UNCLASSIFIED
COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT
Integrated Dell™ Remote Access Controller 9
Dell Technologies
13 November 2019
383-4-479
V1.0
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FOREWORD
This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security
Establishment (CSE).
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS). This
certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian CC Scheme,
and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This report,
and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other
organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product
by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its
associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.
If your department has identified a requirement for this certification report based on business needs and would like more
detailed information, please contact:
Contact Centre and Information Services
Edward Drake Building
contact@cyber.gc.ca | 1-833-CYBER-88 (1-833-292-3788)
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OVERVIEW
The Canadian Common Criteria Scheme provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of
Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Evaluation
Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.
A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a
significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, the General Requirements
for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security
requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in
addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCEF.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are listed on the Certified Products list (CPL) for
the Canadian CC Scheme and posted on the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common
Criteria Project).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 6
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation ........................................................................................................... 7
1.1 Common Criteria Conformance.......................................................................................................................... 7
1.2 TOE Description................................................................................................................................................. 7
1.3 TOE Architecture ............................................................................................................................................... 7
2 Security Policy......................................................................................................................................... 8
2.1 Cryptographic Functionality ............................................................................................................................... 8
3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ....................................................................................................... 9
3.1 Usage and Environmental Assumptions.............................................................................................................. 9
3.2 Clarification of Scope ........................................................................................................................................ 9
4 Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................................................10
4.1 Documentation.................................................................................................................................................10
5 Evaluation Analysis Activities....................................................................................................................11
5.1 Development....................................................................................................................................................11
5.2 Guidance Documents........................................................................................................................................11
5.3 Life-Cycle Support ............................................................................................................................................11
6 Testing Activities ....................................................................................................................................12
6.1 Assessment of Developer tests.........................................................................................................................12
6.2 Conduct of Testing...........................................................................................................................................12
6.3 Independent Functional Testing ........................................................................................................................12
6.3.1 Functional Test Results.................................................................................................................................12
6.4 Independent Penetration Testing.......................................................................................................................13
6.4.1 Penetration Test results................................................................................................................................13
7 Results of the Evaluation ..........................................................................................................................14
7.1 Recommendations/Comments..........................................................................................................................14
8 Supporting Content..................................................................................................................................15
8.1 List of Abbreviations.........................................................................................................................................15
8.2 References.......................................................................................................................................................15
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LIST OF FIGURES
TOE Architecture..................................................................................................................................................7
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: TOE Identification ................................................................................................................................................7
Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation.............................................................................................................................8
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Integrated Dell™ Remote Access Controller 9 (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from Dell
Technologies , was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. A description of the TOE can be found in Section 1.2.
The results of this evaluation demonstrate that the TOE meets the requirements of the conformance claim listed in Table 1
for the evaluated security functionality.
EWA-Canada is the CCEF that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 13 November 2019 and was
carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the
intended environment for the TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify
that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the
comments, observations and recommendations in this Certification Report.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as the Certification Body, declares that this evaluation meets all the conditions of
the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product is listed on the Certified Products
list (CPL) for the Canadian CC Scheme and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common
Criteria Project).
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1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:
Table 1: TOE Identification
TOE Name and Version Integrated Dell™ Remote Access Controller 9
Developer Dell Technologies
1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
The TOE claims the following conformance;
EAL 2+ ALC_FLR.2
1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION
The Integrated Dell™ Remote Access Controller 9 (iDRAC9) is a systems management solution that provides remote
management capabilities, crashed system recovery, and power control functions for Dell PowerEdge systems. The iDRAC9
uses an integrated System-on-Chip microprocessor for the remote monitor/control system. The iDRAC9 co-exists on the
system board with the managed PowerEdge server. The server operating system is concerned with executing applications;
the iDRAC9 is concerned with monitoring and managing the server’s environment and state outside of the operating system.
1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE
A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:
TOE Architecture
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2 SECURITY POLICY
The TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security functional classes:
 Security Audit
 Cryptographic Support
 User Data Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE Access
 Trusted Path/Channel
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST) referenced in
section 8.2.
2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONALITY
The following cryptographic implementation has been evaluated by the CMVP and is used by the TOE:
Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation
Cryptographic Module Certificate Number
Dell Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC, Dell CMC and Dell OME-M 2861
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3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the
product’s installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.
3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:
 The TOE will be located within controlled access facilities, which will prevent unauthorized physical access.
 There are one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE.
 An internal management network is provided for the sole use of management of internal resources, and is logically
separate from other networks.
 The authorized administrators are not careless, wilfully negligent, or hostile, are appropriately trained and will follow
the instructions provided by the TOE documentation.
3.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
The following features are excluded from the evaluated configuration:
 Windows multifactor authentication
 Telnet, Secure Shell and Simple Network Management Protocol are not exercised in the evaluated configuration
 Hardware Root of Trust
 SELinux Policy Enforcement
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4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises the Integrated Dell™ Remote Access Controller 9 3.34.34.34 on the
following Dell platforms:
 PowerEdge T440
 PowerEdge T640
 PowerEdge R440
 PowerEdge R540
 PowerEdge R740
 PowerEdge R740xd
 PowerEdge R640
 PowerEdge R840
 PowerEdge 940
 PowerEdge R940xa
The evaluated configuration also requires a Windows Server 2016 Domain Controller with Active Directory, an NTP server,
and an administrator workstation running Windows 10.
4.1 DOCUMENTATION
The following documents are provided to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:
a) Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9 Version 3.30.30.30 User's Guide, Rev. A00
b) iDRAC9 with Lifecycle Controller Version 3.30.30. 30 RACADM CLI Guide, Rev. A00
c) iDRAC9 with Lifecycle Controller Version 3.31.31.31 Redfish API Guide, Rev. A00
d) Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller 9 Common Criteria Guidance Supplement, Version1.0, 19 August 2019
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5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process dealing with
Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.
5.1 DEVELOPMENT
The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design completely and
accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF implements the security functional
requirements. The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected
against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.
5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it
sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use
and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance, and determined
that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.
Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.
5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT
An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators
found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all of the procedures required to
maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.
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6 TESTING ACTIVITIES
Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent functional tests, and
performing penetration tests.
6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and
reviewing their test results, as documented in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR). The correspondence between the tests
identified in the developer’s test documentation and the functional specification was complete.
6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING
The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The
detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are
documented in a separate Test Results document.
6.3 INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining design and guidance
documentation.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and
results. The following testing activities were performed:
a. Repeat of Developer's Tests: The evaluator repeated a subset of the developer’s tests;
b. Verification of the Cryptographic Module: The objective of this test is to confirm the presence of the claimed
cryptographic module;
c. Security Management: The objective of this test is to confirm that users are assigned appropriate privileges when
assigned to a specific role and that they are maintained over the WSman and Redfish interfaces;
d. User Authentication: The objective of this test is to confirm that users must be identified and authenticated before
being granted access to the TOE;
e. Separation of Roles: The objective of this test is to demonstrate that separation of roles is maintained during
concurrent operator sessions; and
f. Concurrent User Login: The objective of this test is to confirm that the TOE is resistant to concurrent administrator
logins.
6.3.1 FUNCTIONAL TEST RESULTS
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance that the TOE
behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.
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6.4 INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING
Subsequent to the independent review of public domain vulnerability databases and all evaluation deliverables, limited
independent evaluator penetration testing was conducted. The penetration tests focused on:
a) Use of automated vulnerability scanning tools to discover potential network, platform and application layer
vulnerabilities such as Heartbleed, Shellshock, FREAK, POODLE, and GHOST;
b) Information Leakage Verification: The objective of this test case is to confirm that information useful to an attacker
is not disclosed during start up, shutdown, and login scenarios; and
c) Trusted Path: The objective of this test is to confirm that communications between the TOE and the remote
administrator are appropriately protected.
6.4.1 PENETRATION TEST RESULTS
The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating environment.
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7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Table 1. The overall verdict for this
evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS). This
certification report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme and the
conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This is not an
endorsement of the IT product by CCCS or by any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, and no
warranty of the IT product by CCCS or by any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, is
expressed or implied.
7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS
It is recommended that all guidance outlined in Section 4.1 be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
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8 SUPPORTING CONTENT
8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Term Definition
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCEF Common Criteria Evaluation Facility
CM Configuration Management
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE Communications Security Establishment
CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GC Government of Canada
IT Information Technology
ITS Information Technology Security
NTP Network Time Protocol
PP Protection Profile
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
8.2 REFERENCES
Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Integrated Dell™ Remote Access Controller 9 Security Target, Version 1.3, 22 October 2019.
Integrated Dell™ Remote Access Controller 9 Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.2, 13 November 2019.