1
Australian Information Security
Evaluation Program
Certification Report
Juniper Networks Junos OS 22.2R1
for MX Series with MX-SPC3
Version 1.0, 21 December 2023
Document reference: AISEP-CC-CR-2023-EFT-T030-CR-V1.0
(Certification expires five years from certification report date)
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Table of contents
Executive summary 4
Introduction 5
Overview 5
Purpose 5
Identification 5
Target of Evaluation 7
Overview 7
Description of the TOE 7
TOE Functionality 7
TOE physical boundary 7
Architecture 8
Clarification of scope 9
Evaluated functionality 9
Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware 9
Non-evaluated functionality and services 9
Security 10
Usage 10
Evaluated configuration 10
Secure delivery 10
Installation of the TOE 11
Version verification 11
Documentation and guidance 11
Secure usage 11
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Evaluation 13
Overview 13
Evaluation procedures 13
Functional testing 13
Entropy testing 13
Penetration testing 13
Certification 14
Overview 14
Assurance 14
Certification result 14
Recommendations 14
Annex A – References and abbreviations 16
References 16
Abbreviations 17
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Executive summary
This report describes the findings of the IT security evaluation of Juniper Networks Junos OS 22.2R1
for the MX Series with MX-SPC3 appliance against approved Protection Profiles (PPs).
This report concludes that the Target of Evaluation (TOE) has complied with the following PPs [4]:
 collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 (CPP_ND)
 PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, Version 1.1, 18 June 2020
(MOD_VPNGW).
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria and the requirements of the
Australian Information Security Evaluation Program (AISEP). The evaluation was performed by Teron
Labs with the final Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) submitted on 6 December 2023.
With regard to the secure operation of the TOE, the Australian Certification Authority recommends
that administrators:
 ensure that the TOE is operated in the evaluated configuration and that assumptions concerning
the TOE security environment are understood
 configure and operate the TOE according to the vendor’s product administrator guidance and
pay attention to all security warnings
 maintain the underlying environment in a secure manner so that the integrity of the TOE
Security Function is preserved
 verify the hash of any downloaded software, as present on the Juniper website
 have a system auditor review the audit trail generated and exported by the TOE periodically.
Potential purchasers of the TOE should review the intended operational environment and ensure that
they are comfortable that the stated security objectives for the operational environment can be
suitably addressed.
This report includes information about the underlying security policies and architecture of the TOE,
and information regarding the conduct of the evaluation.
It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that the TOE meets their requirements. For this reason, it
is recommended that a prospective user of the TOE refer to the Security Target and read this
Certification Report prior to deciding whether to purchase the product.
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Introduction
Overview
This chapter contains information about the purpose of this document and how to identify the Target
of Evaluation (TOE).
Purpose
The purpose of this Certification Report is to:
 report the certification of results of the IT security evaluation of the TOE against the
requirements of the Common Criteria and Protection Profiles [4.a, 4.b]
 provide a source of detailed security information about the TOE for any interested parties.
This report should be read in conjunction with the TOE’s Security Target [7] which provides a full
description of the security requirements and specifications that were used as the basis of the
evaluation.
Identification
The TOE is Junos OS 22.2R1 for MX Series with MX-SPC3.
Description Version
Evaluation scheme Australian Information Security Evaluation Program
TOE Junos OS 22.2R1 for MX Series with MX-SPC3
Software version 22.2R1
Hardware platform MX Series
Security Target Security Target Junos OS 22.2R1 for MX Series, Version 1.0,
November 29, 2023
Evaluation Technical Report Evaluation Technical Report 1.0, dated 6 December 2023
Document reference EFT-T030-ETR 1.0
Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, April 2017,
Version 3.1 Rev 5
Methodology Common Methodology for Information Technology Security,
April 2017 Version 3.1 Rev 5
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Conformance collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version
2.2e dated 23 March 2020
PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways,
Version 1.1 dated 18 June 2020
Developer Juniper Networks, Inc. 1133 Innovation Way, Sunnyvale
California 94089 United States of America
Evaluation facility Teron Labs
Unit 3, 10 Geils Court
Deakin ACT 2600
Australia
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Target of Evaluation
Overview
This chapter contains information about the Target of Evaluation (TOE), including a description of
functionality provided, its architectural components, the scope of evaluation, its security policies and
its secure usage.
Description of the TOE
The TOE is Juniper Networks, Inc. Junos OS 22.2R1 for MX Series universal modular routing platforms
MX240, MX480 and MX960 with MX-SPC3 services card.
The MX Series platforms deliver powerful routing, switching, security and services features. The TOE
ensures that security-relevant activity is audited and that the TOE functions are protected from
potential attacks. The TOE also implements IPsec for multi-site virtual private network (VPN) gateway
functionality and to tunnel remote administrate SSH connections. The TOE provides tools to manage
all security functions.
The MX Series universal modular routing platforms run the Juniper Networks Junos operating system
(Junos OS), Junos OS 22.2R1.
The TOE is physically self-contained. It houses all software, firmware and hardware to perform all
functions. The hardware consists of two major components: the router chassis and the interface
modules (also known as line cards) which allow it to communicate with the different types of
networks that may be required within the environment where the router will be used.
TOE Functionality
The TOE functionality that was evaluated is described in section 1.6 of the Security Target [7].
TOE physical boundary
The TOE is the Junos OS 22.2R1 firmware running on the MX Series routers as listed in the table
below. The TOE is contained within the physical boundary of the appliance chassis.
Chassis Model Switch Control
Board
Routing Engine Services
Processing Card
Modular Port Concentrator
MX240 SCBE3-MX RE-S-X6 64G
RE-S-X6-128G
MX-SPC3 MPC10E-10C
MPC10E-15C
MX480 SCBE3-MX RE-S-X6 64G
RE-S-X6-128G
MX-SPC3 MPC10E-10C
MPC10E-15C
MX960 SCBE3-MX RE-S-X6 64G
RE-S-X6-128G
MX-SPC3 MPC10E-10C
MPC10E-15C
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Abbreviations:
MPC Modular Port Concentrator
RE Routing Engine
SCB Switch Control Board
The install image provided for the TOE is:
 junos-vmhost-install-mx-x86-64-22.2R1.9.tgz.
The firmware version reflects the detail reported for the components of the Junos OS when the “show
version” command is executed on the device.
The physical boundary for the MX Series routers is shown in the figure below.
The TOE interfaces comprise the following:
 network interfaces which pass traffic
 management interface which handles administrative actions.
Architecture
The TOE consists of the following two major architectural components.
The Routing Engine (RE) runs the Junos firmware and provides Layer 3 routing services and network
management for all operations necessary for the configuration and operation of the TOE. The RE also
controls the flow of information through the TOE, including Network Address Translation (NAT) and all
operations necessary for the encryption/decryption of packets for secure communication via the IPSec
protocol.
The Packet Forwarding Engine (PFE) provides all operations necessary for transit packet forwarding.
9
The Routing Engine and Packet Forwarding Engine perform their primary tasks independently, while
constantly communicating through a high-speed internal link. This arrangement provides streamlined
forwarding and routing control and the capability to run Internet-scale networks at high speeds.
The functions of the TOE can all be managed through the Junos firmware, either from a connected
terminal console or via a network connection. All management, whether from a user connecting to a
terminal or from the network, requires successful authentication. In the evaluated deployment the
TOE is managed and configured via Command Line Interface, either via a directly connected console or
over the network secured using the SSH protocol.
Clarification of scope
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria and associated
methodologies. The scope of the evaluation was limited to those claims made in the Security Target
[7].
Evaluated functionality
Functional tests performed during the evaluation were taken from the Protection Profiles and
Supporting Documents and sufficiently demonstrate the security functionality of the TOE. Some of the
tests were combined for ease of execution.
Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
The TOE relies on the provision of the following items in the network environment:
 Syslog server supporting SSHv2 connections to send audit logs
 SSHv2 client for remote administration
 serial connection client for local administration
 IPsec enabled peers.
Non-evaluated functionality and services
Potential users of the TOE are advised that some functions and services have not been evaluated as
part of the evaluation. Potential users of the TOE should carefully consider their requirements for
using functions and services outside of the evaluated configuration.
Australian Government users should refer to the Australian Government Information Security Manual
[5] for policy relating to using an evaluated product in an unevaluated configuration.
The following components are considered outside of the scope of the TOE:
 use of telnet, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set
 use of File Transfer Protocol, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set
 use of Simple Network Management Protocol, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set
 use of Secure Sockets Layer, including management via J-Web, JUNOScript and JUNOScope,
since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set
 use of Command Line Interface account super-user and Junos root account.
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Security
The TOE Security Policy is a set of rules that defines how information within the TOE is managed and
protected. The Security Target [7] contains a summary of the functionality that is evaluated.
Usage
Evaluated configuration
The evaluated configuration is based on the default installation of the TOE with additional
configuration implemented from specific guidance instructions. The Common Criteria document for
this evaluation is Junos OS, Common Criteria Guide for MX240, MX480 and MX960 Devices with MX-
SPC3 Services Card [6].
Secure delivery
There are several mechanisms provided in the delivery process to ensure that a customer receives a
product that has not been tampered with. The customer should perform the following checks upon
receipt of a device to verify the integrity of the platform:
 shipping label - Ensure that the shipping label correctly identifies the correct customer name and
address as well as the device
 outside packaging - Inspect the outside shipping box and tape. Ensure that the shipping tape has
not been cut or otherwise compromised. Ensure that the box has not been cut or damaged to
allow access to the device
 inside packaging - Inspect the plastic bag and seal. Ensure that the bag is not cut or removed.
Ensure that the seal remains intact.
If the customer identifies a problem during the inspection, they should immediately contact the
supplier providing the order number, tracking number and a description of the identified problem to
the supplier.
Additionally, there are several checks that can be performed to ensure that the customer has received
a box sent by Juniper Networks and not a different company masquerading as Juniper Networks. The
customer should perform the following checks upon receipt of a device to verify the authenticity of
the device:
 verify that the device was ordered using a purchase order. Juniper Networks devices are never
shipped without a purchase order
 when a device is shipped, a shipment notification is sent to the e-mail address provided by the
customer when the order is taken. Verify that this e-mail notification was received and contains
the following information:
 purchase order number
 Juniper Networks order number used to track the shipment
 carrier tracking number used to track the shipment
 list of items shipped including serial numbers
 address and contacts of both the supplier and the customer
 verify that the shipment was initiated by Juniper Network, performing the following tasks:
11
 compare the carrier tracking number of the Juniper Networks order number listed in the
Juniper Networks shipping notification with the tracking number on the package received
 log on to the Juniper Networks online customer support portal at
https://www.juniper.net/customers/csc/management to view the order status
 compare the carrier tracking number or the Juniper Networks order number listed in the
Juniper Networks shipment notification with the tracking number on the package received.
Installation of the TOE
The configuration guide [6] contains all relevant information for the secure configuration of the TOE.
Version verification
The verification of the TOE is largely automatic, including the verification using hashes. The TOE
cannot load a modified image. Valid software images can be downloaded from the
https://www.juniper.net support pages. In addition to the automated verification, the site includes
individual hashes for each image. The administrator should verify the hash of the software before
installing it into the hardware platform.
Security Administrators are able to query the current version of the TOE firmware using the CLI
command ‘show version’.
Documentation and guidance
It is important that the TOE is used in accordance with guidance documentation in order to ensure
secure usage. The following documentation is available to the consumer when the TOE is purchased.
The evaluated configuration guide (system admin guide) document for the MX Series running Junos
OS 22.2R1 is available for download at https://www.juniper.net/documentation. The document is:
Junos OS, Common Criteria Guide for MX240, MX480 and MX960 Devices with MX-SPC3 Services Card
[6].
Common Criteria material is available at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Australian Government Information Security Manual is available at https://www.cyber.gov.au/ism
[5].
Secure usage
The evaluation of the TOE took into account certain assumptions about its operational environment.
These assumptions must hold in order to ensure the security objectives of the TOE are met.
The network device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not
subject to physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere with the device’s physical
interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the
device and the data it contains.
The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not provide
functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For example, the device
should not provide a computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking
functionality).
The administrator(s) for the network device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest
of security for the organisation. This includes being appropriately trained, following policy and
adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials
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have sufficient strength and entropy. The network device is not expected to be capable of defending
against a malicious administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the
device.
The network device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an administrator on a regular
basis in response to the release of product updates due to known security vulnerabilities.
The administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the network device are protected by the
platform on which they reside.
The administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorised access possible for sensitive residual
information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment
when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment.
It is assumed that the TOE is connected to distinct networks in a manner that ensures that the TOE
security policies will be enforced on all applicable network traffic flowing among the attached
networks.
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Evaluation
Overview
This chapter contains information about the procedures used in conducting the evaluation, the testing
conducted as part of the evaluation and the certification result.
Evaluation procedures
The criteria against which the Target of Evaluation (TOE) has been evaluated are contained in the
relevant Protection Profiles [4.a, 4.b] and Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation Version 3.1 Revision 5, Parts 2 and 3 [1, 2].
Testing methodology was drawn from Common Methodology for Information Technology Security,
April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5 [3], the relevant Supporting Documents [12.a, 12.b].
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the operational procedures of the Australian
Information Security Evaluation Program [10].
In addition, the conditions outlined in the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria
Certificates in the field of Information Technology Security [9] and the draft document CC and CEM
addenda, Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, Optional SFRs [13] were also upheld.
Functional testing
All functional tests performed by the evaluators were taken from the Supporting Documents [12]. The
tests were designed to provide the required testing coverage for the security functions claimed by the
TOE.
Entropy testing
The entropy design description, justification, operation and health tests are assessed and documented
in a separate report [11].
Penetration testing
The evaluators performed the evaluation activities for vulnerability assessment specified by the
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Supporting Document [12.a] which follow a flaw
hypothesis methodology. In addition, the PP-Module for VPN Gateways Supporting Document [12.b]
provides extra search term information for generating public vulnerability based flaw hypotheses.
Accordingly, four types of flaw hypotheses have been considered:
 public vulnerabilities
 ND iTC (Network Device international Technical Community) sourced
 evaluation team generated
 tool generated.
Based on the results of this testing, the evaluators determined that the TOE is resistant to an attacker
possessing a basic attack potential.
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Certification
Overview
This chapter contains information about the result of the certification, an overview of the assurance
provided and recommendations made by the certifiers.
Assurance
This certification is focused on the evaluation of product compliance with Protection Profiles that
cover the technology area of network devices with added security functionality including VPN gateway
functions. Organisations can have confidence that the scope of an evaluation against an ASD-
approved Protection Profile covers the necessary security functionality expected of the evaluated
product and known threats will have been addressed.
The analysis is supported by testing as outlined in the Protection Profile Supporting Documents and a
vulnerability survey demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with a basic attack potential.
Compliance also provides assurance through evidence of secure delivery procedures. Certification is
not a guarantee of freedom from security vulnerabilities.
The effectiveness and integrity of cryptographic functions are also within the scope of product
evaluations performed in line with the Protection Profiles (PPs). PPs provide assurance by providing a
full Security Target, and an analysis of the Security Functional Requirements in that Security Target,
guidance documentation, and a basic description of the architecture of the TOE.
Certification result
Teron Labs has determined that the TOE upholds the claims made in the Security Target [7] and has
met the requirements of the Protection Profiles CPP_ND [4.a] and MOD_VPNGW [4.b].
After due consideration of the conduct of the evaluation as reported to the certifiers, and of the
Evaluation Technical Report [8], the Australian Certification Authority certifies the evaluation of
Juniper Junos OS 22.2R1 for MX Series with MX-SPC3 performed by the Australian Information
Security Evaluation Facility, Teron Labs.
Recommendations
Not all of the evaluated functionality present in the TOE may be suitable for Australian Government
users. For further guidance, Australian Government users should refer to the Australian Government
Information Security Manual [5].
In addition to ensuring that the assumptions concerning the operational environment are fulfilled, and
the guidance document is followed, the Australian Certification Authority also recommends that users
and administrators:
 ensure that the TOE is operated in the evaluated configuration and that assumptions concerning
the TOE security environment are understood
15
 configure and operate the TOE according to the vendor’s product administrator guidance and
pay attention to all security warnings
 maintain the underlying environment in a secure manner so that the integrity of the TOE
Security Function is preserved
 verify the hash of any downloaded software, as present on the https://www.juniper.net website
 have a system auditor review the audit trail generated and exported by the TOE periodically.
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Annex A – References and abbreviations
References
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional
components April 2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance
components April 2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5
3. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology, April 2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5
4. Protection Profiles:
a) collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (CPP_ND), Version 2.2e, 23-
March-2020
b) PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, Version 1.1, 18 June 2020
(MOD_VPNGW)
5. Australian Government Information Security Manual: https://www.cyber.gov.au/ism
6. Common Criteria Configuration Guide for MX240, MX480 and MX960 Devices with MX-SPC3
Services Card, Release 22.2R1, 30 March 2023
7. Security Target Junos OS 22.2R1 for MX Series with MX-SPC3, Version 1.0, November 29, 2023
8. Evaluation Technical Report - Junos OS 22.2R1 for MX Series with MX-SPC3, dated 6 December
2023 (Document reference EFT-T030-ETR 1.0)
9. Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of Information
Technology Security, 2 July 2014
10. AISEP Policy Manual (APM):
https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-
03/2022_AUG_REL_AISEP_Policy_Manual_6.3.pdf
11. Seeding of the Kernel RBG in MX240 Platform running Junos 22.2R1.9 Version 1.1, 2022-07-20
12. Supporting Documents:
a) Supporting Document, Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, Version 2.2,
December-2019 (CPP_ND_SD)
b) Supporting Document, Mandatory Technical Document, PP-Module for Virtual
Private Network (VPN) Gateways, version 1.1, dated 2020-06-18 (MOD_VPNGW_SD)
13. CC and CEM addenda, Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, Optional SFRs May 2017,
Version 0.5 CCDB-2017-05-xx
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Abbreviations
AISEP Australian Information Security Evaluation Program
ASD Australian Signals Directorate
ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
GW Gateway
NDcPP CCRA-approved collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices
ND iTC Network Device international Technical Community
PFE Packet Forwarding Engine
PP Protection Profile
RE Routing Engine
SSH Secure Shell
TOE Target of Evaluation
VPN Virtual Private Network