National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 9.16 on
Firepower 1000 and 2100 Series
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11255-2022
Dated: July 15, 2022
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA), Validation Report Version 1.0, July 15, 2022
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Patrick Mallett, Ph.D.
Jerome Myers, Ph.D.
Elisabeth Scruggs
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Cornelius Haley
Shahid Islam
Catherine Sykes
Douglas Kalmus
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................1
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................1
3 Architectural Information...................................................................................................3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms...........................................................................................3
3.2 TOE Architecture .......................................................................................................3
3.3 Physical Boundaries ...................................................................................................3
4 Security Policy....................................................................................................................4
4.1 Security audit..............................................................................................................5
4.2 Cryptographic support................................................................................................5
4.3 Full residual information Protection...........................................................................5
4.4 Identification and authentication ................................................................................5
4.5 Security management .................................................................................................5
4.6 Protection of the TSF..................................................................................................5
4.7 TOE access .................................................................................................................6
4.8 Trusted path/channels.................................................................................................6
4.9 Filtering ......................................................................................................................6
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope...............................................................................7
6 Documentation ...................................................................................................................9
7 IT Product Testing..............................................................................................................9
7.1 Developer Testing ......................................................................................................9
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................9
8 Evaluated Configuration...................................................................................................10
9 Results of the Evaluation..................................................................................................10
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)..................................................................10
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)....................................................................10
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD).......................................................11
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)...........................................11
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE).......................11
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN) ..............................................................11
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results ...............................................................................12
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations..........................................................................12
11 Annexes ............................................................................................................................12
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................12
13 Glossary............................................................................................................................13
14 Bibliography.....................................................................................................................13
Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA), Validation Report Version 1.0, July 15, 2022
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) Cisco
Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) 9.16 on Firepower 1000 and 2100 Series solution provided
by Cisco Systems, Inc. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the
conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in July 2022. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security Solutions.
The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part
3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the collaborative Protection Profile for
Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 with the collaborative Protection Profile
Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, version v1.4 + Errata 20200625, 25 June 2020 and
the PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, version 1.1, 18 June 2020.
The TOE is the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) Firepower 1000 and 2100 series
device running ASA Version 9.16.
The TOE identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as
evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the
product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the
Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s
findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Cisco Adaptive
Security Appliance (ASA) 9.16 on Firepower 1000 and 2100 Series Security Target, Version
0.5, May 18, 2022, and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
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laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) Firepower 1000 and 2100 series
device running ASA Version 9.16
(Specific models identified in Section 8)
Protection Profile collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March
2020 with the collaborative Protection Profile Module for Stateful Traffic Filter
Firewalls, version v1.4 + Errata 20200625, 25 June 2020 and the PP-Module for
Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, version 1.1, 18 June 2020
ST Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) 9.16 on Firepower 1000 and 2100
Series Security Target, Version 0.5, May 18, 2022
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) 9.16
on Firepower 1000 and 2100 Series, version 0.2, July 15, 2022
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 extended
Sponsor Cisco Systems, Inc.
Developer Cisco Systems, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Patrick Mallett, Jerome Myers, Elizabeth Scruggs
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The TOE is comprised of both software and hardware. The hardware models are: Firepower
1000 Series (FP-1010, FP-1120, FP-1140, FP-1150) and 2100 Series (FP-2110, FP-2120, FP-
2130, FP-2140). The software is comprised of the Adaptive Security Appliance software image
Release 9.16. All of the Firepower 1000 series devices run the same image file. All of the
Firepower 2100 Series devices run the same image file.
The Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances that comprise the TOE have common hardware
characteristics. These differing characteristics affect only non-TSF relevant functionality (such
as throughput, processing speed, number and type of network connections supported, number
of concurrent connections supported, and amount of storage) and therefore support security
equivalency of the ASAs in terms of hardware.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE is a purpose-built network device with firewall and VPN gateway capabilities. The
firewall and VPN Gateway capabilities are as defined in the PP-Configuration for Network
Devices, Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, and Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways
(CFG_NDcPP-FW-VPNGW_V1.1). The TOE consists of hardware and software that provide
connectivity and security services onto a single, secure device.
The TOE protects itself from tampering and bypass by offering only a limited and controlled
set of functions at each of its physical interfaces to its environment. Communication via those
interfaces is either directed at the TOE for the purpose of administration or is directed through
the TOE for communication among network devices. In both cases the TOE implements a set
of policies to control the services available and those services are designed to protect and ensure
the secure operation of the TOE.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE consists of a physical device as specified below and includes the Cisco ASA software.
Each instantiation of the TOE has two or more network interfaces and is able to filter IP traffic
to and through those interfaces.
TOE Configuration Hardware Configurations Software Version
FP1010
FP1120
FP1140
FP1150
The Cisco ASA Adaptive Security Appliance
on FP1000 provides high-performance
firewall and VPN services
ASA release 9.16
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FP2110
FP2120
FP2130
FP2140
The Cisco ASA Adaptive Security Appliance
on FP2100 provides high-performance
firewall and VPN services
ASA release 9.16
The TOE optionally supports use of AAA server including RADIUS and TACACS+ (part of
the IT Environment) for authentication of administrative users attempting to connect to the
TOE. The TOE is able to filter connections to/from these external entities using its IP traffic
filtering and can encrypt traffic where necessary using TLS and/or IPsec.
The following figure provides a visual depiction of an example TOE deployment. The TOE
boundary is surrounded with a hashed red line.
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. Full residual information protection
4. Identification and authentication
5. Security management
6. Protection of the TSF
7. TOE access
8. Trusted path/channels
9. Filtering
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4.1 Security audit
The TOE provides extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE can audit events related to
cryptographic functionality, identification and authentication, and administrative actions. The
TOE generates an audit record for each auditable event. The administrator configures auditable
events, performs back-up operations, and manages audit data storage. The TOE provides the
administrator with a circular audit trail where the newest audit record will overwrite the oldest
audit record when the local storage space for audit data is full. Audit logs are backed up over
an encrypted channel to an external audit server, if so configured.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of other TOE security functionality. The TOE
provides cryptography in support of secure connections using IPsec and TLS, and remote
administrative management via SSHv2, and TLS/HTTPS. The cryptographic random bit
generators (RBGs) are seeded by entropy noise source.
4.3 Full residual information Protection
The TOE ensures that all information flows from the TOE do not contain residual information
from previous traffic. Packets are padded with zeros. Residual data is never transmitted from
the TOE.
4.4 Identification and authentication
The TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote device
(VPN peers) and user authentication for the authorized administrator of the TOE. Device-level
authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted peer. The secure
channel is established only after each device authenticates the other. Device-level
authentication is performed via IKE/IPsec X509v3 certificate-based authentication or pre-
shared key methods.
The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users wishing to connect to the
TOEs secure CLI and GUI administrator interfaces. The TOE requires authorized
administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management
functionality. The TOE can be configured to require a minimum password length of 15
characters (8-127). The TOE also implements a lockout mechanism if the number of configured
unsuccessful authentication attempts has been exceeded.
The TOE provides administrator authentication against a local user database. Password-based
authentication can be performed on the serial console, SSHv2, and HTTPS interfaces. The TOE
optionally supports use of AAA server including RADIUS and TACACS+ (part of the IT
Environment) for authentication of administrative users attempting to connect to the TOE.
4.5 Security management
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE
configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration
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occurs either through a secure SSHv2 or TLS/HTTPS session, or via a local console connection.
The TOE provides the ability to securely manage all TOE administrative users; all identification
and authentication; all audit functionality of the TOE; all TOE cryptographic functionality; the
timestamps maintained by the TOE and the information flow control policies enforced by the
TOE including encryption/decryption of information flows for VPNs. The TOE supports an
“authorized administrator” role, which equates to any account authenticated to an
administrative interface (CLI or GUI, but not VPN), and possessing sufficient privileges to
perform security-relevant administrative actions.
When a secure session is initially established, the TOE displays an administrator- configurable
warning banner. This is used to provide any information deemed necessary by the administrator
prior to logging in. After a configurable period of inactivity, administrative sessions will be
terminated, requiring administrators to re-authenticate.
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing
identification, authentication, and administrator roles to limit configuration to authorized
administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords.
Additionally, the TOE is not a general-purpose operating system and access to the TOE memory
space is restricted to only TOE functions.
The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time are used as the timestamp
that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. Administrators can update the TOE’s
clock manually. Additionally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the
appliance itself and that of the cryptographic module. Whenever any system failures occur
within the TOE the TOE will cease operation.
4.7 TOE access
When an administrative session is initially established, the TOE displays an administrator-
configurable warning banner. This is used to provide any information deemed necessary by the
administrator. After a configurable period of inactivity, administrator and VPN client sessions
will be terminated, requiring re-authentication. The TOE also supports direct connections from
VPN clients and protects against threats related to those client connections. The TOE
disconnects sessions that have been idle too long and can be configured to deny sessions based
on IP, time, and day, and to NAT external IPs of connecting VPN clients to internal network
addresses.
4.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports establishing trusted paths between itself and remote administrators using
SSHv2 for CLI access, and TLS/HTTPS for GUI/ASDM access apart from tunneling the
ASDM and/or SSH connections in IPsec VPN tunnels. The TOE supports use of TLS and/or
IPsec for connections with remote syslog servers. The TOE can use IPsec to encrypt
connections with remote authentication servers (e.g. RADIUS, TACACS+). The TOE can
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establish trusted paths of peer-to-peer VPN tunnels using IPsec, and VPN client tunnels using
IPsec or TLS. Note that the VPN client is in the operational environment.
4.9 Filtering
The TOE provides stateful traffic firewall functionality including IP address-based filtering (for
IPv4 and IPv6) to address the issues associated with unauthorized disclosure of information,
inappropriate access to services, misuse of services, disruption or denial of services, and
network-based reconnaissance. Address filtering can be configured to restrict the flow of
network traffic between protected networks and other attached networks based on source and/or
destination IP addresses. Port filtering can be configured to restrict the flow of network traffic
between protected networks and other attached networks based on the originating (source)
and/or receiving (destination) port (service). Stateful packet inspection is used to aid in the
performance of packet flow through the TOE and to ensure that packets are only forwarded
when they’re part of a properly established session. The TOE supports protocols that can spawn
additional sessions in accordance with the protocol RFCs where a new connection will be
implicitly permitted when properly initiated by an explicitly permitted session. The File
Transfer Protocol is an example of such a protocol, where a data connection is created as needed
in response to an explicitly allowed command connection. System monitoring functionality
includes the ability to generate audit messages for any explicitly defined (permitted or denied)
traffic flow. TOE administrators have the ability to configure permitted and denied traffic
flows, including adjusting the sequence in which flow control rules will be applied, and to apply
rules to any network interface of the TOE.
The TOE also provides packet filtering and secure IPsec tunneling. The tunnels can be
established between two trusted VPN peers as well as between remote VPN clients and the
TOE. More accurately, these tunnels are sets of security associations (SAs). The SAs define the
protocols and algorithms to be applied to sensitive packets and specify the keying material to
be used. SAs are unidirectional and are established per the ESP security protocol. An authorized
administrator can define the traffic that needs to be protected via IPsec by configuring access
lists (permit, deny, log) and applying these access lists to interfaces using crypto map set.
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 with
the collaborative Protection Profile Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, version
v1.4 + Errata 20200625, 25 June 2020 and the PP-Module for Virtual Private Network
(VPN) Gateways, version 1.1, 18 June 2020
That information has not been reproduced here and the CPP_ND_V2.2E/
MOD_CPP_FW_v1.4e/MOD_VPNGW_v1.1 should be consulted if there is interest in that
material.
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The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
CPP_ND_V2.2E/MOD_CPP_FW_v1.4e/MOD_VPNGW_v1.1 as described for this TOE in
the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this
evaluation. All other functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and
no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities
specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices with the FW and
VPNGW PP-Modules and performed by the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific
Network Device models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore
should not to be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that
were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM
defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of
understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the CPP_ND_V2.2E/MOD_CPP_FW_v1.4e/MOD_VPNGW_v1.1 and
applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities
of the TOE were not covered by this evaluation.
The following table list functionality excluded from the evaluation.
Excluded Functionality Exclusion Rationale
Telnet for management purposes Telnet passes authentication credentials in
clear text and is disabled by default.
Secure Policy Manager is excluded from
the evaluated configuration
Use of Security Policy Manager is beyond
the scope of this Common Criteria
evaluation.
Filtering of non-IP traffic provided by the
EtherType option when configuring
information flow policies is excluded from
the evaluated configuration
Use of non-IP traffic filtering is beyond the
scope of this Common Criteria evaluation.
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Smart Call Home. The Smart Call Home
feature provides personalized, e-mail-based
and web-based notification to customers
about critical events involving their
individual systems.
Use of Smart Call Home is beyond the
scope of this Common Criteria evaluation.
ASA Cluster functionality is excluded from
the evaluated configuration.
Use of ASA Clustering is beyond the scope
of this Common Criteria evaluation.
6 Documentation
The following document were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) 9.16 on Firepower 1000 and 2100 Series
Preparative Procedures & Operational User Guide for the Common Criteria Certified
configuration, Version 0.3, May 19, 2022
Only the Administrator Guide listed above, and the specific sections of the other documents
referenced by that guide should be trusted for the installation, administration, and use of this
product in its evaluated configuration.”
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online
was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon when
configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
Consumers are encouraged to download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to
ensure the device is configured as evaluated.
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is derived
from information contained in [9] the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Cisco Adaptive
Security Appliances (ASA) 9.16 on Firepower 1000 and 2100 Series (DTR), as summarized in
[8] the evaluation Assurance Activity Report (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the CPP_ND_V2.2E/MOD_CPP_FW_v1.4e/
MOD_VPNGW_v1.1 including the tests associated with optional requirements. Section 3.4 of
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the AAR lists the tested devices, provides a list of test tools, and has diagrams of the test
environment.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the hardware and software listed below when
configured in accordance with the documentation specified in section 6. The TOE consists of
the following hardware models all running the ASA 9.16 software:
• Firepower 1000 Series (1010, 1120, 1140 and 1150)
• Firepower 2100 Series (2110, 2120, 2130 and 2140)
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Adaptive Security
Appliances (ASA) 9.16 on Firepower 1000 and 2100 Series TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to
meet the SARs contained in the CPP_ND_V2.2E, MOD_CPP_FW_v1.4e, and
MOD_VPNGW_v1.1.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 9.16 on
Firepower 1000 and 2100 Series products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and
product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained
in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator performed the
assurance activities specified in the CPP_ND_V2.2E/MOD_CPP_FW_v1.4e/
MOD_VPNGW_v1.1 related to the examination of the information contained in the TSS.
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The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the assurance activities in the CPP_ND_V2.2E/MOD_CPP_FW_v1.4e/
MOD_VPNGW_v1.1 and recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a
public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any
residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the following databases:
• National Vulnerability Database (https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search),
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• Vulnerability Notes Database (http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/),
• Rapid7 Vulnerability Database (https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities),
• Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative (http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories ),
• Exploit / Vulnerability Search Engine (http://www.exploitsearch.net),
• Tenable Network Security (http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search), and
• Offensive Security Exploit Database (https://www.exploit-db.com/).
The search was performed on June 10, 2022 and with a final update on July 15, 2022. The
search was conducted with the following search terms: "ASA", "TLS", "SSH", "IPsec", "IKE",
"Cisco Security Crypto", "FOM", "Xeon Processor", "Atom Processor", "Cavium Octeon III",
"radius", "TACACS+", "Firepower 2100", "Firepower 1100". The evaluators found no
unresolved vulnerabilities.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of
the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Administrator Guide document
listed in Section 6. No versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or later were
evaluated. Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security
functional requirements specified in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the
product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. Other functionality provided by devices in
the operational environment, such as the syslog server, need to be assessed separately and no
further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
11 Annexes
Not applicable
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) 9.16 on
Firepower 1000 and 2100 Series Security Target, Version 0.5, May 18, 2022.
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13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are
justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the
Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more
TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT
product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the
CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of
a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and
for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme.
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction
and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020
[5] collaborative Protection Profile Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, version v1.4
+ Errata 20200625, 25 June 2020
[6] PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, version 1.1, 18 June 2020.
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[7] Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) 9.16 on Firepower 1000 and 2100 Series
Security Target, Version 0.5, May 18, 2022 (ST).
[8] Assurance Activity Report for Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) 9.16 on
Firepower 1000 and 2100 Series, Version 0.2, July 15, 2022 (AAR).
[9] Detailed Test Report for Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) 9.16 on Firepower
1000 and 2100 Series, Version 0.2, July 15, 2022 (DTR).
[10] Evaluation Technical Report for Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) 9.16 on
Firepower 1000 and 2100 Series, Version 0.2, July 15, 2022 (ETR)