CEITECSA 5.410.051 1
Security Target Lite for CEITEC
ePassport Module CTC21001 with BAC
Version 3.0 – 07/Dec/2016
Document History
1.0 Initial version
2.0 Minor corrections
3.0 Clarifications to section 7.1
CEITECSA 5.410.051 2
Table of contents
1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 4
1.1 ST Lite reference and TOE reference............................................................................. 4
1.2 TOE overview ................................................................................................................ 4
1.2.1 Usage and major security features for operational use........................................ 4
1.2.2 TOE type................................................................................................................ 6
1.2.3 Required non-TOE hardware, software and firmware.......................................... 6
1.3 TOE description............................................................................................................. 6
1.3.1 Physical Scope of the TOE ..................................................................................... 7
Table 1 – TOE component identification............................................................................... 8
1.3.2 Logical Scope of the TOE ....................................................................................... 8
1.4 TOE life-cycle................................................................................................................. 9
Table 2 – Roles in the TOE life-cycle.................................................................................... 10
1.4.1 Phase 1 “Development”...................................................................................... 10
1.4.2 Phase 2 “Manufacturing”.................................................................................... 10
1.4.3 Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”.............................................................. 11
1.4.4 Phase 4 “Operational Use”.................................................................................. 11
2 Conformance claims............................................................................................................ 12
2.1 Common Criteria conformance................................................................................... 12
2.2 Protection Profile conformance.................................................................................. 12
2.3 Package conformance ................................................................................................. 12
3 Security problem definition ................................................................................................ 13
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 13
3.2 Assumptions................................................................................................................ 15
3.3 Threats......................................................................................................................... 16
3.4 Organizational security policies (OSPs)....................................................................... 19
4 Security objectives .............................................................................................................. 21
4.1 Security objectives for the TOE................................................................................... 21
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment................................................ 23
4.3 Security Objective Rationale ....................................................................................... 25
5 Extended Components Definition....................................................................................... 29
5.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS ............................................................................... 29
5.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND............................................................................... 29
CEITECSA 5.410.051 3
5.3 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM............................................................................... 30
5.4 Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC........................................................................... 32
6 Security requirements......................................................................................................... 34
6.1 Security functional requirements for the TOE ............................................................ 34
6.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit...................................................................................... 34
6.1.2 Class FCS Cryptographic Support ........................................................................ 34
6.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication........................................................ 37
6.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection........................................................................... 40
6.1.5 Class FMT Security Management........................................................................ 42
6.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions................................................... 45
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE ........................................................... 47
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale................................................................................ 47
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale...................................................... 47
6.3.2 Dependency Rationale ........................................................................................ 50
6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ...................................................... 53
6.3.4 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency.................. 54
7 TOE summary specification................................................................................................. 55
7.1 SF.AC_Pers: Access Control for Personalization.......................................................... 55
7.2 SF.Data_Int: Integrity of Personal Data....................................................................... 55
7.3 SF.Data_Conf: Confidentiality of personal Data.......................................................... 56
7.4 SF.Auth: Identification and Authentication................................................................. 57
7.5 SM.Prot_Abuse_Func: Protection against Abuse of Functionality ............................. 57
7.6 SM.Prot_Inf_Leak: Protection against Information Leakage ...................................... 57
7.7 SM.Prot_Phys_Tamper: Protection against Physical Tampering................................ 58
7.8 SM.Prot_Malfunction: Protection against Malfunctions ............................................ 58
8 List of abbreviations............................................................................................................ 59
9 References........................................................................................................................... 61
CEITECSA 5.410.051 4
1 Introduction
1.1 ST Lite reference and TOE reference
ST Lite identification: CEITECSA 5.410.051, version 3.0
Author: Product and Business Development Department (DP&N), CEITEC S.A.
Date: 7 December 2016
TOE identification: CEITEC ePassport Module, CTC21001, version 1.0.
Applicant: CEITEC S.A., Porto Alegre, Brazil
Compliant to: BSI-CC-PP-0055, “Machine Readable Travel Document with ‘ICAO
Application’, Basic Access Control” [1]
Assurance level: EAL4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2
Keywords: ePassport, MRTD, machine readable travel document, BAC, basic
access control, ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization.
1.2 TOE overview
The TOE is an electronic module for machine readable travel documents (MRTDs) based on the
requirements of the International Civil Aviation Organization, as defined in ICAO Doc 9303 [2].
The TOE is developed and produced by CEITEC and delivered to the passport manufacturer as
micro modules.
The passport manufacturer makes an ePassport book by embedding the TOE and an antenna
into an ePassport book. Neither the antenna nor the ePassport book is part of the TOE. The
passport manufacturer delivers the ePassport books with the antenna and the TOE installed on
them to a Personalization Agent.
The Personalization Agent personalizes the MRZ information and biometric data of the face
and fingerprints of the ePassport holder into the TOE along with the TSF data for
authentication and secure messaging between the TOE and the Inspection System. The
Personalization Agent is required to perform an authentication procedure in order to be
allowed to personalize the module with the holder data.
After the personalization, an Inspection System shall be able to verify the ePassport presented
by the ePassport holder using the secure messaging protocol defined by ICAO. The Inspection
System is required to perform the Basic Access Control (BAC) procedure in order to be allowed
to read the passport holder data.
1.2.1 Usage and major security features for operational use
A State or Organization issues MRTDs to be used by the holder for international travel. The
TOE’s access control function for personalization contributes to assure the authenticity of the
MRTD by verifying the access rights of the Personalization Agent. The TOE does not allow the
holder data in a personalized MRTD to be altered or deleted. The traveler presents a MRTD to
the Inspection System to prove his or her identity. The Inspection System is also required by
the TOE to undergo an identification and authentication procedure before being granted
CEITECSA 5.410.051 5
access to the data stored in the MRTD. Once this access is granted, the communication
between TOE and Inspection System runs on a secure protocol in order to prevent violations of
confidentiality of the holder’s data.
The MRTD in context of this ST contains (i) visual (eye-readable) biographical data and portrait
of the holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using
OCR methods in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the MRTD’s chip
according to LDS for contactless machine reading. The authentication of the traveler is based
on (i) the possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as
given on the biographical data page and (ii) optional biometrics using the reference data
stored in MRTD. The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of
genuine MRTD’s. The receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or
Organization.
For this ST the MRTD is viewed as unit of
(a) the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It presents
visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD Holder
(1) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
(2) the printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ), and
(3) the printed portrait.
(b) the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD Holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [2] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents
contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD
Holder
(1) the digital Machine-Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(2) the digitized portrait(s) (EF.DG2),
(3) optional biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or both,
(4) other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16), and
(5) the Document Security Object.
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the
authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the ePassport book and
the MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the Document Number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper,
security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organizational
security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures). These security
measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the ePassport book.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the
document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the
MRTD’s chip.
CEITECSA 5.410.051 6
ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional advanced
security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Active Authentication of the
MRTD’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption of additional sensitive
biometrics as optional security measure in the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [2]. The Passive Authentication
Mechanism and the Data Encryption are performed completely and independently on the TOE
by the TOE environment.
This ST addresses the protection of the logical MRTD (i) in integrity by write only-once access
control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Basic Access Control
Mechanism. This ST does not address the Active Authentication and the Extended Access
Control as optional security mechanisms.
The Basic Access Control is a mandatory security feature supported by the TOE. The Inspection
System (i) reads optically the MRZ, and (ii) authenticates itself as Inspection System by means
of Document Basic Access Keys. After successful authentication of the Inspection System the
MRTD’s chip provides read access to the logical MRTD by means of private communication
(secure messaging) with this Inspection System.
1.2.2 TOE type
The TOE is an electronic module for machine readable travel documents (MRTDs) based on the
requirements of the International Civil Aviation Organization, as defined in ICAO Doc 9303 [2].
The TOE is developed and produced by CEITEC and delivered to the passport manufacturer as
micro modules.
1.2.3 Required non-TOE hardware, software and firmware
There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to perform
its claimed security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip encapsulated in a micro
module and the IC Embedded Software. The inlay holding the chip as well as the antenna and
the booklet (holding the printed MRZ) are needed to represent a complete MRTD,
nevertheless these parts are not inevitable for the secure operation of the TOE.
1.3 TOE description
The TOE is the CEITEC ePassport Module CTC21001, containing one contactless integrated
circuit programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing the Basic
Access Control according to [2].
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) comprises
(a) at the physical level:
 the contactless integrated circuit chip encapsulated on a micro module;
 IC Software, programmed on the chip;
 data necessary to enable the MRTD personalization (Pre-personalization Data),
programmed on the chip; and
 the associated guidance documentation, i.e. guidance documentation delivered to
the MRTD Manufacturer and personalization facility on a secure construction and
personalization of the ePassport books using the TOE.
CEITECSA 5.410.051 7
(b) at the logical level, functions that provide:
 access control for personalization
 integrity of personal data;
 confidentiality of personal data;
 identification and authentication;
 protection against abuse of functionality;
 protection against information leakage;
 protection against physical tampering;
 protection against malfunctions.
Application Note 1: The antenna and the inlay substrate that will be embedded along with the
encapsulated chip into the passport book are not part of the TOE.
1.3.1 Physical Scope of the TOE
In this ST the physical TOE comprises the MRTD chip, encapsulated on a micro module, which
provides the contacts for an external antenna. The non-volatile memory of the chip contains
the IC Software and the Pre-personalization Data. The TOE also includes the MRTD
Manufacturer and personalization facility guidance. The MRTD Manufacturer may provide
additional guidance to the personalization facility but that additional guidance is not part of
the TOE. The MRTD Manufacturer or the personalization facility may also provide guidance to
the MRTD Holder but that guidance is not part of the TOE.
The antenna and its supporting substrate are not part of the TOE.
Figure 1 – Parts of the TOE and additional physical parts
The physical components of the TOE can be identified as follows:
CEITECSA 5.410.051 8
Component Version
Silicon Integrated Circuit COP V1R0 R
IC Software 1.0.0.719
CEITECSA 5.410.031 -
CTC21001 User Guidance
4.0
CEITECSA 5.410.022 -
Personalization Protocol
5.0
CEITECSA 5.420.014 -
Micromodule CTC21001 MM
R00
Table 1 – TOE component identification
The Pre-personalization Data written on the chip comprise:
 The IC identification number;
 The IC Private Key;
 The Personalization Agent Key;
 The inspection certificate chain;
 The personalization certificate chain; and
 The verification data for the certificates.
1.3.2 Logical Scope of the TOE
Functions performed by the TOE include:
 identification and authentication;
 access control for personalization;
 protection of integrity of personal data;
 protection of confidentiality of personal data;
 protection against abuse of functionality;
 protection against information leakage;
 protection against physical tampering; and
 protection against malfunctions.
Identification and authentication functions concern with the TOE personalization and with the
operational stage of the TOE. At the personalization stage, the Personalization Agent must be
successfully authenticated and establish a secure session between itself and the terminal for
issuing the personalization commands.
At the operational stage, the Inspection System must authenticate himself using a BAC
mechanism with keys derived from the MRZ information in order to read the biographical data
of the MRTD Holder and TSF data. The optional biometric data can only be read after the
Inspection System successfully performs a Chip Authentication and a Terminal Authentication
procedure.
The authentication protocols and the data access control performed by the TOE assure that
only authorized Personalization Agents are given access to TOE functions or data stored in the
CEITECSA 5.410.051 9
TOE memory, and that the access is selective depending on the agent role and authentication
level.
Integrity of the personal data is protected via control of the TOE life-cycle stage. The TOE
enforces a unidirectional sequence of life-cycle phases, enabling or disabling TOE functions
depending on the current phase. The life-cycle management checks the result of the
Personalization Agent authentication and decides whether the TOE can be switched to the
personalization state, kept in the pre-personalized state (awaiting a new agent authentication
attempt) or be permanently disabled (if a potentially unsecure condition has been detected).
The TOE will only transition to the “Operational Use” phase if the personalization is complete.
Any interrupted personalization (e.g. due to power loss) will be discarded and the
personalization process will have to be executed from scratch on the next attempt. Changes
and additions to data on a personalized TOE are prevented.
Confidentiality of personal data is protected by a secure communication mechanism between
the TOE and external systems and via access control to regulate access to the assets stored on
the TOE.
A secure communication session is established between the TOE and the Inspection System
once the BAC procedure is successfully executed. The secure communication uses data
encryption and message authentication according to [2] in order to protect the MRTD Holder’s
data from eavesdropping and unauthorized access. If the communication session is finished or
interrupted, the session keys are destroyed and the TOE requires that the Inspection System
be re-authenticated by the BAC in order to resume the message exchange.
Assets stored in the TOE are protected by measures that enforce their confidentiality and/or
integrity. The TOE private key for Chip Authentication and the code memory are not accessible
externally after the “Manufacturing” phase of the TOE (the Chip Authentication is out of the
scope of this ST, but the reference to the IC private key is made here to exemplify the
protection of TOE assets).
Correct software execution is enforced by the use of logical constructs and techniques
designed to detect perturbations in the program flow.
The integrated circuit of the TOE provides a number of hardware security features aimed at
protecting the stored information against leakage or disclosure.
1.4 TOE life-cycle
The TOE life-cycle is described in terms of the four life-cycle phases. (With respect to [3], the
TOE life-cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 steps.)
The roles in each phase of the TOE life-cycle are played by the following entities:
CEITECSA 5.410.051 10
Role Entity
IC Developer CEITEC S.A.
Software Developer CEITEC S.A.
IC Manufacturer Third-party IC foundry providing services for CEITEC S.A.
Module Manufacturer CEITEC S.A.
MRTD Manufacturer The entity that assembles the passport, embedding the TOE in the
booklet
Personalization Agent The entity that personalizes the MRTD with the MRTD Holder data
MRTD Holder Passport owner; traveler
Table 2 – Roles in the TOE life-cycle
1.4.1 Phase 1 “Development”
(Step 1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC Developer develops the integrated circuit, the
IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE
components. This guidance documentation consists of manufacturing documentation intended
for the IC Manufacturer and SW development guidance intended for the embedded SW
Developer. Neither of the guidance is delivered to the MRTD Manufacturer or to the MRTD
Holder.
(Step 2) The Software Developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit
and the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops
the IC Embedded Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE
components. This guidance documentation is intended for the ePassport manufacturer and
Personalization Agent but is not delivered to the MRTD Holder. Guidance for the MRTD Holder
is not part of the TOE and is to be authored and delivered by the MRTD Manufacturer and/or
the Personalization Agent.
The manufacturing documentation of the IC is securely delivered to the IC Manufacturer.
Application Note 2: The development of the TOE is entirely conducted by CEITEC, therefore
there is no institutional separation between the IC Developer and the Software Developer.
1.4.2 Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
(Step 3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced in accordance with the
manufacturing documentation by the IC Manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC
Manufacturer to the Module Manufacturer (i.e. CEITEC).
(Step 4) The Module Manufacturer writes the IC Software, the IC Private Key, the
Personalization Agent Key, and the remaining Pre-personalization Data onto the chip. The IC is
mounted on and connected to an electronic module base. The finished module is securely
delivered from the Module Manufacturer to the MRTD Manufacturer along with the guidance
documentation for the MRTD Manufacturer. The Personalization Agent Key is delivered to the
Personalization Agent via a secure communication channel by the Module Manufacturer.
Application Note 3: The MRTD application is included in the IC Software, therefore there is no
need to create the MRTD application as in [1].
CEITECSA 5.410.051 11
Application Note 4: This ST defines the TOE delivery to take place at the end of Step 4.
Therefore, the subsequent steps (5 through to 7) are not applicable to the TOE.
Application Note 5: The IC Private Key is used for the Chip Authentication procedure, which is
not in the scope of this ST.
(Step 5) The MRTD Manufacturer combines the module with hardware for the contactless
interface in the passport book.
The pre-personalized MRTD is securely delivered from the MRTD Manufacturer to the
Personalization Agent. The MRTD Manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the
guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.
1.4.3 Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”
(Step 6) The personalization of the MRTD includes (i) the survey of the MRTD Holder’s
biographical data, (ii) the enrolment of the MRTD Holder biometric reference data (i.e. the
digitized portraits and the optional biometric reference data), (iii) the printing of the visual
readable data onto the physical MRTD, (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into
the logical MRTD and (v) configuration of the TSF if necessary. Step (iv) is performed by the
Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation of (i) the digital MRZ data
(EF.DG1), (ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and (iii) the Document Security Object.
The signing of the Document Security Object by the Document Signer [2] finalizes the
personalization of the genuine MRTD for the MRTD Holder. The personalized MRTD (together
with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the MRTD Holder for
operational use.
1.4.4 Phase 4 “Operational Use”
(Step 7) The TOE is used as MRTD chip by the traveler and the Inspection Systems in the
“Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the
issuing State or Organization and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing
State but they can never be modified.
Application Note 6: It is not possible to add data to the MRTD application data groups during
the Operational Use.
CEITECSA 5.410.051 12
2 Conformance claims
2.1 Common Criteria conformance
This ST claims conformance to
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and general model, September 2012, Version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-
2012-09-001 [4]
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
functional components, September 2012, Version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-
002 [5]
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
assurance components, September 2012, Version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-
003 [6]
as follows:
 Part 2 extended,
 Part 3 conformant.
2.2 Protection Profile conformance
This ST claims strict conformance to
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO
Application”, Basic Access Control, BSI-CC-PP-0055, Version 1.10, 25th
March 2009 [1].
2.3 Package conformance
This ST claims conformance to assurance package EAL4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 defined in
CC part 3.
CEITECSA 5.410.051 13
3 Security problem definition
3.1 Introduction
Assets
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD Data
The logical MRTD data consists of EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different security needs)
and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [2]. These data are user data of the
TOE. EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and
EF.DG16 contain personal data of the MRTD Holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key
(EF.DG14) is used by the Inspection System for the Chip Authentication. EF.SOD is used by the
Inspection System for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD. Due to interoperability
reasons as the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [2] the TOE described in this ST specifies only the BAC
mechanisms with resistance against enhanced basic attack potential granting access to
 Logical MRTD standard User Data (i.e. Personal Data) of the MRTD Holder (EF.DG1,
EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16);
 Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14;
 Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD; and
 Common data in EF.COM.
The TOE prevents read access to sensitive User Data
 Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4).
A sensitive asset is the following more general one.
Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the
MRTD Holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.
Subjects
This ST considers the following subjects:
Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD
Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD´s chip. The manufacturer is the default user of
the TOE during Phase 2 Manufacturing.
Application Note 7: The Specific TOE only implements a subset of the MRTD life-cycle. This is
discussed in Sect. 1.4. Therefore, for the purposes of this ST the role Manufacturer is further
decomposed into three types of manufacturer which all play a different role in the
CEITECSA 5.410.051 14
manufacturing process of the TOE. Where necessary, these manufacturer roles shall be
referred to instead of generic Manufacturer in order to avoid ambiguity. In general, the role
Manufacturer (as in e.g. FMT_SMR.1) refers to the Module Manufacturer. Module
Manufacturer has access to the security management functions available to the Manufacturer
(FMT_SMF.1), namely to writing the initialization and pre-personalization data to the TOE.
These functions shall be disabled prior to the TOE being delivered to the MRTD Manufacturer.
1. IC Manufacturer is an external party operating the foundry where the wafers
containing the IC are manufactured;
2. Module Manufacturer is the party completing the TOE, assembling the IC into the
modules based and writing the IC Software and the Pre-personalization Data on it. This
role is carried out by CEITEC; and
3. MRTD Manufacturer is the agent that manufactures the ePassport booklet, embedding
the TOE and the antenna.
Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for
the holder by some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the identity the holder for
the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD
Holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s), (iii)
writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for global,
international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF data and (iv) signing the
Document Security Object defined in [2].
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless
interface.
Inspection System (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an
MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as
MRTD Holder. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the contactless
communication with the MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access
Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic
Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or other parts of the passport book providing this
information. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which
implements additionally the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System
(EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i) implements the Terminal Authentication
Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document
Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The security
attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection System Certificates.
Application Note 8: This ST does not distinguish between the BIS, GIS and EIS because the
Active Authentication and the Extended Access Control are outside the scope.
MRTD Holder
CEITECSA 5.410.051 15
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the
MRTD.
Traveler
Person presenting the MRTD to the Inspection System and claiming the identity of the MRTD
Holder.
Attacker
A threat agent trying (i) to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip remotely
(i.e. without knowing or optically reading the printed MRZ data), (ii) to read or to manipulate
the logical MRTD without authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
Application Note 9: An impostor is attacking the Inspection System as TOE IT environment
independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use
results of successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.
3.2 Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be
used or is intended to be used.
A.MRTD_Manufac MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that
security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain
confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent
any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
A.MRTD_Delivery MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and
conformance to its objectives:
 Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery
and storage;
 Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper
operation in the delivery process and storage; and
 Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have
got the required skill.
A.Pers_Agent Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to the
MRTD Holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key
(EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if
stored on the MRTD’s chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object.
The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate
himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
CEITECSA 5.410.051 16
A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining
an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler
as MRTD Holder. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the
Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or
Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [2]. The Basic
Inspection System reads the logical MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive
Authentication to verify the logical MRTD.
Application Note 10: According to [2] the support of the Passive Authentication mechanism is
mandatory whereas the Basic Access Control is optional. This ST does not address Primary
Inspection Systems therefore the BAC is mandatory within this ST.
A.BAC-Keys Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or
Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the ‘ICAO
Doc 9303’ [2], the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of
the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy
to withstand any attack based on the decision that the Inspection System has to derive
Document Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential.
Application Note 11: When assessing the MRZ data resp. the BAC keys entropy potential
dependencies between these data (especially single items of the MRZ) have to be considered
and taken into account. E.g. there might be a direct dependency between the Document
Number when chosen consecutively and the issuing date.
3.3 Threats
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration
with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational
environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below.
T.Chip_ID Identification of MRTD’s chip
Adverse action An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying
remotely the MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening to communications
through the contactless communication interface.
Threat agent Having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable
MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance.
Asset Anonymity of user.
T.Skimming Skimming the logical MRTD
Adverse action An attacker imitates an Inspection System trying to establish a
communication to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless
communication channel of the TOE.
CEITECSA 5.410.051 17
Threat agent Having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable
MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance.
Asset Confidentiality of logical MRTD data.
T.Eavesdropping Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
Inspection System
Adverse action An attacker is listening communication between the MRTD’s chip and an
Inspection System to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The Inspection
System uses the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker
does not know these data in advance.
Threat agent Having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable
MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance.
Asset Confidentiality of logical MRTD data.
T.Forgery Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
Adverse action An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any
part of it including its security related data in order to deceive on an
Inspection System by means of the changed MRTD Holder’s identity or
biometric reference data. This threat comprises several attack scenarios of
MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the biographical data on the
biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and in the
digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter
the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual
inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric
authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the
biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication
mechanism of the Inspection System. The attacker may combine data
groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the
attacker write the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger
data read from the logical MRTD of a traveler into another MTRD’s chip
leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this
MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD
to another contactless chip.
Threat agent Having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate MRTDs.
Asset Authenticity of logical MRTD data.
The TOE shall avert the threat as specified below.
T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
Adverse action An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the
phase “Operational Use” in order
CEITECSA 5.410.051 18
i. to manipulate User Data;
ii. to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or
functions of the TOE; or
iii. to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and
the personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD Holder.
Threat agent Having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRTD.
Asset Confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness
of TSF.
T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
Adverse action An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its
usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage
may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker.
Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption,
I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time
requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel
transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating
parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the
contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to
the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related
to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential
Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA).
Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by
fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
Threat agent Having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRTD.
Asset Confidentiality logical MRTD and TSF data.
T.Phys_Tamper Physical Tampering
Adverse action An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order
i. to disclose TSF Data; or
ii. to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to
i. modify security features or functions of the MRTD’s chip;
ii. modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software;
iii. modify User Data; or
iv. modify TSF data.
CEITECSA 5.410.051 19
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or
manipulation of TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the
Inspection System) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD’s chip)
or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by
modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage
through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with
the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure
analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the
hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be
identified. Determination of software design including treatment of User
Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result
in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can
be permanent or temporary.
Threat agent Having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRTD.
Asset Confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness
of TSF.
T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
Adverse action An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to
i. deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE; or
ii. circumvent or deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal
operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software or misusing administration function. To exploit these
vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional
operation.
Threat agent Having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRTD.
Asset Confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness
of TSF.
3.4 Organizational security policies (OSPs)
The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as security rules,
procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its operations (see CC
part 1, sec. 3.2).
CEITECSA 5.410.051 20
P.Manufact Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The Initialization Data are written by the Module Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The
Module Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the
Personalization Agent Key.
P.Personalization Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or
Organization only
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the
logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD Holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the
holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
P.Personal_Data Personal data protection policy
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s chip
(EF.DG1), the printed portrait and the digitized portrait (EF.DG2) and the biometric reference
data of finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s) (EF.DG4) and data
according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the MRTD’s chip are personal data
of the MRTD Holder. These data groups are intended to be used only with agreement of the
MRTD Holder by Inspection Systems to which the MRTD is presented. The MRTD’s chip shall
provide the possibility for the Basic Access Control to allow read access to these data only for
terminals successfully authenticated based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys
as defined in [2].
Application Note 12: The organizational security policy P.Personal_Data is drawn from the
ICAO ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [2]. Note that the Document Basic Access Key is defined by the TOE
environment and loaded to the TOE by the Personalization Agent.
CEITECSA 5.410.051 21
4 Security objectives
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the
TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into security
objectives for the development and production environment and security objectives for the
operational environment.
4.1 Security objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified
threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.
OT.AC_Pers Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document Security
Object according to LDS [2] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization
Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document Security Object and
the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization.
Application Note 13: The TOE does not support the addition of LDS groups other than EF.DG1,
EF.DG2 and EF.DG3 by the Personalization Agent. The TOE does not support addition of data to
the existing LDS groups during the “Operational Use” phase.
OT.Data_Int Integrity of personal data
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against
physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure that the Inspection
System is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data.
OT.Data_Conf Confidentiality of personal data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16.
Read access to EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as
Personalization Agent. Read access to EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 is granted to
terminals successfully authenticated as Basic Inspection System. The Basic Inspection System
shall authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the
Document Basic Access Key. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data
during their transmission to the Basic Inspection System.
Application Note 14: The traveler grants the authorization for reading the personal data in
EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 to the Inspection System by presenting the MRTD.
The MRTD’s chip shall provide read access to these data for terminals successfully
authenticated by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the Document
Basic Access Keys.
The security objective OT.Data_Conf requires the TOE to ensure the strength of the security
function Basic Access Control Authentication. The Document Basic Access Keys are derived
from the MRZ data defined by the TOE environment and are loaded into the TOE by the
Personalization Agent. Therefore the sufficient quality of these keys has to result from the
MRZ data’s entropy. Any attack based on decision of the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [2] that the
CEITECSA 5.410.051 22
Inspection System derives Document Basic Access is ensured by OE.BAC Keys. Note that the
authorization for reading the biometric data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 is only granted after
successful Enhanced Access Control not covered by this ST. Thus the read access is prevented
even in case of a successful BAC Authentication.
OT.Identification Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-personalization Data in its non-
volatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC
during Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The storage of
the Pre-personalization Data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s). In Phase 4
“Operational Use” the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic
Inspection System or Personalization Agent.
Application Note 15: The TOE security objective OT.Identification addresses security features
of the TOE to support the life-cycle security in the manufacturing and personalization phases.
The IC Identification Data are used for TOE identification in Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and for
traceability and/or to secure shipment of the TOE from Phase 2 “Manufacturing” into the
Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The OT.Identification addresses security features of
the TOE to be used by the TOE manufacturing. In the Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE is
identified by the Document Number as part of the printed and digital MRZ. The
OT.Identification forbids the output of any other IC (e.g. integrated circuit card serial number
ICCSN) or MRTD identifier through the contactless interface before successful authentication
as Basic Inspection System or as Personalization Agent.
The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s chip
independent of the TOE environment.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and
support functions that may be maliciously used to
(i) disclose critical User Data, (ii) manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded
Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded IC Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate,
change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test
Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or
processed in the MRTD’s chip
 by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
 by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
 by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
CEITECSA 5.410.051 23
Application Note 16: This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex
signal processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker.
Details correspond to an analysis of attack scenarios which is not given here.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF
Data, and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with
enhanced-basic attack potential by means of
 measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips
surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage
and current) or
 measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction
between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure
analysis)
 manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
 controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
 reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the
normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or
tested.
This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp.
electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
Application Note 17: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction
with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the
objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper) provided that details about the TOE´s internals are known.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.MRTD_Manufact Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through
phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing
and test data.
CEITECSA 5.410.051 24
OE.MRTD_ Delivery Protection of the MRTD delivery
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the
following objectives:
 non-disclosure of any security relevant information;
 identification of the element under delivery;
 meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception
acknowledgment);
 physical protection to prevent external damage;
 secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE’s); and
 traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
o origin and shipment details,
o reception, reception acknowledgement,
o location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the
delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality
convention) and highlight all non-conformance to this process.
Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department)
dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to
meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above
expectations.
OE.Personalization Personalization of logical MRTD
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf
of the issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create
biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD Holder i.e.
the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s), and (iii) personalize
the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical and logical security measures to
protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA
Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document
Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of
the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations maintaining its
authenticity and integrity. The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic
secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys,
(ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment
only, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving States
and Organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates all data in the
data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [2].
OE.BAC-Keys Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or
Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the ‘ICAO
CEITECSA 5.410.051 25
Doc 9303’ [2] the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of
the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy
to withstand any attack based on the decision that the Inspection System has to derive
Document Basic Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential.
Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.Exam_MRTD Examination of the MRTD passport book
The Inspection System of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD
presented by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures
and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global
interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key
of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access
Control [2].
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif Verification by Passive Authentication
The border control officer of the receiving State uses the Inspection System to verify the
traveler as MRTD Holder. The Inspection Systems must have successfully verified the signature
of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they
are used. The receiving States and Organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key
and the Document Signer Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all
Inspection Systems.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Protection of data from the logical MRTD
The Inspection System of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and
integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the logical
MRTD being under Basic Access Control will use Inspection Systems which implement the
terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the secure messaging with fresh generated
keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection Systems).
4.3 Security Objective Rationale
The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage.
CEITECSA 5.410.051 26
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_Delivery
OE.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.BAC-Keys
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
T.Chip-ID x
T.Skimming x x
T.Eavesdropping x
T.Forgery x x x x x x
T.Abuse-Func x x
T.Information_Leakage x
T.Phys-Tamper x
T.Malfunction x
P.Manufact x
P.Personalization x x x
P.Personal_Data x x
A.MRTD_Manufact x
A.MRTD_Delivery x
A.Pers_Agent x
A.Insp_Sys x x
A.BAC-Keys x
Table 3 – security objectives coverage
The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires a unique identification of
the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-personalization Data as
being fulfilled by OT.Identification.
The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only”
addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the Personalization Agent as described
in the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of
logical MRTD”, and (ii) the access control for the user data and TSF data as described by the
security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”. Note the
Module Manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalization Agent Key(s) according to
OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE”. The security objective
OT.AC_Pers limits the management of TSF data and management of TSF to the Personalization
Agent.
The OSP P.Personal_Data “Personal data protection policy” requires the TOE (i) to support the
protection of the confidentiality of the logical MRTD by means of the Basic Access Control and
(ii) enforce the access control for reading as decided by the issuing State or Organization. This
policy is implemented by the security objectives OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data”
CEITECSA 5.410.051 27
describing the unconditional protection of the integrity of the stored data and during
transmission.
The security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” describes the
protection of the confidentiality.
The threat T.Chip_ID “Identification of MRTD’s chip” addresses the trace of the MRTD
movement by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip through the contactless communication
interface. This threat is countered as described by the security objective OT.Identification by
Basic Access Control using sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the security objective
for the environment OE.BAC-Keys.
The threat T.Skimming “Skimming digital MRZ data or the digital portrait” and T.Eavesdropping
“Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and Inspection System” address the
reading of the logical MRTD trough the contactless interface or listening the communication
between the MRTD’s chip and a terminal. This threat is countered by the security objective
OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” through Basic Access Control using sufficiently
strong derived keys as required by the security objective for the environment OE.BAC-Keys.
The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent alteration of
the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access
Control for Personalization of logical MRTD” requires the TOE to limit the write access for the
logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf. OE.Personalization). The TOE will
protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD according the security objective OT.Data_Int
“Integrity of personal data” and OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical
Tampering”. The examination of the presented MRTD passport book according to
OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” shall ensure that passport book
does not contain a sensitive contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged
logical MRTD. The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of
digital signature which will be created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of
logical MRTD by Signature” and verified by the Inspection System according to
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication”.
The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks using the MRTD’s chip as
production material for the MRTD and misuse of the functions for personalization in the
operational state after delivery to MRTD Holder to disclose or to manipulate the logical MRTD.
This threat is countered by OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality”.
Additionally this objective is supported by the security objective for the TOE environment:
OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD” ensuring that the TOE security functions
for the initialization and the personalization are disabled and the security functions for the
operational state after delivery to MRTD Holder are enabled according to the intended use of
the TOE.
The threats T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip”, T.Phys-Tamper
“Physical Tampering” and T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress” are typical
for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The
protection of the TOE against these threats is addressed by the directly related security
objectives OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage”, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
CEITECSA 5.410.051 28
“Protection against Physical Tampering” and T.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against
Malfunctions”.
The assumption A.MRTD_Manufact “MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to 6” is covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Manufact “Protection of the MRTD
Manufacturing” that requires to use security procedures during all manufacturing steps.
The assumption A.MRTD_Delivery “MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6” is covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_ Delivery “Protection of the MRTD
delivery” that requires to use security procedures during delivery steps of the MRTD.
The assumption A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”
including the enrolment, the protection with digital signature and the storage of the MRTD
Holder personal data.
The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys
“Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for the
TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book”. The security
objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data from the
logical MRTD” will require the Basic Inspection System to implement the Basic Access Control
and to protect the logical MRTD data during the transmission and the internal handling.
The assumption A.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys” is directly
covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality
of Basic Access Control Keys” ensuring the sufficient key quality to be provided by the issuing
State or Organization.
CEITECSA 5.410.051 29
5 Extended Components Definition
This ST uses components defined as extensions to CC part 2. Some of these components are
defined in [7], other components are defined in this ST.
5.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FAU_SAS) of the
Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements
for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does
not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give
specific details of the content of the audit records.
The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behavior
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component leveling:
FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability
to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
5.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FCS_RND) of
the Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family describes the functional
requirements for random number generation used for cryptographic purposes. The
component FCS_RND is not limited to generation of cryptographic keys unlike the component
FCS_CKM.1.
The similar component FIA_SOS.2 is intended for non-cryptographic use.
The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)” is specified as follows.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage 1
CEITECSA 5.410.051 30
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behavior
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are
intended to be used for cryptographic purposes.
Component leveling:
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers 1
FCS_RND.1 Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a
defined quality metric.
Management: FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1.1 TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
5.3 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE.
The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses
the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the
TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the
abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.
The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behavior
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a
combined manner. Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the Limited
capability of this family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a specific manner.
Component leveling:
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers 1
CEITECSA 5.410.051 31
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the
capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its
genuine purpose.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions
(refer to Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for
instance, by removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of
the TOE’s lifecycle.
Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FMT_LIM) of
the Class FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family describes the functional
requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined
in the class FMT because this class addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The
examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate
to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of
the functions and by limiting their availability.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so
that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the
following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and
availability policy].
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so
that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
1
2
CEITECSA 5.410.051 32
following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and
availability policy].
Application Note 18: The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume that
there are two types of mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which together
shall provide protection in order to enforce the policy. This also allows that (i) the TSF is
provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment but its capabilities are so
limited that the policy is enforced or conversely (ii) the TSF is designed with test and support
functionality that is removed from, or disabled in, the product prior to the “Operational Use”
phase.
The combination of both requirements shall enforce the policy.
5.4 Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC
The sensitive family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is
defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall
prevent attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is based on external
observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s
electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA),
timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of
intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed by any other component of CC part 2
[5].
The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC)” is specified as follows.
Family behavior
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component leveling:
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_EMSEC TOE emanation 1
CEITECSA 5.410.051 33
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of
types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the
following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to
[assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of
user data].
CEITECSA 5.410.051 34
6 Security requirements
6.1 Security functional requirements for the TOE
This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into sub-section
following the main security functionality.
6.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended).
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer1
with the capability to store
the IC Identification Data2
in the audit records.
Application Note 19: The Manufacturer here refers to the Module Manufacturer.
6.1.2 Class FCS Cryptographic Support
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic key
generation algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated by the TOE.
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation – Generation of
Document Basic Access Keys by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Document
Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm3
and specified
cryptographic key sizes 112 bit4
that meet the following: [2],
normative appendix 55
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
1
[assignment: authorized users]
2
[assignment: list of audit information]
3
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
4
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
5
[assignment: list of standards]
CEITECSA 5.410.051 35
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction – MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method: overwriting the memory
data6
that meets the following: none7
.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic
algorithms to be implemented by the TOE.
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA The TSF shall perform hashing8
in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-19
and cryptographic key sizes none10
that meet the following: FIPS 180-411
[8].
FCS_COP.1/ENC Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption
Triple DES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/ENC The TSF shall perform secure messaging (BAC) – encryption and
decryption12
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
Triple-DES in CBC mode13
and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit14
that
6
[assignment: cryptographic key destruction method]
7
[assignment: list of standards]
8
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
9
[selection: SHA-1 or other approved algorithms]
10
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
11
[selection: FIPS 180-2 or other approved standards]
12
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
13
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
14
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
CEITECSA 5.410.051 36
meet the following: FIPS 46-3 [9] and [2], normative appendix 5,
A5.315
.
FCS_COP.1/AUTH Cryptographic operation – Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/AUTH The TSF shall perform symmetric authentication – encryption and
decryption16
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm:
Triple-DES17
and cryptographic key sizes 11218
bitthat meet the
following: FIPS 46-319
[9].
FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication
code20
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail
MAC21
and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit22
that meet the following:
ISO/IEC 9797 [10] (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence
Message Counter, padding mode 2)23
.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS_RND.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that
meet AIS-31 class PTG.224
[11].
15
[assignment: list of standards]
16
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
17
[selection: Triple-DES, AES]
18
[selection: 112, 128, 168, 192, 256]
19
[selection: FIPS 46-3, FIPS 197]
20
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
21
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
22
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
23
[assignment: list of standards]
24
[assignment: a defined quality metric]
CEITECSA 5.410.051 37
6.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
Application Note 20: The table below provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms
used.
Name SFR for the TOE Algorithms and key sizes according to [2],
normative appendix 5, and [12]
Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU.4 and
FIA_UAU.6
Triple-DES, 112 bit keys (cf.
FCS_COP.1/ENC) and Retail-MAC, 112 bit
keys (cf. FCS_COP.1/MAC)
Symmetric Authentication
Mechanism for
Personalization Agents
FIA_UAU.4 Triple-DES, 112 bit keys (cf.
FCS_COP.1/ENC) and Retail-MAC, 112 bit
keys (cf. FCS_COP.1/MAC)
Table 4– Authentication Mechanisms
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
2. To read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of
the MRTD”,
3. To read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use”28
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
28
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
CEITECSA 5.410.051 38
1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
2. To read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of
the MRTD”,
3. To read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use” 29
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms – Single-use
authentication of the Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES30
.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES to
support user authentication31
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the
following rules:
1. the TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization
Agent by one of33
the following mechanism(s)34
: (1) symmetric
authentication with the Transport Key,
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection
29
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
30
[selection: Triple-DES, AES or other approved algorithms]
31
[selection: Triple-DES, AES]
33
[Refinement: removed ´one of´ as there is only a single mechanism for Personalization Agent
authentication consisting of three stages]
34
[Refinement: only a single mechanism – but consisting of three stages]
CEITECSA 5.410.051 39
System only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys.36
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by
the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.6.1 The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE during a BAC mechanism based
communication after successful authentication of the terminal with
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism37
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when a defined number (defined in Table 5,
column “Maximum Consecutive Attempts”) of consecutive38
unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to each
authentication event listed in Table 5, column “Authentication
Event”39
.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has
been surpassed40
, the TSF shall execute the action defined in Table 5,
column “Action”41
.
Authentication Event Maximum Consecutive Attempts Action
Personalization 3 Enter violated state
Inspection BAC 1 Stop authenticating the IS for at
least 5 s
MAC verification 1 Close Secure Messaging session
Table 5 – FIA_AFL.1 refinement
36
[assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication]
37
[assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
38
[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within
[assignment: range of acceptable values]]
39
[assignment: list of authentication events]
40
[assignment: met or surpassed]
41
[assignment: list of actions]
CEITECSA 5.410.051 40
Application Note 21: The number of unsuccessful authentication attempts is stored in a non-
volatile memory in the TOE, so that it is unaffected by powering down the TOE, and the count
is reset to zero only after a successful authentication.
6.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control – Basic Access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP 42
on terminals
gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM,
EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD43
.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACF.1 Basic Security attribute based access control – Basic
Access Control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP44
to objects based
on the following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Basic Inspection System,
c. Terminal,
2. Objects:
a. data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
b. data in EF.COM,
c. data in EF.SOD,
3. Security attributes
a. authentication status of terminals.45
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
42
[assignment: access control SFP]
43
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
44
[assignment: access control SFP]
45
[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and. for each, the SFP relevant
security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
CEITECSA 5.410.051 41
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to
write and to read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
of the logical MRTD,
Application Note 22: The Personalization Agent may only write the data of the EF.COM,
EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 after being successfully authenticated.
2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed
to read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.46
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none47
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
rule:
1. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
2. Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
3. The Basic Inspection System is not allowed to read the data in
EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.48
Application Note 23: The Inspection System needs special authentication and authorization
for read access to DG3 and DG4 not defined in this ST (cf. [13] for details).
Inter-TSF-Transfer
Application Note 24: FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 require the protection of the User Data
transmitted from the TOE to the terminal by secure messaging with encryption and message
authentication codes after successful authentication of the terminal. The authentication
mechanisms as part of Basic Access Control Mechanism include the key agreement for the
encryption and the message authentication key to be used for secure messaging.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality – MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information
flow control]
46
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations
on controlled objects]
47
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects]
48
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
CEITECSA 5.410.051 42
FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP49
to be able to
transmit and receive50
user data in a manner protected from
unauthorized disclosure.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity – MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP 51
to be able to
transmit and receive 52
user data in a manner protected from
modification, deletion, insertion and replay 53
errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay 54
has occurred.
6.1.5 Class FMT Security Management
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions:
1. Initialization,
2. Pre-personalization,
3. Personalization. 55
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
49
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
50
[selection: transmit, receive]
51
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
52
[selection: transmit, receive]
53
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
54
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
55
[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]
CEITECSA 5.410.051 43
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer,
2. Personalization Agent,
3. Basic Inspection System. 56
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application Note 25: The SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 address the management of the TSF
and TSF data to prevent misuse of test features of the TOE over the life-cycle phases.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so
that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the
following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
3. Software to be reconstructed and
4. Substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks 57
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so
that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the
following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
3. Software to be reconstructed and
4. Substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks. 58
56
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
57
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
58
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
CEITECSA 5.410.051 44
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management functions and
different TSF data.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write 59
the Initialization
Data and Pre-personalization Data 60
to the Manufacturer. 61
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of
Read Access to Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users
to 62
the Initialization Data 63
to the Personalization Agent. 64
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write 65
the
Document Basic Access Keys 66
to the Personalization
Agent. 67
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
59
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
60
[assignment: list of TSF data]
61
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
62
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
63
[assignment: list of TSF data]
64
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
65
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
66
[assignment: list of TSF data]
67
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
CEITECSA 5.410.051 45
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read 68
the Document
Basic Access Keys and Personalization Agent Keys 69
to none.
70
6.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and TSF
Data. The security functional requirement FPT_EMSEC.1 addresses the inherent leakage. With
respect to the forced leakage they have to be considered in combination with the security
functional requirements “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” and “TSF
testing (FPT_TST.1)” on the one hand and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” on the
other. The SFRs “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” and
“Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” together with the SAR “Security architecture
description” (ADV_ARC.1) prevent bypassing, deactivation and manipulation of the security
features or misuse of TOE functions.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit electromagnetic fields and power consumption
information71
in excess of non-useful information72
enabling access to
Personalization Agent Key(s) 73
and data stored in EF.COM, EF.SOD,
EF.DG1 to EF.DG1674
.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users 75
are unable to use the
following interface smart card circuit contacts 76
to gain access to
Personalization Agent Key(s) 77
and data stored in EF.COM, EF.SOD,
EF.DG1 to EF.DG1678
.
The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit
information leakage including physical manipulation.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
68
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
69
[assignment: list of TSF data]
70
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
71
[assignment: types of emissions]
72
[assignment: specified limits]
73
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
74
[assignment: list of types of user data]
75
[assignment: type of users]
76
[assignment: type of connection]
77
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
78
[assignment: list of types of user data]
CEITECSA 5.410.051 46
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur:
1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a
malfunction could occur,
2. Failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1. 79
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2).
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up,
periodically during normal operation, at the request of random
numbers, after cryptographic operations80
to demonstrate the
correct operation of the TSF. 81
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the
integrity of TSF data. 82
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the
integrity of stored TSF executable code. 83
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing 84
to
the TSF 85
by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always
enforced.
79
[assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF]
80
[selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorized user, at
the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self-test should occur]]
81
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF]
82
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF data], TSF data]
83
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF].
84
[assignment: physical tampering scenarios]
85
[assignment: list of TSF devices/elements]
CEITECSA 5.410.051 47
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
The for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating environment are those
taken from the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4) and augmented by taking the following
component:
ALC_DVS.2.
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage.
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FAU_SAS.1 x
FCS_CKM.1 x x x
FCS_CKM.4 x x
FCS_COP.1/SHA x x x
FCS_COP.1/ENC x x x
FCS_COP.1/AUTH x x
FCS_COP.1/MAC x x x
FCS_RND.1 x x x
FIA_UID.1 x x
FIA_AFL.1 x x
FIA_UAU.1 x x
FIA_UAU.4 x x x
FIA_UAU.5 x x x
FIA_UAU.6 x x x
FDP_ACC.1 x x x
FDP_ACF.1 x x x
FDP_UCT.1 x x x
FDP_UIT.1 x x x
FMT_SMF.1 x x x
FMT_SMR.1 x x x
FMT_LIM.1 x
FMT_LIM.2 x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE x x x
CEITECSA 5.410.051 48
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ x x x
FPT_EMSEC.1 x x
FPT_TST.1 x X
FPT_FLS.1 x x X
FPT_PHP.3 x x x
Table 6- Coverage of Security Objective for the TOE by SFR
The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”
addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRTD. The write access to the logical
MRTD data are defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 as follows: only the successfully
authenticated Personalization Agent (FIA_UAU.5) is allowed to write the data of the groups
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD only once. The authentication of the terminal as
Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5.
The Personalization Agent (FIA_UAU.5.2 stage 1) can be authenticated either by using the BAC
mechanism (FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and
FCS_COP.1/ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/MAC) with the personalization key or for reasons of
interoperability with the [13] by using the symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/
AUTH).
In case of using the BAC mechanism the SFR FIA_UAU.6 describes the re-authentication and
FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 the protection of the transmitted data by means of secure
messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC as well as
FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode.
The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1
lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization) setting the Document Basic
Access Keys according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as authentication reference data.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to the secret key of the Personalization
Agent Keys and ensure together with the SFR FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMSEC.1, FPT_FLS.1 and
FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys.
The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to protect the
integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical manipulation and
unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the SFR
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the Personalization Agent is allowed to write
the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and
terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (cf.
FDP_ACF.1.4). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR
CEITECSA 5.410.051 49
FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization). The
authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to
SRF FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5 and FIA_UAU.6 using either FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC
or FCS_COP.1/AUTH.
The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to ensure that
the Inspection System is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data
by means of the BAC mechanism. The SFR FIA_UAU.6, FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 requires the
protection of the transmitted data by means of secure messaging implemented by the
cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key
generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE requires the Personalization Agent to establish the Document Basic
Access Keys in a way that they cannot be read by anyone in accordance to
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ.
The security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” requires the TOE to
ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. The SFR
FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 allow only those actions before identification respective
authentication which do not violate OT.Data_Conf. In case of failed authentication attempts
FIA_AFL.1 enforces additional waiting time prolonging the necessary amount of time for
facilitating a brute force attack. The read access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1.2: the successful authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to
read the data of the logical MRTD (EF.DG1 to EF.DG16). The successful authenticated Basic
Inspection System is allowed to read the data of the logical MRTD (EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5
to EF.DG16). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent and Basic
Inspection System) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including
Personalization for the key management for the Document Basic Access Keys). The SFR
FIA_UAU.4 prevents reuse of authentication data to strengthen the authentication of the user.
The SFR FIA_UAU.5 enforces the TOE to accept the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection
System only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the
Document Basic Access Keys. Moreover, the SFR FIA_UAU.6 requests secure messaging after
successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
which includes the protection of the transmitted data in ENC_MAC_Mode by means of the
cryptographic functions according to FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC (cf. the SFR
FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1). (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/ MAC
for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA and FCS_RND.1
establish the key management for the secure messaging keys. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE addresses the key management and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents
reading of the Document Basic Access Keys.
The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE” address
the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip in its non-volatile
memory. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
Furthermore, the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection
System in Phase 4 “Operational Use”. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the
Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data (including the
CEITECSA 5.410.051 50
Personalization Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the Personalization Agent to
disable Initialization Data if their usage in the phase 4 “Operational Use” violates the security
objective OT.Identification. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 do not allow reading of any data
uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip before successful authentication of the Basic Inspection
Terminal and will stop communication after unsuccessful authentication attempt (cf.
Application note 30). In case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1 enforces additional
waiting time prolonging the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack.
The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” is
ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality of
the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE Delivery.
The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage” requires the
TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip against
disclosure – by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption,
clock, or I/O lines, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMSEC.1, - by forcing a malfunction of
the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_TST.1, and/or – by a physical
manipulation of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” is
covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is covered by (i)
the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self-tests to demonstrate the correct operation and tests of
authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code, and (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1
which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or operating conditions possibly
causing a malfunction.
6.3.2 Dependency Rationale
The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the basis for
mutual support and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is
satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional components are analyzed, and non-
dissolved dependencies are appropriately explained.
The table below shows the dependencies between the SFR of the TOE.
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FCS_CKM.1 [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic
key distribution or FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic
key destruction,
Fulfilled by FCS_COP.1/ENC
and FCS_COP.1/MAC,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user
data without security
attributes, FDP_ITC.2 Import
of user data with security
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
CEITECSA 5.410.051 51
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation]
FCS_COP.1/SHA [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user
data without security
attributes, FDP_ITC.2 Import
of user data with security
attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction
justification 1 for non-
satisfied dependencies,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/ENC [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user
data without security
attributes, FDP_ITC.2 Import
of user data with security
attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AUTH [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user
data without security
attributes, FDP_ITC.2 Import
of user data with security
attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction
justification 2 for non-
satisfied dependencies
justification 2 for non-
satisfied dependencies
FCS_COP.1/MAC [FDP_ITC.1
Import of user data without
security attributes, FDP_ITC.2
Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of
authentication
Fulfilled by FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1
CEITECSA 5.410.051 52
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FIA_UAU.4 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.5 No dependencies n.a
FIA_UAU.6 No dependencies n.a.
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute
based access control
Fulfilled by FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, FMT_MSA.3 Static
attribute initialization
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1,
justification 3 for non-
satisfied dependencies
FDP_UCT.1 [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel, or FTP_TRP.1
Trusted path], [FDP_IFC.1
Subset information flow
control or FDP_ACC.1 Subset
access control]
justification 4 for non-
satisfied dependencies
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1
FDP_UIT.1 [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel, or FTP_TRP.1
Trusted path], [FDP_IFC.1
Subset information flow
control or FDP_ACC.1 Subset
access control]
justification 4 for non-
satisfied dependencies
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies n.a.
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.1 Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FPT_EMSEC.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies n.a.
CEITECSA 5.410.051 53
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies n.a.
Table 7 – Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE
Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for TOE:
No. 1: The hash algorithm required by the SFR FCS_COP.1/SHA does not need any key material.
Therefore neither key generation (FCS_CKM.1) nor key import (FDP_ITC.1/2) is necessary.
No. 2: The SFR FCS_COP.1/AUTH uses the symmetric Personalization Key permanently stored
during the Pre-Personalization process (cf. FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA) by the manufacturer. Thus it
is not necessary to generate or import a key during the addressed TOE lifecycle by the means
of FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC. Since the key is permanently stored within the TOE there is no need
for FCS_CKM.4, too.
No. 3: The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes which are
defined during the personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No
management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary
here.
No. 4: The SFR FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 require the use secure messaging between the
MRTD and the BIS. There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication
channel to be logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one
channel. Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by
FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not
require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line. EAL4 is
applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level
of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur
sensitive security specific engineering costs.
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the
MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the MRTD’s
material.
The component ALC_DVS.2 augmented to EAL4 has no dependencies to other security
requirements.
Dependencies ALC_DVS.2:
No dependencies.
CEITECSA 5.410.051 54
6.3.4 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency
The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security
requirements for the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and the
security assurance requirements (SARs) together form a mutually supportive and internally
consistent whole.
The analysis of the TOE´s security requirements with regard to their mutual support and
internal consistency demonstrates: The dependency analysis in section 6.3.2 Dependency
Rationale for the security functional requirements shows that the basis for mutual support and
internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All dependencies
between the chosen functional components are analyzed, and non-satisfied dependencies are
appropriately explained.
The assurance class EAL4 is an established set of mutually supportive and internally consistent
assurance requirements. The dependency analysis for the sensitive assurance components in
section 6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale shows that the assurance
requirements are mutually supportive and internally consistent as all (sensitive) dependencies
are satisfied and no inconsistency appears.
Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if there are
functional-assurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility which has been shown not
to arise in sections 6.3.2 Dependency Rationale and 6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements
Rationale. Furthermore, as also discussed in section 6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements
Rationale, the chosen assurance components are adequate for the functionality of the TOE. So
the assurance requirements and security functional requirements support each other and
there are no inconsistencies between the goals of these two groups of security requirements.
CEITECSA 5.410.051 55
7 TOE summary specification
This section provides a description of the TOE’s security functions and mechanisms and the
corresponding SFRs that are met by each function or mechanism.
7.1 SF.AC_Pers: Access Control for Personalization
During the Phase 3, “Personalization” the Personalization Agent is identified and authenticated
cryptographically using random numbers meeting the AIS-31 PTG.2 quality requirements
(FCS_RND.1) for challenge-response authentication as well as a symmetric key mechanism
3DES (FCS_COP.1/AUTH) and message authentication codes (FCS_COP.1/MAC) for the
authentication.
The Personalization Agent receives the TOE in a Locked state from the MRTD Manufacturer
(who in turn receives the TOE in a Locked state from the Module Manufacturer). The
Personalization Agent must complete an authentication procedure with the TOE in order to
unlock the TOE and perform the personalization (FIA_UAU.5).
The authentication procedure involves both parties generating a symmetric session key
(FCS_CKM.1) with a SHA-1 hash function (FCS_COP.1/SHA) and using that session key for
encrypting and authenticating subsequent exchanges (FCS_COP.1/ENC). Upon completion of
the Personalization of the TOE, the session key used for secure messaging is destroyed
(FCS_CKM.4). The secure messaging channel ensures that the data communicated between
the TOE and the Personalization Agent is protected from unauthorized disclosure (FDP_UCT.1).
The mechanism ensures that reuse of authentication data from previous sessions is prevented
(FIA_UAU.4) as each session key is unique (based on a unique challenge and unique RNDs).
Only commands communicated to the TOE via a secure channel (FCS_COP.1/ENC) and with a
correct message authentication code (FCS_COP.1/MAC) are executed by the TOE (FIA_UAU.6).
The security function is implement in a rigorous manner so that any TSF failure shall not
expose the TOE into an insecure state (FPT_FLS.1) and that attempts of physical manipulation
of the TOE (FPT_PHP.3) or reading of electromagnetic emanations during the personalization
(FPT_EMSEC.1) shall not provide the attacker with an advantage which could be practically
turned into a successful attack against the TOE.
The TOE maintains a role Personalization Agent and the authentication mechanism allows the
TOE to establish the identity and determine legitimacy of the Personalization Agent
(FMT_SMR.1) and make available to the Personalization Agent the functions required for the
Personalization of the TOE (FMT_SMF.1).
7.2 SF.Data_Int: Integrity of Personal Data
Prior to being shipped to the MRTD Manufacturer and, subsequently, to the Personalization
Agent, the TOE is only manipulated by the Manufacturer (specifically, the Module
Manufacturer). The Module Manufacturer initializes and pre-personalizes the TOE in secure
premises. Upon completing the initialization and pre-personalization of the TOE, the TOE is set
to a Locked mode and all subsequent accesses require a successful authentication procedure
to establish the user of the TOE as a Personalization Agent or Basic Inspection System
(FMT_SMR.1).
CEITECSA 5.410.051 56
Initialization of the TOE concerns with the writing of the TOE software on the module and pre-
personalization concerns with the downloading of the TSF Data on the TOE.
Personalization is only allowed upon successful authentication of the Personalization Agent
(FIA_UAU.5). There are no other TOE management functions (FMT_SMF.1).
The TOE only allows an authorized Personalization Agent (FMT_SMR.1) to write the data
elements containing the personal data and Document Basic Access Keys as part of TOE
Personalization through a well-defined management function (FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE). No party is allowed to read the BAC keys (FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ).
The Personalization Agent is authenticated and a secure messaging channel established
between the TOE and the Personalization Agent (FCS_CKM.1, FCS_RND.1, FCS_COP.1/AUTH,
FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_CKM.4, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5,
FIA_UAU.6, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1). Writing to these data groups is not allowed after the
Personalization phase as shall be discussed in the following.
During the “Operational Use” phase, a Basic Inspection System is only allowed to read data
from the TOE after being successfully authenticated by a BAC mechanism using the MRZ data
and deriving the BAC keys from that data (FCS_CKM.1, FCS_RND.1, FCS_COP.1/MAC,
FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_CKM.4, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.6, FDP_ACC.1,
FDP_ACF.1).
The Basic Inspection System must generate the 3DES key from the optically readable data on
the ePassport data page (the travel document serial number and the personal data of the
traveler). The TOE generates the same key from the logical data stored on the TOE. The two
parties (Basic Inspection System and the TOE) now use this key to complete the BAC
authentication.
This allows the TOE to establish the authenticity and assign a role of the Basic Inspection
System to the user (FMT_SMR.1). Upon successful authentication and role establishment, the
TOE shall enforce a role based access control rules to ensure that only legitimate accesses are
allowed to the Basic Inspection System (FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1) and that only reading of data
is allowed.
The secure messaging channel between the the TOE and the Basic Inspection System ensures
that the data communicated between the TOE and the Basic Inspection System is protected
from unauthorized disclosure (FDP_UCT.1) and modification (FDP_UIT.1).
7.3 SF.Data_Conf: Confidentiality of personal Data
Data confidentiality is enforced by the TOE:
1. By ensuring cryptographic quality of the BAC secrets and the subsequent secure
channel used for communicating any data between the TOE and the Basic Inspection
System as described under SF.Data_Int (Sect.7.2) covering SFR´s FCS_RND.1,
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_COP.1/MAC,
FCS_COP.1/AUTH FDP_UIT.1 and FDP_UCT.1;
2. by restricting access to functions available before user identification and
authentication at different life-cycle stages (FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1);
CEITECSA 5.410.051 57
3. by ensuring that rigorous authentication functions are implemented as described
under SF.AC_Pers (Sect.7.1) and SF.Data_Int (Sect.7.2) covering SFRs FIA_UAU.4,
FIA_UAU.5 and FIA_UAU.6;
4. by ensuring that only well-defined accesses are allowed based on the role of the user
(FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1) which prevents violations of confidentiality and integrity of
data stored on the TOE; and
5. by only allowing TOE management via well-defined management functions
(FMT_SMF.1) to the systems acting in specific authorized roles (FMT_SMR.1) so that
unauthorized reading and writing of BAC keys is prevented (FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ).
7.4 SF.Auth: Identification and Authentication
The TOE allows the Manufacturer to write the IC Identification and Pre-personalization data,
including the personalization Agent Key during Phase 2 “Manufacturing” (FAU_SAS.1,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA). The IC Identification can be read by the Personalization Agent during
Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. Upon completion of the personalization of the TOE,
the Personalization Agent removes any initialization data thus disables any read access to the
initialization data and the TOE ensures that only the personalization agent is allowed to
remove the initialization data (FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS).
The TOE implements measures to handle failed authentication attempts as expressed in Table
3 (FIA_AFL.1). The TOE implements authentication and access control mechanism to make sure
that the TOE and Personalization Agent and the TOE and the Basic Inspection System are
mutually authenticated prior to granting any access to the TSF data during the Personalization
or Operational Use of the TOE. Only the read accesses required for authentication and
establishment of the secure channel are allowed prior to identification and authentication of
the Personalization Agent or the Basic Inspection System (FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1). The TOE also
allows the Manufacturer (namely, the Module Manufacturer) to read the initialization data
written on the TOE during Module Manufacturing to ensure that the TOE can be fully tested
prior to shipment to the MRTD Manufacturer.
7.5 SM.Prot_Abuse_Func: Protection against Abuse of Functionality
During the Phase 2, “Manufacturing” the connection to the test interface of the chip is
disabled before the chip is mounted onto the module. This prevents the direct access to the
chip circuit and functions (FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2).
7.6 SM.Prot_Inf_Leak: Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE provides protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or
processed in the MRTD’s chip by observation of its electromagnetic emanations
(FPT_EMSEC.1). Data disclosure by direct physical manipulation of the TOE or by forcing
malfunctions is prevented by the features listed in Sect. 7.7 and Sect. 7.8 (FPT_FLS.1,
FPT_TST.1, FPT_PHP.3).
CEITECSA 5.410.051 58
7.7 SM.Prot_Phys_Tamper: Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE provides protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data,
and the IC Embedded Software against direct reading with physical probing or forced
disclosure due to perturbation injections (FPT_PHP.3).
The IC of the TOE additionally provides a rich set of hardware countermeasures against
physical tampering which prevent construction of intelligible data from any information
obtained by physically tampering with the TOE.
7.8 SM.Prot_Malfunction: Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE is protected against malfunctions due to abnormal operation conditions by a set of
sensors (FPT_FLS.1) and self-tests (FPT_TST.1).
CEITECSA 5.410.051 59
8 List of abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption System
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BAC Basic Access Control
BIS Basic Inspection System
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
CBC Cipher-Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria
CDS DS Public Key Certificate
DES Data Encryption System
DG Data Group
DP&N Desenvolvimento de Produtos e Negócios
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAC Extended Access Control
EAL Assurance Level
EF Elementary File
EIS Extended Inspection System
GIS General Inspection System
IC Integrated Circuit
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
ICCSN Integrated Circuit Card Serial Number
IS Inspection System
LDS Logical Data Structure
LDS Logical Data Security
MAC Message Authentication Code
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
MRZ Machine-Readable Zone
n.a. Not Applicable
OCR Optical Character Recognition
OSP Organization Security Policy
PA Personalization Agent
PP Protection Profile
PS Personalization System
CEITECSA 5.410.051 60
RFID Radio Frequency Identification
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOD Document Security Object
SPA Simple Power Analysis
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
CEITECSA 5.410.051 61
9 References
[1] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, “Common Criteria Protection Profile
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control,” 2009.
[2] International Civil Aviation Organization, “ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel
Documents, part 1 – Machine Readable Passports,” 2006.
[3] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, “Security IC Platform Protection
Profile,” 2007.
[4] “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction
and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4,” 2012.
[5] “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional Components, Version 3.1, Revision 4,” 2012.
[6] “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance Requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 4,” 2012.
[7] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, “PP conformant to Smartcard IC
Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,” 2001.
[8] U.S. Department Of Commerce/National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Secure
Hash Standard (SHS),” 2012.
[9] U.S. Department Of Commerce/National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Data
Encryption Standard (DES),” 1999.
[10] ISO, “Information technology - Security techniques - Message Authentication Codes
(MACs) - Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher,” 2011.
[11] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, “Funktionalitätsklassen und
Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren,” 2013.
[12] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, “Technical Guideline Advanced
Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents – Extended Access Control
(EAC)”.
[13] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, “Common Criteria Protection Profile
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control,
BSI-PP-0056, Version 1.10,” 25th March, 2009.
[14] U.S. Department Of Commerce/National Institute of Standards and Technology,
“Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),” 2001.
[15] ISO, “Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards - Part 2: Cards with contacts -
Dimensions and location of the contacts,” 2007.
CEITECSA 5.410.051 62
[16] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, "Technical Guideline TR-03110-1,"
Bonn, 2012.
[17] G. Ilha, CTC21001 APDU Specification version 1 (*preliminary*), 02/apr/2015.
[18] CEITEC SA, CEITECSA 5.410.028 - ST ePassport Module BAC.
[19] CEITEC SA, CEITECSA 5.410.029 - ST ePassport Module EAC.
[20] CEITEC SA, Copernicus Architecture Specification Document version 1.0 (*preliminary*),
2015.
[21] CEITEC SA, CEITECSA 5.420.014 - Micromodule CTC21001 MM - (*preliminary*).
[22] International Civil Aviation Organization, Doc 9303 - Machine Readable Travel Documents
- Part 1, 6 ed., vol. 2, ICAO, 2006.