KECS-CR-26-10
Smart TV and Monitor Security Solution V9.0
for Samsung Knox
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-1392-2026
2026. 3. 9.
IT Security Certification Center
Certification Report Page 2
History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2026.3.9. -
Certification report for Smart TV and Monitor Security
Solution V9.0 for Samsung Knox
- First documentation
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This document is the certification report for Smart TV and Monitor
Security Solution V9.0 for Samsung Knox of SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS Co.,
Ltd.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Korea Security Evaluation Laboratory (KSEL)
Certification Report Page 4
Table of Contents
Smart TV and Monitor Security Solution V9.0 ..........................................................1
for Samsung Knox......................................................................................................1
Certification Report ....................................................................................................1
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.........................................................................................................9
3. Security Policy ...................................................................................................10
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..........................................................10
4.1 Assumptions...........................................................................................10
4.2 Clarification of Scope..............................................................................10
5. Architectural Information .................................................................................. 11
5.1 Physical Scope of TOE........................................................................... 11
5.2 Logical Scope of TOE.............................................................................12
6. Documentation...................................................................................................14
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................15
9. Results of the Evaluation ..................................................................................16
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................16
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ......................................................16
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).................................................17
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV) ..............................................................17
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE).............................................................................17
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..............................................................18
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ...................................................................19
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................20
11. Security Target ...................................................................................................20
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................20
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................22
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the result of the EAL1 evaluation of Smart TV and Monitor
Security Solution V9.0 for Samsung Knox from SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS Co., Ltd.
with reference to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(“CC” hereinafter)[1]. It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and
conformity.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Korea Security Evaluation
Laboratory (KSEL) and completed on February 9, 2026. This report grounds on the
evaluation technical report (“ETR” hereinafter)[3] and the Security Target (“ST”
hereinafter)[4]. All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based only
upon assurance component in CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs of
Evaluation Assurance Level EAL1. Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part
3 conformant. The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based only upon
functional components in CC Part 2, and the TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST.
Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
Smart TV and Monitor Security Solution V9.0 for Samsung Knox (hereinafter ‘TOE’) is
security solution that provides security functions in the form of library by being
embedded on Samsung Smart TV/Monitor. For the secure operation of Samsung
Smart TV/Monitor, The TOE provides System(kernel of Tizen OS) Integrity Monitoring
function, Phishing Site Blocking function, and Script File Signature Verification function.
Samsung Knox is a brand name given to a secure platform and security solutions that
are equipped with the products released from Samsung Electronics.
The TOE provides the security functions as follows.
- System Integrity Monitoring: Function to check the integrity of the kernel of
the Tizen OS and a function to send the inspection results to the Security
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Care Server
- Phishing Site Blocking: Function to verify whether the site to access is a
phishing site or not when Smart TV and Monitor User accesses the site by
using Web Browser (linked to the Google Safe Browsing)
- Script File Signature Verification: Before executing the script file stored in
the writable partition, Samsung Smart TV/Monitor requests the TOE to verify
the signature stored in the script file, allowing execution of only the
authenticated script file.
The TOE is delivered to the developers of Samsung Smart TV/Monitor in the form of a
library which is a kind of software, and is not in charge of all kinds of security functions
provided in Samsung Smart TV/Monitor. The TOE provides only the security function
defined in the above.
The operating systems of TOE uses Tizen 10.0 and TrustWare V3.5.0. This is the
operating environment of TOE. Tizen 10.0 includes the Crypto Module (CryptoCore
0.2.9-1), the Update Manager, OpenSSL 3.0.18, and SQLite 3.50.2 required for TOE
operation, and TrustWare V3.5.0 includes the Crypto Module (CryptoCore 0.2.9-1). The
Crypto Module provides a cryptographic algorithm required by the security function of
the TOE, and the Update Manager provides a function of communicating with the
Security Care Server. OpenSSL provides secure communication of TLS V1.3 when
communicating with an external IT entity (Google Safe Browsing Server, Security Care
Server). SQLite is used to retrieve the DB list of phishing sites.
The Update Manager provided in the operating environment of the TOE communicates
with an external IT entity using the secure communication protocol of TLS V1.3 using
OpenSSL. For communication with external IT entities, Smart TV can perform wired
communication using Ethernet and wireless communication using Wi-Fi, and Smart
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Monitor can perform wireless communication using Wi-Fi.
The external IT entities required for TOE operation are as follows.
- Google Safe Browsing Server: A server operated by Google that
communicates to check whether the URL is a phishing site in the Phishing
Site Blocking function
- Security Care Server: Server that collects problems by receiving reports
detected by the System Integrity Monitoring function of Samsung Smart
TV/Monitor and provides online update function of phishing site DB list
The System Integrity Monitoring function of the TOE transmits the detected integrity
verification report to the Update Manager provided by the operating environment, and
the Update Manager periodically communicates with the Security Care Server to
transmit the report to the server.
The Update Manager provided by the operating environment of the TOE communicates
with the Security Care Server to download and install the phishing site DB list file to
update the phishing site DB list used by the Phishing Site Blocking function. The
Phishing Site Blocking function first checks the URL of the site opened by the browser
based on the list of phishing sites stored in the phishing site DB. If it is suspected to be
a phishing site, it communicates with the Google Safe browsing server to make sure
that the URL is a phishing site. Retrieving the DB list of phishing sites uses the SQLite
provided by the TOE operating environment.
The developer can communicate with Samsung Smart TV/Monitor using the serial port
when developing applications for Smart TV/Monitor using TOE. Serial port
communication is not provided to Smart TV/Monitor User who is not developer.
The TOE is a security solution that is in the form of library running in Samsung Smart
TV/Monitor and has the minimum hardware and the software requirements as show in
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[Table 1].
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Category Contents
H/W
CPU ARM architecture (Cortex A53 Quad) or higher
DDR Memory 1.5GB or higher
Flash Memory eMMC 8GB or higher
NIC
10/100 MB Ethernet*1 (optional)
※ Smart Monitor does not have an Ethernet port
Wi-Fi 802.11a/b/g/n
Serial Port RS-232C
S/W
REE OS Tizen 10.0 (kernel 5.4.261, 32bit)
TEE OS TrustWare V3.5.0
OpenSSL V3.0.18
Used to protect communication data with external IT entities
(Security Care Server, Google Safe Browsing Server)
SQLite V3.50.2
Used when searching the phishing site DB list for the
Phishing Site Blocking function
Crypto module
(CryptoCore 0.2.9-
1)
Providing the cryptographic algorithm used in the
System Integrity Monitoring function, Phishing Site
Blocking function
Update manager
Transmitting a system integrity monitoring detection
result report to the Security Care Server, and
performing an update of the phishing site DB received
from the Security Care Server
Web Browser Samsung Browser 10.0.12280
[Table 1] Non-TOE Hardware/Software required by the TOE
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2. Identification
The TOE is identified as follows.
TOE Smart TV and Monitor Security Solution V9.0 for Samsung Knox
TOE Version V9.0
TOE
Components
Knox_Solution_SYSTEM-V9.0-1.1.1.armv7l
Knox_Solution_BROWSER-V9.0-1.1.1.armv7l
Knox_Solution_SERVICE_A-V9.0-1.1.1.armv7l
Knox_Solution_SERVICE_U-V9.0-1.1.1.armv7l
Knox_Solution_SERVICE_R-V9.0-1.1.1.armv7l
Knox_Solution_UEP-V9.0-1.1.1.armv7l
Guidance
Document
Smart TV and Monitor Security Solution V9.0 for Samsung Knox
developer guidance V1.1
[Table 2] TOE identification
Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(October 31, 2022)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (May
17, 2021)
TOE Smart TV and Monitor Security Solution V9.0 for Samsung Knox
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
CC:2022 Revision 1, CCMB-2022-11-001 ~ CCMB-2022-11-005,
November 2022
Errata and Interpretation for CC:2022 (Release 1) and
CEM:2022 (Release 1), Version 1.2, 2025-10-15
EAL EAL1
Protection Profile N/A (ST does not claim conformance to a PP)
Developer SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS Co., Ltd.
Sponsor SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS Co., Ltd.
Evaluation Facility Korea Security Evaluation Laboratory (KSEL)
Completion Date of
Evaluation
February 9, 2026
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 3] Additional identification information
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3. Security Policy
The TOE complies security policies defined in the ST by security objectives and
security requirements. The TOE provides security features such as System Integrity
Monitoring, Phishing Site Blocking, and Script File Signature Verification.
For more details refer to the ST.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Assumptions
The following assumptions describe the security aspects of the operational
environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used (for the detailed
and precise definition of the assumption refer to the ST, chapter 3.4):
⚫ Firmware on Smart TV/Monitor should always be kept up-to-date.
⚫ The TOE must perform secure communication using cryptographic
communication with the Google Safe Browsing server and the Security Care
Server.
⚫ Developers using TOE are harmless and must be properly trained in
development using TOE and perform their obligations accurately according to
developer guidelines.
⚫ OpenSSL, SQLite, Crypto module, and update manager required for TOE
operation included in the TOE operating system (Tizen) are reliable and safe.
⚫ The Google Safe Browsing Server and Security Care Server that exist
outside the TOE are reliable and safe. In addition, the Google Safe Browsing
server provides the result of checking whether it is a phishing site to the TOE,
and the Security Care Server provides the phishing site DB to the TOE.
⚫ The private key for digital signing a script file is reliable and safe.
4.2 Clarification of Scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurance covered in
the Security Target. Other functionality included in Samsung Smart TV/Monitor was not
assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by Samsung Smart
TV/Monitor needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn
about their effectiveness. All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as
potential misconceptions that need clarification. This text covers some of the more
Certification Report Page 11
important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation.
Note that:
⚫ This evaluation covers only the specific software version identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process. (for
the detailed information of TOE version and TOE Components version refer
to the [Table 2])
5. Architectural Information
The architecture of Samsung Smart TV/Monitor is basically composed based on the
ARM TrustZone technology provided by ARM CPU. Samsung Smart TV/Monitor's
operating system consists of Rich Execution Environment (REE) and Trusted
Execution Environment (TEE). REE refers to an execution environment provided by a
general operating system and operates based on Tizen 10.0, TEE refers to an
execution environment that provides a higher level of security than REE and operates
based on TrustWare V3.5.0 (Operating System developed by Samsung Electronics).
Among the security functions of the TOE, the System Integrity Monitoring function is
executed in TEE and REE, Phishing Site Blocking function and Script File Signature
Verification function is executed in REE.
5.1 Physical Scope of TOE
The TOE consists of software provided in the form of a library, and developer guidance
as shown in [Table 4]. The TOE is delivered to the developers of Samsung Smart
TV/Monitor, and is operated in the form of a library. The scope of the TOE includes only
some libraries that are in charge of security functions. That is, only the distributed
libraries and developer guidance are included in the physical scope of the TOE. Update
Manager, SQLite, OpenSSL, Crypto Module required for TOE operation are excluded
from the physical scope of the TOE.
TOE is directly delivered to Samsung Smart TV/Monitor developer in the form of CD
including developer guidance.
TOE Components
Delivery
Form
Note
Certification Report Page 12
[Table 4] Physical scope of the TOE
5.2 Logical Scope of TOE
Logical scope of the TOE includes all the aspects that are included in the physical
scope of TOE. That is, all the functions provided by the library are included in the
logical scope of TOE. The security functions provided within the logical scope of the
TOE are as follows.
System Integrity Monitoring
The TOE periodically performs the verification on the kernel integrity of Tizen OS while
in normal operation through the System Integrity Monitoring function so as to ensure
secure operation of Samsung Smart TV/Monitor. When integrity verification fails, a
• Knox_Solution_SYSTEM-V9.0-1.1.1.armv7l
(Knox_Solution_SYSTEM-V9.0-
1.1.1.armv7l.rpm)
Software
(CD)
System Integrity
Monitoring
• Knox_Solution_BROWSER-V9.0-1.1.1.armv7l
(Knox_Solution_BROWSER-V9.0-
1.1.1.armv7l.rpm)
Phishing Site
Blocking
• Knox_Solution_SERVICE_A-V9.0-1.1.1.armv7l
(Knox_Solution_SERVICE_A-V9.0-
1.1.1.armv7l.rpm)
• Knox_Solution_SERVICE_U-V9.0-1.1.1.armv7l
(Knox_Solution_SERVICE_U-V9.0-
1.1.1.armv7l.rpm)
• Knox_Solution_SERVICE_R-V9.0-1.1.1.armv7l
(Knox_Solution_SERVICE_R-V9.0-
1.1.1.armv7l.rpm)
System Integrity
Monitoring,
Phishing Site
Blocking
• Knox_Solution_UEP-V9.0-1.1.1.armv7l
(Knox_Solution_UEP-V9.0-1.1.1.armv7l.rpm)
Script File
Signature
Verification
• Smart TV and Monitor Security Solution V9.0 for
Samsung Knox developer guidance V1.1
( Smart TV and Monitor Security Solution V9.0
for Samsung Knox developer guidance
V1.1.pdf)
Document
File
(CD)
Certification Report Page 13
result report including terminal information and a tampering detection area is
transmitted to the Security Care Server. The System Integrity Monitoring function can
be separated into three parts.
- The part on the application area of Tizen OS that starts System Integrity
Monitoring and report to the Security Care Server when integrity tampering
is detected
- The part that does system integrity monitoring on the dynamic area, while
operating on the kernel module area of Tizen OS, when TOE gets operated
- The part that does system integrity monitoring on the static area while
operating on the application area of TrustWare
The System Integrity Monitoring function that operates in the application of the Tizen
OS starts the monitoring process after being installed in the application area of the
Tizen OS, it is inserted as a kernel module in the form of LKM (Loadable Kernel Module)
so that the monitoring function can operate in the kernel area of the Tizen OS. In
addition, the results of tampering are confirmed from the System Integrity Monitoring
function operated on the application of Trustware and reported to the Security Care
Server.
As mentioned earlier, the System Integrity Monitoring function that operates on the
kernel module area of Tizen OS performs a part of functions of TOE. Thus, this
operates while being inserted as a Loadable Kernel Module (LKM) by the System
Integrity Monitoring function that operates on the application of Tizen OS. When
monitoring function starts, this performs system integrity monitoring for dynamic kernel
memory area.
The System Integrity Monitoring function that operates in the application area of
TrustWare detects whether there is any distortion or not by periodically comparing the
memory value of the static kernel memory and the original value. This also receives the
detected result from the System Integrity Monitoring function that operates on the
kernel module area of Tizen OS, and saves the result in Trustware's memory area
along with static memory tampering detection results.
Phishing Site Blocking
The TOE provides the Phishing Site Blocking function in order to prevent private
information from being exposed to any risks through the access to a harmful phishing
site by Samsung Smart TV/Monitor User. If Samsung Smart TV/Monitor User accesses
web sites using Web Browser (Samsung Browser), the Phishing Site Blocking function
checks the site based on the phishing site database stored in Smart TV/Monitor. If the
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site is suspected for being a phishing site, the Google Safe Browsing service is used to
check whether the relevant site is a phishing site or not. If the relevant site is confirmed
to be a phishing site, the information of such for the site being a phishing site is
informed to the user. If the user selects to block the access to the site, the access to
the phishing site is blocked to protect private information of the user. The TOE also
provides Smart TV/Monitor User the ability to either disable or enable the Phishing Site
Blocking function. If a user disables the Phishing Site Blocking function, the Phishing
Site Blocking function does not work. The list of phishing site on the database is
updated periodically through the Security Care Server.
Script File Signature Verification
Before executing the script file stored in the writable partition, Samsung Smart
TV/Monitor requests the TOE to verify the signature stored in the script file, allowing
execution of only the authenticated script file.
The TOE goes through three steps to verify the signature of the script file. First,
calculate the unique hash value of the script file to be executed. Next, the signature
included in the script file is decrypted using the public key, and the signed hash value is
extracted. The TOE compares the unique hash value of the last calculated file with the
decrypted hash value of the signature to see if the two values match exactly.
Since only Samsung Smart TV/Monitor developers can sign script files using private
keys in advance, Samsung Smart TV/Monitor can check the integrity and origin of
script files through functions provided by the TOE.
6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE to the Samsung
Smart TV and Monitor Developer.
[T
able 5] Documentation
Identifier Version
Smart TV and Monitor Security Solution V9.0 for Samsung Knox
developer guidance
V1.1
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7. TOE Testing
The evaluator conducted independent testing listed in ETR, based upon test cases
devised by the evaluator. The evaluator set up the test configuration and testing
environment consistent with the ST. The evaluator considered followings when devising
a test subset:
⚫ TOE security functionality: The TOE is security solution that provides
security functions in the form of library by being embedded on Samsung
Smart TV/Monitor. For the secure operation of Samsung Smart TV/Monitor,
The TOE provides System(kernel of Tizen OS) Integrity Monitoring function,
Phishing Site Blocking function, and Script File Signature Verification function.
⚫ Balance between evaluator's activities: The targeted evaluation assurance
level is EAL1, and the evaluator tried to balance time and effort of
evaluator's activities between EAL1 assurance components.
In addition, the evaluator conducted penetration testing based upon test cases devised
by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential vulnerabilities.
These tests cover privilege check of executable code, bypassing security functionality,
invalid inputs for interfaces, flaws in networking protocol implementation, vulnerability
scanning using commercial tools, disclosure of secrets, and so on. No exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential were found from
penetration testing.
The evaluator confirmed that all the actual testing results correspond to the expected
testing results. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth,
and results are summarized in the ETR.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is security solution that provides security functions in the form of library by
being embedded on Samsung Smart TV/Monitor. For the secure operation of Samsung
Smart TV/Monitor, The TOE provides System(kernel of Tizen OS) Integrity Monitoring
function, Phishing Site Blocking function, and Script File Signature Verification function.
The TOE is identified by TOE name and version number. The TOE identification
information is provided CLI.
And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6, [Table 5] were evaluated
with the TOE.
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9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC[1] and CEM[2].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance
components of EAL1.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to packages. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Problem Definition clearly defines the security problem intended to be
addressed by the TOE and its operational environment. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_SPD.1.
The Security Objectives clearly define operational environment. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1.
The ST doesn't define any extended component. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally
consistent. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be use as the basis for
the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer clearly identifies the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMC.1.
The configuration management document verifies that the configuration list includes
Certification Report Page 17
the TOE, and the evaluation evidence. Therefore, the verdict of ALC_CMS.1 is the
Pass.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure
use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The functional specification provides high-level description of SFR-enforcing and SFR-
supporting TSFIs, in terms of descriptions of their parameters. Therefore, the verdict of
ADV_FSP.1 is the Pass.
Therefore, the functional specification (TSF interface description) which are included in
the development documentation, are adequate to give understanding about how the
TSF satisfies the SFRs, and how these SFRs implementation are not damaged or
bypassed.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
By independently testing a subset of the TSFI, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1.
Certification Report Page 18
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no easily identifiable
exploitable vulnerabilities in the operational environment of the TOE. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), don’t
allow attackers possessing less than an enhanced-basic attack potential to violate the
SFRs. The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
Certification Report Page 19
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE
ASE_INT.1
ASE_INT.1.1E PASS
PASS
PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_SPD.1 ASE_SPD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS
PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1
ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS
PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC
ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1.1E PASS PASS
PASS
ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD
AGD_PRE.1
AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS
PASS
PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_FSP.1
ADV_FSP.1.1E PASS
PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.1.2E PASS
ATE ATE_IND.1
ATE_IND.1.1E PASS
PASS PASS
ATE_IND.1.2E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.1
AVA_VAN.1.1E PASS
PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.1.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.1.3E PASS
[Table 6] Evaluation Result Summary
Certification Report Page 20
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
⚫ Smart TV/Monitor Developer must develop the default settings for the
Phishing Site Blocking function to be activated in order for Smart TV/Monitor
User to use the smart TV/Monitor safely.
⚫ Smart TV/Monitor Developer must insert a warning message informing them
of the dangers of accessing phishing sites so that Smart TV/Monitor User
can choose to block when phishing sites are detected.
⚫ Smart TV/Monitor User must install the Smart TV/Monitor software update
immediately when an alarm occurs in order to always maintain the latest
version of the security technology applied to the Smart TV/Monitor operating
environment.
⚫ The TOE must protect transmitted data using a secure encrypted
communication protocol between the TOE and Google Safe Browsing
Server/Security Care Server.
⚫ Smart TV/Monitor Developer must check whether the encryption module
used in the System Integrity Monitoring function, Phishing Site Blocking
function operates normally.
⚫ Smart TV/Monitor Developer must securely manage the keys used for script
file signature verification function.
11. Security Target
Smart TV and Monitor Security Solution V9.0 for Samsung Knox Security Target V1.2[4]
is included in this report for reference. For the purpose of publication, it is provided as
sanitized version [5] according to the CCRA supporting document ST sanitizing for
publication [6].
12. Acronyms and Glossary
CC Common Criteria
CLI Command Line Interface
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
Certification Report Page 21
ETR
OR
TSF
Evaluation Technical Report
Observation Report
TOE Security Functionality
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
Security Care Server Server to collect problems by receiving reports
delivered by the System Integrity Monitoring
function of Smart TV/Monitor and to provide online
update of the DB list of internal phishing sites used
for the Phishing Site Blocking function.
Google Safe Browsing The Google Safe Browsing is a service provided by
Google that provides a URL list containing phishing
content and a public API to use it.
Update Manager It delivers the report of the System Integrity
Monitoring function to the Security Care Server and
downloads the phishing site DB list from the
Security Care Server.
Smart TV/Monitor User Users who install and run apps to use various
smart functions installed on the TV/Monitor and
utilize management functions supported within the
TV/Monitor.
Smart TV/Monitor Developer Developers who are provided with an environment
to use the Serial Port and develop applications to
be installed on smart TV/Monitor using the security
functions of the TOE.
Tizen OS Tizen is based on the Linux kernel of Linux
foundation, and is made based on HTML5 and
C++. It is an open source operating system having
the purpose of being included in mobile devices
including smart phone, and electronic devices such
as TV.
Trusted Execution Environment
(TEE)
This refers to an execution environment providing
the security of a quality higher than the execution
environment provided in general operating
Certification Report Page 22
environment. This defined the function of security
hardware and software providing execution
environment based on secure reliability of security
related applications in devices such as
smartphone, Smart TV/Monitor. Global Platform,
which is a standard group, establishes the
standard in the architecture of TEE and related
API.
Rich Execution Environment
(REE)
This is a concept that is contradictory to TEE, and
refers to execution environment provided by
general operating environment such as Tizen and
Android.
TrustWare Samsung Electronics developed its own TEE
operating system from kernel based on ARM
TrustZone tech.
Samsung Knox Brand name given to a secure platform and
security solutions that are equipped with the
products released from Samsung Electronics.
13. Bibliography
The evaluation facility has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CC:2022
Revision 1, CCMB-2022-11-001 ~ CCMB-2022-11-005, November 2022
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CC:2022
Revision 1, CCMB-2022-11-006, November 2022
Errata and Interpretation for CC:2022 (Release 1) and CEM:2022 (Release 1)
[3] Smart TV and Monitor Security Solution V9.0 for Samsung Knox, Evaluation
Technical Report V2.00, March 3, 2026
[4] Smart TV and Monitor Security Solution V9.0 for Samsung Knox Security Target
V1.2, February 2, 2026
Certification Report Page 23
[5] Smart TV and Monitor Security Solution V9.0 for Samsung Knox Security Target
Lite V1.1, February 2, 2026 (Sanitized Version)
[6] ST sanitizing for publication, CCDB-2006-04-004, April 2006