect the functions of the TOE.
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- For some tests such as cryptographic tests, the testing firmware created by the
developer is used for calling for testing the cryptographic modules in the TOE.
The module called in the test using the testing firmware is the same as the
module of the TOE, so it does not affect the functions of the TOE.
Table 7-1 Components of Independent Testing
Configuration Item Detail
TOE BP-30C25 (Fax: Standard)
 Option: BP-FR10U
BP-30C25 (Fax: None)
 Option: BP-FR10U, MX-PK13, MX-FX15
Audit Server rsyslog ver.8.24.0
Mail Server Postfix ver.2.10.1
Authentication
Server
openLDAP ver.2.4.44
FTP Server Microsoft Internet Information Services ver.8.5
9600.16384
Client PC OS : Windows 8.1 / 10
Web browser:
 Internet Explorer 11
 Google Chrome 81.0.4044.129
Printer driver:
 SHARP BP-30C25 SPDL2 06.00.06.14
 SHARP BP-30C25 PCL6 06.00.06.14
Summary of the Independent Testing
A summary of the independent testing is as follows.
a. Viewpoints of the Independent Testing
The viewpoints of the independent testing devised by the evaluator based on the
requirements of the Conformance PP and on the evaluation documentation
submitted for evaluation are shown below.
<Independent Testing Viewpoints>
1. Checking security functions by SFR.
2. Checking if the encryption implementation is correct.
b. Independent Testing Outline
An outline of the independent testing that the evaluators performed is as follows.
<Independent Testing Approach>
For the external interfaces of the TOE, inputs were provided using the TOE
operation panel, client PC and testing tools, and the behaviors were observed
using the following methods.
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 If the behavior can be observed from the external interface of the TOE, the
external interface of the TOE is used.
 If the behavior cannot be observed from the external interface of the TOE,
the logs in the audit server are investigated, and network analyzer or
testing firmware is used.
<Content of the Performed Independent Testing>
The independent testing was performed on 35 items by the evaluators.
Table 7-2 shows viewpoints of the independent testing and the content of the
testing corresponding to them.
Table 7-2 Content of the Performed Independent Testing
Viewpoint Outline of the Independent Testing
1 Checking security functions
 To confirm for each SFR that all the security functions are as specified
by the test items created from the assurance activities of the
Conformance PP or the specification of SFR.
2 Checking encryption implementation
 To confirm the implementation of the following encryption algorithm to
be tested by the testing firmware installed on the TOE.
- RSA (key generation, signature generation/verification)
- ECDSA (signature verification)
- DSA (signature verification)
- AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256, AES-ECB-256, AES-GCM-128, AES-
GCM-256
- SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
- HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384
- CTR_DRBG
 The encryption key of the user document data and the user document
data encrypted and stored inside the TOE are taken out by the testing
firmware and decrypted by the decryption tool to confirm that it is
correctly encrypted.
c. Result
All the independent testing performed by the evaluator was correctly completed,
and the evaluator confirmed the behavior of the TOE. The evaluator confirmed
consistencies between the expected behavior and all the testing results.
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7.4.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluators devised and performed the necessary evaluator penetration testing
(hereinafter referred to as the "penetration testing") on the potentially exploitable
vulnerabilities of concern under the assumed environment of use and attack level from
the evidence shown in the process of the evaluation.
The penetration testing performed by the evaluators is explained as follows.
Summary of the Penetration Testing
A summary of the penetration testing performed by the evaluators is as follows.
a. Vulnerability of Concern
The evaluators searched into the provided documentation and the publicly available
information for the potential vulnerabilities, and then identified the following
vulnerabilities which require the penetration testing.
1. There is concern that it can be exploited by the fact that the unintended port
of the TOE is enabled or a publicly known vulnerability exists in the running
network service.
2. In the TOE web interface, there is concern that it can be exploited by the
existence of publicly known vulnerabilities, such as bypass of the
identification and authentication function by direct designation of URL, and
XSS.
3. There is concern that manipulation of print job, buffer overflow or arbitrary
code execution may occur due to unauthorized print data input to the TOE.
4. There is concern that the identification and authentication function may be
bypassed due to unauthorized input from the operation panel, printer driver
and web interface.
5. When the TOE operates as a TLS client, there may be vulnerabilities in the
verification process of the server certificate of the communication destination.
b. Penetration Testing Outline
The evaluators performed the following penetration testing to identify potentially
exploitable vulnerabilities.
<Penetration Testing Environment>
The following testing tools shown in the Table 7-3 below were added to the
environment of the evaluator independent testing to implement.
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Table 7-3 Penetration Testing Tools
Tool Name Outline and Purpose of Use
Port Scan Tool
nmap 7.8.0
It is used for searching ports.
Vulnerability Scan Tool
Nessus 8.8.0
It is used for detecting publicly known
vulnerability.
Web Vulnerability Scan Tool
OWASP ZAP 2.8.0
Active scanner rules(beta) v27.0.0
Added
It is used for detecting general vulnerability of
web.
Web Application Analysis Tool
Fiddler 5.0.20194.41348
It is used for capturing or issuing
communication data received or sent by web
application.
Printer Security Testing Tool
PRET 0.40
It is used for detecting vulnerability of printing
device by using printer language.
Penetration Testing Tool
Metasploit Framework v5.0.9
It is used for creating unauthorized print files.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0694-01-2020
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<Content of the Performed Penetration Testing>
Table 7-4 shows vulnerabilities of concern and the content of the penetration
testing corresponding to them.
Table 7-4 Content of the Performed Penetration Testing
Vulnerability Penetration Testing Outline
1 It is confirmed that unexpected ports are not open and that there is no
publicly known vulnerability in the available ports by using the port scan
tool and the vulnerability scan tool.
2 It is confirmed that there is no publicly known vulnerability in the Web
interface by using the web vulnerability scan tool and web application
analysis tool.
3 It is confirmed that unintended behavior does not occur by using print
data in Postscript, PJL language, TIFF format and PDF format that are
intended to generate unauthorized behavior.
4 It is confirmed that no unauthorized behavior occurs due to character
strings entered in the identification and authentication function.
5 It is confirmed in the mail processsing that TOE has correctly performed
the verification processing of the TLS server certificate.
c. Result
In the penetration testing performed by the evaluators, the evaluators did not find
any exploitable vulnerabilities that attackers who have the assumed attack
potential could exploit.
7.5 Evaluated Configuration
The requirements of the TOE configurations, which are the assumptions for this
evaluation, are as described in the guidance documents listed in Chapter 6. In order to
enable the security functions of this TOE and use them securely, the TOE must be set as
described in the guidance documents. Different settings are not subject to assurance by
this evaluation.
7.6 Evaluation Results
The evaluators had concluded that the TOE satisfies all work units prescribed in the
CEM and all assurance activities in the Conformance PP as per the Evaluation Technical
Report.
In the evaluation, the following were confirmed.
- PP Conformance:
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0 dated September 10, 2015
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0694-01-2020
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Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices - v1.0 Errata #1, June 2017
Guideline for Certification Application with HCD-PP Conformance [16]
- Treatment regarding FCS_RBG_ EXT.1 Test
- Treatment regarding FCS_TLS_ EXT.1.1 Test
- Security functional requirements: Common Criteria Part 2 Extended
- Security assurance requirements: Common Criteria Part 3 Conformant
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict "PASS" was confirmed for the following
assurance components required by the Conformance PP:
ASE_INT.1, ASE_CCL.1, ASE_SPD.1, ASE_OBJ.1, ASE_ECD.1,
ASE_REQ.1, ASE_TSS.1, ADV_FSP.1, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1,
ALC_CMC.1, ALC_CMS.1, ATE_IND.1, AVA_VAN.1
The result of the evaluation is only applied to those which are composed by the TOE
corresponding to the identification described in Chapter 2.
7.7 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
There is no evaluator recommendation to be addressed to procurement entities.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0694-01-2020
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8 Certification
Based on the evidence submitted by the Evaluation Facility during the evaluation
process, the Certification Body has performed certification by checking that the following
requirements are satisfied:
1. Contents pointed out in the Observation Reports shall be adequate.
2. Contents pointed out in the Observation Reports shall properly be solved.
3. The submitted documentation was sampled, the content was examined, and the
related work units in the CEM and assurance activities of the Conformance PP shall
be evaluated as presented in the Evaluation Technical Report.
4. Rationale of the evaluation verdict by the evaluators presented in the Evaluation
Technical Report shall be adequate.
5. The evaluator's evaluation methodology presented in the Evaluation Technical
Report shall conform to the CEM and the assurance activities of the Conformance
PP.
Concerns found in the certification process were prepared as the certification oversight
reviews, and they were sent to the Evaluation Facility.
The Certification Body confirmed such concerns pointed out in the certification oversight
reviews were solved in the ST and the Evaluation Technical Report and issued this
Certification Report.
8.1 Certification Result
As a result of verification of the Evaluation Technical Report, Observation Report and
related evaluation documentation submitted by the Evaluation Facility, the Certification
Body determined that the TOE evaluation satisfies the assurance requirements required
by the Conformance PP.
8.2 Recommendations
Procurement entities who are interested in the TOE are advised to refer to "4.3
Clarification of Scope" and "7.5 Evaluated Configuration" to make sure that the scope of
the evaluation target and operational requirements of the TOE meet the operational
conditions they assume.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0694-01-2020
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If the transmission of the audit data to the audit server fails, the warning messages are
displayed on the operation panel and the web page. The TOE tries to retransmit, but the
operator needs to be careful about the warning messages.
9 Annexes
There is no annex.
10 Security Target
The Security Target [12] of the TOE is provided as a separate document from this
Certification Report.
Title: SHARP BP-30C25 fax standard model with BP-FR10U; and BP-
30C25 fax option model with BP-FR10U, MX-PK13 and MX-
FX15 Security Target
Version: 1.03
Publication Date: 2020-11-02
ST Author: SHARP CORPORATION
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0694-01-2020
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11 Glossary
The abbreviations relating to the CC used in this report are listed below.
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
PP Protection Profile
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
The abbreviations relating to the TOE used in this report are listed below.
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Codebook
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GCM Galois/ Counter Mode
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS HTTP over SSL/TLS
IPP Internet Printing Protocol
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MFD Multifunction Device
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSL Secure Socket Layer
TLS Transport Layer Security
XSS Cross Site Scripting
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The definitions of terms used in this report are listed below.
Field Replaceable
(Unit)
The smallest subassembly that can be swapped in the field
to repair a fault.
Hardcopy Device A system producing or utilizing a physical embodiment of an
electronic document or image. These systems include
printers, scanners, fax machines, digital copiers, MFPs
(multifunction peripherals), MFDs (multifunction devices),
"all-in-ones" and other similar products.
Copy function It is a function to copy and print the user document data
scanned from paper documents by user’s operation from the
operation panel.
Scanner function It is a function to scan paper documents and send the scanned
user document data to the mail server and FTP server by
user’s operation from the operation panel.
Document filing
function
It is a function to store the user document data in the internal
storage of the TOE at the same time with the copy function,
etc., and to print the stored user document data by user’s
operation from the operation panel or from the client PC via
the LAN.
Fax function It is a function to send and receive the document data to and
from external fax machines conforming to the G3 standard
connected by the PSTN. It consists of the fax transmission
function, in which paper documents are scanned and the
scanned document data are sent to the external fax machine,
and the fax reception function, in which document data sent
from an external fax machine are received and printed by
user’s operation.
Printer function It is a function to receive the user document data via the LAN
from the printer driver of the client PC and print it by user’s
operation from the operation panel.
Assurance
Activities
Evaluation work that the evaluator must carry out for PP
Conformance. It is supplement of the CEM, and it is described
in the Conformance PP regarding the Conformance PP [14].
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12 Bibliography
[1] IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme Document, July 2018, Information-
technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCS-01
[2] Requirements for IT Security Certification, September 2018,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCM-02
[3] Requirements for Approval of IT Security Evaluation Facility, September 2018,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCM-03
[4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-
001
[5] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-002
[6] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-003
[7] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-
001, (Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[8] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-002, (Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[9] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-003, (Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[10] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Evaluation methodology, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-004
[11] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Evaluation methodology, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-004, (Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[12] SHARP BP-30C25 fax standard model with BP-FR10U; and BP-30C25 fax option
model with BP-FR10U, MX-PK13 and MX-FX15 Security Target, Version 1.03,
November 02, 2020, SHARP CORPORATION
[13] SHARP CORPORATION SHARP BP-30C25 fax standard model with BP-FR10U;
and BP-30C25 fax option model with BP-FR10U, MX-PK13 and MX-FX15
Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.3, November 05, 2020, Information
Technology Security Center Evaluation Department
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0694-01-2020
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[14] Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0 dated September 10, 2015 (Certification
Identification: JISEC-C0553)
[15] Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices - v1.0 Errata #1, June 2017
[16] Guideline for Certification Application with HCD-PP Conformance, Version 1.7, July
1, 2020, Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, JISEC-CERT-2020-A17