National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
FireEye HX Series Appliances 4.0, Version 1.0
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10892-2018
Dated: 31 July 2018
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jean Petty
Chris Thorpe
Patrick Mallett, PhD
Lisa D. Mitchell
Jenn Dotsen
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 5
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 7
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 8
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ............................................................... 10
5.1 Assumptions..................................................................................................................................................10
5.2 Threats...........................................................................................................................................................11
5.3 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................12
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 13
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 14
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................14
7.2 Excluded Functionality .................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 15
8.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................15
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................15
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 16
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................16
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................16
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................16
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................17
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................17
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................17
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................17
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 19
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 20
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 21
13 Glossary ................................................................................................................................ 22
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 23
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is
where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those
security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5
and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration
are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the FireEye HX Series Appliances Target of Evaluation (TOE). It presents the
evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an
endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is
either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of
the product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in July 2018. The information in this report
is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report, all
written by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common
Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant and meets the assurance requirements defined in
the Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0 + Errata 20180314
(NDcPPv2.0e).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in
the NDcPP. This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common
Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Based on
these findings, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate,
the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of
Standards effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate
products against Protection Profile containing Assurance Activities, which are
interpretation of CEM work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality
and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products
desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's
evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's
Product Compliance List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE FireEye HX Series Appliances 4.0
Protection Profile Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0 + Errata 20180314,
14 March 2018 (NDcPPv2.0e)
Security Target FireEye HX Series Appliances Security Target
Evaluation Technical
Report
FireEye HX Series Appliances ETR
CC Version Version 3.1 Revision 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor FireEye, Inc.
Developer FireEye, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
2400 Research Blvd
Rockville, MD 20850
CCEVS Validators Jean Petty
Chris Thorpe
Patrick Mallett
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Jenn Dotson
Lisa Mitchell
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3 Architectural Information
The TOE is classified as network devices that provide a managed solution for managing the
security posture of connected end points. The FireEye HX Series Appliances are network devices
providing organizations with the ability to continuously monitor endpoints for advanced malware
and indicators of compromise.
The HX 4502v is a virtual appliance version of the TOE, and the hardware and virtualization
layer are included in the TOE boundary. There may only be one instance of the HX 4502v
virtual appliance installed on the physical hardware platform. Thus, the TOE is considered to be
a network device as defined in NDcPP v2.0e modified by a few TDs.
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4 Security Policy
The logical boundary of the TOE includes those security functions implemented exclusively by
the TOE.
Security Audit
The TOE keeps local and remote audit records of security relevant events. The TOE internally
maintains the date and time which can either be set manually or synchronized with an NTP
server.
Cryptographic Operations
The TOE provides cryptographic support for the services and the related FIPS140-2 validation
details are provided in the table below.
Cryptographic Method Use within the TOE
TLS Establishment Used to establish initial TLS session.
SSH Establishment Used to establish initial SSH session.
ECDSA Signature
Services
Used in TLS session establishment.
RSA Signature Services Used in TLS session establishment.
Used in SSH session establishment
Used in secure software update
SP 800-90 DRBG Used in TLS session establishment.
Used in SSH session establishment
SHS Used in secure software update
HMAC-SHS Used to provide TLS traffic integrity verification
Used to provide SSH traffic integrity verification
AES Used to encrypt TLS traffic
Used to encrypt SSH traffic
Protected Communications
The TOE protects the integrity and confidentiality of communications such as SSH connectivity
with the Management SSH Client. Additionally, the TOE provides TLS connectivity with the
following entities: Audit Server (with device level authentication) and Management Web
Browser.
Secure Administration
The TOE enables secure local and remote management of its security functions, including:
o Local console CLI administration
o Remote CLI administration via SSHv2
o Remote GUI administration via HTTPS/TLS
o Administrator authentication using a local database
o Timed user lockout after multiple failed authentication attempts
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o Password complexity enforcement
o Role Based Access Control - the TOE supports several types of administrative user
roles. Collectively these sub-roles comprise the “Security Administrator”
o Configurable banners to be displayed at login
o Timeouts to terminate administrative sessions after a set period of inactivity
o Protection of secret keys and passwords
Self-Test
The TOE performs a suite of self-tests to ensure the correct operation and enforcement of its
security functions.
Trusted Update
The TOE ensures the authenticity and integrity of software updates through digital signatures
and requires administrative intervention prior to the software updates being installed.
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5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE
security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
Assumption Description
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION The network device is assumed to be physically protected in its
operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that
compromise the security and/or interfere with the device’s physical
interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to
be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result,
the [NDcPP] will not include any requirements on physical tamper
protection or other physical attack mitigations. The [NDcPP] will not
expect the product to defend against physical access to the device that
allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other controls, or
otherwise manipulate the device.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core
function and not provide functionality/services that could be deemed
as general purpose computing. For example, the device should not
provide a computing platform for general purpose applications
(unrelated to networking functionality).
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION A standard/generic network device does not provide any assurance
regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the
network device to protect data that originates on or is destined to the
device itself, to include administrative data and audit data. Traffic that
is traversing the network device, destined for another network entity,
is not covered by the NDcPP. It is assumed that this protection will
be covered by cPPs for particular types of network devices (e.g.,
firewall).
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR The Security Administrator(s) for the network device are assumed to
be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the
organization. This includes being appropriately trained, following
policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are
trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and
entropy and to lack malicious intent when administering the device.
The network device is not expected to be capable of defending against
a malicious Administrator that actively works to bypass or
compromise the security of the device.
A.REGULAR_UPDATES The network device firmware and software is assumed to be updated
by an Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of
product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the
network device are protected by the platform on which they reside.
A.COMPONENTS_RUNNING (applies
to distributed TOEs only)
For distributed TOEs it is assumed that the availability of all TOE
components is checked as appropriate to reduce the risk of an
undetected attack on (or failure of) one or more TOE components. It
is also assumed that in addition to the availability of all components
it is also checked as appropriate that the audit functionality is running
properly on all TOE components.
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access
possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys,
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Assumption Description
keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment
when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational
environment.
5.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The
assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
Threat Description
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMI
NISTRATOR_ACCESS
Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to the network device by
nefarious means such as masquerading as an Administrator to the device,
masquerading as the device to an Administrator, replaying an administrative
session (in its entirety, or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle
attacks, which would provide access to the administrative session, or sessions
between network devices. Successfully gaining Administrator access allows
malicious actions that compromise the security functionality of the device and the
network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPH
Y
Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a
cryptographic exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption
algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow attackers to compromise the
algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key space and give them unauthorized
access allowing them to read, manipulate and/or control the traffic with minimal
effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUN
ICATION_CHANNELS
Threat agents may attempt to target network devices that do not use standardized
secure tunnelling protocols to protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may
take advantage of poorly designed protocols or poor key management to
successfully perform man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful
attacks will result in loss of confidentiality and integrity of the critical network
traffic, and potentially could lead to a compromise of the network device itself.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATI
ON_ENDPOINTS
Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use weak methods to
authenticate the endpoints – e.g. a shared password that is guessable or transported
as plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the
attacker could masquerade as the Administrator or another device, and the
attacker could insert themselves into the network stream and perform a man-in-
the-middle attack. The result is the critical network traffic is exposed and there
could be a loss of confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the network device
itself could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of the software or
firmware which undermines the security functionality of the device. Non-
validated updates or updates validated using non-secure or weak cryptography
leave the update firmware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVIT
Y
Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the security
functionality of the network device without Administrator awareness. This could
result in the attacker finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the
product) to compromise the device and the Administrator would have no
knowledge that the device has been compromised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONA
LITY_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data enabling continued
access to the network device and its critical data. The compromise of credentials
includes replacing existing credentials with an attacker’s credentials, modifying
existing credentials, or obtaining the Administrator or device credentials for use
by the attacker.
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Threat Description
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak administrative passwords to
gain privileged access to the device. Having privileged access to the device
provides the attacker unfettered access to the network traffic, and may allow them
to take advantage of any trust relationships with other network devices.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONA
LITY_FAILURE
Security mechanisms of the network device generally build up from roots of trust
to more complex sets of mechanisms. Failures could result in a compromise to
the security functionality of the device. A network device self-testing its security
critical components at both start-up and during run-time ensures the reliability
of the device’s security functionality.
5.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this
evaluation is defined within the NDcPPv2.0e.
 Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not
specifically search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an
“obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities
included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
 FireEye HX Series Appliances Security Target
 FireEye HX Series Appliances Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures
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7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE evaluated configuration consists of one of the following HX series appliances,
 HX 4402
 HX 4502
 HX 4502v
The TOE also supports (sometimes optionally) secure connectivity with several other IT
environment devices, including,
Component Required Usage/Purpose Description for TOE performance
Management Workstation
with Web Browser/SSH
Client
Yes This includes any IT Environment Management workstation with a
Web Browser and a SSH client installed that is used by the TOE
administrator to support TOE administration through HTTPS and SSH
protected channels. Any SSH client that supports SSHv2 may be used.
Any web browser that supports TLS 1.1 or greater may be used.
NTP Server No The TOE supports communications with an NTP server to synchronize
date and time.
Syslog server No The syslog audit server is used for remote storage of audit records that
have been generated by and transmitted from the TOE. The syslog
server must support communications using TLS 1.1 or TLS 1.2.
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in Evaluation Test Report for FireEye HX Series Appliances, which
is not publicly available. The Assurance Activities Report provides an overview of testing and
the prescribed assurance activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the vendor-provided guidance documentation
and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP. The Independent Testing activity is documented in the
Assurance Activities Report, which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR). The reader of this document can assume that activities and
work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the FireEye HX Series
Appliances to be Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally the
evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the NDPP.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the FireEye HX Series Appliances that are consistent
with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the
requirements. Additionally, the evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities
specified in the NDcPP.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in
the Security Target's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP related to the examination of the information
contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of
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the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP related to the examination of the information
contained in the operational guidance documents.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the Assurance Activities in the NDcPP and recorded the results in a Test Report,
summarized in the Evaluation Technical Report and Assurance Activities Report.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities
in the NDcPP, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed a public
search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any issues with
the TOE.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the NDcPPv2.0e, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the NDcPPv2.0e,
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and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The validators suggest that the consumer pay special attention to the evaluated configuration of
the device(s) and the specific functionality defined within the Security Target. The functionality
evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the Security
Target. Only the functionality implemented by the security functional requirements within the
Security Target was evaluated. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as
part of this evaluation.
The product contains more functionality than was covered by the evaluation. All other
functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions
can be drawn about their effectiveness.
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11 Annexes
Not applicable.
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12 Security Target
FireEye HX Series Appliances Security Target, version 1.2, July 2018.
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13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
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14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5.