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ASE – Security Target Lite
Security Target Lite of the Security Enclave in
SEQUANS communication SoC Monarch 2/N-SQN3401
TESIC-04001R20
D-SPD-1113-1311-1.0
Security Level 1: Public
Revision: 1.0
Date: 30/07/2021
Security Target Lite of the Security Enclave in SEQUANS communication SoC Monarch 2/N-SQN3401
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Contents
Version..................................................................................................................................................5
1 Security Target Introduction .............................................................................................................6
This chapter Version.............................................................................................................................6
1.1 Security Target and Target of Evaluation Reference ...............................................................6
1.2 TOE Overview and TOE Description........................................................................................7
1.2.1 Introduction.......................................................................................................................7
1.2.2 TOE Definition ..................................................................................................................7
1.2.3 TOE Hardware..................................................................................................................9
1.2.4 TOE Software ................................................................................................................ 10
1.2.5 TOE Configuration......................................................................................................... 12
1.2.6 TOE Life Cycle............................................................................................................... 14
1.2.7 TOE security domains ................................................................................................... 18
1.3 Interfaces of the TOE .............................................................................................................18
1.3.1 Hardware Interfaces ...................................................................................................... 18
1.3.2 Software Interfaces........................................................................................................ 19
1.4 TOE intended Usage ..............................................................................................................19
2 Conformance Claims......................................................................................................................20
2.1 CC Conformance Claim..........................................................................................................20
2.2 PP Claim.................................................................................................................................20
2.3 PP Additions ...........................................................................................................................21
2.4 Package Claim........................................................................................................................22
2.5 Conformance Claim Rationale................................................................................................22
3 Security Problem Definition ............................................................................................................23
3.1 Description of Assets..............................................................................................................23
3.2 Threats....................................................................................................................................25
3.2.1 Standard Threats........................................................................................................... 27
3.2.2 Threats related to security services............................................................................... 29
3.2.3 Threats related to additional TOE Specific Functionality .............................................. 29
3.2.4 Threats related to Authentication of the Security IC...................................................... 30
3.2.5 Threats related to flash ICs'........................................................................................... 30
3.2.6 Threats related to architectures with passive external NVMs ....................................... 30
3.3 Organizational Security Policies.............................................................................................33
3.4 Assumptions ...........................................................................................................................34
4 Security Objectives.........................................................................................................................37
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE .............................................................................................37
4.2 Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software .................................................44
4.2.1 Clarification of “Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)” ............................................ 45
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4.3 Security Objectives for the operational Environment .............................................................45
4.3.1 “Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization (OE.Process-Sec-IC)”... 46
4.3.2 Clarification of “Protection during Composite Product Manufacturing (OE.Process-Sec-
IC)” 46
4.3.3 “Limitation of capability and blocking the Loader (OE.Lim_Block_Loader)” ................. 46
4.3.4 Clarification of “Limitation of capability and blocking the Loader (OE.Lim_Block_Loader)”
47
4.3.5 “External entities authenticating of the TOE (OE.TOE_Auth)” ...................................... 47
4.3.6 “Secure communication and usage of the Loader (OE.Loader_Usage)” ...................... 47
4.4 Security Objectives Rationale.................................................................................................47
5 Extended Components Definition...................................................................................................52
5.1 Definition of the Family FDP_URC.........................................................................................52
5.2 Definition of the Family FDP_IRA...........................................................................................53
6 IT Security Requirements...............................................................................................................55
6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE......................................................................55
6.1.1 Malfunctions................................................................................................................... 58
6.1.2 Abuse of Functionality ................................................................................................... 58
6.1.3 Physical Manipulation and Probing ............................................................................... 60
6.1.4 Leakage......................................................................................................................... 62
6.1.5 Random Numbers.......................................................................................................... 63
6.1.6 Memory Access Control ................................................................................................ 64
6.1.7 Cryptographic reuse of memory .................................................................................... 66
6.1.8 Cryptographic Support................................................................................................... 66
6.1.9 Authentication of the TOE ............................................................................................. 70
6.1.10 Loader dedicated for usage by authorized users only .................................................. 71
6.1.11 Passive External NVM................................................................................................... 72
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE .....................................................................74
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale...........................................................................................75
6.3.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements..................................................... 75
6.3.2 Dependencies of security functional requirements........................................................ 82
6.3.3 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements................................................................... 85
6.3.4 Security Requirements are Internally Consistent .......................................................... 85
7 TOE Summary Specification ..........................................................................................................88
8 ANNEX ...........................................................................................................................................94
8.1 Glossary..................................................................................................................................94
8.2 Literature.................................................................................................................................95
8.3 List of Abbreviations ...............................................................................................................97
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1-1: SoC simplified architecture ................................................................................................... 8
Figure 1-2: Block diagram of the TOE..................................................................................................... 9
Figure 1-3 : Software TOE components................................................................................................ 10
Figure 1-4: TOE Engineering Samples life cycle................................................................................... 17
Figure 3-1: Standard Threats ................................................................................................................ 25
Figure 3-2: Threats related to security service...................................................................................... 26
Figure 3-3: Interactions between the TOE and its outer world.............................................................. 26
Figure 3-4: Policies................................................................................................................................ 33
Figure 3-5: Assumptions........................................................................................................................ 35
Figure 4-1: Standard Security Objectives.............................................................................................. 37
Figure 4-2: Security Objectives related to Specific Functionality .......................................................... 38
Figure 4-3: Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software development environment... 45
Figure 4-4: Security Objectives for the operational Environment.......................................................... 45
Table 1-1: Summary of TOE hardware, software and guidance documents ........................................ 13
Table 1-2: TOE Hardware identification ................................................................................................ 14
Table 1-3: TOE engineering Samples Life cycle phases & development location................................ 16
Table 4-1: Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies ............................................. 48
Table 6-1: Summary of the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE......................................... 58
Table 6-2: Security Requirements versus Security Objectives ............................................................. 77
Table 6-3 : Dependencies of the Security Functional Requirements.................................................... 84
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Version
Version Date Description
1.0 30/07/2021 Initial release
Security Target Lite of the Security Enclave in SEQUANS communication SoC Monarch 2/N-SQN3401
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TIEMPO S.A.S. Confidential Information. Security Target Introduction
6 www.tiempo-secure.com This chapter Version
1 Security Target Introduction
This chapter Version
Version Date Description
1.0 30/07/2021 Initial release
1 Security Target Introduction contains the following sections:
Security Target and Target of Evaluation Reference (1.1)
TOE Overview and TOE Description (1.2)
Interfaces of the TOE (1.3)
TOE intended Usage (1.4)
1.1 Security Target and Target of Evaluation Reference
2 This document is entitled “Security Target Lite of the Security Enclave in SEQUANS
communication SoC Monarch 2/N-SQN3401”, is in its version 1.0 and is dated 30/07/2021. The
Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Tiempo Security IP TESIC-04001R20 with an optional specific
IC-dedicated firmware and an optional cryptographic library. It constitutes the security enclave of
the Sequans Communication SoC Monarch 2/N – SQN3401. The Target of Evaluation (TOE)
TESIC-04001R20 is described in the following sections.
3 The Security Target is strictly compliant to Eurosmart Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages, Version 1.0, 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084 [1] and built on Common criteria
version 3.1 [2-5].
4 The targeted Evaluation Assurance Level for the TOE is EAL5 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and
ALC_DVS.2.
Title: Security Target Lite of the Security Enclave in SEQUANS
communication SoC Monarch 2/N-SQN3401
Target of Evaluation Tiempo Security IP TESIC-04001R20
TOE reference: TESIC-04001R20-BL2.0-AL28-CL3.0.F
Provided by: TIEMPO-IC
Evaluation schema: France (ANSSI)
Evaluator: LETI ITSEF (France)
Common Criteria version: [2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model; April 2017,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Requirements; April 2017,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002.
[4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements; April 2017,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003.
[5] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology; April 2017, Version
3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004.
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1.2 TOE Overview and TOE Description
1.2.1 Introduction
5 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the security enclave TESIC-04001R20 of the communication
chip Monarch 2/N - SQN3401. The security enclave includes a ROM (64Kbytes), a RAM
(32Kbytes), a CACHERAM (16Kbytes), a CRYPTORAM (4Kbytes), an OTP (128 Kbits),
accelerators for symmetric/asymmetric cryptography and random number/keys generation. The
security enclave is able to securely manage an external non-volatile memory. A Crypto-library is
provided which includes symmetric and asymmetric cryptography as well as keys and random
number generation. An ADMIN loader and services is also provided to manage the external
memory.
1.2.2 TOE Definition
6 TESIC-04001R20 is the security enclave of SQN3401 and is a hardware IP provided by Tiempo,
based on Tiempo TESIC asynchronous platform, built around an 8/16/32-bit asynchronous CPU
with coprocessors for hardware acceleration of standard cryptographic operations, peripherals,
communication interfaces, embedded memories and security features.
7 The main security features associated to security services integrated in TESIC-04001R20 are
listed below:
 Security sensors.
 Shield.
 Security mechanisms for memory protection.
 Dedicated hardware techniques against side-channel attacks
 Dedicated hardware techniques against fault injection attacks
 Secure DES/Triple DES cryptographic coprocessor
 Secure AES cryptographic coprocessor
 Secure accelerator for RSA and ECC against side channel and fault injection attacks.
 True Random Number Generator (TRNG) that meets some of ANSSI requirements
(RGS_B1).
 Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG)
o No compliance to any specific metric but PRNG is used by the chip for internal use.
 Proprietary secure asynchronous CPU.
 Secure CRC coprocessor for integrity check.
 Memory protection unit (MPU) for secure access memory.
 Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) that meets some of ANSSI requirements
(RGS_B1).
 Secure software AES.
 Secure software DES.
 Secure software RSA.
 Secure software ECC.
 Secure software SHA2 (SHA2-224/ SHA2-256/SHA2-384/SHA2-512).
 Secure software AEAD algorithm.
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 Secure external memory management.
Note: the DRBG from the IC Dedicated Support Software combined with the TRNG from the IC together
meet some of the ANSSI requirements (RGS_B1).
8 The operating temperature range is defined as:
 -40°C to +125°C
9 The operating voltage range is defined as:
 0.99 V – 1.1 V
10 The overview of the architecture of the Monarch 2/N-SQN3401 SoC is presented in Figure 1-1.
Figure 1-1: SoC simplified architecture
11 The CPU platform macro includes the 3 CPUs and all additional functional blocks (timers, WDT,
etc.) together with all interfaces (UARTs, SPI, I2C, etc.). Additionally, 10 DMAs, QSPI, PSRAM
controllers are included in the platform as well as a PCM/I2S block for audio support. The CPU
platform also includes a Flash controller which communicates with the external NVM. The TESIC-
04001R20 security enclave is one of the featured subsystems of the CPU platform.
12 The power supply for the TOE and the global reset are handled by the PMU in a separate
wrapper.
13 The architecture described in Figure 1-1 uses a passive external NVM (Flash memory) that does
not implement any security functionality.
14 The TOE fetches the IC dedicated software from the external NVM.
15 The external NVM comprises an area dedicated for the TOE in which the data is encrypted using
diversified keys that are specific to each chip.
16 The IC dedicated software is optionally loaded in external NVM in phase 5 secured by the Tiempo
keys loaded in phase 4. It includes a full featured Admin loader with the services needed to store
TSF and user data in external memory (providing confidentiality, authenticity and anti-roll-back
protection). Then the composite application software is loaded into the external NVM in phase 5.
17 The software stored in the external memory is decrypted, authenticated and loaded in the internal
CACHE RAM memory before being executed.
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1.2.3 TOE Hardware
18 The overview of the hardware architecture is presented in Figure 1-2.
Figure 1-2: Block diagram of the TOE
19 The hardware blocks integrated in the TOE are listed below:
 Low power 8/16-bit microcontroller which provides 32-bit operations.
 Timers: 3 timers providing periodic timestamp, watchdog, application timeout, profiling
function, and CPU power saving mode features.
 Interrupt controller with 2 types of interrupts: Maskable interrupts (MI) and non-maskable
interrupts (NMI).
 Hardware contact interface compliant with ISO7816-3 [6].
 AMBA AHB-Lite master interface as a suitable interface for high-performance designs.
 AMBA APB slave interface.
 Hardware AES cryptographic coprocessor compliant with the AES-128, AES-192 and
AES-256 standards [7] as a part of the TPOCRYPTO subsystem which regroups the AES
and PKA cryptographic modules.
 Hardware DES/Triple DES cryptographic coprocessor with 56 bits, 112 bits and 168 bits
of key sizes [8].
 Hardware asymmetric cryptographic accelerator (PKA) implementing RSA and ECC over
GF(p) with operand sizes up to 4096 bits. It integrates modular multiplication function,
addition and subtraction functions, shift functions and logical operation functions [11]. It is
a part of the TPOCRYPTO subsystem which regroups the AES and PKA cryptographic
modules.
 CRC-16 block compliant with ISO/IEC 13239 with additional recommendation in
CCITTv41 [12].
 Security sensors.
 True Random Number Generator (TRNG) that meets some of ANSSI requirements
(RGS_B1).
 Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG)
o No compliance to any specific metric but PRNG is used by the chip for internal use.
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 Shield.
 OTP (One-Time programmable) memory of 128 Kbits.
 RAM of 52 Kbytes.
 Read-Only Memory of 64 Kbytes.
 Reset block.
 Memory controller block (BUS).
 General Purpose Inputs and Outputs (GPI, GPO).
 Memory protection unit (MPU).
20 The TOE directly reads the external memories content, but communicates with the SoC software
in order to write and erase.
1.2.4 TOE Software
21 The software TOE components are described in the Figure 1-3.
Figure 1-3 : Software TOE components
22 The software components contained in the TOE is listed below:
 The IC Dedicated Test software which provides the self-test capabilities and allows to pre-
personalize the IC in OTP before the external NVM is available. This software is not
available after TOE delivery.
 The IC Dedicated Support Software is part of the TOE. It provides services after TOE
delivery and is composed of:
o The Secure Bootloader used to initialize the product and located in ROM.
o The RMA domain used as a special diagnostic mode which can be run at every steps
of the life cycle to provide failure analysis without modifying the TOE state. The
advanced debug capabilities are locked before TOE delivery.
o The PRE-PERSO loader used to load data and code to RAM, OTP or external memory
and switch to the ADMIN mode. The PRE-PERSO software is located in the ROM
memory.
o The Write interface installer is a software loaded by the PRE-PERSO-loader and
executed during the load process. It installs the eNVM driver which is used by the
loader to write and erase in external flash.
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o The AEAD service dedicated to encryption and authentication of data/code which are
initially accessed from the external memory. The AEAD service is part IC Dedicated
Software written in the ROM memory.
o The ADMIN loader and services (optional) are loaded into the external NVM. The
ADMIN loader is used load the composite application in external memory. The ADMIN
services are used by both the ADMIN loader and the composite application to protect
the external memory against modification, disclosure or roll-back.
o The crypto library (optional). The crypto library is loaded into the external NVM. The
software components of the Crypto Library are:
 The optional secure DRBG library built on top of the TESIC-04001R20
cryptographic coprocessors and TRNG. The DRBG library meets some of the
ANSSI requirements (RGS_B1). It provides high level interface functions to
perform Random Number Generation:
 Generation of the internal DRBG seed matching the specified entropy
strength.
 Secure instantiation of a DRBG engine.
 Secure reseed of a DRBG instance.
 Secure generation of a pseudo random bit stream from an instantiated DRBG.
 Release of the resources of a DRBG instance.
 The optional secure DES library built on top of the TESIC-04001R20 TDES
coprocessor and providing the following high-level interface to DES cryptographic
algorithms:
 Secure DES cryptographic encryption or decryption operation in ECB mode.
 Secure TDEA (triple DES) cryptographic encryption or decryption operation
in ECB mode.
 Secure DES cryptographic encryption or decryption operation in CBC mode.
 Secure TDEA (triple DES) cryptographic encryption or decryption operation
in CBC mode.
 The optional secure AES library built on top of the TESIC-04001R20 AES
coprocessor and providing the following high-level interface to AES cryptographic
algorithms:
 Secure AES cryptographic encryption or decryption operation in ECB mode.
 Secure AES cryptographic encryption or decryption operation in CBC mode.
 Secure AES cryptographic encryption or decryption operation in CTR mode.
 Secure AES cryptographic encryption or decryption operation in CMAC
mode.
 The optional secure RSA library built on top of the TESIC-04001R20 crypto
processors and providing high-level interface to RSA cryptographic algorithms.
The following RSA interfaces are provided:
 Secure RSA public and private key pair generation.
 Secure RSA signature generation using CRT or standard method.
 Secure RSA signature verification.
 Secure RSA encryption operation.
 Secure RSA decryption operation.
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 The optional secure ECC library built on top of the TESIC-04001R20 crypto
processors and providing high-level interface to ECC cryptographic operations.
The following ECC functions are provided:
 Secure ECC point addition.
 Secure ECC point scalar multiplication.
 Secure ECC Diffie-Hellman Key agreement.
 Secure ECC key pair generation.
 Secure ECDSA signature generation.
 Secure ECDSA signature verification.
 The optional secure hash calculation (SHA) library built on top of the TESIC-
04001R20 and providing high-level interface to SHA hash algorithms. The
following SHA functions are provided:
 Secure hash calculation according to the SHA2-224.
 Secure hash calculation according to the SHA2-256.
 Secure hash calculation according to the SHA2-384.
 Secure hash calculation according to the SHA2-512.Secure
1.2.5 TOE Configuration
23 The Table 1-1 summarizes the hardware, software and guidance documents of the TOE.
Component Version Date
Hardware, delivered as encrypted GDSII to the manufacturer
Monarch 2/N – SQN3401 A1 23/05/2020
TESIC-04001R20 Hard Macro 04001 23/05/2020
Software, integrated in ROM memory and delivered in the hardware GDSII
TESIC-04001R20 Secure Bootloader 2.0 23/05/2020
Software, delivered as Embedded software
TESIC-04001R20 Admin Loader and services
TESIC-04001R20 Write interface installer
28
1.0
Software, delivered as Embedded software
TESIC-04001R20 Cryptographic Library 3.0.F
Guidance, delivered as electronic document
TESIC-04001R20 - AGD_PRE - Preparative 1.1 22/07/2021
TESIC-04001R20 - AGD_OPE - Operational User Guidance 1.2 16/07/2021
TESIC-04001R20 Hardware User Manual 1.11 08/07/2021
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TESIC-04001R20 Crypto Library User Manual
3.0.F
Rev 1
30/07/2021
TESIC-04001R20 Software Development Kit User Manual 1.1 30/07/2020
TESIC-04001R20 TESIC Host Loader User Manual 1.5 06/04/2021
TESIC-04001R20 - Admin Loader User Specification 1.0 22/01/2021
TESIC-04001R20 - AGD_OPE - Developer role 2.4 16/07/2021
TESIC_04001R20 - AGD_OPE - eNVM loader role 1.4 01/07/2021
TESIC_04001R20- AGD_OPE – Package generator role 1.3 11/06/2021
TESIC_04001R20- AGD_OPE – Flash Write interface specification 1.6 28/11/2019
TESIC-04001R20-CL AGD_OPE - Security Guidelines 1.2 11/06/2021
TESIC_04001R20- AGD_OPE ADMIN – Package generator role 1.3 06/07/2021
TESIC_04001R20 ADM - AGD_OPE - Developer role 1.1 02/07/2021
TESIC_04001R20 ADM - AGD_OPE - Loader role 1.3 01/07/2021
TESIC-04001R20 ADMIN services – User guide 1.1 16/04/2021
Monarch N Platform - SQN3410 Chipset - Datasheet Rev. 2 January 2020
Table 1-1: Summary of TOE hardware, software and guidance documents
24 The methods of delivery of the TOE components are the following:
 The crypto library files, composed of header files (.h) and static binary libraries (.a), are
compressed (tar.gz), PGP encrypted using the recipient key and signed using the sender
PGP key. The software package is then sent by email or pushed to a server.
 The ADMIN loader is packaged in a self-secure load package suitable for being loaded
by the TOE in PRE-PERSO mode. It is signed using AES-CMAC and encrypted using
AES-CBC, with a key set devoted to each production lot. The self-secure load package is
made available using a HSM.
 All user guide and security guidance are delivered as a pdf format, PGP encrypted using
the recipient key and signed using the Tiempo sender key. The signed and encrypted
documents are then sent by email or pushed to a server.
 The hardware TOE is delivered using standard transportation at the end of phase 4.
25 The Table 1-2 gives the expected values of the TOE hardware identifiers for the TOE Reference
TESIC-04001R20-BL2.0-AL28-CL3.0.F.
Identifier Expected Value
PRODUCTID 0x0400
MASKID0 0x1110
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MASKID1 0x0001
MASKID2 0x5000
MASKID3 0x0005
JTAGID 0x00400AAB
ROM_VERSION 0x0002
Table 1-2: TOE Hardware identification
1.2.6 TOE Life Cycle
26 The complex development and manufacturing processes of a Composite Product can be
separated into seven distinct phases. The phases 2 and 3 of the Composite Product life cycle
cover the IC development and production. The table below details these different phases by
giving the companies involved and their locations.
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Phase Description Company Location
Phase 2 IC Development
- IC Design
- IC Dedicated Software
development.
- Integration of the Security
enclave into the SoC
GDSII
TIEMPO SAS 110 rue Blaise Pascal
Bâtiment Viseo –Inovallée
38330 Montbonnot Saint
Martin FRANCE
T : +33 4 76 61 10 00
F : +33 4 76 44 19 69
Phase 3 IC Manufacturing
- Mask preparation
- Integration and photo
mask fabrication.
- IC production
TSMC Fab 14A
TSMC Fab 14A
TSMC Fab 14A
1-1, Nan-ke North Road,
Tainan Science Park,
Shanhua District
741-44 Tainan City
TAIWAN
T : +886 6 505 6688
F : +886 6 505 1262
Phase 3 IC testing
- SoC testing
UTAC Singapore
SPIL TAIWAN
5 Serangoon North Ave 5
Singapore 554916
T:+65 6481 0033
No. 19, Keya Rd., Daya,
Taichung , Taiwan 428, R. O.
C.
T: +886 4 2554 5527
Phase 4 IC Packaging
- Security IC packaging
- Security enclave testing &
Pre personalization
SPIL TAIWAN
TIEMPO SAS
No. 19, Keya Rd., Daya,
Taichung , Taiwan 428, R. O.
C.
T: +886 4 2554 5527
110 rue Blaise Pascal
Bâtiment Viseo –Inovallée
38330 Montbonnot Saint
Martin FRANCE
T : +33 4 76 61 10 00
F : +33 4 76 44 19 69
In addition, four important stages have to be considered in the Composite Product life cycle
Phase 1 Security IC Embedded Software
Development.
Phase 5 Composite Product Integration.
- The Composite Product
finishing process,
preparation and shipping
to the personalization line
for the Composite Product
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Description
Phase 6 Personalization
- The Composite Product
personalization and testing
stage where the User Data
is loaded into the Security
IC's memory.
Phase 7 Operational Usage
- The Composite Product
usage by its issuers and
consumers which may
include loading and other
management of
applications in the field.
Table 1-3: TOE engineering Samples Life cycle phases & development location
27 Figure 1-4 provides an overview of the TOE’s engineering sample Life cycle and maps it onto
the relevant PP0084 phases [1] as well as the corresponding IC operating modes.
28 This engineering samples life cycle is the temporary life cycle that is assessed in the current
evaluation. It is limited to the TOE development and is meant to replace the standard production
life-cycle in the short term. A revaluation process is to be expected once the site used for the
production life cycle are determined and in place.
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www.tiempo-secure.com 17
Figure 1-4: TOE Engineering Samples life cycle
29 The Security IC Embedded Software is developed outside the TOE development in Phase 1. The
TOE is developed in Phase 2 and produced in Phase 3.
30 In the following the term “TOE Delivery” (refer to Figure 1-4) is uniquely used to indicate:
- during phase 5 when the TOE in Admin mode (as part of the SoC) is delivered in form of
packaged products. Indeed, the pre-personalization is performed by the developer and the
TOE is delivered in admin mode.
31 The Protection Profile uniquely uses the term “TOE Manufacturer” which includes the following
roles:
- the IC Developer (Phase 2),
- the IC Manufacturer (Phase 3) and
- the IC Packaging Manufacturer (Phase 4)
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18 www.tiempo-secure.com Interfaces of the TOE
32 Hence the “TOE Manufacturer” comprises all roles beginning with Phase 2 and before “TOE
Delivery”. Starting with “TOE Delivery” another party takes over the control of the TOE.
33 The Protection Profile uniquely uses the term “Composite Product Manufacturer” which includes
all roles (outside TOE development and manufacturing) except the End-consumer as user of the
Composite Product (refer to Figure 1-3) which are the following:
- security IC Embedded Software development (Phase 1).
- the IC Packaging Manufacturer (Phase 4)
if the TOE is delivered after Phase 3 in form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice)
- the Composite Product Manufacturer (Phase 5) and the Personaliser (Phase 6).
1.2.7 TOE security domains
34 The TOE integrates two separated domains: the RMA domain and the NORMAL domain.
The RMA domain is a domain for test and debug purposes. It implements:
 A diagnostic mode which allows to run self-test procedures at any step of the life cycle. It
does not change the internal state of the TOE.
 An advanced diagnostic mode which is only usable by Tiempo. This mode is locked before
the TOE delivery.
The NORMAL domain is the default domain which contains several modes:
 TEST mode: this is the first operating mode after manufacturing which allows to test the
circuit and run the self-test
 PRE-PERSO mode: this mode is dedicated to loading data and code to OTP or external
memory (when available). It is used in phase 4 before TOE delivery for pre-
personalization and key provisioning, and after TOE delivery in phase 5 to load the ADMIN
loader and switch to ADMIN mode.
 ADMIN mode: this mode aims at loading the firmware to external memory using ADMIN
services loaded in PRE-PERSO, and preparing the chip to enter in FIRMWARE mode.
The ADMIN services include the secure external memory management which is used by
the ADMIN loader to load the data, and then by the loaded firmware to access it.
 FIRMWARE mode: is entered once the ADMIN mode is locked. This mode is the
privileged execution mode of the user firmware and is the default mode for the operational
use of the composite product.
35 The selection of the operating domain and mode is done at each boot.
36 It is not possible to go back to a previous mode in NORMAL domain.
1.3 Interfaces of the TOE
1.3.1 Hardware Interfaces
37 The interfaces of the TOE are listed below:
 The electrical interface of the TOE with the external environment consists of the power
supply input (Vdd, ground), the 2.3V OTP power supply OTP_HV_2Vx, the enable input
of the OTP Macro HDR_EN_2Vx. These inputs are generated by the SoC.
 The data interface of the TOE is made of 4 General Purpose Inputs (GPI), 8 General
Purpose Outputs, the AHB-Lite Master Interface, the APB slave interface, the JTAG
interface and the ISO7816 contact interface.
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1.3.2 Software Interfaces
38 The TOE software interfaces consist of interfaces between hardware and software, and
interfaces providing high-level security or cryptographic features to the composite software. The
Hardware/Software interface is made of interface registers. All TESIC-04001R20 blocks,
particularly the crypto-processors, integrate such registers which enable together with software
drivers to access into TESIC-04001R20 hardware functions.
39 The TOE software also includes the PRE-PERSO and ADMIN loader command interfaces, and
ADMIN services and crypto library API.
40 The interface of the PRE-PERSO loader is made of interpreted commands. These commands
are used to load the ADMIN loader and services to external NVM.
41 The interface of the ADMIN loader and services are the following:
 The command interpreter interface of the TOE used to receive user command during the
load process
 The ADMIN services interface used secure the storage of the TSF and user data in
external memory against disclosure, modification and roll-back attacks. This interface is
used by both the ADMIN loader in ADMIN mode to store the ADMIN TSF data and the
loaded user data. This services are also available to the user application.
42 The high-level cryptographic software interfaces with the TOE are defined as follows:
 The DRBG interface of the TOE is defined by the DRBG library interface (optional).
 The high-level DES interface of the TOE is defined by the DES library interface (optional).
 The high-level AES interface of the TOE is defined by the AES library interface (optional).
 The RSA interface of the TOE is defined by the RSA library interface (optional).
 The ECC interface of the TOE is defined by the ECC library interface (optional).
 The external memory interface of the TOE (optional).
 The ADMIN loader (optional).
1.4 TOE intended Usage
43 Monarch 2/N - SQN3401 is intended to be used for narrowband IoT applications, including
sensors, wearables, and other low data, low power M2M and IoT devices.
44 The TOE TESIC-04001R20 is designed to provide security services to the SoC Monarch 2/N -
SQN3401.
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2 Conformance Claims
45 This chapter contains the following sections:
CC Conformance Claim (2.1)
PP Claim (2.2)
PP Additions (2.3)
Package Claim (2.4)
Conformance Claim Rationale (2.5)
46 The TOE has been designed to be compliant with the security requirements of the GSMA
composite certification for integrated eUICC.
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
47 This Security Target claims to be conformant to the Common Criteria version 3.1 R5, [2], [3], [4]
and [5].
48 Furthermore, it claims to be CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant. The extended
Security Functional Requirements are defined in chapter 5.
49 This Security Target has been built with the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation; Version 3.1
which comprises
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General Model; April 2017, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional
Requirements; April 2017, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002.
[4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance
Requirements; April 2017, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003.
50 The following reference has been taken into account :
[5] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation
Methodology; April 2017, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004.
2.2 PP Claim
51 This Security Target is strictly conformant to the Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0084 “Security IC
Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages” [1].
52 All refinements described in the Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0084 [1] are taken into
consideration. In particular the refinements of Security Assurance Requirements ADV_FSP.5
and ALC_CMS.5.
53 The conformance to the following additional packages from BSI-CC-PP-0084 [1] is also claimed:
 Package “Authentication of the Security IC”
 Packages for Loader
o Package 1: Loader dedicated for usage in secured environment only
o Package 2: Loader dedicated for usage by authorized users only
54 This ST does not claim conformance to any other PP.
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2.3 PP Additions
55 The following security problems, security objectives and security functional requirements have
been added:
 T.Mem-Access
 T.Open_Samples_Diffusion
 T.External-Content-Abuse
 T.NVM-Command-Replay
 T.NVM-Unauthorized-Rollback
 T.NVM-Clone-Replace
 T.NVM-Shared-Content-Abuse
 A.Key-Function
 O.Mem-Access
 O.PKA
 O.RSA
 O.ECC
 O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality
 T.External-Content-Abuse
 T.NVM-Command-Replay
 T.NVM-Unauthorized-Rollback
 T.NVM-Clone-Replace
 T.NVM-Shared-Content-Abuse
 FDP_ACC.1
 FDP_ACF.1
 FMT_MSA.1
 FMT_MSA.3
 FMT_SMF.1
 FDP_RIP.1
 FCS_COP.1/RSA
 FCS_COP.1/ECDSA
 FCS_COP.1/ECDH
 FCS_COP.1/SHA
 FCS_CKM.1/RSA
 FCS_CKM.1/ECDSA
 FDP_URC.1/PM
 FDP_IRA.1/PM
 FPT_RPL.1/PM
 FDP_DAU.2/PM
 FIA_UID.1/PM
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2.4 Package Claim
56 The assurance level for this Security Target is EAL5+. It includes the assurance level EAL5
augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2.
57 The Protection Profile [1] enables the TOE to be evaluated above the EAL4+, therefore the fact
that this Security Target addresses the EAL5+ level still maintains the conformance claims to
Protection Profile [1]. The rationale is given in section 4.4 and section 6.3.
2.5 Conformance Claim Rationale
58 This Security Target claims strict conformance to only one Protection Profile, the Security IC
Platform Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0084 [1].
59 The Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) of the Protection Profile [1] is EAL4 augmented with the
assurance components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. The Assurance Requirements of the TOE
obtain the Evaluation Assurance Level 5 augmented with the assurance components
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
60 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a complete solution implementing a security integrated circuit
(security IC) as defined in the Protection Profile [1] section 1.3.1, so the TOE is consistent with
the TOE type defined in [1].
61 The security problem definition of this Security Target is consistent with the statement of the
security problem definition in the Protection Profile [1].
62 The security objectives of this Security Target are consistent with the statement of the security
objectives in the Protection Profile [1].
63 The differences between this Security Target and the Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP0084 [1] that
is the addition of:
 Threats
 Organizational Security Policy
 Assumption
 Security Objectives for the TOE
 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
do not affect the conformance claims of this Security Target. The Rationale for these additions
is given in section 5.1 of this Security Target.
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3 Security Problem Definition
64 The chapter 3 contains the following sections:
Description of Assets (3.1)
Threats (3.2)
Organizational Security Policies (3.3)
Assumptions (3.4)
3.1 Description of Assets
Assets regarding the Threats
65 The assets (related to standard functionality) to be protected are:
 the user data of the composite TOE,
 TSF data including root keys and keys derived from root keys as well as the unique
identification of the TOE instances,
 the Security IC Embedded Software, stored and in operation,
 the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software.
66 The user (consumer) of the TOE places value upon the assets related to high-level security
concerns:
SC1 integrity of User Data of the Composite TOE,
SC2 confidentiality of User Data of the Composite TOE being stored in the TOE’s
protected memory areas.
SC3 correct operation of the security services provided by the TOE for the Security
IC Embedded Software.
67 The Security IC may not distinguish between user data which is public knowledge or kept
confidential. Therefore, the Security IC shall protect the user data of the Composite TOE in
integrity and in confidentiality if stored in protected memory areas, unless the Security IC
Embedded Software chooses to disclose or modify it.
68 In particular integrity of the Security IC Embedded Software means that it is correctly being
executed which includes the correct operation of the TOE’s functionality. Parts of the Security IC
Embedded Software which do not contain secret data or security critical source code, may not
require protection from being disclosed. Other parts of the Security IC Embedded Software may
need to be kept confidential since specific implementation details may assist an attacker.
69 The Protection Profile requires the TOE to provide at least one security service: the generation
of random numbers by means of a physical Random Number Generator. The annex 7 of
Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0084 provides packages for typical additional security services.
The Security Target may require additional security services as described in these packages or
define TOE specific security services. It is essential that the TOE ensures the correct operation
of all security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software.
70 According to the Protection Profile there is the following high-level security concern related to
security service:
SC4 deficiency of random numbers.
71 The TOE uses a passive external NVM for code and data storage, hence, the following security
concerns are identified:
SC5 Integrity, Authenticity, Freshness of TOE code when loaded and stored in TOE
environment (External Memory and/or Device) and then loaded for execution in TOE
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SC6 Integrity, Authenticity, Freshness of TOE data when loaded, stored and
updated in TOE environment (External Memory and/or Device) and loaded for
execution in TOE
SC7 (o) Confidentiality of TOE code when loaded and stored in TOE
environment (External Memory and/or Device) and then loaded for execution in TOE
SC8 (o) Confidentiality of TOE data when loaded, stored and updated in TOE
environment (External Memory and/or Device) and loaded for execution in TOE
SC9 Confidentiality of TOE data during TOE usage observed at TOE environment
level (by logical or physical observation using SoC)
72 Also, in the context of a System-On-Chip product, the following security concern is identified:
SC10 Isolation of TOE execution from perturbation induced in TOE
environment and especially in SoC
73 To be able to protect these assets (SC1 to SC10) the TOE shall self-protect its TSF. Critical
information about the TSF shall be protected by the development environment and the
operational environment. Critical information may include:
 logical design data, physical design data, IC Dedicated Software, and configuration data,
 Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data, specific development aids, test and
characterization related data, material for software development support, and photo
masks.
74 Such information and the ability to perform manipulations assist in threatening the above assets.
75 Note that there are many ways to manipulate or disclose the User Data: (i) An attacker may
manipulate the Security IC Embedded Software or the TOE. (ii) An attacker may cause
malfunctions of the TOE or abuse Test Features provided by the TOE. Such attacks usually
require design information of the TOE to be obtained. They pertain to all information about (i) the
circuitry of the IC (hardware including the physical memories), (ii) the IC Dedicated Software with
the parts IC Dedicated Test Software (if any) and IC Dedicated Support Software (if any), and
(iii) the configuration data for the security functionality. The knowledge of this information enables
or supports attacks on the assets. Therefore, the TOE Manufacturer must ensure that the
development and production of the TOE is secure so that no restricted, sensitive, critical or very
critical information is unintentionally made available for the operational phase of the TOE.
76 The TOE Manufacturer must apply protection to support the security of the TOE. This not only
pertains to the TOE but also to all information and material exchanged with the developer of the
Security IC Embedded Software. This covers the Security IC Embedded Software itself if
provided by the developer of the Security IC Embedded Software or any authentication data
required to enable the download of software. This includes the delivery (exchange) procedures
for Phase 1 and the Phases after TOE Delivery as far as they can be controlled by the TOE
Manufacturer. These aspects enforce the usage of the supporting documents and the
refinements of SAR defined in the protection profile.
77 The information and material produced and/or processed by the TOE Manufacturer in the TOE
development and production environment (Phases 2 up to TOE Delivery) can be grouped as
follows:
 logical design data,
 physical design data,
 IC Dedicated Software, Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data,
 specific development aids,
 test and characterization related data,
 material for software development support,
 photo masks and products in any form,
as long as they are generated, stored or processed by the TOE manufacturer.
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3.2 Threats
78 The following explanations help to understand the focus of the threats and objectives defined
below. For example, certain attacks are only one step towards a disclosure of assets, others may
directly lead to a compromise of the application security.
 Manipulation of user data (which includes user data and code of the Composite TOE,
stored in or processed by the Security IC) means that an attacker is able to alter a
meaningful block of data. This should be considered for the threats T.Malfunction, T.Phys-
Manipulation and T.Abuse-Func.
 Disclosure of user data (which may include user data and code of the Composite TOE,
stored in protected memory areas or processed by the Security IC) or TSF data means
that an attacker is realistically able to determine a meaningful block of data. This should
be considered for the threats T.Leak-Inherent, T.Phys-Probing, T.Leak-Forced and
T.Abuse-Func.
 Manipulation of the TSF or TSF data means that an attacker is able to deliberately
deactivate or otherwise change the behaviour of a specific security functionality in a
manner which enables exploitation. This should be considered for the threat
T.Malfunction, T.Phys-Manipulation and T.Abuse-Func.
79 The cloning of the functional behaviour of the Security IC on its physical and command interface
is the highest-level security concern in the application context.
80 The cloning of that functional behaviour requires to (i) develop a functional equivalent of the
Security IC Embedded Software, (ii) disclose, interpret and employ the user data of the
Composite TOE stored in the TOE, and (iii) develop and build a functional equivalent of the
Security IC using the input from the previous steps.
81 The Security IC is a platform for the Security IC Embedded Software which ensures that
especially the critical user data of the Composite TOE are stored and processed in a secure way
(refer to below). The Security IC Embedded Software must also ensure that critical user data of
the Composite TOE are treated as required in the application context (refer to Section 3.4). In
addition, the personalization process supported by the Security IC Embedded Software (and
perhaps by the Security IC in addition) must be secure (refer to Section 3.4). This last step is
beyond the scope of the Protection Profile. As a result the threat “cloning of the functional
behaviour of the Security IC on its physical and command interface” is averted by the combination
of mechanisms which split into those being evaluated according to the Protection Profile (Security
IC) and those being subject to the evaluation of the Security IC Embedded Software or Security
IC and the corresponding personalization process. Therefore, functional cloning is indirectly
covered by the security concerns and threats described below.
82 The high-level security concerns are refined below by defining threats as required by the
Common Criteria (refer to Figure 3-1). Note that manipulation of the TOE is only a means to
threaten user data is not a success for the attacker in itself.
Figure 3-1: Standard Threats
83 The high-level security concern related to specific security service is refined below by defining
threats as required by the Common Criteria (refer to Figure 3-2).
T.Phys-Manipulation
T.Abuse-Func
From BSI-CC-PP-0084
T.Phys-Probing T.Leak-Forced
T.Leak-Inherent
T.Malfunction
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Figure 3-2: Threats related to security service
84 The Security IC Embedded Software may be required to contribute to averting the threats. At
least it must not undermine the security provided by the TOE. For detail refer to the assumptions
regarding the Security IC Embedded Software specified in Section 122.
85 The above security concerns are derived from considering the operational usage by the end-
consumer (Phase 7) since
 Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 are covered by
assumptions and
 The development and production environment starting with Phase 2 up to TOE Delivery
are covered by an organizational security policy.
86 The TOE’s countermeasures are designed to avert the threats described below. Nevertheless,
they may be effective in earlier phases (Phases 4 to 6).
87 The TOE is exposed to different types of influences or interactions with its outer world. Some of
them may result from using the TOE only but others may also indicate an attack. The different
types of influences or interactions are visualized in Figure 3-3. Due to the intended usage of the
TOE all interactions are considered as possible.
Figure 3-3: Interactions between the TOE and its outer world
T.RND T.Mem-Access
Addition
From BSI-CC-PP-0084
T.Masquerade_TOE T.Open_Samples_Diffusion
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88 An interaction with the TOE can be done through the physical interfaces (Number 7–9 in Figure
3-3) which are realized using the contact interface. Influences or interactions with the TOE also
occur through the chip surface (Number 1–6 in Figure 3-3). In Number 1 and 6 galvanic contacts
are used. In Number 2 and 5 the influence (arrow directed to the chip) or the measurement (arrow
starts from the chip) does not require a contact. Number 3 and 4 refer to specific situations where
the TOE and its functional behaviour is not only influenced but definite changes are made by
applying mechanical, chemical and other methods (such as 1, 2). Many attacks require a prior
inspection and some reverse-engineering (Number 3). This demonstrates the basic building
blocks of attacks. A practical attack will use a combination of these elements.
3.2.1 Standard Threats
89 The TOE shall avert the threat “Inherent Information Leakage (T.Leak-Inherent)” as specified
below.
T.Leak-Inherent Inherent Information Leakage
An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the
TOE during usage of the Security IC in order to disclose
confidential user data as part of the assets.
No direct contact with the Security IC internals is required here. Leakage may occur through
emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by
changes in processing time requirements. One example is Differential Power Analysis (DPA).
This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related
to measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from direct (contact)
measurements (Numbers 6 and 7 in Figure 3-3) or measurement of emanations (Number 5
in Figure 3-3) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed.
90 The TOE shall avert the threat “Physical Probing (T.Phys-Probing)” as specified below.
T.Phys-Probing Physical Probing
An attacker may perform physical probing of the TOE in order (i)
to disclose user data while stored in protected memory areas, (ii)
to disclose/reconstruct the user data while processed or (iii) to
disclose other critical information about the operation of the TOE
to enable attacks disclosing or manipulating the user data of the
Composite TOE or the Security IC Embedded Software.
Physical probing requires direct interaction with the Security IC internals (Numbers 5 and 6
in Figure 3-3). Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse
engineering efforts may be used. Before that hardware security mechanisms and layout
characteristics need to be identified (Number 3 in Figure 3-3). Determination of software
design including treatment of user data of the Composite TOE may also be a prerequisite.
This pertains to “measurements” using galvanic contacts or any type of charge interaction
whereas manipulations are considered under the threat “Physical Manipulation (T.Phys-
Manipulation)”. The threats “Inherent Information Leakage (T.Leak-Inherent)” and “Forced
Information Leakage (T.Leak-Forced)“ may use physical probing but require complex signal
processing in addition.
91 The TOE shall avert the threat “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress (T.Malfunction)” as
specified below.
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T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the Security
IC Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in
order to (i) modify security services of the TOE or (ii) modify
functions of the Security IC Embedded Software (iii) deactivate
or affect security mechanisms of the TOE to enable attacks
disclosing or manipulating the user data of the Composite TOE
or the Security IC Embedded Software. This may be achieved
by operating the Security IC outside the normal operating
conditions (Numbers 1, 2 and 9 in Figure 3-3).
The modification of security services of the TOE may e.g. affect the quality of random
numbers provided by the random number generator up to undetected deactivation when the
random number generator does not produce random numbers and the Security IC
Embedded Software gets constant values. In another case errors are introduced in executing
the Security IC Embedded Software. To exploit this, an attacker needs information about the
functional operation, e.g. to introduce a temporary failure within a register used by the
Security IC Embedded Software with light or a power glitch.
92 The TOE shall avert the threat “Physical Manipulation (T.Phys-Manipulation)” as specified below.
T.Phys-Manipulation Physical Manipulation
An attacker may physically modify the Security IC in order to (i)
modify user data of the Composite TOE, (ii) modify the Security
IC Embedded Software, (iii) modify or deactivate security
services of the TOE, or (iv) modify security mechanisms of the
TOE to enable attacks disclosing or manipulating the user data
of the Composite TOE or the Security IC Embedded Software.
The modification may be achieved through techniques commonly employed in IC failure
analysis (Numbers 1, 2 and 4 in Figure 3-3) and IC reverse engineering efforts (Number 3 in
Figure 3-3). The modification may result in the deactivation of a security feature. Before that,
hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified.
Determination of software design including treatment of user data of the Composite TOE
may also be a pre-requisite. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
In contrast to malfunctions (refer to T.Malfunction) the attacker requires gathering significant
knowledge about the TOE’s internal construction here (Number 3 in Figure 3-3).
93 The TOE shall avert the threat “Forced Information Leakage (T.Leak-Forced)“ as specified below:
T.Leak-Forced Forced Information Leakage
An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the
TOE during usage of the Security IC in order to disclose
confidential user data of the Composite TOE as part of the assets
even if the information leakage is not inherent but caused by the
attacker.
This threat pertains to attacks where methods described in “Malfunction due to
Environmental Stress” (refer to T.Malfunction) and/or “Physical Manipulation” (refer to
T.Phys-Manipulation) are used to cause leakage from signals (Numbers 5, 6, 7 and 8 in
Figure 3-3) which normally do not contain significant information about secrets.
94 The TOE shall avert the threat “Abuse of Functionality (T.Abuse-Func)” as specified below.
T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
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An attacker may use functions of the TOE which may not be used
after TOE Delivery in order to (i) disclose or manipulate user data
of the Composite TOE, (ii) manipulate (explore, bypass,
deactivate or change) security services of the TOE or (iii)
manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) functions of
the Security IC Embedded Software or (iv) enable an attack
disclosing or manipulating the user data of the Composite TOE
or the Security IC Embedded Software.
3.2.2 Threats related to security services
95 The TOE shall avert the threat “Deficiency of Random Numbers (T.RND)” as specified below.
T.RND Deficiency of Random Numbers
An attacker may predict or obtain information about random
numbers generated by the TOE security service for instance
because of a lack of entropy of the random numbers provided.
An attacker may gather information about the random numbers produced by the TOE security
service. Because unpredictability is the main property of random numbers this may be a
problem in case they are used to generate cryptographic keys. The entropy provided by the
random numbers must be appropriate for the strength of the cryptographic algorithm, the key
or the cryptographic variable is used for. Here the attacker is expected to take advantage of
statistical properties of the random numbers generated by the TOE. Malfunctions or
premature ageing are also considered which may assist in getting information about random
numbers.
3.2.3 Threats related to additional TOE Specific Functionality
96 The TOE shall avert the additional threat “Memory Access Violation (T.Mem-Access)” as
specified below.
T.Mem-Access Memory Access Violation
Parts of the Security IC Embedded Software may cause security
violations by accidentally or deliberately accessing restricted
data (which may include code). Any restrictions are defined by
the security policy of the specific application context and must be
implemented by the Security IC Embedded Software.
Clarification: This threat does not address the proper definition and management of the
security rules implemented by the Security IC Embedded Software, this being software
design and correctness issue. This threat addresses the reliability of the abstract machine
targeted by the software implementation. To avert the threat, the set of access rules provided
by this TOE should be undefeated if operated according to the provided guidance. The threat
is not realized if the Security IC Embedded Software is designed or implemented to grant
access to restricted information. It is realized if an implemented access denial is granted
under unexpected conditions or if the execution machinery does not effectively control a
controlled access. Here the attacker is expected to (i) take advantage of flaws in the design
and/or the implementation of th/e TOE memory access rules (refer to T.Abuse-Func but for
functions available after TOE delivery), (ii) introduce flaws by forcing operational conditions
(refer to T.Malfunction) and/or by physical manipulation (refer to T.Phys-Manipulation). This
attacker is expected to have a high-level potential of attack.
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3.2.4 Threats related to Authentication of the Security IC
97 The TOE shall avert the additional threat “Masquerade the TOE (T.Masquerade-TOE)” as
specified below.
T.Masquerade-TOE Masquerade the TOE
An attacker may threaten the property being a genuine TOE by
producing a chip which is not a genuine TOE but wrongly
identifying itself as genuine TOE sample.
The threat T.Masquerade_TOE may threaten the unique identity of the TOE as described in
the P.Process-TOE or the property as being a genuine TOE without unique identity.
Mitigation of masquerade requires tightening up the identification by authentication.
3.2.5 Threats related to flash ICs'
98 The TOE shall avert the additional threat “Diffusion of Open Samples
(T.Open_Samples_Diffusion)” as specified below.
T.Open_Samples_Diffusion Diffusion of Open Samples
An attacker may get access to open samples of the TOE and
use them to gain information about the TSF (loader, memory
management unit, ROM code…). He may also use the open
samples to characterize the behaviour of the IC and its
security functionalities (for example: characterization of side
channel profiles, perturbation cartography…). The execution
of dedicated security features (for example: execution of a
DES computation without countermeasures or by de-
activating countermeasures) through the loading of an
adequate code would allow this kind of characterization and
the execution of enhanced attacks on the IC.
3.2.6 Threats related to architectures with passive external NVMs
99 As described in 1.2.2, the TOE uses a passive external NVM. Hence, The Security IC is entirely
in charge of protecting the confidentiality and integrity of the contents stored in the passive
external NVM or in transit through the interconnection bus, as well as protecting against replay
attacks. This implies parrying several threats which will list in what follows.
100 The TOE shall avert the threat “Unauthorized abuse of NVM content (T.External-Content-
Abuse)”, as specified below.
T.External-Content-Abuse Unauthorized access of NVM contents.
An attacker may attempt to access for disclosing or modifying
the contents of the passive external NVM.
101 An attacker may obtain direct access to the passive external NVM and attempt to access the
contents stored to disclose or modify it. Consequently, the TOE must ensure that confidentiality
of contents is guaranteed before contents (TSF code and TSF data) are serialized into the
passive external NVM, and that integrity of contents (TSF code and TSF data) is verified when
contents are deserialized from the passive external NVM.
102 The TOE shall avert the threat “Replay of commands between the host MCU and the passive
external NVM (T.NVM-Command-Replay)” as specified below.
T.NVM-Command-Replay Replay of commands between the host MCU and the passive
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external NVM
An attacker may attempt to replay the write and erase
commands or responses to the read commands between the
host MCU and the passive external NVM, to affect the
freshness of the contents read from or written to the external
NVM.
103 The read, write and erase commands issued by the TOE to exercise the storage functionality of
the external memory, and their payloads, can be intercepted by an attacker (e.g. eavesdrop the
commands on the link between the TOE and the external memory). Such attacker may use
copies of these commands to try to misuse the TOE or compromise data. The command replay
attack can take the following forms:
 The attacker reacts on a read command and replies a previously recorded answer e.g.
to a previous read request. Thereby the TOE gets an old version of such content.
 The attacker issues a previous write command, trying to overwrite the external memory
with the previous content, leading to the TOE obtaining old versions of such content in
later read operations.
 The attacker issues a previous erase command, trying to overwrite status information
or other data that may lead to misuse for the TOE.
104 The TOE shall avert the threat “Unauthorized rollback of NVM contents (T.NVM-Unauthorized-
Rollback)”, as specified below.
T.NVM-Unauthorized-
Rollback
Unauthorized rollback of NVM contents to a previous version
An attacker may attempt to read the contents of the passive
external NVM, record them, and later write them back to the
passive external NVM after the original contents were updated
by the host MCU.
105 This threat takes advantage of the fact that the passive external NVM is not integrated into the
host MCU chip. Hence, the physical protections for preventing the replacement of stored contents
may not cover the passive external NVM. This situation enables an attacker to read and write the
contents of the passive external NVM. Even when the NVM contents are protected in
confidentiality and integrity, the replacement may be valid as well, since it is retrieved from the
passive external NVM.
106 Since TSF code is stored in the passive external NVM, this threat may lead to an unauthorized
rollback of the TSF code to an older version. Similarly, overwriting the NVM with an older version
of TSF data (partially or fully) might affect the behaviour of the TSF.
107 The TOE shall avert the threat “Cloning or replacement of NVM (T.NVM-Clone-Replace)”, as
specified below.
T.NVM-Clone-Replace Cloning or replacement of NVM
An attacker may attempt to clone the full contents of the
passive external NVM of the TOE and write them to the
passive external NVM of a different TOE unit; alternatively, an
attacker may physically replace the NVM of a TOE with a
different NVM that may come from a different TOE unit.
108 This threat refers to the case where the full contents of the passive external NVM are cloned to
a different device. It can also cover the replacement of the NVM of the TOE with the NVM of a
different unit. The second case might not be viable on some architectures when the physical
design or assembling procedures impede it.
109 The effect of this threat is in replacing the data or code of a TOE with a different one.
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110 Unlike T.NVM-Unauthorized-Rollback, the threat of T.NVM-Clone-Replace involves using two
different TOE units or instances. One TOE unit is used as a source for the passive external NVM
contents. Those contents are used to replace the genuine contents of the external NVM of the
second TOE unit.
111 Another possible scenario for this threat can be contemplated for passive external non-volatile
memory: the external non-volatile memory is replaced with an empty or virgin non-volatile
memory, removing the user and TSF data used by the TOE, and possibly forcing the TSF to
generate new user and TSF data, potentially affecting the TSF behaviour.
112 The TOE shall avert the threat “Confidentiality of TSF content in shared NVM (T.NVM-Shared-
Content-Abuse)”, as specified below.
T.NVM-Shared-Content-Abuse Confidentiality of TSF content in shared NVM
Other parts of the SoC may attempt to access or modify
TSF content that is written in the external NVM
113 Other parts of the SoC which have access to the shared external NVM may attempt to access
TSF code, TSF data or application data that was written by the TOE in the external NVM. This
threat covers the confidentiality and integrity requirements of the TSF content w.r.t to
access/modification by other parts of the SoC which are allowed to use the external NVM.
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3.3 Organizational Security Policies
114 The following Figure 3-4 shows the policies applied in this Security Target.
Figure 3-4: Policies
115 The IC Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy “Protection during TOE Development and
Production (P.Process-TOE)” as specified below.
P.Process-TOE Protection during TOE Development and Production
An accurate identification must be established for the TOE. This
requires that each instantiation of the TOE carries this unique
identification.
116 The accurate identification is introduced at the end of the production test in phase 3. Therefore,
the production environment must support this unique identification.
117 The groups of information and material processed and/or produced by the TOE manufacturer in
the TOE development and production environment (Phase 2 to TOE Delivery) are listed below:
 logical design data,
 physical design data,
 IC Dedicated Software, Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data,
 specific development aids,
 test and characterisation related data,
 material for software development support,
 photo masks and products in any form,
while they are processed by the TOE Manufacturer.
118 The IC Developer / Manufacturer must apply the organisational security policy “Protection of
residual information (P.Protect-Resid-Info)” as specified below.
P.Protect-Resid-Info Protection of residual information
The TOE shall provide an additional security functionality to the
Security IC Embedded Software to ensure the protection of
residual information.
119 The IC Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy “Cryptographic services of the TOE
(P.Crypto-Service)” as specified below.
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P.Crypto-Service Cryptographic services of the TOE
The TOE provides secure hardware based cryptographic
services for the IC Embedded Software.
Application note: The TOE shall provide the following security functionality to the Security
IC Embedded Software:
Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES)
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Public Key Accelerator (PKA) supporting Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) cryptography and
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) in GF(p).
Cryptographic hash functions (SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512).
Note: The TOE can be delivered without the RSA/ECC cryptographic library. In this case the
TOE does not provide the Additional Specific Security Functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
(RSA) Cryptography and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC).
120 The IC Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy “Limiting and Blocking the Loader
Functionality (P.Lim_Block_Loader)” as specified below.
P.Lim_Block_Loader Limiting and Blocking the Loader Functionality
The composite manufacturer uses the Loader for loading of
Security IC Embedded Software, user data of the Composite
Product or IC Dedicated Support Software in charge of the IC
Manufacturer. He limits the capability and blocks the availability
of the Loader in order to protect stored data from disclosure and
manipulation.
Application note: This policy applies to the admin loader.
121 The organisational security policy “Controlled usage to Loader Functionality (P.Ctlr_Loader)”
applies to Loader dedicated for usage by authorized users only.
P.Ctrl_Loader Controlled usage to Loader Functionality
Authorized user controls the usage of the Loader functionality in
order to protect stored and loaded user data from disclosure and
manipulation.
122 The organisational security policy “Identification of each TOE instance (P.Gen-Unique-ID)”
applies to Loader dedicated for usage in testing and pre-personalization.
P.Gen-Unique-ID Identification of each TOE instance
An accurate identification must be established for the TOE. The
policy requires that each instantiation of the TOE stores its own
unique identification.
3.4 Assumptions
123 The following Figure 3-5 shows the assumptions applied in this Security Target.
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Figure 3-5: Assumptions
124 The intended usage of the TOE is twofold, depending on the Life Cycle Phase: (i) The Security
IC Embedded Software developer uses it as a platform for the Security IC software being
developed (ii) The Composite Product Manufacturer (and the consumer) uses it as a part of the
Security IC.
125 Before being delivered to the consumer the TOE is packaged. Many attacks require the TOE to
be removed from the carrier. Though this extra step adds difficulties for the attacker no specific
assumptions are made here regarding the package.
126 Appropriate “Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization (A.Process-Sec-IC)”
must be ensured after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6, as well as during the delivery to
Phase 7 as specified below.
A.Process-Sec-IC Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization
It is assumed that security procedures are used after delivery of
the TOE by the TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the end-
consumer to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and
of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy,
modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
This means that the Phases after TOE Delivery are assumed to
be protected appropriately.
127 The information and material produced and/or processed by the Security IC Embedded Software
Developer in Phase 1 and by the Composite Product Manufacturer can be grouped as follows:
 the Security IC Embedded Software including specifications, implementation and related
documentation,
 pre-personalization Data and personalization data including specifications of formats and
memory areas, test related data,
 the user data of the Composite TOE and related documentation, and
 material for software development support
as long as they are not under the control of the TOE Manufacturer. Details must be defined in
the Security Target for the evaluation of the Security IC Embedded Software and/or Security
IC.
128 The developer of the Security IC Embedded Software must ensure the appropriate usage of
Security IC while developing this software in Phase 1 as described in the (i) TOE guidance
documents (refer to the Common Criteria assurance class AGD) such as the hardware data
sheet, and the hardware application notes, and (ii) findings of the TOE evaluation reports relevant
for the Security IC Embedded Software as documented in the certification report.
129 Note that particular requirements for the Security IC Embedded Software are often not clear
before considering a specific attack scenario during vulnerability analysis of the Security IC
(AVA_VAN). A summary of such results is provided in the document "ETR for composite
evaluation" (ETR-COMP). This document can be provided for the evaluation of the composite
product. The ETR-COMP may also include guidance for additional tests being required for the
combination of hardware and software. The TOE evaluation must be completed before evaluation
of the Security IC Embedded Software can be completed. The TOE evaluation can be conducted
before and independent from the evaluation of the Security IC Embedded Software.
A.Process-Sec-IC A.Key-Function
Addition
From BSI-CC-PP-0084
A.Resp-Appl
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130 The Security IC Embedded Software must ensure the appropriate “Treatment of user data of the
Composite TOE (A.Resp-Appl)” as specified below.
A.Resp-Appl Treatment of user data of the Composite TOE
All user data of the Composite TOE are owned by Security IC
Embedded Software. Therefore, it must be assumed that
security relevant user data of the Composite TOE (especially
cryptographic keys) are treated by the Security IC Embedded
Software as defined for its specific application context.
131 The application context specifies how the user data of the Composite TOE shall be handled and
protected. The evaluation of the Security IC according to this Security Target is conducted on
generalized application context. The concrete requirements for the Security IC Embedded
Software shall be defined in the Protection Profile respective Security Target for the Security IC
Embedded Software. The Security IC cannot prevent any compromise or modification of user
data of the Composite TOE by malicious Security IC Embedded Software.
132 The developer of the Security IC Embedded Software must ensure the appropriate “Usage of
Key-dependent Functions (A.Key-Function)” while developing this software in Phase 1 as
specified below.
A.Key-Function Usage of Key-dependent Functions
Key-dependent functions (if any) shall be implemented in the
Security IC Embedded Software in a way that they are not
susceptible to leakage attacks (as described under T.Leak-
Inherent and T.Leak-Forced).
133 Note that here the routines which may compromise keys when being executed are part of the
Security IC Embedded Software. In contrast to this the threats T.Leak-Inherent and T.Leak-
Forced address (i) the cryptographic routines which are part of the TOE and (ii) the processing
of User Data including cryptographic keys
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4 Security Objectives
134 This chapter Security Objectives contains the following sections:
Security Objectives for the TOE (4.1)
Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software (4.2)
Security Objectives for the operational Environment (4.3)
Security Objectives Rationale (4.4)
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
135 The standard high-level security goals related to the assets are described as followed for the
user:
SG1 Maintain the integrity of user data (when being executed/processed and when
being stored in the TOE’s memories) as well as
SG2 Maintain the confidentiality of user data (when being processed and when being
stored in the TOE’s protected memories).
SG3 Maintain the correct operation of the security services provided by the TOE for the
Security IC Embedded Software.
Note, the Security IC may not distinguish between user data which are public known or kept
confidential. Therefore, the security IC shall protect the user data in integrity and in
confidentiality if stored in protected memory areas, unless the Security IC Embedded
Software chooses to disclose or modify it. Parts of the Security IC Embedded Software
which do not contain secret data or security critical source code, may not require protection
from being disclosed. Other parts of the Security IC Embedded Software may need kept
confidential since specific implementation details may assist an attacker.
136 These standard high-level security goals in the context of the security problem definition build the
starting point for the definition of security objectives as required by the Common Criteria (refer to
Figure 4-1). Note that the integrity of the TOE is a means to reach these objectives.
Figure 4-1: Standard Security Objectives
137 According to this Security Target there are the following security goals related to TOE
architectures using passive external NVM:
O.Phys-Manipulation
O.Abuse-Func
From BSI-CC-PP-0084
O.Phys-Probing O.Leak-Forced
O.Leak-Inherent
O.Malfunction
O.Identification
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SG4 Protect against disclosure and undetected modification of external NVM contents.
SG5 Ensure that the contents stored in the external NVM have not been replaced by a
previous version of them.
SG6 Ensure that the contents of the NVM are genuine.
138 According to this Security Target there is the following high-level security goal related to specific
functionality:
SG7 Provide true random numbers.
139 The additional high-level security considerations are refined below by defining security objectives
as required by the Common Criteria (refer to Figure 4-2).
Figure 4-2: Security Objectives related to Specific Functionality
Standard Security Objectives
140 The TOE shall provide “Protection against Inherent Information Leakage (O.Leak-Inherent)” as
specified below:
O.Leak-Inherent Protection against Inherent Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential
data stored and/or processed in the Security IC
by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals
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(for example on the power, clock, or I/O lines) and
by measurement and analysis of the time between events found by
measuring signals (for instance on the power, clock, or I/O lines).
This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex
signal processing whereas O.Phys-Probing is about direct
measurements on elements on the chip surface. Details correspond
to an analysis of attack scenarios which is not given here.
141 The TOE shall provide “Protection against Physical Probing (O.Phys-Probing)” as specified
below:
O.Phys-Probing Protection against Physical Probing
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure/reconstruction
of user data while stored in protected memory areas and processed
or against the disclosure of other critical information about the
operation of the TOE.
This includes protection against:
- measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical
probing on the chips surface except on pads being bonded
(using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
- measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of
physical interaction between charges (using tools used in solid-
state physics research and IC failure analysis)
with a prior
- Reverse-engineering to understand the design and its
properties and functions.
The TOE must be designed and fabricated so that it requires a high
combination of complex equipment, knowledge, skill, and time to be
able to derive detailed design information or other information which
could be used to compromise security through such a physical
attack.
142 The TOE shall provide “Protection against Malfunctions (O.Malfunction)” as specified below:
O.Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation.
The TOE must indicate or prevent its operation outside the normal
operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not
been proven or tested. This is to prevent malfunctions. Examples of
environmental conditions are voltage, clock frequency,
temperature, or external energy fields.
Remark: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with
elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the
objective O.Phys-Manipulation) provided that detailed knowledge about the TOE´s internal
construction is required and the attack is performed in a controlled manner.
143 The TOE shall provide “Protection against Physical Manipulation (O.Phys-Manipulation)” as
specified below:
O.Phys-Manipulation Protection against Physical Manipulation
The TOE must provide protection against manipulation of the TOE
(including its software and TSF data), the Security IC Embedded
Software and the user data of the Composite TOE. This includes
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protection against:
- reverse-engineering (understanding the design and its
properties and functions),
- manipulation of the hardware and any data, as well as
- undetected manipulation of memory contents.
The TOE must be designed and fabricated so that it requires a high
combination of complex equipment, knowledge, skill, and time to be
able to derive detailed design information or other information which
could be used to compromise security through such a physical
attack.
144 The TOE shall provide “Protection against Forced Information Leakage (O.Leak-Forced)” as
specified below:
O.Leak-Forced Protection against Forced Information Leakage
The Security IC must be protected against disclosure of confidential
data processed in the Security IC (using methods as described
under O.Leak-Inherent) even if the information leakage is not
inherent but caused by the attacker
- by forcing a malfunction (refer to “Protection against
Malfunction due to Environmental Stress (O.Malfunction)”
and/or
- by a physical manipulation (refer to “Protection against
Physical Manipulation (O.Phys-Manipulation)”.
If this is not the case, signals which normally do not contain
significant information about secrets could become an information
channel for a leakage attack.
145 The TOE shall provide “Protection against Abuse of Functionality (O.Abuse-Func)” as specified
below:
O.Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE which may not be
used after TOE Delivery can be abused in order to (i) disclose
critical user data of the Composite TOE, (ii) manipulate critical user
data of the Composite TOE, (iii) manipulate Security IC Embedded
Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security
features or security services of the TOE. Details depend, for
instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features provided by the IC
Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
146 The TOE shall provide “TOE Identification (O.Identification)” as specified below:
O.Identification TOE Identification
The TOE must provide means to store Initialization Data and Pre-
personalization Data in its non-volatile memory. The Initialization
Data (or parts of them) are used for TOE identification.
Security Objectives Related to SG.External-Content-Protection (SG4)
147 The TOE shall provide “Passive External NVM content protection (O.External-Content-
Protection)” as specified below:
O.External-Content- Passive External NVM content protection
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Protection Protection against disclosure and undetected modification of
external NVM contents. Since an attacker can get direct access to
the external NVM, the contents stored in the external NVM must be
protected against disclosure and undetected modification.
This security objective requires protection of the content stored in
external memory by the TOE. The protection prevents disclosure
and identifies modifications of stored code and data that is not
performed by the TOE.
Security Objectives Related to SG.NVM-Updated-Contents (SG5)
148 The TOE shall provide “Protection against replay of commands between host MCU and external
NVM (O.NVM-Command-Replay-Protection)”, as specified below:
O.NVM-Command-
Replay-Protection
Protection against replay of commands between host MCU and
external NVM
The TOE shall protect against replay of the read, write and erase
commands issued by the TOE to the external NVM through the
interconnection bus.
This security objective requires protection against replay of read,
write and erase operations. This covers simple replay of previously
recorded commands or memory content but also the replay of
modified commands or memory content. The TOE shall be able to
detect such attacks violating the TOE.
149 The TOE shall provide “Protection against an unauthorized rollback of NVM contents (O.NVM-
Unauthorized-Rollback-Protection)”, as specified below:
O.NVM-
Unauthorized-
Rollback-Protection
Protection against an unauthorized rollback of NVM contents
The TOE shall protect against replacement of the external NVM
contents with a previous version, even if it was valid in the past.
The security objective requires protection against the simulation of
outdated memory content. Replacement of memory content with a
previous version of the same content or the manipulations of write
operations violate the freshness of the external memory content
and shall be detected by the TOE
150 The TOE shall provide “(O.NVM-Irreversibility-Anchor)”, as specified below:
O.NVM-
Irreversibility-Anchor
Passive External NVM Contents Irreversibility Anchor
The TOE shall implement a non-volatile mutable mechanism that
goes through a predefined sequence of states (that are associated
with increasing ‘values’) that can never be returned to a previous
state. This value given by a sequence of states shall be used to
determine whether the external NVM contents meet the data
freshness property and to prevent replay attacks.
In order to manage data freshness, the TOE shall provide an
irreversibility anchor, as described in the above security objective.
Advancing the value of the irreversibility anchor through its defined
sequence of states mechanism occurs when write/erase operations
are issued by the Security IC. This mechanism shall allow detecting
and protecting against violation of data freshness of the external
NVM contents.
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Application Note: This mechanism can be vulnerable to fault injection attacks, e.g. voltage glitches.
The attacker may try to prevent the Irreversibility Anchor from incrementing, or alter its perceived value,
which would enable the attacker to replay old sessions of commands. These kinds of attack are covered
by the T.Malfunction threat defined in [1].
Security Objectives Related to SG.NVM-Genuine-Content (SG6)
151 The TOE shall provide “Protection against external NVM cloning or replacement (O.NVM-Clone-
Replace-Protection)”, as specified below.
O.NVM-Clone-
Replace-Protection
Protection against NVM cloning or replacement.
The TOE shall protect against cloning the memory contents of
another unit into the TOE’s external NVM and against replacement
of the external NVM with the one from a different unit.
By means of this objective, the TOE shall protect against the
replacement of its external NVM contents with ones from a different
unit. While those contents are valid for the TOE from where they
were extracted, they shall be detected as non-belonging to the TOE
unit where they were cloned to and, thus, non-valid. The TOE shall
also protect against a similar scenario where, instead of cloning the
contents of one NVM into another, the external NVM is physically
replaced by the external NVM of a different TOE unit.
Security Objectives related to Specific Functionality (referring to SG7)
152 The TOE shall provide “Random Numbers (O.RND)” as specified below:
O.RND Random Numbers
The TOE will ensure the cryptographic quality of random number
generation. For instance, random numbers shall not be predictable
and shall have sufficient entropy.
The TOE will ensure that no information about the produced random
numbers is available to an attacker since they might be used for
instance to generate cryptographic keys.
Security Objectives for Cryptographic Services
153 The TOE shall provide “Cryptographic service Triple-DES (O.TDES)” as specified below.
O.TDES Cryptographic service Triple-DES
The TOE provides secure hardware based cryptographic services
implementing the Triple-DES for encryption and decryption.
154 The security objective “Cryptographic service Triple-DES (O.TDES)” enforces the organizational
security policy P.Crypto-Service.
155 The TOE shall provide “Cryptographic service AES (O.AES)” as specified below.
O.AES Cryptographic service AES
The TOE provides secure hardware based cryptographic services
for the AES for encryption and decryption.
156 The security objective “Cryptographic service AES (O.AES)” enforces the organizational security
policy P.Crypto-Service.
157 The TOE shall provide “Cryptographic service PKA (O.PKA)” as specified below.
O.PKA Cryptographic service PKA
The TOE shall provide the following specific security functionality to
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the Security IC Embedded Software:
Public Key Accelerator (PKA) supporting Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
(RSA) cryptography and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) in
GF(p).
Note: The TOE can be delivered without the RSA/ECC cryptographic library. In this case
the TOE does not provide the Additional Specific Security Functionalities Rivest-Shamir-
Adleman (RSA) Cryptography and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC).
158 The security objective “Cryptographic service PKA (O.PKA)” enforces the organizational security
policy P.Crypto-Service.
159 The TOE shall provide “Cryptographic service RSA (O.RSA)” as specified below.
O.RSA Cryptographic service RSA
The TOE provides shall provide the following specific security
functionality to the Security IC Embedded Software:
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) public key asymmetric
cryptography.
Note: The TOE can be delivered without the RSA cryptographic library. In this case the
TOE does not provide the specific security functionalities Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)
Cryptography.
160 The security objective “Cryptographic service RSA (O.RSA)” enforces the organizational security
policy P.Crypto-Service.
161 The TOE shall provide “Cryptographic service RSA (O.ECC)” as specified below.
O.ECC Cryptographic service ECC
The TOE provides shall provide the following specific security
functionality to the Security IC Embedded Software:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC).
Note: The TOE can be delivered without the ECC library. In this case the TOE does not
provide the specific security functionalities Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC).
162 The security objective “Cryptographic service ECC (O.ECC)” enforces the organizational security
policy P.Crypto-Service.
163 The TOE shall provide “Cryptographic service Hash function (O.SHA)” as specified below.
O.SHA Cryptographic service Hash function
The TOE provides secure software cryptographic services for
secure hash calculation.
164 The security objective “Cryptographic service Hash function (O.SHA)” enforces the
organizational security policy P.Crypto-Service.
Security Objectives for Added Function
165 The TOE shall provide “Area based Memory Access Control (O.Mem-Access)” as specified
below.
O.Mem-Access Area based Memory Access Control
The TOE must provide the Security IC Embedded Software with the
capability to define restricted access memory areas. The TOE must
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Security IC Embedded Software
then enforce the partitioning of such memory areas so that access
of software to memory areas is controlled as required, for example
in a multi-application environment.
166 The TOE shall provide “(O.Reuse)” as specified below.
O.Reuse Cryptographic reuse of memory
The TOE shall provide the measures to ensure that the memory
resources being used by the TOE for the Crypto Library cannot be
disclosed to subsequent users of the same memory resource.
167 The TOE shall provide “Capability and availability of the Loader (O.Cap-Avail-Loader)” as
specified below.
O.Cap_Avail_Loader Capability and availability of the Loader
The TSF provides limited capability of the Loader functionality and
irreversible termination of the Loader in order to protect stored user
data from disclosure and manipulation.
168 The TOE shall provide “Authentication to external entities (O.Authentication)” as specified below:
O.Authentication Authentication to external entities
The TOE shall be able to authenticate itself to external entities. The
Initialisation Data (or parts of them) are used for TOE authentication
verification data.
169 The TOE shall provide “Access control and authenticity for the Loader (O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader)” as
specified below:
O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader Access control and authenticity for the Loader
The TSF provides trusted communication channel with authorized
user, supports confidentiality protection and authentication of the
user data to be loaded and access control for usage of the Loader
functionality.
170 The TOE shall provide “Protection of the confidentiality of the TSF (O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality)”
as specified below.
O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality Protection of the confidentiality of the TSF
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of
confidential operations of the Security IC (loader,
memory management unit…) through the use of a
dedicated code loaded on open samples.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software
171 The development of the Security IC Embedded Software is outside the development and
manufacturing of the TOE (cf. section 1.2.6). The Security IC Embedded Software development
defines the operational use of the TOE. This section describes the security objectives for the
Security IC Embedded Software development.
172 Note, in order to ensure that the TOE is used in a secure manner the Security IC Embedded
Software shall be designed so that the requirements from the following documents are met: (i)
hardware data sheet for the TOE, (ii) data sheet of the IC Dedicated Software of the TOE, (iii)
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TOE application notes, other guidance documents, and (iv) findings of the TOE evaluation reports
relevant for the Security IC Embedded Software as referenced in the certification report.
Phase 1
Figure 4-3: Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software development environment
173 The Security IC Embedded Software shall provide “Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)” as
specified below.
OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of user data of the Composite TOE
Security relevant user data of the Composite TOE (especially
cryptographic keys) are treated by the Security IC Embedded
Software as required by the security needs of the specific
application context.
For example, the Security IC Embedded Software will not disclose
security relevant user data of the Composite TOE to unauthorized
users or processes when in operation.
4.2.1 Clarification of “Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)”
174 User Data are defined but not limited to cipher or plain text data and cryptographic keys. These
data shall be manipulated appropriately by the Security IC Embedded Software. Secret keys
used as input for the cryptographic function of the TOE shall be chosen carefully in order to
ensure the strength of cryptographic operation.
175 Keys are defined and must be treated as confidential data which must be unique with high
entropy. The environment shall integrate appropriate key management for manipulating keys (for
example the importation of keys into TOE and/or the derivation from other keys).
176 If the Embedded Software of the TOE integrates multi-application operating systems, user data
shall be treated carefully. The Multi-application operating system should not disclose security
relevant user data of one application to another application.
4.3 Security Objectives for the operational Environment
TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6
Figure 4-4: Security Objectives for the operational Environment
OE.Resp-Appl
From BSI-CC-PP-0084
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4.3.1 “Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization (OE.Process-Sec-IC)”
177 Appropriate “Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization (OE.Process-Sec-IC)”
must be ensured after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phases 6, as well as during the delivery to
Phase 7 as specified below.
OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during composite product manufacturing
Security procedures shall be used after TOE Delivery up to delivery
to the end-consumer to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the
TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible
copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
This means that Phases after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase
6 (refer to section 1.2.6) must be protected appropriately. For a
preliminary list of assets to be protected refer to Section 122.
178 The pre-personalisation environment shall ensure “Uniqueness and authenticity of the device
individual identifier” (OE.Secure-Initialisation).
OE.Secure-Initialisation Uniqueness and authenticity of the device individual identifier
Security procedures shall be applied during the initialisation of the
TOE to ensure that each device is loaded with an individual
identifier. The identifier shall allow the unique identification of each
device in later life cycle phases.
179 Phases after the initialisation can use the individual identify for tracking and further provisioning.
Depending on the application context, the tracking may not be possible in the operational phase
of the TOE.
4.3.2 Clarification of “Protection during Composite Product Manufacturing (OE.Process-Sec-
IC)”
180 The personalization process and the personalization of data happening during phase 4, 5 and 6
of life cycle, shall be protected as the packaging, finishing and personalization phases are
protected.
181 Measures assumed in A.Process-Sec-IC should be implemented by the Composite Product
Manufacturer according to requirement of OE.Process-Sec-IC. This objective covers this
assumption.
4.3.3 “Limitation of capability and blocking the Loader (OE.Lim_Block_Loader)”
182 The operational environment of the TOE shall provide “Limitation of capability and blocking the
Loader (OE.Lim_Block_Loader)” as specified below.
OE.Lim_Block_Loader Limitation of capability and blocking the loader
The Composite Product Manufacturer will protect the Loader
functionality against misuse, limit the capability of the Loader and
terminate irreversibly the Loader after intended usage of the
Loader.
183 Note: The Loader is intended to be used from phase 3 to 5 of the life cycle.
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4.3.4 Clarification of “Limitation of capability and blocking the Loader
(OE.Lim_Block_Loader)”
184 The Loader functionality during phases 3 to 5 shall be protected against misuse. Measures
assumed in P.Lim_Block_Loader should be implemented by the Composite Product
Manufacturer according to requirement of OE.Lim_Block_Loader and O.Cap-Avail-Loader.
185 Note: To maintain the confidentiality of the data of the Composite TOE, the intended usage of
the Loader is limited to the phases 3 to 5 of the life cycle.
4.3.5 “External entities authenticating of the TOE (OE.TOE_Auth)”
186 The operational environment shall provide “External entities authenticating of the TOE
(OE.TOE_Auth)”.
OE.TOE_Auth External entities authenticating of the TOE
The operational environment shall support the authentication
verification mechanism and know authentication reference data of
the TOE.
187 The justification of the additional policy and the additional assumption show that they do not
contradict to the rationale already given in the Protection Profile for the assumptions, policy and
threats defined there.
4.3.6 “Secure communication and usage of the Loader (OE.Loader_Usage)”
188 The operational environment of the TOE shall provide “Secure usage of the Loader
(OE.Loader_Usage)” as specified below.
OE.Loader_Usage Secure communication and usage of the Loader
The authorized user must support the trusted communication
channel with the TOE by confidentiality protection and authenticity
proof of the data to be loaded and fulfilling the access conditions
required by the Loader.
4.4 Security Objectives Rationale
189 Table 4-1 below gives an overview, how the assumptions, threats, and organizational security
policies are addressed by the objectives. The text following after the table justifies this in details.
Assumption, Threat or
Organizational Security Policy
Security Objective Notes
A.Resp-Appl OE.Resp-Appl Phase 1
P.Process-TOE O.Identification Phase 2 - 3 optional phase 4
A.Process-Sec-IC OE.Process-Sec-IC Phase 5 – 6 optional Phase 4
T.Leak-Inherent O.Leak-Inherent
T.Phys-Probing O.Phys-Probing
T.Malfunction O.Malfunction
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T.Phys-Manipulation O.Phys-Manipulation
T.Abuse-Func O.Leak-Forced
T.RND O.RND
T.Mem-Access O.Mem-Access
P.Protect-Resid-Info O.Reuse
P.Crypto-Service
O.TDES
O.AES
O.PKA
O.RSA
O.ECC
O.SHA
A.Key-Function OE.Resp-Appl
P.Lim_Block_Loader
O.Cap_Avail_Loader
OE.Lim_Block_Loader
Phases 3 to 6
T.Masquerade_TOE
O.Authentication
OE.TOE_Auth
T.Open_Samples_Diffusion
O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality
O.Leak-Inherent
O.Leak-Forced
P.Ctrl_Loader
O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader
OE.Loader_Usage
Phases 3 to 5
P.Gen-Unique-ID OE.Secure-Initialisation Phases 3 to 5
T.External-Content-Abuse O.External-Content-Protection Phases 5 to 7
T.NVM-Command-Replay O.NVM-Command-Replay-
Protection
O.NVM-Irreversibility-Anchor
Phases 5 to 7
T.NVM-Unauthorized-Rollback O.NVM-Unauthorized-Rollback-
Protection
O.NVM-Irreversibility-Anchor
Phases 5 to 7
T.NVM-Clone-Replace O.NVM-Clone-Replace-
Protection
Phases 5 to 7
T.NVM-Shared-Content-Abuse O.External-Content-Protection Phases 5 to 7
Table 4-1: Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies
190 The justification related to the assumption “Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-Appl)” is as follows:
191 Since OE.Resp-Appl requires the Security IC Embedded Software to implement measures as
assumed in A.Resp-Appl, the assumption is covered by the objective.
192 The justification related to the organizational security policy “Protection during TOE Development
and Production (P.Process-TOE)” is as follows:
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193 O.Identification requires that the TOE has to support the possibility of a unique identification. The
unique identification can be stored on the TOE. Since the unique identification is generated by
the production environment the production environment must support the integrity of the
generated unique identification. The technical and organizational security measures that ensure
the security of the development environment and production environment are evaluated based
on the assurance measures that are part of the evaluation. For a list of material produced and
processed by the TOE Manufacturer refer to Section 3.1. All listed items and the associated
development and production environments are subject of the evaluation. Therefore, the
organizational security policy P.Process-TOE is covered by this objective, as far as organizational
measures are concerned.
194 The justification related to the assumption “Protection during Packaging, Finishing and
Personalization (A.Process-Sec-IC)” is as follows:
195 Since OE.Process-Sec-IC requires the Composite Product Manufacturer to implement those
measures assumed in A.Process-Sec-IC, the assumption is covered by this objective.
196 The justification related to the threats “Inherent Information Leakage (T.Leak-Inherent)”,
“Physical Probing (T.Phys-Probing)”, “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
(T.Malfunction)”,“Physical Manipulation (T.Phys-Manipulation)”, “Forced Information Leakage
(T.Leak-Forced)“, “Abuse of Functionality (T.Abuse-Func)” and “Deficiency of Random Numbers
(T.RND)” is as follows:
197 For all threats the corresponding objectives (refer to Table 4-1) are stated in a way, which directly
corresponds to the description of the threat (refer to Section 3.2). It is clear from the description
of each objective (refer to Section 4.1), that the corresponding threat is removed if the objective
is valid. More specifically, in every case the ability to use the attack method successfully is
countered, if the objective holds.
198 The threat “Memory Access Violation (T.Mem-Access)” is justified as follows: the TOE must
enforce the partitioning of the memory areas and must control its accesses. The Security IC
Embedded Software must define restrictions so that accidental or deliberate security violation
access to restricted memory area shall be prevented (T.Mem-Access). Therefore, the threat
T.Mem-Access is eliminated when the objective O.Mem-Access is achieved.
199 The Security IC Embedded Software should implement the memory management mechanism
exploiting appropriately TSF. This assertion is clarified in T.Mem-Access and O.Mem-Access.
The TOE makes available to Security IC Embedded Software access control functions.
Clarification "Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)” emphasizes this point by reminding that
the Security IC Embedded Software must not bypass access memory restrictions. This
clarification allows covering the threat T.Mem-Access.
200 The Security Objective O.Reuse covers the Organisational Security Policy P.Protect-Resid-Info
because it requires the TOE to partially implement functionality to provide protection of residual
information as required by the Security Policy.
201 The justification related to the security objectives “Cryptographic service TDES (O.TDES)”,
“Cryptographic service AES (O.AES)”, “Cryptographic service PKA (O.PKA)”, “Cryptographic
service RSA (O.RSA)” , “Cryptographic service ECC (O.ECC)” and “Cryptographic service Hash
function (O.SHA)” is as follows:
202 Since the objectives O.TDES, O.AES, O.PKA, O.RSA, O.ECC and O.SHA require the TOE to
implement exactly the same specific security functionality as required by P.Crypto-Service, the
organizational security policy is covered by these objectives.
203 The implementation of the specific security functionality required by P.Crypto-Service is defined
by the following security objectives: O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-
Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced. As expected from P.Crypto-Service and described in these
objectives, the specific security functionality is provided in a secure way. In general, the protection
of confidential data (User data or TSF data) is referred in O.Leak-Inherent and O.Leak-Forced.
P.Crypto-Service require specific security functions which enable to process User data.
204 The clarification has been made for the security objective “Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-
Appl)”. The Security IC Embedded Software will protect User data such as cipher, plain text and
cryptographic keys if required by using secured functions for ensuring the security of
cryptographic operations. Secure mechanism in the environment must be used for the
management of keys or derived keys. This is supported by the assumption A.Key-Function
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covered by OE.Resp-Appl. Therefore, the assumption A.Key-Function is covered by the objective
OE.Resp-Appl.
205 The organizational security policy "Limitation of capability and blocking the Loader
(P.Lim_Block_Loader)” is directly implemented by the security objective for the TOE “Capability
and availability of the Loader (O.Cap_Avail_Loader)” and the security objective for the TOE
environment “Limitation of capability and blocking the Loader (OE.Lim_Block_Loader)”. The TOE
security objective “Capability and availability of the Loader” (O.Cap_Avail_Loader)” mitigates also
the threat “Abuse of Functionality “(T.Abuse-Func) if attacker tries to misuse the Loader
functionality in order to manipulate security services of the TOE provided or depending on IC
Dedicated Support Software or user data of the TOE as IC Embedded Software, TSF data or
user data of the smartcard product.
206 The threat “Masquerade the TOE (T.Masquerade_TOE)” is directly covered by the TOE security
objective “Authentication to external entities (O.Authentication)” describing the proving part of the
authentication and the security objective for the operational environment of the TOE “External
entities authenticating of the TOE (OE.TOE_Auth)” the verifying part of the authentication.
207 The justification related to the threat “Diffusion of Open Samples (T.Open_Samples_Diffusion)”
is as follows:
208 The authentication required before having access to the Loader ensures the TOE is self-
protected at delivery point. The threat “Diffusion of Open Samples is then removed if the following
objectives are valid: “Protection of the confidentiality of the TSF (O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality)”,
“Protection against Inherent Information Leakage (O.Leak-Inherent)” and “Protection against
Forced Information Leakage (O.Leak-Forced)”.
209 The organisational security policy “Controlled usage to Loader Functionality (P.Ctlr_Loader) is
directly implemented by the security objective for the TOE “Access control and authenticity for
the Loader (O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader)” and the security objective for the TOE environment “Secure
usage of the Loader (OE.Loader_Usage)”.
210 T.External-Content-Abuse is countered by O. External-Content-Protection, which requires the
TOE to prevent disclosure and undetected modification of the contents stored in external NVM.
211 T.NVM-Command-Replay is countered by O.NVM-Command-Replay-Protection and O.NVM-
Irreversibility-Anchor as follows:
 O.NVM-Command-Replay-Protection requires that the TOE implements protection
against the replay of commands between the Security IC and the external NVM through
the interconnection bus, mitigating T.NVM-Command-Replay.
 O.NVM-Irreversibility-Anchor requires that the TOE implements a mechanism that goes
through a sequence of states associated with the changes issued by the Security IC on
the NVM. This mechanism helps for the detection of older NVM commands, as contents
of such commands would not meet the requirement of having a consistent value of the
irreversibility anchor.
212 T.NVM-Unauthorized-Rollback is countered by O.NVM-Unauthorized-Rollback-Protection and
O.NVM-Irreversibility-Anchor as follows:
 O.NVM-Unauthorized-Rollback-Protection requires that the TOE protects against
replacement of external NVM contents with older contents of the same NVM, where the
data freshness property is not met, thus, mitigating this threat.
 O.NVM-Irreversibility-Anchor requires that the TOE implements a mechanism that goes
through a sequence of states associated with the changes issued by the Security IC on
the external NVM. Unauthorized rollback of contents of the external NVM would result in
a state that would fail the validation against the current value of the irreversibility anchor
mechanism.
213 T.NVM-Clone-Replace is countered by O.NVM-Clone-Replace-Protection, which requires the
TOE to detect the replacement of the external NVM contents with those of a different TOE’s NVM,
or physical replacement of the external NVM with the external NVM of a different TOE unit.
214 T.NVM-Shared-Content-Abuse is countered by O.External-Content-Protection which requires
the TOE to protect the TSF content written in the external NVM through cryptographic security
mechanisms which prevent other parts of the SoC from accessing (read) the TSF content and
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prevent any security impact which be due to TSF data being overwritten by other parts of the
SoC.
215 The organisational security policy “Identification of each TOE instance (P.Gen-Unique-ID)” is
implemented in order to fulfil the security objective “Uniqueness and authenticity of the device
individual identifier (OE.Secure-Initialisation)”. Indeed, a unique identification must be stored on
each instance of the TOE. Phases after the initialisation can use the individual identify for tracking
and further provisioning.
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52 www.tiempo-secure.com Definition of the Family
FDP_URC
5 Extended Components Definition
216 This chapter presents the extended components definition. The extended components include
the following components which are introduced in the PP0084 [1]:
 FCS_RNG.1
 FMT_LIM.1
 FMT_LIM.2
 FAU_SAS.1
 FDP_SDC.1
 FIA_API.1
217 The components listed in 216 are defined in the PP0084 [1].
218 Additionally, the following extended components are introduced:
 FDP_URC.1
 FDP_IRA.1
5.1 Definition of the Family FDP_URC
219 To define the security functional requirements of the TOE, an additional family (FDP_URC) of
the Class FDP (User data protection) is defined here.
220 This family describes the functional requirements for the detection of unauthorized rollback of the
contents stored in the external NVM. An unauthorized rollback situation occurs when the contents
of the external NVM are replaced with other previous contents of the same NVM that were valid
at a certain moment in the past. The unauthorized rollback is understood as a full replacement
of external NVM contents with previous valid contents, or partial content replacement.
221 The family “Protection against an unauthorized rollback of stored contents (FDP_URC)” is
specified as follows:
FDP_URC: Protection against an unauthorized rollback of stored contents
Family behaviour
This family defines functional requirements for the detection of an unauthorized
rollback of contents stored in the external NVM.
Component levelling:
FDP_URC.1 Requires the TOE to protect against an unauthorized rollback of the
contents stored in the external NVM.
Management: FDP_URC.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FDP_URC.1
FDP_URC.1 Protection against an unauthorized rollback of stored contents 1
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There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FDP_URC.1 Protection against an unauthorized rollback of stored contents
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_URC.1.1 The TOE shall detect an unauthorized replacement of the contents
stored in the external NVM before the contents are used. The
detection shall take place even if the contents were previously stored
in the same NVM and were valid and consistent at a given past time.
FDP_URC.1.2 Upon detection of unauthorized rollback of external NVM contents,
the TOE shall [selection: stop TOE operation, [assignment: other
actions]].
5.2 Definition of the Family FDP_IRA
222 To define the security functional requirements of the TOE, an additional family (FDP_IRA) of the
Class FDP (User Data Protection) is defined here.
223 This family describes the functional requirements for the implementation of an irreversibility
anchor mechanism linked to the data freshness property for the contents of the external NVM.
The external NVM irreversibility anchor mechanism consists of a non-volatile mutable
mechanism that goes through a predefined sequence of states (that are associated with
increasing values). These values are increasing and cannot revert to previous states. They serve
to determine whether the contents of the NVM meet the property of data freshness, by verifying
that they are those resulting from the latest write or erase operation issued by the Security IC on
the external NVM. Otherwise, the data freshness property is not met, and this mechanism serves
to prevent or detect it.
224 The family FDP_IRA aims to cover the requirements associated with the above problem,
providing the ability to prevent or detect the scenario of external NVM contents not being fresh.
225 The family “Irreversibility Anchor of NVM contents (FDP_IRA)” is specified as follows:
FDP_IRA: Irreversibility Anchor of NVM contents
Family behaviour
This family defines functional requirements for the implementation of a non-volatile
mutable irreversibility anchor that goes through a series of predefined states in an
irreversible way, i.e., without the possibility of going back to previous states. The
irreversibility anchor value resulting from its state is linked to the data freshness of
the external NVM contents. Violating data freshness property of the external NVM
contents would result in a non-concordance of the value of the irreversibility anchor
with the contents retrieved from the external NVM. Therefore, this mechanism
serves to maintain the data freshness of the external NVM contents.
Component levelling:
FDP_IRA.1 Irreversibility Anchor of NVM Contents 1
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54 www.tiempo-secure.com Definition of the Family
FDP_IRA
Management: FDP_IRA.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FDP_IRA.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FDP_IRA.1 Irreversibility Anchor of NVM contents
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_IRA.1.1 The TOE shall implement a non-volatile irreversibility anchor
mechanism that maintains a value that goes through a predefined
sequence of states without the possibility of reversion to a previous
state. The state of the Irreversibility Anchor is used to verify that NVM
contents preserve data freshness as follows: [selection, choose one
of:
- Its value is (1) associated to the state of the external NVM
contents, (2) advanced to the next state before contents are
updated by the host MCU, and (3) checked to determine if
the external NVM contents are fresh before they are used;
- Its value is (1) associated to sequences of commands or
individual commands sent by the host MCU to the external
NVM, (2) advanced to the next state before each command
or sequence of commands are issued by the host MCU to
the external NVM and (3) checked to determine if command
contents are fresh when a command is issued;
- [assignment: other option]].
[assignment: indication of in which way the irreversibility anchor
serves to determine that external NVM contents meet data
freshness].
FDP_IRA.1.2 Upon detection of unauthorized rollback of external NVM contents,
the TOE shall [selection: stop TOE operation, [assignment: other
actions]].
Application Note: The TSF related to this mechanism can be implemented in multiple ways.
Typical architectures include:
- A protected field in an internal memory of the Security IC, e.g., an effuse
array, an EEPROM variable, etc.
- A mechanism in the external NVM (in case it implements any TSF), e.g., a
dedicated Flash array programmed bit-by-bit, etc.
The above implementation mechanisms are illustrative, and the possible
implementation options are not limited to them.
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6 IT Security Requirements
226 The chapter IT Security Requirements describes the security functional requirements for the TOE
(6.1), the TOE assurance requirements (6.2) and the security requirement rationale (6.3) as
required in [1].
6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
227 A summary of the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE is given in Table 6-1.
# Security Functional Requirements Origin of the SFR Threats or policies
1 FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance BSI-CC-PP-0084
T.Malfunction
T.Leak-Forced
T.Abuse-Func
T.RND
2 FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation
of secure state
BSI-CC-PP-0084
T.Malfunction
T.Leak-Forced
T.Abuse-Func
T.RND
3 FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
BSI-CC-PP-0084
(extended component)
T.Abuse-Func
4 FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
BSI-CC-PP-0084
(extended component)
T.Abuse-Func
5 FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
BSI-CC-PP-0084
(extended component)
P.Process-TOE
6.1 FDP_SDC.1/IM
Stored data
confidentiality for
internal memories
BSI-CC-PP-0084
(extended component)
T.Phys-Probing
T.Phys-Manipulation
6.2 FDP_SDC.1/PM
Stored data
confidentiality for
passive external NVM
Extended Components
due to external NVMs
T.External-Content-
Abuse
T.NVM-Shared-
Content-Abuse
7.1 FDP_SDI.2/IM
Stored data integrity
monitoring and action for
internal memories
BSI-CC-PP-0084
T.Phys-Probing
T.Phys-Manipulation
7.2 FDP_SDI.2/PM
Stored data integrity
monitoring and action for
passive external NVM
Extended Components
due to external NVMs
T.External-Content-
Abuse
T.NVM-Shared-
Content-Abuse
8 FPT_PHP.3
Resistance to physical
attack
BSI-CC-PP-0084
T.Phys-Probing
T.Phys-Manipulation
T.Leak-Forced
T.Abuse-Func
T.RND
9 FDP_ITT.1
Basic internal transfer
protection
BSI-CC-PP-0084
T.Leak-Inherent
T.Leak-Forced
T.Abuse-Func
T.RND
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Requirements for the TOE
10 FPT_ITT.1
Basic internal TSF data
transfer protection
BSI-CC-PP-0084
T.Leak-Inherent
T.Leak-Forced
T.Abuse-Func
T.RND
11.1 FDP_IFC.1/IM
Subset information flow
control for internal
memories
BSI-CC-PP-0084
T.Leak-Inherent
T.Leak-Forced
T.Abuse-Func
T.RND
11.2 FDP_IFC.1/PM
Subset information flow
control for passive
external NVM
Extended Components
due to external NVMs
T.Leak-Inherent
T.Leak-Forced
T.Abuse-Func
T.RND
12.1 FCS_RNG.1/RGS-IC
Random number
generation – RGS-IC
BSI-CC-PP-0084
(extended component)
T.RND
12.2 FCS_RNG.1/DRBG
Random number
generation – DRBG
BSI-CC-PP-0084
(extended component)
T.RND
12.3 FCS_RNG.1/PRNG
Pseudo-Random
Generation - PRNG
BSI-CC-PP-0084
(extended component)
T.RND
13 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control CC 3.1 - Part 2 T.Mem-Access
14 FDP_ACF.1
Security attribute based
access control
CC 3.1 - Part 2 T.Mem-Access
15 FMT_MSA.3
Static attribute
initialization
CC 3.1 - Part 2 T.Mem-Access
16 FMT_MSA.1
Management of security
attributes
CC 3.1 - Part 2 T.Mem-Access
17 FMT_SMF.1
Specification of
management functions
CC 3.1 - Part 2 T.Mem-Access
18 FDP_RIP.1
Subset residual
information protection
CC 3.1 - Part 2 P.Protect-Resid-Info
19.1 FCS_COP.1/[HW]TDES
Cryptographic operation
- TDES (Hardware)
BSI-CC-PP-0084
(Packages for
Cryptographic Services)
P.Crypto-Service
19.2 FCS_COP.1/[SW]TDES
Cryptographic operation
- TDES (Software)
BSI-CC-PP-0084
(Packages for
Cryptographic Services)
P.Crypto-Service
19.3 FCS_COP.1/[HW]AES
Cryptographic operation
- AES (Hardware)
BSI-CC-PP-0084
(Packages for
Cryptographic Services)
P.Crypto-Service
19.4 FCS_COP.1/[SW]AES
Cryptographic operation
- AES (Software)
BSI-CC-PP-0084
(Packages for
Cryptographic Services)
P.Crypto-Service
19.4 FCS_COP.1/PKA
Cryptographic Operation
- PKA
CC 3.1 - Part 2 (derived
from the component
FCS_COP.1)
P.Crypto-Service
19.5 FCS_COP.1/RSA
Cryptographic Operation
- RSA
CC 3.1 - Part 2 (derived
from the component
FCS_COP.1)
P.Crypto-Service
19.6 FCS_COP.1/ECDSA
Cryptographic operation
- ECDSA
CC 3.1 - Part 2 (derived
from the component
FCS_COP.1)
P.Crypto-Service
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19.7 FCS_COP.1/ECDH
Cryptographic operation
- ECDH
CC 3.1 - Part 2 (derived
from the component
FCS_COP.1)
P.Crypto-Service
19.8 FCS_COP.1/SHA
Cryptographic operation
– SHA
BSI-CC-PP-0084
(Packages for
Cryptographic Services)
P.Crypto-Service
20.1 FCS_CKM.1/RSA
Cryptographic key
generation - RSA
CC 3.1 - Part 2 (derived
from the component
FCS_CKM.1)
P.Crypto-Service
20.2 FCS_CKM.1/ECDSA
Cryptographic key
generation - ECDSA
CC 3.1 - Part 2 (derived
from the component
FCS_CKM.1)
P.Crypto-Service
21 FMT_LIM.1/Loader
Limited capabilities -
Loader
BSI-CC-PP-0084
(Package 1: Loader
dedicated for usage in
secured environment
only)
P.Lim_Block_Loader
22 FMT_LIM.2/Loader
Limited availability -
Loader
BSI-CC-PP-0084
(Package 1: Loader
dedicated for usage in
secured environment
only)
P.Lim_Block_Loader
23 FIA_API.1
Authentication Proof of
Identity
BSI-CC-PP-0084
(Package
“Authentication of the
Security IC”)
T.Masquerade_TOE
24 FTP_ITC.1
Inter-TSF trusted
channel
BSI-CC-PP-0084
(Package 2 for Loader)
P.Ctrl_Loader
25 FDP_UCT.1
Basic data exchange
confidentiality
BSI-CC-PP-0084
(Package 2 for Loader)
P.Ctrl_Loader
26 FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
BSI-CC-PP-0084
(Package 2 for Loader)
P.Ctrl_Loader
27 FDP_ACC.1/Loader
Subset access control –
Loader
BSI-CC-PP-0084
(Package 2 for Loader)
P.Ctrl_Loader
28 FDP_ACF.1/Loader
Security attribute based
access control – Loader
BSI-CC-PP-0084
(Package 2 for Loader)
P.Ctrl_Loader
29 FDP_URC.1/PM
Protection against an
unauthorized rollback of
stored contents
Extended Components
due to external NVMs
T.NVM-Unauthorized-
Rollback
30 FDP_IRA.1/PM
Irreversibility Anchor of
NVM contents
Extended Components
due to external NVMs
T.NVM-Command-
Replay
T.NVM-Unauthorized-
Rollback
31 FIA_UID.1/PM Stored data authenticity
Extended Components
due to external NVMs
T.External-Content-
Abuse
T.NVM-Shared-
Content-Abuse
33 FDP_DAU.2/PM
Data Authentication with
Identity of Guarantor
CC 3.1 - Part 2 T.NVM-Clone-Replace
34 FPT_RPL.1/PM Replay detection CC 3.1 - Part 2
T.NVM-Command-
Replay
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Requirements for the TOE
Table 6-1: Summary of the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
228 In order to define the Security Functional Requirements, the Part 2 of the Common Criteria was
used. However, some Security Functional Requirements have been refined. These refinements
are described below along with the associated SFR. The refinements appear in bold font whereas
the assignments and selections appear in italic bold font.
6.1.1 Malfunctions
229 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2)” as specified below.
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance
Hierarchical to: FRU_FLT.1 Degraded fault tolerance
Dependencies: FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state.
FRU_FLT.2.1 The TSF shall ensure the operation of all the TOE’s capabilities when
the following failures occur: exposure to operating conditions
which are not detected according to the requirement Failure with
preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1).
Refinement: The term “failure” above means “circumstances”. The TOE
prevents failures for the “circumstances” defined above.
230 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” as
specified below.
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur: exposure to operating conditions which may not
be tolerated according to the requirement Limited fault
tolerance (FRU_FLT.2) and where therefore a malfunction
could occur.
Refinement: The term “failure” above also covers “circumstances”. The
TOE prevents failures for the “circumstances” defined above.
6.1.2 Abuse of Functionality
231 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
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FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits
their capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability
(FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced: Deploying Test
Features after TOE Delivery does not allow user data of the
Composite TOE to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be
disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and no
substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks.
232 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities – Loader (FMT_LIM.1/Loader)” as
specified below.
FMT_LIM.1/Loader Limited capabilities – Loader
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1/Loader The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits
its capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability
(FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced: Deploying Loader
functionality after the locking of the Loader does not allow
stored user data to be disclosed or manipulated by
unauthorized user
Application Note FMT_LIM.1 supplements FMT_LIM.2 allowing for non-overlapping
loading of user data and protecting the TSF against misuse of the
Loader for attacks against the TSF. The TOE Loader may allow for
correction of already loaded user data before the assigned action
e.g. before blocking the TOE Loader for TOE Delivery to the end
customer or any intermediate step in the life cycle of the Security IC
or the smartcard.
233 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits
their availability so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities
(FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced: Deploying Test
Features after TOE Delivery does not allow user data of the
Composite TOE to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be
disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and no
substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks.
234 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability – Loader (FMT_LIM.2/Loader)” as
specified as follows.
FMT_LIM.2/Loader Limited availability – Loader
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
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FMT_LIM.2.1/Loader The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits its availability so
that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the
following policy is enforced: The TSF prevents deploying the
Loader functionality after the locking of the Loader.
235 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended).
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide
- The test process
- The pre-personalization process
- The admin loader
- The firmware
With the capability to store the initialization Data and/or Pre-
personalization Data and/or supplements of the Security IC
Embedded Software and/or firmware data in the Non-volatile
Memory.
Application note: The development, production and the testing phases require the TOE
to support unique identification number.
6.1.3 Physical Manipulation and Probing
236 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Stored data confidentiality for internal memories
(FDP_SDC.1/IM)” as specified below.
FDP_SDC.1/IM Stored data confidentiality for internal memories
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_SDC.1.1/IM The TSF shall ensure the confidentiality of the information of the user
data while it is stored in the memories within TOE Hardware
boundary (ROM, CRAM, RAM and OTP).
237 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Stored data confidentiality for passive external NVM
(FDP_SDC.1/PM)” as specified below.
FDP_SDC.1/PM Stored data confidentiality for passive external NVM
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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FDP_SDC.1.1/PM The TSF shall ensure the confidentiality of the information of the user
data while it is stored in the memories outside the TOE Hardware
boundary (passive external NVM).
238 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Stored data integrity monitoring and action for internal
memories (FDP_SDI.2/IM)” as specified below.
FDP_SDI.2/IM Stored data integrity monitoring and action for internal
memories
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1/IM Stored data integrity monitoring for internal memories
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_SDI.2.1/IM The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by
the TSF for integrity errors using the CRC coprocessor and the
CRC modules integrated in both RAM and CRAM on all objects,
based on the content of the OTP, RAM and CRAM memories
within TOE Hardware boundary
FDP_SDI.2.2/IM Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall reset the TOE
or generate a non-maskable interrupt signal.
Refinement: The TOE needs additional support by the Embedded Software
to check data integrity on external memory with the help of CRC
coprocessor.
239 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Stored data integrity monitoring and action for passive
external NVM (FDP_SDI.2/PM)” as specified below.
FDP_SDI.2/PM Stored data integrity monitoring and action for passive external
NVM
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_SDI.2.1/PM The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by
the TSF for integrity errors using the AEAD service on all objects,
based on the content of the passive external NVM.
FDP_SDI.2.2/PM Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall reset the TOE
or generate a non-maskable interrupt signal.
Refinement: The TOE needs additional support by the Embedded Software
to check data integrity on external memory with the help of CRC
coprocessor.
240 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as specified
below.
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing
to the TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are
always enforced.
Refinement: The TSF implements appropriate mechanisms to continuously
counter physical manipulation and physical probing. Due to the
nature of these attacks (especially manipulation) the TSF can by
no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore,
permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring
that security functional requirements are enforced. Hence,
“automatic response” means here (i) assuming that there might
be an attack at any time and (ii) countermeasures are provided
at any time.
Application note: Security features such as active shield, data and bus scrambling for
memory and 1 to N encoding data style make the reverse-
engineering of the TOE layout impracticable. When a physical
probing attack is detected a Non-Maskable Interrupt is generated.
These features enable to meet the security functional requirement of
FPT_PHP.3.
6.1.4 Leakage
241 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic internal transfer protection (FDP_ITT.1)” as specified
below.
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control].
FDP_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Data Processing Policy to prevent the
disclosure of user data when it is transmitted between physically-
separated parts of the TOE.
Refinement: The different memories, the CPU and other functional units of
the TOE (e.g. a cryptographic co-processor) are seen as
physically-separated parts of the TOE.
242 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection (FPT_ITT.1)”
as specified below.
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall protect TSF data from disclosure when it is
transmitted between separate parts of the TOE.
Refinement: The different memories, the CPU and other functional units of
the TOE (e.g. a cryptographic co-processor) are seen as
separated parts of the TOE.
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243 This requirement is equivalent to FDP_ITT.1 above but refers to TSF data instead of user data.
Therefore, it should be understood as to refer to the same Data Processing Policy defined under
FDP_IFC.1 below.
244 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset information flow control for internal memories
(FDP_IFC.1/IM)” as specified below:
FDP_IFC.1/IM Subset information flow control for internal memories
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes.
FDP_IFC.1.1/IM The TSF shall enforce the Data Processing Policy on all confidential
data when they are processed or transferred by the TOE or by the
Security IC Embedded Software.
245 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset information flow control for passive external NVM
(FDP_IFC.1/PM)” as specified below:
FDP_IFC.1/PM Subset information flow control for passive external NVM
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes.
FDP_IFC.1.1/PM The TSF shall enforce the Data Processing Policy on all confidential
data when they are transferred from passive external NVM to the
TOE or by the TOE to the passive external NVM.
246 The following Security Function Policy (SFP) Data Processing Policy is defined for the
requirement “Subset information flow control (FDP_IFC.1)”:
User data of the Composite TOE and TSF data shall not be accessible from the TOE except
when the Security IC Embedded Software decides to communicate the user data of the
Composite TOE via an external interface. The protection shall be applied to confidential data only
but without the distinction of attributes controlled by the Security IC Embedded Software.
6.1.5 Random Numbers
247 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS_RNG.1/RGS-IC)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FCS_RNG.1/RGS-IC Random number generation – RGS-IC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RNG.1.1/RGS-
IC
The TSF shall provide a physical random number generator that
implements: the rule RègleArchiGVA-1 of [14] and the
recommendation RecomArchiGVA-1 of [14], total failure tests
and online tests.
FCS_RNG.1.2/RGS-
IC
The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet the rule
RègleArchiGVA-2 of [14].
Warning The TSF fulfils some but not all the necessary rules to comply
with [14] regarding random numbers generators (RNG). The
composite product's RNG will comply with [14] only when all
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the rules of §2.4 "Génération d'aléa cryptographique" of [14]
are addressed. In particular, a cryptographic post-processing
must be implemented by the composite developer.
Application note: The TRNG integrates a post-processing function with features that
enable to perform online tests and statistical tests.
248 In addition to FCS_RNG.1/RGS-IC the TOE shall optionally provide a DRBG cryptographic library
to produce deterministic random bit generator as follows:
FCS_RNG.1/DRBG Random number generation – DRBG
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RNG.1.1/DRBG The TSF shall provide a deterministic random number generator
that implements a software post-processing algorithm that
meets:
(DRBG.1) the rule RègleArchiGDA-4 of [14] and the
recommendation RecomArchiGDA-1 of [14].
(DRBG.2) the rule RègleAlgoGDA-1 of [14].
FCS_RNG.1.2/DRBG The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet the rules
RègleAlgoGDA-2 and RègleAlgoGDA-3 of [14].
Application note The DRBG relies on a random seed provided by the TRNG.
249 The TOE provides a hardware pseudo-random number generator that can be used for
cryptographic support.
FCS_RNG.1/PRNG Pseudo-Random number generation – PRNG
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RNG.1.1/PRNG The TSF shall provide a deterministic random number generator
that meets:
(PRNG.1.1) Generated random numbers shall pass AIS31
statistical tests (Test procedure A).
Application note The PRNG relies on a random seed provided by the TRNG.
6.1.6 Memory Access Control
250 The TOE shall support mechanism that enable to separate code and data in order to prevent one
application to access code and/or data of another application. Several Security Functional
Policies (SFP) are used for protecting data such as access control and information flow control.
251 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified below.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Memory Access Control Policy on all
subjects (software with test mode, pre-personalization mode,
administrator mode and firmware mode), all objects (data
including code stored in memories within TOE Hardware
boundary (ROM, CRAM, RAM and OTP) and in memories outside
the TOE Hardware boundary (Flash) and all the operations
among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
252 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” as
specified below.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Memory Access Control Policy to
objects based on the following: memories within TOE Hardware
boundary (ROM, CRAM, RAM and OTP) and in memories outside
the TOE Hardware boundary (Flash).It includes access rights
and the software executed from these memories.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
evaluate the permission access rights before granting access to
controlled subjects and objects.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none.
253 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3)” as specified
below.
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the Memory Access Control Policy to
provide initialization default values for security attributes that are
used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow any subjects to specify alternative initial values
to override the default values when an object or information is
created.
254 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)” as
specified below:
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FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Memory Access Control Policy to restrict
the ability to change initial values, modify or delete the security
access rights of control information to running at privilege
mode.
255 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1)” as
specified below:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall make available the access of control registers of
the MPU for allowing security management functions.
6.1.7 Cryptographic reuse of memory
256 The TOE shall support mechanisms to prevent cryptographic resource stored in memory from
being reused.
257 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset residual information protection (FDP_RIP.1)” as
specified below.
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content is made
unavailable upon the deallocation of the resource from the
following objects: all objects used by the cryptographic library as
specified in the user guidance documentation.
6.1.8 Cryptographic Support
258 The Cryptographic Operation component FCS_COP.1 requires the cryptographic
algorithm and key size used to perform specified cryptographic operations which can be
based on assigned standard.
259 The following additional specific security functionality is implemented in the TOE as software
libraries:
 Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES) (optional)
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 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (optional)
 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) public key asymmetric cryptography, with key size 1280-
bit up to 4096-bit with (optional)
 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) (optional)
 Cryptographic service Hash function (SHA) (optional)
260 The TOE shall meet the Cryptographic Operation (FCS_COP.1) requirements as specified
below:
Triple DES operation
FCS_COP.1/[HW]TDES Cryptographic Operation - TDES (Hardware)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/[HW]TDES The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm TDES in
ECB mode and cryptographic key sizes: 112 bit, 168 bit that
meet the following: NIST SP 800-67 [9], NIST SP 800-38A [10].
The optional DES cryptographic library of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic
operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/[SW]TDES Cryptographic Operation - TDES (Software)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/[SW]TDES The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm TDES in
ECB and CBC modes and cryptographic key sizes: 112 bit,
168 bit that meet the following: NIST SP 800-67 [9], NIST SP
800-38A [10].
AES Operation
FCS_COP.1/[HW]AES Cryptographic Operation - AES (Hardware)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/[HW]AES The TSF shall perform decryption and encryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES in ECB
, CBC, CTR and CMAC modes and cryptographic key sizes: 128
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bit, 192 bit and 256 bit that meet the following standard: FIPS
197 [7], NIST SP 800-38A [10], NIST SP 800-38B [17].
The optional AES cryptographic library of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic
operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/[SW]AES Cryptographic Operation - (Software)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/[SW]AES The TSF shall perform decryption and encryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: AES in
ECB , CBC, CTR and CMAC modes and cryptographic key
sizes: 128 bit, 192 bit and 256 bit that meet the following
standard: FIPS 197 [7], NIST SP 800-38A [10], NIST SP 800-
38B [17].
Public Key Accelerator (PKA) Operation
FCS_COP.1/PKA Cryptographic Operation - PKA
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/PKA The TSF shall perform modular exponentiation in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm none and cryptographic
key sizes between 128 and 4096 bits that meet the following
standard: none.
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) Operation
FCS_COP.1/RSA Cryptographic Operation - RSA
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/RSA The TSF shall perform encryption, decryption, signature
generation and verification in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm RSA Cryptography Standard with
Montgomery and cryptographic key sizes: between 128-bit
and 4096-bit that meet the following: PKCS#1 v2.1 June, 14,
2002.
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) Key Generation
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The RSA key generation for the optional RSA cryptographic library shall meet the requirement
“Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as specified below.
FCS_CKM.1/RSA Cryptographic key generation - RSA
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/RSA The TSF shall generate the RSA public/private key pair in
accordance with the specified cryptographic key generation
algorithm and with the specified cryptographic key sizes from
1280-bit up to 4096-bit with 32-bit granularity that meet the
following standards: ETSI TS 102 176-1, section 6.2.2.1 Key
and parameter generation algorithm rsagen1.
Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA) Operation
The ECC cryptographic library of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation
(FCS_COP.1)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA Cryptographic operation - ECDSA
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/ECDSA The TSF shall perform signature generation and verification
in accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA
and cryptographic key sizes up to 640-bit that meet the
following standard: ANS X9.62, section 7.3 Signing Process
and section 7.4 Verifying Process.
Cryptographic hash function (SHA) Operation
The SHA cryptographic library of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation
– SHA (FCS_COP.1/SHA)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation - SHA
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with the specified
cryptographic algorithms: SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512 that meet the following standard: FIPS 180-4 [16].
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Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA) Key Generation
The key generation for the ECC cryptographic library shall meet the requirement
“Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1/ECDSA)” as specified below.
FCS_CKM.1/ECDSA Cryptographic key generation - ECDSA
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/ECDSA The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm specified in
ANS X9.62 and with the cryptographic key sizes up to 640-bit
that meet the following standard: ANS X9.62, section A.4.3
Elliptic Curve Key Generation.
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Agreement
The ECC cryptographic library of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation
(FCS_COP.1)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/ECDH Cryptographic operation - ECDH
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/ECDH The TSF shall perform the key exchange in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm ECDH and cryptographic key
sizes from 192-bit up to 640-bit that meet the following
standard: ANS X9.63, section 5.4.1 Standard Diffie-Hellman
primitive.
6.1.9 Authentication of the TOE
261 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as specified
below.
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide an authentication mechanism to prove the
identity of the TOE to an external entity.
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6.1.10 Loader dedicated for usage by authorized users only
262 The TOE Functional Requirement “Inter-TSF trusted channel” (FTP_ITC.1) is specified as
follows.
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and
authorized users that is logically distinct from other communication
channels and provides assured identification of its end points and
protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
deploying Loader mutual authentication and establishment of
session keys.
263 The TOE Functional Requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” is
specified as follows.
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Loader SFP to receive user data in a
manner protected from unauthorized disclosure.
264 The TOE Functional Requirement “Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)” is specified as follows.
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
FDP_UIT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Loader SFP to receive user data in a
manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion has occurred.
265 The TOE Functional Requirement “Subset access control - Loader (FDP_ACC.1/Loader)” is
specified as follows.
FDP_ACC.1/Loader Subset access control - Loader
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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Dependencies FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.
FDP_ACC.1.1/
Loader
The TSF shall enforce the Loader SFP on
(1) the subjects: Loader role,
(2) the objects user data in Memory outside the TOE Hardware
(Flash),
(3) the operation deployment of Loader
266 The TOE Functional Requirement “Security attribute based access control - Loader
(FDP_ACF.1/Loader)” is specified as follows.
FDP_ACF.1/Loader Security attribute based access control - Loader
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FDP_ACF.1.1/
Loader
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Loader SFP to objects
based on the following:
(1) the subjects : Loader role with security attributes : writing
access rights.
(2) the objects user data in Memory outside the TOE Hardware
(Flash) with security attributes : data are located in controlled
sectors of the external memory devoted to TESIC.
FDP_ACF.1.2/
Loader
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine
if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed: evaluate the writing access rights before granting
access to the controlled subjects or objects.
FDP_ACF.1.3/
Loader
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects
to objects based on the following additional rules: the Loader role
shall be authenticated before access is granted.
FDP_ACF.1.4/
Loader
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: the TSF prevents deploying the
Loader functionality after the locking of the Loader, the TSF
prevents deploying the Loader functionality if the Loader role
has not been authenticated.
Note The SFR FMT_MSA.3 as a dependency is not necessary as the
security attributes used to enforce the Loader SFP are fixed by
the IC manufacturer and no new objects under control of the
Loader SFP are created.
6.1.11 Passive External NVM
6.1.11.1 Protection of NVM content freshness
267 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Protection against an unauthorized rollback of stored
contents in Passive external NVM (FDP_URC.1/PM)”, as specified below.
FDP_URC.1/PM Protection against an unauthorized rollback of stored contents
in Passive external NVM
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Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FDP_URC.1.1/PM The TOE shall detect an unauthorized replacement of the contents
stored in the passive external NVM before the contents are used.
The detection shall take place even if the contents were previously
stored in the same passive external NVM and were valid and
consistent at a given past time.
FDP_URC.1.2/PM Upon detection of unauthorized rollback of passive external NVM
contents, the TOE shall throw an exception and the exception
shall be handled accordingly by the application software.
268 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Irreversibility Anchor of passive external NVM contents
(FDP_IRA.1/PM)”, as specified below.
FDP_IRA.1/PM Irreversibility Anchor of passive external NVM contents
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FDP_IRA.1.1/PM
The TOE shall implement a non-volatile irreversibility anchor
mechanism that maintains a value that goes increasingly through
a predefined sequence of states without the possibility of reversion
to a previous state. The state of the Irreversibility Anchor is used to
verify that NVM contents preserve data freshness as follows:
- Its value is (1) associated to the state of the passive external
NVM contents, (2) advanced to the next state before contents
are updated by the host MCU, and (3) checked to determine if
the passive external NVM contents are fresh before they are
used.
The irreversibility anchor keeps track of the state of the
external NVM contents and its value is used to sign the
associated image in the external NVM. Thus, this association
allows to verify that the external NVM contents do meet data
freshness.
FDP_IRA.1.2/PM Upon detection of unauthorized rollback of external NVM contents,
the TOE shall throw an exception and the exception shall be
handled accordingly by the application software.
6.1.11.2 Data transfer between host MCU and passive external NVM
269 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Replay detection in passive external NVM
(FPT_RPL.1/PM)”, as specified below.
FPT_RPL.1/PM Replay detection in passive external NVM
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_RPL.1.1/PM The TSF shall detect replay for the following entities: commands
issued by the host MCU to the passive external NVM for the
read, write and erase operations.
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Requirements for the TOE
FPT_RPL.1.2/PM The TSF shall throw an exception and the exception shall be
handled accordingly by the application software when replay is
detected.
270 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Data Authentication with Identity of Guarantor
(FDP_DAU.2/PM)”, as specified below.
FDP_DAU.2/PM Data Authentication with Identity of Guarantor
Hierarchical to: FDP_DAU.1 Basic Data Authentication
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of Identification
FDP_DAU.2.1/PM The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be
used as a guarantee of the validity of data objects and containers
stored in the external memory.
FDP_DAU.2.2/PM The TSF shall provide the TOE with the ability to verify evidence of
the validity of the indicated information and the identity of the user
that generated the evidence.
271 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of Identification (FIA_UID.1/PM)”, as specified
below.
FIA_UID.1/PM Timing of Identification
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_UID.1.1/PM The TSF shall allow the secure start-up or wake-up without
access to data objects and containers stored in the external
memory on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
identified.
FIA_UID.1.2/PM The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
272 The Security Target will be evaluated according to
Security Target evaluation (Class ASE)
273 The Security Assurance Requirements for the evaluation of the TOE are those taken from the
Evaluation Assurance Level 5 (EAL5)
and augmented by taking the following components:
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
this corresponds to level “EAL5+”
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274 The assurance requirements are (augmented components are highlighted):
Title Label Origin
Class ADV: Development
Architectural design (ADV_ARC.1) CC & BSI-CC-PP-0084
Functional specification (ADV_FSP.5) CC & BSI-CC-PP-0084
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP.1) CC & BSI-CC-PP-0084
Well-structured internals (ADV_INT.2) CC
TOE design (ADV_TDS.4) CC
Class AGD: Guidance documents
Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1) CC & BSI-CC-PP-0084
Preparative user guidance (AGD_PRE.1) CC & BSI-CC-PP-0084
Class ALC: Life-cycle support
CM capabilities (ALC_CMC.4) CC & BSI-CC-PP-0084
CM scope (ALC_CMS.5) CC & BSI-CC-PP-0084
Delivery (ALC_DEL.1) CC & BSI-CC-PP-0084
Development security (ALC_DVS.2) CC & BSI-CC-PP-0084
Life-cycle definition (ALC_LCD.1) CC
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT.2) CC
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1) CC
Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1) CC
ST introduction (ASE_INT.1) CC
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ.2) CC
Derived security requirements (ASE_REQ.2) CC
Security problem definition (ASE_SPD.1) CC
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1) CC
Class ATE: Tests
Coverage (ATE_COV.2) CC & BSI-CC-PP-0084
Depth (ATE_DPT.3) CC
Functional tests (ATE_FUN.1) CC
Independent (ATE_IND.2) CC
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN.5) CC & BSI-CC-PP-0084
275 All refinements of Security Assurances requirements (CC V3.1 Part 3) defined in the Protection
Profile BSI-CC-PP-0084 are considered (claimed) in this Security Target. They also include
refinement for the augmented components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements
276 Table 6-2 below gives an overview, how the security functional requirements are combined to
meet the security objectives. The detailed justification follows after the table.
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Objective TOE Security Functional and Assurance Requirements
O.Leak-Inherent
- FDP_ITT.1 “Basic internal transfer protection”
- FPT_ITT.1 “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection”
- FDP_IFC.1 “Subset information flow control”
O.Phys-Probing
- FDP_SDC.1 “Stored data confidentiality”
- FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”
O.Malfunction
- FRU_FLT.2 “Limited fault tolerance”
- FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state”
O.Phys-Manipulation
- FDP_SDI.2 “Stored data integrity monitoring and action”
- FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”
O.Leak-Forced
All requirements listed for O.Leak-Inherent
- FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1
plus those listed for O.Malfunction and O.Phys-Manipulation
- FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3
O.Abuse-Func
- FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”
- FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”
plus those for O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction,
O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Leak-Forced
- FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3,
FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1
O.Identification - FAU_SAS.1 “Audit storage”
O.RND
- FCS_RNG.1/RGS-IC “Quality metric for random numbers”
plus those for O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction,
O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Leak-Forced
- FCS_RNG.1/DRBG
- FCS_RNG.1/PRNG
- FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3,
FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1
O.Reuse - FDP_RIP.1 “Subset residual information protection”
O.TDES
- FCS_COP.1/[HW]TDES "Cryptographic operation - TDES
(Hardware)"
- FCS_COP.1/[SW]TDES "Cryptographic operation - TDES
(Software)"
O.AES
- FCS_COP.1/[HW]AES "Cryptographic operation - AES (Hardware)"
- FCS_COP.1/[SW]AES "Cryptographic operation - AES (Software)"
O.PKA - FCS_COP.1/PKA “Cryptographic operation - PKA”
O.RSA
- FCS_COP.1/RSA "Cryptographic operation - RSA"
- FCS_CKM.1/RSA “Cryptographic key generation - RSA”
O.ECC
- FCS_COP.1/ECDSA “Cryptographic operation - ECDSA”
- FCS_COP.1/ECDH “Cryptographic operation - ECDH”
- FCS_CKM.1/ECDSA “Cryptographic key generation - ECDSA”
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O.SHA - FCS_COP.1/SHA “Cryptographic operation - SHA”
OE.Resp-Appl Not applicable
OE.Process-Sec-IC Not applicable
O.Mem-Access
- FDP_ACC.1 “Subset access control”
- FDP_ACF.1 “Security attribute based access control”
- FMT_MSA.3 “Static attribute initialisation”
- FMT_MSA.1 “Management of security attributes”
- FMT_SMF.1 “Specification of Management Functions”
O.Cap_Avail_Loader
- FMT_LIM.1/Loader “Limited capabilities - loader”
- FMT_LIM.2/Loader “Limited availability - loader”
OE.Lim_Block_Loader Not applicable
O.Authentication - FIA_API.1 “Authentication Proof of Identity”
OE.TOE_Auth - FIA_API.1 “Authentication Proof of Identity”
O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality
- FTP_ITC.1 “Inter-TSF trusted channel”
- FDP_UCT.1 “Basic data exchange confidentiality”
- FDP_UIT.1 “Data exchange integrity”
- FDP_ACC.1/Loader “Subset access control - Loader”
- FDP_ACF.1/Loader “Security attribute based access control -
Loader”
O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader
- FTP_ITC.1 “Inter-TSF trusted channel”
- FDP_UCT.1 “Basic data exchange confidentiality”
- FDP_UIT.1 “Data exchange integrity”
- FDP_ACC.1/Loader “Subset access control - Loader”
- FDP_ACF.1/Loader “Security attribute based access control -
Loader”
OE.Loader_Usage Not applicable
O.External-Content-
Protection
- FDP_SDC.1/PM for confidentiality protection
- FDP_SDI.2/PM for integrity protection
- FDP_IFC.1/PM
O.NVM-Command-Replay-
Protection
- FPT_RPL.1/PM “Replay detection”
O.NVM-Unauthorized-
Rollback-Protection
- FDP_URC.1/PM “Protection against an unauthorized rollback of
stored contents”
O.NVM-Irreversibility-
Anchor
- FDP_IRA.1/PM “Irreversibility Anchor of NVM contents”
O.NVM-Clone-Replace-
Protection
- FDP_DAU.2/PM “Data Authentication with Identity of Guarantor”
- FIA_UID.1/PM “Timing of identification”
Table 6-2: Security Requirements versus Security Objectives
277 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against Inherent Information Leakage
(O.Leak-Inherent)” is as follows:
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278 The refinements of the security functional requirements FPT_ITT.1 and FDP_ITT.1 together with
the policy statement in FDP_IFC.1 explicitly require the prevention of disclosure of secret data
(TSF data as well as user data) when transmitted between separate parts of the TOE or while
being processed. This includes that attackers cannot reveal such data by measurements of
emanations, power consumption or other behaviour of the TOE while data are transmitted
between or processed by TOE parts.
279 It is possible that the TOE needs additional support by the Security IC Embedded Software (e.g.
timing attacks are possible if the processing time of algorithms implemented in the software
depends on the content of secret). This support must be addressed in the Guidance
Documentation. Together with this FPT_ITT.1, FDP_ITT.1 and FDP_IFC.1 are suitable to meet
the objective.
280 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against Physical Probing (O.Phys-
Probing)” is as follows:
281 The SFR FDP_SDC.1 requires the TSF to protect the confidentiality of the information of the user
data stored in specified memory areas and prevent its compromise by physical attacks bypassing
the specified interfaces for memory access. The scenario of physical probing as described for
this objective is explicitly included in the assignment chosen for the physical tampering scenarios
in FPT_PHP.3. Therefore, it is clear that this security functional requirement supports the
objective.
282 It is possible that the TOE needs additional support by the Security IC Embedded Software (e.g.
to send data over certain buses only with appropriate precautions). This support must be
addressed in the Guidance Documentation. Together with this FPT_PHP.3 is suitable to meet
the objective.
283 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against Malfunctions (O.Malfunction)”
is as follows:
284 The definition of this objective shows that it covers a situation, where malfunction of the TOE
might be caused by the operating conditions of the TOE (while direct manipulation of the TOE is
covered O.Phys-Manipulation). There are two possibilities in this situation: Either the operating
conditions are inside the tolerated range or at least one of them is outside of this range. The
second case is covered by FPT_FLS.1, because it states that a secure state is preserved in this
case. The first case is covered by FRU_FLT.2 because it states that the TOE operates correctly
under normal (tolerated) conditions. The functions implementing FRU_FLT.2 and FPT_FLS.1
must work independently so that their operation cannot be affected by the Security IC Embedded
Software (refer to the refinement). Therefore, there is no possible instance of conditions under
O.Malfunction, which is not covered.
285 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against Physical Manipulation
(O.Phys-Manipulation)” is as follows:
286 The SFR FDP_SDI.2 requires the TSF to detect the integrity errors of the stored user data and
react in case of detected errors. The scenario of physical manipulation as described for this
objective is explicitly included in the assignment chosen for the physical tampering scenarios in
FPT_PHP.3. Therefore, it is clear that this security functional requirement supports the objective.
287 It is possible that the TOE needs additional support by the Embedded Software (for instance by
implementing FDP_SDI.2 to check data integrity with the help of appropriate checksums, refer to
section 6.1). This support must be addressed in the Guidance Documentation. The combination
of the Embedded Software together with this FPT_PHP.3 is suitable to meet the objective.
288 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against Forced Information Leakage
(O.Leak-Forced)“ is as follows:
289 This objective is directed against attacks, where an attacker wants to force an information
leakage, which would not occur under normal conditions. In order to achieve this the attacker has
to combine a first attack step, which modifies the behaviour of the TOE (either by exposing it to
extreme operating conditions or by directly manipulating it) with a second attack step measuring
and analysing some output produced by the TOE. The first step is prevented by the same
mechanisms which support O.Malfunction and O.Phys-Manipulation, respectively. The
requirements covering O.Leak-Inherent also support O.Leak-Forced because they prevent the
attacker from being successful if he tries the second step directly.
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290 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against Abuse of Functionality
(O.Abuse-Func)” is as follows:
291 This objective states that abuse of functions (especially provided by the IC Dedicated Test
Software, for instance in order to read secret data) must not be possible in Phase 7 of the life-
cycle. There are two possibilities to achieve this: (i) They cannot be used by an attacker (i. e. its
availability is limited) or (ii) using them would not be of relevant use for an attacker (i. e. its
capabilities are limited) since the functions are designed in a specific way. The first possibility is
specified by FMT_LIM.2 and the second one by FMT_LIM.1. Since these requirements are
combined to support the policy, which is suitable to fulfil O.Abuse-Func, both security functional
requirements together are suitable to meet the objective.
292 Other security functional requirements which prevent attackers from circumventing the functions
implementing these two security functional requirements (for instance by manipulating the
hardware) also support the objective. The relevant objectives are also listed in Table 6-1.
293 It was chosen to define FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 explicitly (not using Part 2 of the Common
Criteria) for the following reason: Though taking components from the Common Criteria
catalogue makes it easier to recognize functions, any selection from Part 2 of the Common
Criteria would have made it harder for the reader to understand the special situation meant here.
As a consequence, the statement of explicit security functional requirements was chosen to
provide more clarity.
294 The justification related to the security objective “TOE Identification (O.Identification)“ is as
follows:
295 Obviously, the operations for FAU_SAS.1 are chosen in a way that they require the TOE to
provide the functionality needed for O.Identification. The Initialisation Data (or parts of them) are
used for TOE identification. The technical capability of the TOE to store Initialisation Data and/or
Pre-personalisation Data is provided according to FAU_SAS.1.
296 It was chosen to define FAU_SAS.1 explicitly (not using a given security functional requirement
from Part 2 of the Common Criteria) for the following reason: the security functional requirement
FAU_GEN.1 in Part 2 of the CC requires the TOE to generate the audit data and gives details on
the content of the audit records (for instance date and time). The possibility to use the functions
in order to store security relevant data which are generated outside of the TOE, is not covered
by the family FAU_GEN or by other families in Part 2. Moreover, the TOE cannot add time
information to the records, because it has no real time clock. Therefore, the new family FAU_SAS
was defined for this situation.
297 The Manufacturer has to support this objective which is examined during the evaluation of the
assurance requirements of the classes AGD and ALC.
298 The justification related to the security objective “Random Numbers (O.RND)” is as follows:
299 FCS_RNG.1 requires the TOE to provide random numbers of good quality. The exact metric is
defined in [14].
300 Other security functional requirements, which prevent physical manipulation and malfunction of
the TOE (see the corresponding objectives listed in the Table 6-2) support this objective because
they prevent attackers from manipulating or otherwise affecting the random number generator.
301 Random numbers are often used by the Security IC Embedded Software to generate
cryptographic keys for internal use. Therefore, the TOE must prevent the unauthorized disclosure
of random numbers. Other security functional requirements which prevent inherent leakage
attacks, probing and forced leakage attacks ensure the confidentiality of the random numbers
provided by the TOE.
302 Depending on the functionality of specific TOEs the Security IC Embedded Software will have to
support the objective by providing runtime-tests of the random number generator. Together,
these requirements allow the TOE to provide cryptographically good random numbers and to
ensure that no information about the produced random numbers is available to an attacker.
303 It was chosen to define FCS_RNG.1 explicitly, because Part 2 of the Common Criteria does not
contain generic security functional requirements for Random Number generation. (Note, that
there are security functional requirements in Part 2 of the Common Criteria, which refer to random
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numbers. However, they define requirements only for the authentication context, which is only
one of the possible applications of random numbers.).
304 The SFR FCS_COP.1/[HW]TDES and FCS_COP.1/[SW]TDES meet the security objective
“Cryptographic service Triple-DES (O.TDES)”.
305 The SFR FCS_COP.1/[HW]AES and FCS_COP.1/[SW]AES meet the security objective
“Cryptographic service AES (O.AES)”.
306 The security objective “Cryptographic service PKA (O.PKA)” is implemented by the security
functional requirements FCS_COP.1/PKA.
307 The security objective “Cryptographic service RSA (O.RSA)” is implemented by the security
functional requirements FCS_COP.1/RSA and FCS_CKM.1/RSA.
308 The security objective “Cryptographic service ECC (O.ECC)” is implemented by the security
functional requirements FCS_COP.1/ECDSA, FCS_COP.1/ECDH and FCS_CKM.1/ECDSA.
309 The security objective “Cryptographic service hash function (O.SHA)” is implemented by the
security functional requirements FCS_COP.1/SHA.
310 The justification related to the security objective “Area based Memory Access Control (O.Mem-
Access)” is as follows:
311 The security functional requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” with the related
Security Function Policy (SFP) “Memory Access Control Policy” exactly require the
implementation of an area based memory access control, which is a requirement from O.Mem-
Access. Therefore, FDP_ACC.1 with its SFP is suitable to meet the security objective.
312 The security functional requirement “Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3)” requires that the
TOE provides default values for the security attributes. Since the TOE is a hardware platform
these default values are generated by the reset procedure. Therefore FMT_MSA.3 is suitable to
meet the security objective O.Mem-Access.
313 The security functional requirement “Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)” requires
that the ability to change the security attributes is restricted to privileged subject(s). It ensures
that the access control required by O.Mem-Access can be realized using the functions provided
by the TOE. Therefore FMT_MSA.1 is suitable to meet the security objective O.Mem-Access.
314 Finally, the security functional requirement “Specification of Management Functions
(FMT_SMF.1)” is used for the specification of the management functions to be provided by the
TOE as required by O. Mem-Access. Therefore, FMT_SMF.1 is suitable to meet the security
objective O.Mem-Access.
315 The justification related to the security objective “Protection of residual information (O.Reuse)” is
as follows:
316 O.Reuse requires the TOE to provide procedural measures to prevent disclosure of memory
contents used by the TOE. This applies to the Crypto Library of TESIC-04001R20 and is met by
the SFR “Subset residual information protection (FDP_RIP.1)” which requires the library to make
unavailable all memory content that has been used by it. Note that the requirement for residual
information protection applies to all functionality of the Cryptographic Library.
317 The justification related to the security objective “Protection during Packaging, Finishing and
Personalization (OE.Process-Sec-IC)” is as follows:
318 The Composite Product Manufacturer has to use adequate measures to fulfil OE.Process-Sec-
IC. Depending on the security needs of the application, the Security IC Embedded Software may
have to support this for instance by using appropriate authentication mechanisms for
personalization functions.
319 The justification related to the security objective “Capability and availability of the Loader
(O.Cap_Avail_Loader)” is as follows:
320 The security functional requirement “Limited capabilities – loader (FMT_LIM.1/Loader)” with the
security functional requirement “Limited availability - Loader (FMT_LIM.2/Loader)” require the
implementation that enable to limit the availability and capabilities of Loader. Therefore, the
security objective “Capability and availability of the Loader (O.Cap_Avail_Loader) is directly
covered by the SFR FMT_LIM.1/Loader and FMT_LIM.2/Loader.
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321 The justification related to the security objective “Limitation of capability and blocking the Loader
(OE.Lim-Block-Loader)” is as follows:
322 The Composite Product Manufacturer has to use adequate measures to protect the Loader
functionality against misuse in order to fulfil (OE.Lim_Block_Loader). The Security IC Embedded
Software may have to support this for instance by limiting the capability of the Loader and
terminate irreversibly the Loader after intended usage of the Loader.
323 The security objective Protection of the confidentiality of the TSF (O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality) is
covered by the SFR as follows:
- The SFR FDP_ACC.1/Loader defines the subjects, objects and operations of the Loader
SFP enforced by the SFR FTP_ITC.1, FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1 and FDP_ACF.1/Loader.
- The SFR FTP_ITC.1 requires the TSF to establish a trusted channel with assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
- The SFR FDP_UCT.1 requires the TSF to receive data protected from unauthorised
disclosure.
- The SFR FDP_UIT.1 requires the TSF to verify the integrity of the received user data.
- The SFR FDP_ACF.1/Loader requires the TSF to implement access control for the Loader
functionality.
324 The security objective Access control and authenticity for the Loader (O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader) is
covered by the SFR as follows:
- The SFR FDP_ACC.1/Loader defines the subjects, objects and operations of the Loader
SFP enforced by the SFR FTP_ITC.1, FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1 and FDP_ACF.1/Loader.
- The SFR FTP_ITC.1 requires the TSF to establish a trusted channel with assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
- The SFR FDP_UCT.1 requires the TSF to receive data protected from unauthorised
disclosure.
- The SFR FDP_UIT.1 requires the TSF to verify the integrity of the received user data.
- The SFR FDP_ACF.1/Loader requires the TSF to implement access control for the Loader
functionality.
325 The SFR FDP_SDC.1/PM and FDP_SDI.2/PM support the objective O.External-Content-
Protection.
326 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against unauthorized disclosure and
undetected modification of passive external NVM contents (O.External-Content-Protection)” is as
follows:
327 The SFR FDP_SDC.1/PM ensures protection of confidentiality of the contents stored in the
passive external NVM, while the SFR FDP_SDI.2/PM ensures protection of the integrity of the
contents stored in the NVM. Finally, FDP_DAU.2/PM ensures the authenticity of the user data
while it is stored in the passive external NVM. Therefore, it is clear that these security functional
requirements support the objective.
328 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against replay of commands between
host MCU and passive external NVM (O.NVM-Command-Replay-Protection)” is as follows:
329 The SFR FPT_RPL.1/PM requires the TSF to detect replays in responses in the read commands
to the NVM or replays of sequences of write/erase commands to the passive external NVM. This
requirement is considered in the assignment of FPT_RPL.1.1/PM. Therefore, it is clear that this
security functional requirement supports the objective.
330 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against contents (O.NVM-
Unauthorized-Rollback-Protection)” is as follows:
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331 The SFR FDP_URC.1/PM requires that the TSF detects the case when the contents of the
passive external NVM have been replaced by previous versions of them. This way, this security
functional requirement supports the objective.
332 The justification related to the security objective “Passive External NVM Contents Irreversibility
Anchor (O.NVM-Irreversibility-Anchor)” is as follows:
333 The SFR FDP_IRA.1/PM requires the TOE to implement distinct transaction references for each
write and erase operation that is unambiguously linked with the current content of the transaction
with the external memory. Thereby, the data freshness can be verified during a read operation
based on the data maintained by the irreversible anchor. If the external memory is a non-volatile
memory, the Irreversibility-Anchor needs to be maintained in any operation mode. By providing
the mechanism required by this SFR, the security objective O.Mem-Irreversibility-Anchor is
directly supported.
334 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against NVM cloning or replacement
(O.NVM-Clone-Replace-Protection)” is as follows:
335 The SFR FDP_DAU.2/PM requires the TOE to be able to generate evidence that guarantees the
validity of data objects and containers stored in the external memory. With the refinement that
the dedicated TOE instance is the user in case of user data the cloning or replacement of the
external memory is detected. The SFR FIA_UID.1/PM requires the definition of actions that can
be performed without user identification. The authenticity external memory content needs to be
identified instead of a user. The authenticity of the data stored in the external memory needs to
be identified before any user data is accessed. By providing the mechanism required by these
two SFRs, the security objective O.Mem-Clone-Replace-Protection is directly supported.
6.3.2 Dependencies of security functional requirements
336 Table 6-3 below lists the security functional requirements defined in this security target, their
dependencies and whether they are satisfied by other security requirements defined in this
security target.
Security Functional
Requirement
Dependencies
Fulfilled by security
requirements
FRU_FLT.2 FPT_FLS.1 Yes
FPT_FLS.1 None No dependency
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 Yes
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.1 Yes
FAU_SAS.1 None No dependency
FPT_PHP.3 None No dependency
FDP_ITT.1 FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 Yes
FDP_IFC.1/IM FDP_IFF.1 See discussion below
FDP_IFC.1/PM FDP_IFF.1
FPT_ITT.1 None No dependency
FDP_SDC.1/IM None No dependency
FDP_SDC.1/PM None No dependency
FDP_SDI.2/IM None No dependency
FDP_SDI.2/PM None No dependency
FCS_RNG.1/RGS-IC None No dependency
FCS_RNG.1/DRBG None No dependency
FCS_RNG.1/PRNG None No dependency
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Security Functional
Requirement
Dependencies
Fulfilled by security
requirements
FCS_COP.1/[HW]TDES
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
Yes, see discussion
below
FCS_COP.1/[SW]TDES
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
Yes, see discussion
below
FCS_COP.1/[HW]AES
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
Yes, see discussion
below
FCS_COP.1/[SW]AES
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
Yes, see discussion
below
FCS_COP.1/PKA
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
Yes
See discussion below
FCS_COP.1/RSA
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
Yes
See discussion below
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
Yes
See discussion below
FCS_COP.1/ECDH
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
Yes
See discussion below
FCS_COP.1/SHA
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
Yes
See discussion below
FCS_CKM.1/RSA
FCS_CKM.2 or FCS.COP.1
FCS_CKM.4
Yes
See discussion below
FCS_CKM.1/ECDSA
FCS_CKM.2 or FCS.COP.1
FCS_CKM.4
Yes
See discussion below
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 Yes
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
Yes
Yes
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
Yes
See discussion below
FMT_MSA.1
FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
Yes
See discussion below
Yes
FMT_SMF.1 None No dependency
FDP_RIP.1 None No dependency
FMT_LIM.1/Loader FMT_LIM.2/Loader Yes
FMT_LIM.2/Loader FMT_LIM.1/Loader Yes
FIA_API.1 None No dependency
FTP_ITC.1 None No dependency
FDP_UCT.1
FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1
FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1
Yes
Yes
FDP_UIT.1
FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1
FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1
Yes
Yes
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Security Functional
Requirement
Dependencies
Fulfilled by security
requirements
FDP_ACC.1/Loader FDP_ACF.1 Yes
FDP_ACF.1/Loader None No dependency
FPT_RPL.1/PM None No dependency
FDP_URC.1/PM None No dependency
FDP_IRA.1/PM None No dependency
FDP_DAU.2/PM FIA_UID.1/PM Yes
FIA_UID.1/PM None No dependency
Table 6-3 : Dependencies of the Security Functional Requirements
337 Part 2 of the Common Criteria defines the dependency of FDP_IFC.1 (information flow control
policy statement) on FDP_IFF.1 (Simple security attributes). The specification of FDP_IFF.1
would not capture the nature of the security functional requirement nor add any detail. As stated
in the Data Processing Policy referred to in FDP_IFC.1 there are no attributes necessary. The
security functional requirement for the TOE is sufficiently described using FDP_ITT.1 and its Data
Processing Policy (FDP_IFC.1).
338 Components FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3 introduce FMT_SMR.1 requirement for security
management roles. This requirement, defined on Part 2 of the Common Criteria, is considered to
be satisfied because the access control specified for the intended TOE is not based on roles but
enforced for each subject. Therefore, there is no need to identify roles in form of a security
functional requirement FMT_SMR.1.
339 As Table 6-3 shows, all other dependencies of functional requirements are fulfilled by security
requirements defined in this Protection Profile.
340 The discussion in Section 6.3.1 has shown how the security functional requirements support each
other in meeting the security objectives of this Protection Profile. In particular the security
functional requirements providing resistance of the hardware against manipulations (e. g.
FPT_PHP.3) support all other more specific security functional requirements (e. g. FCS_RNG.1)
because they prevent an attacker from disabling or circumventing the latter.
341 Together with the discussion of the dependencies above this shows that the security functional
requirements build a mutually supportive whole.
342 The functional requirements FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.4 which are dependent to
FCS_COP.1/[HW]TDES, FCS_COP.1/[SW]TDES and FCS_COP.1/[HW]AES and
FCS_COP.1/[SW]AES are not included in this Security Target since the TOE only provides an
engine for encryption and decryption. But the Security Embedded Software may fulfil these
requirements related to the needs of the implemented application. The dependent requirements
of FCS_COP.1/TDES and FCS_COP.1/AES concerning these functions shall be fulfilled by the
environment (Security IC Embedded Software).
343 The FCS_CKM.1 which is dependent to FCS_COP.1/ECDH is not included in this Security
Target. But the Security IC Embedded Software may fulfil these requirements related to the
needs of the implemented application. The dependent requirements of FCS_COP.1/ECDH
concerning these functions shall be fulfilled by the environment (Security IC Embedded
Software).
344 The functional requirement FCS_CKM.4 which is dependent to FCS_COP.1/PKA,
FCS_COP.1/RSA, FCS_COP.1/ECDSA and FCS_COP.1/ECDH is not included in this Security
Target. But the Security IC Embedded Software may fulfil these requirements related to the
needs of the implemented application. The dependent requirements of FCS_COP.1/RSA,
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA and FCS_COP.1/ECDH concerning these functions shall be fulfilled by the
environment (Security IC Embedded Software).
345 The functional requirements FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.4 which are dependent to
FCS_COP.1/SHA are not included in this Security Target. However, the Security IC Embedded
Software may fulfil these requirements related to the needs of the implemented application. The
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dependent requirements of FCS_COP.1/SHA concerning these functions shall be fulfilled by the
environment (Security IC Embedded Software).
6.3.3 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements
346 The assurance level EAL5 and the augmentation with the requirements ALC_DVS.2, and
AVA_VAN.5 were chosen in order to meet assurance expectations explained in the following
paragraphs.
347 An assurance level of EAL5 with the augmentations AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 are required
for this type of TOE since it is intended to defend against sophisticated attacks. This evaluation
assurance package was selected to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering based on good commercial practices. In order to provide a meaningful level
of assurance that the TOE provides an adequate level of defence against such attacks, the
evaluators should have access to the low-level design and source code.
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
348 Development security is concerned with physical, procedural, personnel and other technical
measures that may be used in the development environment to protect the TOE.
349 In the particular case of a Security IC the TOE is developed and produced within a complex and
distributed industrial process which must especially be protected. Details about the
implementation, (e.g. from design, test and development tools as well as Initialization Data) may
make such attacks easier. Therefore, in the case of a Security IC, maintaining the confidentiality
of the design is very important.
350 This assurance component is a higher hierarchical component to EAL5 (which only requires
ALC_DVS.1). ALC_DVS.2 has no dependencies.
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
351 Due to the intended use of the TOE, it must be shown to be highly resistant to penetration attacks.
This assurance requirement is achieved by the AVA_VAN.5 component.
352 Independent vulnerability analysis is based on highly detailed technical information. The main
intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks
performed by an attacker possessing high attack potential.
353 AVA_VAN.5 has dependencies to ADV_ARC.1 “Security architecture description”, ADV_FSP.4
“Complete functional specification”, ADV_TDS.3 “Basic modular design”, ADV_IMP.1
“Implementation representation of the TSF”, AGD_OPE.1 “Operational user guidance”, and
AGD_PRE.1 “Preparative procedures” and ATE_DPT.1 “Testing: basic design”.
354 All these dependencies are satisfied by EAL5.
355 It has to be assumed that attackers with high attack potential try to attack Security ICs like smart
cards used for digital signature applications or payment systems. Therefore, specifically
AVA_VAN.5 was chosen in order to assure that even these attackers cannot successfully attack
the TOE.
6.3.4 Security Requirements are Internally Consistent
356 The discussion of security functional requirements and assurance components in the preceding
sections has shown that consistency is given for both groups of requirements. The arguments
given for the fact that the assurance components are adequate for the functionality of the TOE
also shows that the security functional requirements and assurance requirements support each
other and that there are no inconsistencies between these groups.
357 The security functional requirements FDP_SDC.1 and FDP_SDI.2 address the protection of user
data in the specified memory areas against compromise and manipulation. The security
functional requirement FPT_PHP.3 makes it harder to manipulate data. This protects the primary
assets identified in Section 3.1 and other security features or functionality which use these data.
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358 Though a manipulation of the TOE (refer to FPT_PHP.3) is not of great value for an attacker in
itself, it can be an important step in order to threaten the primary assets. Therefore, the security
functional requirement FPT_PHP.3 is not only required to meet the security objective O.Phys-
Manipulation. Instead it protects other security features or functions of TOE from being bypassed,
deactivated or changed. In particular this may pertain to the security features or functions being
specified using FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FPT_FLS.1, FMT_LIM.2 and FCS_RNG.1/RGS-IC.
359 A malfunction of TSF (refer to FRU_FLT.2 and FPT_FLS.1) can be an important step in order to
threaten the primary assets. Therefore, the security functional requirements FRU_FLT.2 and
FPT_FLS.1 are not only required to meet the security objective O.Malfunction. Instead they
protect other security features or functions of TOE from being bypassed, deactivated or changed.
In particular this pertains to the security features or functions being specified using FDP_ITT.1,
FPT_ITT.1, FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2 and FCS_RNG.1/RGS-IC.
360 In a forced leakage attack the methods described in “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress”
(refer to T.Malfunction) and/or “Physical Manipulation” (refer to T.Phys-Manipulation) are used to
cause leakage from signals which normally do not contain significant information about secrets.
Therefore, in order to avert the disclosure of primary assets; it is important that the security
functional requirements averting leakage (FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1) and those against malfunction
(FRU_FLT.2 and FPT_FLS.1) and physical manipulation (FPT_PHP.3) are effective and bind
well. The security features and functions against malfunction ensure correct operation of other
security functions (refer to above) and help to avert forced leakage themselves in other attack
scenarios. The security features and functions against physical manipulation make it harder to
manipulate the other security functions (refer to above).
361 Physical probing (refer to FPT_PHP.3) shall directly avert the disclosure of primary assets
identified in Section 3.1. In addition, physical probing can be an important step in other attack
scenarios if the corresponding security features or functions use secret data. For instance, the
security functional requirement FMT_LIM.2 may use passwords. Therefore, the security
functional requirement FPT_PHP.3 (against probing) helps to protect other security features or
functions. Details depend on the implementation.
362 Leakage (refer to FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1) shall directly avert the disclosure of primary assets. In
addition, inherent leakage and forced leakage (refer to above) can be an important step in other
attack scenarios if the corresponding security features or functions use secret data. For instance,
the security functional requirement FMT_LIM.2 may use passwords. Therefore, the security
functional requirements FDP_ITT.1 and FPT_ITT.1 help to protect other security features or
functions implemented or provided by the TOE (FPT_ITT.1). Details depend on the
implementation.
363 The user data of the Composite TOE are treated as required to meet the requirements defined
for the specific application context (refer to Treatment of user data of the Composite TOE
(A.Resp-Appl)). However, the TOE may implement additional functions. This can be a risk if their
interface cannot completely be controlled by the Security IC Embedded Software. Therefore, the
security functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 are very important. They ensure
that appropriate control is applied to the interface of these functions (limited availability) and that
these functions, if being usable, provide limited capabilities only.
364 The combination of the security functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 ensures
that (especially after TOE Delivery) these additional functions cannot be abused by an attacker
(i) to disclose or manipulate user data of the Composite TOE, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass,
deactivate or change) security features or services of the TOE or of the Security IC Embedded
Software or (iii) to enable other attacks on the assets. Hereby the binding between these two
security functional requirements is very important.
365 The security functional requirement Limited Capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) must close gaps which
could be left by the control being applied to the function’s interface (Limited Availability
(FMT_LIM.2). Note that the security feature or services which limit the availability can be
bypassed, deactivated or changed by physical manipulation or a malfunction caused by an
attacker. Therefore, if Limited Availability (FMT_LIM.2) is vulnerable, it is important to limit the
capabilities of the functions in order to limit the possible benefit for an attacker.
366 The security functional requirement Limited Availability (FMT_LIM.2) must close gaps which
could result from the fact that the function’s kernel in principle would allow to perform attacks.
The TOE must limit the availability of functions which potentially provide the capability to disclose
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or manipulate user data of the Composite TOE, to manipulate security features or services of the
TOE or of the Security IC Embedded Software or to enable other attacks on the assets.
Therefore, if an attacker could benefit from using such functions, it is important to limit their
availability so that an attacker is not able to use them.
367 No perfect solution to limit the capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) is required if the limited availability
(FMT_LIM.2) alone can prevent the abuse of functions. No perfect solution to limit the availability
(FMT_LIM.2) is required if the limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) alone can prevent the abuse of
functions. Therefore, it is correct that both requirements are defined in a way that they together
provide sufficient security.
368 It is important to avert malfunctions of TSF and of security functions implemented in the Security
IC Embedded Software (refer to above). There are two security functional requirements which
ensure that malfunctions cannot be caused by exposing the TOE to environmental stress. First
it must be ensured that the TOE operates correctly within some limits (Limited fault tolerance
(FRU_FLT.2)). Second the TOE must prevent its operation outside these limits (Failure with
preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)). Both security functional requirements together
prevent malfunctions. The two functional requirements must define the “limits”. Otherwise there
could be some range of operating conditions which is not covered so that malfunctions may
occur. Consequently, the security functional requirements Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2)
and Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1) are defined in a way that they together
provide sufficient security.
369 The contents of the passive external NVM (user data, TSF data and code) need to be protected,
considering that the passive external NVM may be more accessible to attackers than the internal
(embedded in the same chip) one.
370 Confidentiality and integrity of the contents stored in the passive external NVM are given by
FDP_SDC.1/PM and FDP_SDI.2/PM. Also, the contents stored in the NVM require a guarantee
of “data freshness”, namely that the contents are the last ones stored under control of the Security
IC). The TOE needs to be capable of detecting the replay of old write, erase, and read operations
to the passive external NVM. This requirement is provided by FPT_RPL.1/PM.
371 The non-volatile mutable irreversibility anchor provides a mechanism for protection against
reverting passive external NVM contents to old non-fresh versions of them is given by
FDP_IRA.1/PM. In addition, the extended component FDP_URC.1/PM provides protection
against an unauthorized rollback of the NVM contents to old versions of them, and the
components FDP_DAU.2/PM, FIA_UID.1/PM ensure protection against cloning or replacement
of the passive external NVM.
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7 TOE Summary Specification
372 This chapter lists all the Security Functional Requirements (SFR) and all security features which
meet the Security Functional Requirements.
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SFR SFR description TOE security features meeting SFR
1 FRU_FLT.2
Limited fault tolerance
This SFR is ensured by a TOE functional design stable
within the limits of the operational conditions. The
asynchronous logic contributes to fault tolerance
therefore ensuring a correct behaviour of the TOE.
2 FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation of
secure state.
Hardware TOE
The TOE integrates mechanisms that enable to detect
abnormal/failure events before the secure state is
compromised. Secure state is maintained by the TOE
which monitors all abnormal and failure events.
3 FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities
The TSF ensures that the test mode and test
capabilities are locked.
4 FMT_LIM.2 Limited availabilities Different modes are integrated inside the TOE: TEST
mode, the PRE-PERSO mode, ADMIN mode, and the
FIRMWARE mode. The TEST mode uses specific
protocol for industrial test, the PRE-PERSO mode is
used for pre-personalization and loading the admin
services, the ADMIN mode used to load the firmware to
the memory outside the TOE boundary (Flash) and the
firmware mode is available for running consumer
applications.
All these modes require an authentication and are non-
reversible. Each mode restricts the use of functions
integrated in the TOE.
5 FAU_SAS.1
Audit Storage
Hardware TOE
Audit Storage requirement is covered by the following
security features:
 Non-reversibility of test mode. An
authentication is required to enter to test mode.
This mode is locked by writing non-volatile
memory after the test phase has been
accomplished successfully. It is used only once
during the manufacturing process for ensuring
the non-reversibility of this mode.
 Identification/authentication values are written
in non-volatile memory in order to ensure the
traceability of the TOE. The Admin loader
implements an authentication function.
 Non-reversibility of the Firmware mode. It is the
functional mode of the TOE. It is controlled by
the operating system embedded inside the
TOE.
Software ADMIN loader TOE
Audit Storage requirement is covered by the ability
offered by the ADMIN services to read and write TSF
and user data in external memory.
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6.1 FDP_SDC.1/IM
Stored data confidentiality for
internal memories
Hardware TOE
This requirement is covered by the following security
features integrated in TOE:
 Shield.
 Security mechanisms for memory protection.
 MPU for memory access control.
Software TOE
This SFR is covered by the AEAD mechanisms in ROM
and ADMIN code which protects the confidentiality of
internal memory (OTP).
6.2 FDP_SDC.1/PM
Stored data confidentiality for
passive external memory
The confidentiality of the external NVM is ensured by
the AEAD services.
7.1 FDP_SDI.2/IM
Stored data integrity monitoring
and action for internal memories
Hardware TOE
This requirement is covered by the CRC checksum
modules on each RAM memory. Sensitive data stored
in OTP are also AEAD protected.
7.2 FDP_SDI.2/PM
Stored data integrity monitoring
and action for passive external
memory
The integrity of the external NVM is ensured by the
AEAD services.
8 FPT_PHP.3
Resistance to physical attacks
Hardware TOE
The integration inside the TOE of the shield module
enables to meet this requirement. The physical
manipulation or the physical probing is detected or
made very difficult by using techniques that enhance
the security of the TOE by making the reverse-
engineering unpredictable or very difficult to realize.
9 FDP_ITT.1
Basic internal transfer protection
Hardware TOE
The security features integrated in the TOE enable to
achieve this requirement:
 Security mechanisms for memory protection
 Asynchronous logic.
10 FPT_ITT.1
Basic internal TSF data transfer
protection
This requirement is achieved by the same security
features used for covering security functional
requirement FDP_ITT.1.
11.1 FDP_IFC.1/IM
Subset information flow control
for internal memories
Hardware TOE
This requirement is covered by the memory encryption
units for protecting all confidential data processing or
transferring by the TOE or by the security IC embedded
software.
Software TOE
Sensitive data such as keys are encrypted in OTP using
the AEAD mechanism from ROM.
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11.2 FDP_IFC.1/PM
Subset information flow control
for passive external memory
This requirement is covered by the AEAD mechanism
for protecting all confidential data processing or
transferring by the TOE from/to the passive external
NVM.
12.1 FCS_RNG.1/RGS-IC
Random number generation -
RGS_IC
The TRNG module integrated in the TOE covers this
requirement. The TRNG follows some of the ANSSI
RGS_B1 requirements (French scheme).
12.2 FCS_RNG.1/DRBG
Random number generation –
DRBG
The DRBG developed in the crypto library part of the
TOE covers this requirement. It relies on the TRNG to
generate the seed. The DRBG library meets some of
the ANSSI requirements (RGS_B1).
12.3 FCS_RNG.1/PRNG Pseudo-
Random number generation –
PRNG
The PRNG module integrated in the TOE covers this
requirement.
13 FDP_ACC.1
Subset access control
Hardware TOE
The Subset access control is met by integrating the
following secure features inside the TOE
 Security mechanisms for memory protection.
 Memory protection unit (MPU) for secure
memory access.
 Mode protection.
 Restriction of use of TOE functionalities.
Software TOE
This SFR is covered by both the PRE-PERSO and
ADMIN loaders which verify the authenticity of the
commands and the loaded data.
14 FDP_ACF.1
Security attributes based
access control
Hardware TOE
The Memory Access Control Policy is enforced by the
MPUs, the non-reversibility and the bootloader, features
which implement different access rights.
Software TOE
This SFR is covered by the loaders which uses
cryptographic means to optionally authenticate users.
15 FMT_MSA.3
Static attribute initialization
Hardware TOE
When the TOE is reset, all sensitive register functions
are initialized (by hardware) with default value.
Software TOE
The MPU is initialized by software by the ROM code at
boot, by the ADMIN loader when started, or by the
composite application.
16 FMT_MSA.1
Management of security
attributes
Management of security attributes is covered by the
security features integrated in TOE’s memory protection
unit (MPU).
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17 FMT_SMF.1
Specification of management
functions
This requirement is achieved by the possibilities offered
by the TOE to access to control registers of TOE’s MPU.
18 FDP_RIP.1
Subset residual information
protection
Software TOE
This requirement is achieved by all the software
components of the TOE which clear the sensible
content.
19 FCS_COP.1
Cryptography operation
This requirement is fulfilled by the following
cryptography operation functions:
 Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES) with
112 bits or 168 bits of key. This operation is
fulfilled either by hardware functions or by
software functions (through the secure crypto
library using the secure hardware
coprocessor).
 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with 128,
192 and 256 bits of key. This operation is
fulfilled either by hardware functions or by
software functions (through the secure crypto
library using the secure hardware
coprocessor).
 Public Key Accelerator (PKA) for RSA and ECC
in GF(p) with key size from 128 up to 4096 bits.
This module integrates 3 exponentiations
functions for RSA key cryptosystem.
 RSA with key size from 128 up to 4096 bits.
This operation is fulfilled by software functions
through the optional secure crypto library using
the Public Key Accelerator (PKA).
 ECC with key size from 128 up to 521 bits. This
operation is fulfilled by software functions
through the optional secure crypto library using
the Public Key Accelerator (PKA).
 SHA hashing software function which
implements the following algorithms: SHA2-
224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512.
20.1 FCS_CKM.1/RSA
Cryptographic key generation -
RSA
The RSA key generation part of the optional Crypto
library meets this requirement. It allows generating RSA
key with size in the range 1280-bit and up to 4096-bit
with 32-bit granularity.
20.2 FCS_CKM.1/ECDSA
Cryptographic key generation -
ECDSA
The ECC key generation part of the optional Crypto
library meets this requirement. It implements ECC key
generation for size up to 640-bit.
21 FMT_LIM.1/Loader
Limited capabilities - Loader
The limited capabilities of Loader (this includes Test
mode loader, pre-perso loader and admin loader) are
met by the secure authentication system.
22 FMT_LIM.2/Loader
Limited availabilities - Loader
The limited availabilities of Loader (this includes Test
mode loader, pre-perso loader and admin loader) are
met by implementing a secure lock.
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Rationale
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23 FIA_API.1
Authentication Proof of Identity
The authentication proof of identity of the TOE to an
external entity is provided by the loaders using the
SCP03 protocol.
24 FTP_ITC.1
Inter-TSF trusted channel
The Inter-TSF trusted channel is supported by loaders
using the SCP03 protocol.
25 FTP_UCT.1
Basic data exchange
confidentiality
The confidentiality during basic data exchange is
ensured by AES encryption and decryption.
26 FDP_UIT.1
Data exchange integrity
The integrity of data exchange is ensured by the AES-
CMAC algorithm.
27 FDP_ACC.1/Loader
Subset access control - Loader
The access control is ensured by verifying the signature
of the data to be sent to the PRE-PERSO and ADMIN
loaders.
28 FDP_ACF.1/Loader
Security attribute based access
control - Loader
The access control for both the PRE-PERSO and
ADMIN loaders is ensured by the authentication of the
loader commands.
29 FDP_URC.1 Protection against
an unauthorized rollback of
stored contents in Passive
external NVM
The ADMIN loader and services are contained in a load
package loaded in external NVM by the PRE-PERSO
loader in phase 5. This package, provided by TIEMPO,
is encrypted and can be loaded only once, following the
procedure described in the guidance « AGD_OPE –
eNVM Loader user role ». This package is the only
package generated by TIEMPO which is signed and
encrypted for each batch of PRE-PERSO loader keys.
The composite software is loaded in external NVM later
in phase 5 by the ADMIN loader (TOE in ADMIN mode),
and following the procedure described in the guidance
« AGD_OPE – Admin loader user role ». The external
NVM content is programmed using the ADMIN services
which implement the anti-rollback protection.
30 FDP_IRA.1 Irreversibility
Anchor of passive external NVM
contents
The non-volatile irreversibility anchor is based on the
internal monotonic counter.
31 FIA_UID.1 Timing of
Identification
The TOE integrates a unique per device key which is
used to decrypt and authenticate the passive external
NVM content before using it.
32 FDP_DAU.2 Data
Authentication with Identity of
Guarantor
The passive external NVM content is identified by
cryptographic means using a unique per device key.
33 FPT_RPL.1 Replay detection
from passive external NVM
The TOE implements the replay detection by
authenticating the external memory content along with
a version information of the content based on the
irreversibility anchor. The content authentication is
performed using the AEAD services of the ROM code
at boot, and the ADMIN services when started.
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94 www.tiempo-secure.com Glossary
8 ANNEX
8.1 Glossary
Application Data All data managed by the Security IC Embedded Software in the
application context. Application data comprise all data in the final
Security IC.
Composite Product Integrator Role installing or finalizing the IC Embedded Software and the
applications on platform transforming the TOE into the unpersonalized
Composite Product after TOE delivery.
The TOE Manufacturer may implement IC Embedded Software
delivered by the Security IC Embedded Software Developer before
TOE delivery (e.g. if the IC Embedded Software is implemented in
ROM or is stored in the non-volatile memory as service provided by
the IC Manufacturer or IC Packaging Manufacturer).
Composite Product Manufacturer The Composite Product Manufacturer has the following roles (i) the
Security IC Embedded Software Developer (Phase 1), (ii) the
Composite Product Integrator (Phase 5) and (iii) the Personaliser
(Phase 6). If the TOE is delivered after Phase 3 in form of wafers or
sawn wafers (dice) he has the role of the IC Packaging Manufacturer
(Phase 4) in addition.
The customer of the TOE Manufacturer who receives the TOE during
TOE Delivery. The Composite Product Manufacturer includes the
Security IC Embedded Software developer and all roles after TOE
Delivery up to Phase 6 (refer [1] and section 7).
End-consumer User of the Composite Product in Phase 7.
Hard Macro Is an intellectual property (IP) block stored in a set of files (e.g. gds-
file) that includes final layout information (physical design, placement,
routing, etc) of a component (or part of a component). A Hard macro
is targeted towards a specific technology (e.g., SoC or IC
manufacturing technology, or programmable logic device), and is
predictable in terms of operational ranges such as performance,
timing, area, and power.
IC Dedicated Software IC proprietary software embedded in a Security IC (also known as IC
firmware) and developed by the IC Developer. Such software is
required for testing purpose (IC Dedicated Test Software) but may
provide additional services to facilitate usage of the hardware and/or
to provide additional services (IC Dedicated Support Software).
IC Dedicated Test Software That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used
to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any
functionality thereafter.
IC Dedicated Support Software That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides
functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated
Software might be restricted to certain phases.
Initialization Data Initialization Data defined by the TOE Manufacturer to identify the
TOE and to keep track of the Security IC’s production and further life-
cycle phases are considered as belonging to the TSF data. These
data are for instance used for traceability and for TOE identification
(identification data).
Integrated Circuit (IC) Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or
memory functions.
Pre-personalization Data Any data supplied by the Card Manufacturer that is injected into the
non-volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase
3). These data are for instance used for traceability and/or to secure
shipment between phases.
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Security IC (as used in the Protection Profile) Composition of the TOE, the
Security IC Embedded Software, User Data and the package (the
Security IC carrier).
Security IC Embedded Software Software embedded in a Security IC and normally not being
developed by the IC Designer. The Security IC Embedded Software
is designed in Phase 1 and embedded into the Security IC in Phase 3
or in later phases of the Security IC product life-cycle.
Some parts of that software may actually implement a Security IC
application, others may provide standard services. Nevertheless, this
distinction doesn’t matter here so that the Security IC Embedded
Software can be considered as being application dependent whereas
the IC Dedicated Software is definitely not.
Security IC Product Composite product which includes the Security Integrated Circuit (i.e.
the TOE) and the Embedded Software and is evaluated as composite
target of evaluation in the sense of the Supporting Document
System-On-Chip A System-On-Chip is an integrated circuit (also known as a "chip") that
integrates all or most components of a computer or other electronic
system.
Test Features All features and functions (implemented by the IC Dedicated Test
Software and/or hardware) which are designed to be used before TOE
Delivery only and delivered as part of the TOE.
TOE Delivery The period when the TOE is delivered which is (refer to Figure 2 on
page 10) either (i) after Phase 3 (or before Phase 4) if the TOE is
delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice) or (ii) after Phase 4
(or before Phase 5) if the TOE is delivered in form of packaged
products.
TOE Manufacturer The TOE Manufacturer must ensure that all requirements for the TOE
and its development and production environment are fulfilled.
The TOE Manufacturer has the following roles: (i) IC Developer
(Phase 2) and (ii) IC Manufacturer (Phase 3). If the TOE is delivered
after Phase 4 in form of packaged products, he has the role of the (iii)
IC Packaging Manufacturer (Phase 4) in addition.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of the
TOE. This includes information about the TOE’s configuration, if any
is coded in non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM), in
specific circuitry, in non-volatile programmable memories (for instance
EEPROM) or a combination thereof.
User data of the Composite TOE All data managed by the Security IC Embedded Software in the
application context.
User data of the TOE Data for the user of the TOE, that does not affect the operation of the
TSF. From the point of view of TOE defined in this PP the user data
comprises the Security IC Embedded Software and the user data of
the Composite TOE.
8.2 Literature
[1] Eurosmart Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, Version 1.0,
2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General Model; April 2017, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional
Requirements; April 2017, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002.
[4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance
Requirements; April 2017, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003.
[5] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation
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96 www.tiempo-secure.com Literature
Methodology; April 2017, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004.
[6] ISO7816, ISO+IEC 7816-3-2006.pdf
[7] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, ADVANCED ENCRYPTION
STANDARD (AES), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards
and Technology, November 26, 2001
[8] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 46-3, DATA ENCRYPTION
STANDARD (DES), Reaffirmed 1999 October 25, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology.
[9] NIST SP 800-67, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block
Cipher, revised January 2012, National Institute of Standards and Technology.
[10] NIST SP 800-38A Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, 2001, with
Addendum Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of
Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode, October 2010.
[11] Laboratories RSA RSA Cryptography Standard, PKCS #1 v2.1, 2002.
[12] Internal Standard ISO/IEC 13239, third edition, July 2002.
[13] Smartcard Integrated Circuit Platform Augmentations, version 1.00, March 8, 2002, developed
by Atmel, Hitachi Europe, Infineon Technologies, and Philips Semiconductors.
[14] Règles et recommandations concernant le choix et le dimensionnement des mécanismes
cryptographiques.
Annexe B1 du RGS 2.0. Version 2.04, 01/01/2020, ANSSI.
https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/2021/03/anssi-guide-mecanismes_crypto-2.04.pdf
[15] GlobalPlatform Secure Channel Protocol 03 – Card Specification v2.2 – Amendment D.
[16] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4 SECURE HASH STANDARD
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011
February, 11
[17] NIST SP 800-38B Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode
for Authentication, May 2005.
[18] GSM Association, Official Document SGP.01 - Embedded SIM Remote Provisioning
Architecture, Version 4.2, 05 June 2020.
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List of Abbreviations www.tiempo-secure.com 97
8.3 List of Abbreviations
AFE Analog Front End
AL Admin Loader
BL Bootloader
CC Common Criteria
CL Crypto Library
DCXO Digital Controlled Crystal Oscillators
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
HW Hardware
I2S Inter-IC Sound
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
MCU Microcontroller Unit
MSSR Minimal Site Security Requirements
MSSPI Multiple Slave Serial Peripheral Interface
OTP One Time Programmable
PCM Pulse-code modulation
PMU Power Management Unit
PP Protection Profile
PSRAM Pseudo-Static Random Access Memory
QSPI Quad Serial Peripheral Interface
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SE Security Enclave
SFR Security Functional Requirements
SoC System on Chip
ST Security Target
TC Tuning Capacitance
TCXO Temperature Controlled Crystal Oscillator
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98 www.tiempo-secure.com List of Abbreviations
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope OF Control
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VCO Voltage Controlled Oscillator
WDT Watch Dog Timer