TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa 6054ci, TASKalfa 5054ci, TASKalfa 4054ci Series with FAX System
Security Target
© 2023 KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.
December 27, 2023
KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.
TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa 6054ci, TASKalfa
5054ci, TASKalfa 4054ci Series with FAX
System
Security Target
Version 1.20
TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa 6054ci, TASKalfa 5054ci, TASKalfa 4054ci Series with FAX System
Security Target
© 2023 KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.
- History of Revisions-
Date Version Detail
2019-08-02 0.90 First release
2020-02-06 0.91 Modified for corresponding ORs.
2020-05-18 0.92 Modified for corresponding ORs.
2020-05-21 0.93 Modified for corresponding ORs.
2020-06-12 0.94 Modified for corresponding ORs.
2020-11-11 0.95 Modified for corresponding ORs.
2021-03-04 1.00 Modified for corresponding ORs.
2023-02-02 1.10 Add products.
2023-12-27 1.20 Update version
TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa 6054ci, TASKalfa 5054ci, TASKalfa 4054ci Series with FAX System
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© 2023 KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.
Table of Contents
1. ST Introduction ....................................................................... 1
1.1. ST Reference........................................................................................................................1
1.2. TOE Reference.....................................................................................................................1
1.3. TOE Overview......................................................................................................................2
1.3.1. TOE Type.....................................................................................................................2
1.3.2. TOE Usage...................................................................................................................2
1.3.3. Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software and Firmware .............................................4
1.3.4. Major Security Features of TOE..................................................................................4
1.4. TOE Description...................................................................................................................4
1.4.1. TOE user......................................................................................................................4
1.4.2. Physical Configuration of TOE.....................................................................................4
1.4.3. Logical Configuration of TOE ......................................................................................6
1.4.4. Functionality Excluded from the Evaluated Configuration.......................................10
1.4.5. Guidance...................................................................................................................10
1.4.6. Protected Assets of TOE ...........................................................................................11
2. Conformance Claim .............................................................. 13
2.1. CC Conformance Claim .....................................................................................................13
2.2. PP Claims...........................................................................................................................13
2.3. Package Claims..................................................................................................................13
2.4. Conformance Rationale ....................................................................................................13
3. Security Problem Definitions ................................................ 14
3.1. Threats ..............................................................................................................................14
3.2. Organizational Security Policies........................................................................................14
3.3. Assumptions......................................................................................................................14
4. Security Objectives ............................................................... 16
4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE ........................................................................................16
4.2. Security Objectives for the operational environment ......................................................17
4.3. Security Objectives rationale ............................................................................................17
5. Extended Components Definition......................................... 23
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6. Security Requirements.......................................................... 24
6.1. TOE Security Functional Requirements. ...........................................................................24
6.1.1. Class FAU: Security Audit..........................................................................................24
6.1.2. Class FCS: Cryptographic Support.............................................................................32
6.1.3. Class FDP: User Data Protection...............................................................................36
6.1.4. Class FIA: Identification and Authentication ............................................................41
6.1.5. Class FMT: Security Management ............................................................................45
6.1.6. Class FPT: TSF Protection..........................................................................................57
6.1.7. Class FTA: TOE Access...............................................................................................58
6.1.8. Class FTP: High Trusted Path/Channel......................................................................58
6.2. TOE Security Assurance Requirement...............................................................................59
6.3. Security Functional Requirements Rationale....................................................................60
6.3.1. Security Functional Requirements Rationale...........................................................60
6.3.2. Dependency Relationship of the TOE Security Functional Requirements ...............65
6.3.3. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale............................................................67
7. TOE Summary Specification.................................................. 68
7.1. User Management Function .............................................................................................69
7.2. Data Access Control Function ...........................................................................................71
7.3. Fax Data Flow Control Function........................................................................................73
7.4. SSD Encryption Function...................................................................................................73
7.5. Audit Log Function............................................................................................................74
7.6. Security Management Function........................................................................................75
7.7. Self-Test Function..............................................................................................................77
7.8. Network Protection Function ...........................................................................................78
7.9. Deviations From Allowed Cryptographic Standards .........................................................80
8. Acronyms and Terminology .................................................. 81
8.1. Definition of terms............................................................................................................81
8.2. Definition of acronyms......................................................................................................82
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List of Figures
Figure 1-1 Common usage in the offices..........................................................................................3
Figure 1-2 Physical Configuration of TOE .........................................................................................5
Figure 1-3 Logical Configuration of TOE...........................................................................................7
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List of Tables
Table 1-1 Delivery method for each TOE components.....................................................................6
Table 1-2 Guidance that comprises TOE.........................................................................................10
Table 1-3 TSF Data to be targeted by the TOE................................................................................11
Table 3-1 Threats............................................................................................................................14
Table 3-2 Organizational Security Policies......................................................................................14
Table 3-3 Assumptions ...................................................................................................................15
Table 4-1 Security objectives for the TOE.......................................................................................16
Table 4-2 Security objectives for the operational environment.....................................................17
Table 4-3 Completeness of security objectives..............................................................................18
Table 4-4 Sufficiency of security objectives....................................................................................19
Table 6-1 Auditable data requirements..........................................................................................25
Table 6-2 Key Generation ...............................................................................................................33
Table 6-2 Cryptographic Operations...............................................................................................35
Table 6-3 Cryptographic Operations...............................................................................................36
Table 6-4 User Data Access Control SFP.........................................................................................38
Table 6-5 User Data Access Control SFP for Device Administrator ................................................39
Table 6-6 The list of Subjects, Information, and Operations that triggers information flow.........40
Table 6-7 Management of security attributes (Box function)........................................................46
Table 6-8 Management of security attributes (Fax receive function)............................................47
Table 6-9 Operation of TSF data.....................................................................................................50
Table 6-10 Operation of TSF data...................................................................................................51
Table 6-11 Management Functions................................................................................................53
Table 6-12 Security Assurance Requirements................................................................................59
Table 6-13 Correspondence between Security Functional Requirements.....................................60
Table 6-14 Dependency Relationship of the TOE Security Functional Requirements ...................65
Table 7-1 TOE security functions and security functional requirements .......................................68
Table 7-2 Access Control Rules for Data Access Control Functions................................................72
Table 7-3 Auditable Events and Audit Data....................................................................................74
Table 7-4 Operation of TSF Data by Device Administrators ...........................................................76
Table 7-5 Operation of TSF Data by Normal Users.........................................................................77
Table 7-6 Trusted channel communications provided by the TOE.................................................78
Table 8-1 Definitions of terms used in this ST................................................................................81
Table 8-2 Definitions of acronyms used in this ST..........................................................................83
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1. ST Introduction
1.1. ST Reference
ST Title TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa 6054ci, TASKalfa 5054ci, TASKalfa 4054ci
Series with FAX System
Security Target
ST Version 1.20
Date December 27, 2023
Author KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.
1.2. TOE Reference
TOE Title : TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa 6054ci, TASKalfa 5054ci, TASKalfa 4054ci,
TASKalfa 7054ciG, TASKalfa 6054ciG, TASKalfa 5054ciG, TASKalfa
4054ciG, TASKalfa VFM601ci, TASKalfa VFM501ci, TASKalfa VFM401ci
(KYOCERA), 7008ci, 6008ci, 5008ci, 4008ci(TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX),
with FAX System
Remarks :
The models with FAX System are the products that comprise the
models such as TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa 6054ci, TASKalfa 5054ci,
TASKalfa 4054ci, TASKalfa 7054ciG, TASKalfa 6054ciG, TASKalfa 5054ciG,
TASKalfa 4054ciG, TASKalfa VFM601ci, TASKalfa VFM501ci, TASKalfa
VFM401ci, 7008ci, 6008ci, 5008ci, 4008ci and the following additional
options:
- FAX Option (FAX System 12)
TOE Version： System : 2XC_S0IS.C03.317
FAX : 3R2_5100.003.012
Developer : KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.
Applicable MFP : KYOCERA TASKalfa 7054ci, KYOCERA TASKalfa 6054ci,
KYOCERA TASKalfa 5054ci, KYOCERA TASKalfa 4054ci,
KYOCERA TASKalfa 7054ciG, KYOCERA TASKalfa 6054ciG,
KYOCERA TASKalfa 5054ciG, KYOCERA TASKalfa 4054ciG,
KYOCERA TASKalfa VFM601ci, KYOCERA TASKalfa VFM501ci,
KYOCERA TASKalfa VFM401ci,
TA Triumph-Adler 7008ci, TA Triumph-Adler 6008ci,
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TA Triumph-Adler 5008ci, TA Triumph-Adler 4008ci,
UTAX 7008ci, UTAX 6008ci, UTAX 5008ci, UTAX 4008ci
This TOE is identified by a combination of the respective MFP titles as listed in the TOE title and
each version of the two kinds of firmwares, which is installed on the above-described TOE. There
are multiple MFP titles as listed above, however the MFP components are all the same. The
only differences are print speed and sales destinations.
1.3. TOE Overview
1.3.1. TOE Type
The TOE defined in this ST is a Multi-Function Printer (MFP) manufactured by KYOCERA
Document Solutions Inc., namely, “TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa 6054ci, TASKalfa 5054ci, TASKalfa
4054ci, TASKalfa 7054ciG, TASKalfa 6054ciG, TASKalfa 5054ciG, TASKalfa 4054ciG, TASKalfa
VFM601ci, TASKalfa VFM501ci, TASKalfa VFM401ci, 7008ci, 6008ci, 5008ci, 4008ci”, each of
which includes mainly Copy function, Scan function, Print function, FAX function and Box
function. As for the FAX function, the optional FAX System 12 must be installed on the device
to be available.
1.3.2. TOE Usage
This TOE can perform copying (duplication), printing (paper output), sending (electronization)
and storing (accumulation) of various documents handled by users. The TOE is located in a
common office environment and is not only used as a standalone but also connected to LAN for
the use in the network environment. In the network environment, the TOE is assumed to be
used by connecting to a server and a client PC on the internal network protected from
unauthorized access on the external network by firewall. And, the TOE is assumed to be used
by connecting to a Local Port (USB Port). In this user environment, the above-mentioned
operational functions can be performed through operations on the operation panel or from the
client PCs on the network and of the local connection.
Figure 1-1 shows a normal user environment.
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The environment to use the common functions of the TOE is illustrated as follows.
⚫ Internal Network :
The network environment inside the office protected from unauthorized access on the
external network by firewall.
⚫ Client PC:
It is connected to the MFP via the internal network or a Local Port (USB Port). The common
functions of the MFP can be available upon receipt of a user instruction.
Client PC needs the following:
➢ Printer Driver
➢ TWAIN Driver
➢ Web Browser
⚫ Server:
It is used when sending the documents in the MFP. The following servers are needed.
➢ Mail Server
➢ FTP Server
⚫ Public Line:
A public line is needed when sending and receiving the documents in the MFP by the FAX.
Figure 1-1 Common usage in the offices
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1.3.3. Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software and Firmware
Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software and Firmware name is as follows.
⚫ Client PCs:
• Printer Driver : KX Driver
• TWAIN Driver : Kyocera TWAIN Driver
• Web Browser : Microsoft Internet Explorer 11.0
⚫ Mail Server : IPsec(IKEv1) should be available.
⚫ FTP Server : IPsec(IKEv1) should be available.
1.3.4. Major Security Features of TOE
The TOE can perform copying, printing, sending scanned data, FAX (send/receive) and Box
storage of various documents handled by users. To prevent alteration and leaks of these
documents, the TOE has functions to identify and to authenticate users, to control access to
image data, to encrypt image data stored on SSD, to control forwarding the data received from
public line to external network, to generate and to refer audit logs, to allow only authorized
users to make security function related settings, to perform the TOE self-test, and to protect the
network.
1.4. TOE Description
1.4.1. TOE user
User roles related to the use of the TOE are defined as follows.
There are two kinds of users, Normal User and Administrator.
⚫ Normal User
A person who uses functions provided by TOE, like Copy function, Print function, Scan to
Send function, FAX function, and Box function.
⚫ Device Administrator
A person who manage operations of TOE and registered as an Administrator. A device
administrator has privilege to manage device configuration, installation and operation for
the TOE correct behavior.
1.4.2. Physical Configuration of TOE
The conceptual figure of physical configuration of the TOE is shown in Figure 1-2.
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The TOE consists of an Operation Panel, a Scanner Unit, a Printer Unit, a Main Board, a FAX
Board, SSD hardware, and firmwares.
The Operation Panel is the hardware that displays status and results upon receipt of input
by the TOE user. The Scanner Unit and the Printer Unit are the hardware that input document
into MFP and output as printed material.
A Main Board is the circuit board to control entire TOE. A system firmware is installed on a SSD,
which is positioned on the Main Board. The Main Board has a Network Interface (NIC) and a
Local Interface (USB Port).
ASIC that is also on the Main Board includes a Security Chip, which shares
installation of some of the security functions. The Security Chip realizes security
arithmetic processing for SSD encryption function
(See below).
A FAX control firmware that controls FAX communication is installed on the PROM, which is
positioned on the FAX Board. Additionally, a FAX Board has a NCU as an interface.
As for memory mediums, a NAND that stores device settings, a Volatile Memory that is used as
working area and a SSD for the system firmware installation or image data are positioned on the
Figure 1-2 Physical Configuration of TOE
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Main Board. A Flash Memory that stores FAX receive/send image, and a PROM for the FAX
control firmware installation are positioned on the FAX Board. Any of the above memory
mediums are not removable. Only the FAX receive/send image is stored in the Flash Memory.
Image data handled by other basic functions is stored in the SSD.
The delivery method for each TOE components is as follows. Guidance is also a part of TOE.
Table 1-1 Delivery method for each TOE components
TOE Configuration Form Delivery Method Identification
Information
MFP Device MFP Device Courier MFP product name
and firmware version
information described
in TOE Reference +
Mass storage device:
Not installed
Fax FAX Board Courier FAX System 12
Guidance Paper document, PDF
format file in DVD
Included in the box
of the MFP device.
Name and version
described in Table 1-2.
* Firmware is preinstalled in the MFP
1.4.3. Logical Configuration of TOE
The conceptual figure of logical configuration of the TOE is shown in Figure 1-3.
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1.4.3.1. Basic Functions provided by TOE
The TOE provides the following basic functions.
⚫ Copy Function
A function that reads image data from the Scanner of the TOE and outputs from the Printer
Unit of the TOE by inputting or operating from the Operation Panel by normal users.
(Execute a Copy job)
⚫ Scan to Send Function
A function that sends image data to client PCs or servers connected via LAN by inputting or
operating from the Operation Panel and the TWAIN Driver of Client PCs by general users.
The following types of send functions are available. (Execute a Scan to Send job)
➢ FTP send (FTP Server)
➢ E-mail send (Mail Server)
Figure 1-3 Logical Configuration of TOE
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➢ TWAIN send (TWAIN Driver)
⚫ Print Function
A function that outputs received image data from the Printer Unit of the TOE by printing
instructions from Client PCs connected over LAN or a local port to MFP by normal users. The
printing instructions are given from the printer driver installed on Client PCs. The function
also supports printing from a USB Memory connected to the local port. The printing
instructions are given from the Operation Panel. (Execute a Print job)
⚫ Fax Function
A function that sends and receives documents by FAX via public line. As for FAX Send, the
scanned image data will be sent by FAX to outside. Whereas for FAX Reception, the received
image data will be outputted from the Print Unit of the TOE, and then forwarded to outside.
(Execute a FAX Send job)
⚫ Box Function
A function that stores image data in the Box, reads image data from the Box and then sends
it or print it by normal users. Image data can also be moved or joined inside the box.
Inputted image data is stored in the SSD by inputting/operating by normal users from the
Operation Panel or the Client PCs connected over LAN or directly connected with MFP. In
addition, image data transmitted/received by using the FAX function is stored in the Flash
Memory. Stored image data can be outputted from the Print Unit of the TOE or sent to a
server such as a Client PC, a mail server and other faxes over public line. Stored image data
can also be deleted. When inputting from Client PCs, printer driver is used, and when
operating from Client PCs, web browser is used. The following types of send functions are
available.
➢ FTP send (FTP Server)
➢ E-mail send (Mail Server)
➢ TWAIN send (TWAIN Driver)
➢ FAX send (Other faxes)
➢ USB Memory send (USB Memory)
1.4.3.2. Security Functions provided by TOE
TOE provides the following security functions.
⚫ User Management Function
A function that identifies and authenticates users so that only authorized users can use the
TOE. When using the TOE from the Operation Panel and Client PCs, a user will be required
to enter his/her login user name and login user password for identification and
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authentication. The User Management Function includes a User Account Lockout Function,
which prohibits the users access for a certain period of time if the number of identification
and authentication attempts consecutively result in failure, a function, which protects
feedback on input of login user password when performing identification and authentication
and a function, which automatically logouts in case no operation has been done for a certain
period of time.
⚫ Data Access Control Function
A function that restricts access so that only authorized users can access to image data stored
in the TOE.
⚫ FAX Data Flow Control Function
A function that controls forwarding the data received from public line to the TOE’s external
interface, following to the FAX forward setting.
⚫ SSD Encryption Function
A function that encrypts information assets stored in the SSD in order to prevent leakage of
data stored in the SSD inside the TOE.
⚫ Audit Log Function
A function that records and stores the audit logs of user operations and security-relevant
events on the SSD. This function provides the audit trails of TOE use and security-relevant
events. Stored audit logs can be accessed only by a device administrator. The stored
audit logs will be sent by email to the destination set by the device administrator.
⚫ Security Management Function
A function that sets security functions of the TOE. This function can be used only by
authorized users. This function can be utilized from an Operation Panel and a Client PC.
Operations from a Client PC use a web browser.
⚫ Self-Test Function
A function that verifies the integrity of TSF executable code and TSF data to detect
unauthorized alteration of the executable code of the TOE security functions.
⚫ Network Protection Function
A function that protects communication paths to prevent leaking and altering of data by
eavesdropping of data in transition over the internal network connected to TOE.
This function verifies the propriety of the destination to connect to and protects targeted
information assets by encryption, when using a Scan to Send Function, a Print Function, a
Box Function and a BOX Function from a Client PC (web browser), or a Security Management
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Function from a Client PC (web browser). However, usage of a Print Function directly
connected to a MFP is exception.
1.4.4. Functionality Excluded from the Evaluated Configuration
The following features are excluded from this evaluation:
⚫ Maintenance Interface
1.4.5. Guidance
The guidance comprising the TOE is shown below.
Table 1-2 Guidance that comprises TOE
Name Version
Notice (KYOCERA) 302XC5641003
Notice (KYOCERA VFM) 302XC5644001
Notice (Copystar) 302XC5642001
Notice (TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX) 302XC5643003
FAX System 12 Installation Guide 303RK5671101
TASKalfa 7054ci / TASKalfa 6054ci / TASKalfa VFM601ci /
TASKalfa 5054ci / TASKalfa VFM501ci / TASKalfa 4054ci /
TASKalfa VFM401ci /TASKalfa 3554ci / TASKalfa VFM351ci
/ TASKalfa 2554ci / TASKalfa VFM251ci First Steps Quick
Guide
302XC5606002
TASKalfa 2554ci / TASKalfa 3554ci / TASKalfa 4054ci /
TASKalfa 5054ci / TASKalfa 6054ci / TASKalfa 7054ci
Operation Guide
2XCKDEN000
TASKalfa 2554ci / TASKalfa VFM251ci / TASKalfa 3554ci /
TASKalfa VFM351ci / TASKalfa 4054ci / TASKalfa VFM401ci
/ TASKalfa 5054ci / TASKalfa VFM501ci / TASKalfa 5004i /
TASKalfa VFM501i / TASKalfa 6054ci / TASKalfa VFM601ci
/ TASKalfa6004i / TASKalfa VFM601i / TASKalfa 7054ci /
TASKalfa 7004i Safety Guide
302XC5628001
FAX System 12 Operation Guide 3RKKDEN300
Data Encryption/Overwrite Operation Guide 3MS2XCKDEN1
Command Center RX User Guide CCRXKDEN23
TASKalfa 7054ci / TASKalfa 6054ci / TASKalfa 5054ci /
TASKalfa 4054ci / TASKalfa 3554ci / TASKalfa 2554ci Printer
Driver User Guide
2XCCLKTEN750.2020.02
KYOCERA Net Direct Print User Guide DirectPrintKDEN2.2019.2
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1.4.6. Protected Assets of TOE
Protected Assets of TOE are described below.
(1) Image data
The image data that is stored on the SSD in the TOE when a Normal User uses TOE basic
functions such as Copy function, Scan to Send function, Print function, Fax function, and Box
function. However when a USB memory locally connected to the TOE is specified in Box
function, the image data will be stored in the USB memory. Also when Fax function is used,
the image data will be stored in the Flash memory. Other function stores image data on the
SSD.
(2) TOE configuration data
The data shown in Table 1-3. They are set or registered by Device Administrator or Normal
User to control and use TOE security functions.
(3) Communication data on the internal network
The data flow on the internal network when a Normal User uses basic functions or when a
Device Administrator changes or manages security settings of TOE via Web interface. It
includes both of document data and TOE setting data.
Table 1-3 TSF Data to be targeted by the TOE
TSF Data Explanation
Login User Name User’s identification information that is used for the User
Management Function.
User Authorization User’s authorization information that is used for the User
Management Function. There are two kinds of
authorization such as Device Administrator and Normal
User in the TOE.
Owner Information Owner Information that targeted assets hold. Login user
name is assigned to the owner information.
Number of Retries
until Locked
(User Account
Lockout Policy
Settings )
Number of retries until user account is locked out. This
information is used for the user management function.
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Lockout Duration
(User Account
Lockout Policy
Settings)
Time duration of rejection before user account is
unlocked. This information is used for the user
management function.
Lockout List User list that shows users with their user names who are
locked out for user management function.
Release of lockout on per user account basis from the list
can be instructed by a device administrator.
Auto Logout Time
Setting
Time information about automatic termination of login
session.
Password Policy
Settings
Information that is used for setting Password Policy such
as password length, complexity and validity period.
Box Owner Setting for showing the box owner. Login user name is
assigned to the owner information.
Box Permission Setting for sharing documents inside a box with all users.
When box permission is enabled , all the users can access
to the box.
Date and Time
Settings
Setting information for date and time
Network
Encryption Setting
Setting information for TLS and IPsec encryption
communication, which is used for Network Protection
function.
FAX Forward
Setting
Setting for forwarding of received fax data.
Send destination
information for
Audit Log Report
Destination information when sending audit log report to
an administrator.
Login User
Password
Authentication information of users that is required for
user management function.
Audit Log Log data that are generated by an audit log function.
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2. Conformance Claim
2.1. CC Conformance Claim
The CC conformance claim of this ST and TOE is as follows.
CC version for which this ST and TOE claim conformance:
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part1: Introduction and general model Version 3.1 Revision 5
Part2: Security functional components Version 3.1 Revision 5
Part3: Security assurance components Version 3.1 Revision 5
Conformity of ST to CC Part 2: CC part 2 conformant
Conformity of ST to CC Part 3: CC part 3 conformant
2.2. PP Claims
No PP to which this ST and TOE are conformant.
2.3. Package Claims
The ST and TOE claim the package: EAL2 and addition. Additional Component is ALC_FLR.2.
2.4. Conformance Rationale
There is no rationale that the ST and TOE conform to PP because no PP is claimed.
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3. Security Problem Definitions
This section describes Threats, Organizational Security Policies and Assumptions.
3.1. Threats
Threats is identified shown in Table 3-1. Attacker shall have a basic ability to attack TOE.
Table 3-1 Threats
Threat Description
T.SETTING_DATA Malicious person may have unauthorized access
to, to change, or to leak TOE setting data via the
operation panel or client PCs.
T.IMAGE_DATA Malicious person may illegally access not
authorized image data via the operation panel or
Client PC and leak or alter them.
T.NETWORK Malicious person may illegally eavesdrop or alter
image data or TOE setting data on the internal
network.
3.2. Organizational Security Policies
Organizational Security Policies that must be conformed by the TOE is shown in Table 3-2.
Table 3-2 Organizational Security Policies
Name Definition
P.SSD_ENCRYPTION TOE must encrypt image data and TOE setting
data stored on SSD.
P.FAX_CONTROL TOE must control forwarding data received from
public line and send it to external interface
according with rules set by authorized roles.
P.SOFTWARE_VERIFICATION TOE must execute Self Test that verify execution
code of TSF to detect corruption of executable
code.
3.3. Assumptions
Assumbtions of the TOE is shown in Table 3-3.
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Table 3-3 Assumptions
Assumption Definition
A.ACCESS The hardware and software that are composed of TOE are located
in a protected environment from security invasion such as illegal
analysis and alteration.
A.NETWORK The TOE is connected to the internal network that is protected
from illegal access from the external network.
A.USER_EDUCATION The TOE users are aware of the security policies and procedures of
their organization, and are educated to follow those policies and
procedures.
A.DADMIN_TRUST The TOE's administrators are competent to manage devices
properly as a device administrator and have a reliability not to use
their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.
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4. Security Objectives
This section describes Security Objectives for TOE, Security Objectives of Operational
Environment and Security Objectives Rationale.
4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE
Security Objectives for the TOE is shown in Table 4-1.
Table 4-1 Security objectives for the TOE
Objective Definition
O.SSD_ENCRYPTION The TOE shall provide a function to encrypt image
data and TOE setting data stored in SSD in order to
prevent unauthorized decryption.
O.AUDIT_LOG The TOE shall provide a function to record auditable
event and provide audit logs in order to monitor
unauthorized access.
O.NETWORK_ENCRYPTION The TOE shall provide encrypted communication
function required on network protection in order to
protect image data and TOE setting data on the
internal network from eavesdropping or alteration.
O.FAX_CONTROL The TOE shall provide a function to control FAX data
flow to forward received data from public line to
external interfaces of TOE according with rules set
by authorized role.
O.SETTING_DATA The TOE shall authorize access to the TOE setting
data only for authenticated right users, and prevent
access to the TOE setting data by unauthorized
users, and prevent change or leak of TOE setting
data.
O.ACCESS_CONTROL The TOE shall provide a function to ensure that the
TOE identifies and authenticates users, and controls
access privilege to image data in order only
authorized user can access to the image data.
O.SOFTWARE_VERIFICATION The TOE shall provide a function to self-verify
executable code in the TSF.
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4.2. Security Objectives for the operational environment
Security Objectives for the operational environment is shown in Table 4-2.
Table 4-2 Security objectives for the operational environment
Objective Definition
OE.ACCESS The TOE shall be placed in a secure or
monitored area and Device
Administrator can monitor it so that it
provides protection from attacks such
as unmanaged analyze and alteration
to hardware and software in the TOE.
OE.NETWORK_PROTECTION The internal network that the TOE
connected to shall prevent attacks
from the external network to the TOE
by introducing appliance such as a
firewall.
OE.USER_EDUCATION The organization shall make the TOE
users aware of the security policies
and procedures of their organization,
and make them educated and
acquired to follow those security
policies and procedures.
OE.DADMIN_TRUST The device administrator shall be
elected a trustworthy person and
received enough guidance to comply
security policy and operation rules in
the belonged organization and to be
able appropriate operation following
the description in the product's
guidance.
4.3. Security Objectives rationale
The relation among assumption, threat, and organizational security policy is shown in the table
below. It describes that one Security Objective corresponds at least one assumtion, threat, and
organizational security policy.
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Table 4-3 Completeness of security objectives
Security Objectives
Assumption, Threat, and
Organizational security policy
A.ACCESS
A.NETWORK
A.USER_EDUCATION
A.DADMIN_TRUST
T.SETTING_DATA
T.IMAGE_DATA
T.NETWORK
P.SSD_ENCRYPTION
P.FAX_CONTROL
P.SOFTWARE_VERIFICATION
O.SSD_ENCRYPTION ✓
O.AUDIT_LOG ✓ ✓ ✓
O.NETWORK_ENCRYPTION ✓
O.FAX_CONTROL ✓
O.SETTING_DATA ✓
O.ACCESS_CONTROL ✓
O.SOFTWARE_VERIFICATION ✓
OE.ACCESS ✓
OE.NETWORK_PROTECTION ✓
OE.USER_EDUCATION ✓
OE.DADMIN_TRUST ✓
Also the Security Objectives Rationale for Assumptions, Threats, and Organizational Security
Policy is shown in Table 4-4.
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Table 4-4 Sufficiency of security objectives
Assumptions, Threats, and
Organizational Security Policy
Security Objectives Rationale
A.ACCESS Assumptions of A.ACCESS requires that the
hardware and software that are composed of TOE
are located in a protected environment from
security invasion such as illegal analysis and
alteration.
By OE.ACCESS, the TOE is placed in a secure or
monitored area that it provides protection from
attacks such as unmanaged analyze and
alteration to hardware and software in the TOE.
Therefore the methods or opportunities of
attacks are restricted and A.ACCESS can be
achieved.
A.NETWORK Assumptions of A.NETWORK requires that the
TOE is connected to the internal network that is
protected from illegal access from the external
network.
By OE.NETWORK_PROTECTION, the internal
network that the TOE connected to prevents
attacks from the external network to the TOE by
introducing appliance such as a firewall.
Therefore the methods or opportunities of
attacks by many and unspecified agents on the
external network are restricted and A.NETWORK
can be achieved.
A.USER_EDUCATION Assumptions of A.USER_EDUCATION requires
that the TOE users are aware of the security
policies and procedures of their organization, and
are educated to follow those policies and
procedures.
By OE.USER_EDUCATION, the organization makes
the TOE users aware of the security policies and
procedures of their organization, and make them
educated and acquired to follow those security
policies and procedures. Therefore
A.USER_EDUCATION can be achieved.
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A.DADMIN_TRUST Assumptions of A.DADMIN_TRUST requires that
the TOE's administrators are competent to
manage devices properly as a device
administrator and have a reliability not to use
their privileged access rights for malicious
purposes.
By OE.DADMIN_TRUST, the device administrator
is elected a trustworthy person and received
enough guidance to comply security policy and
operation rules in the belonged organization and
to be able appropriate operation following the
description in the product's guidance. Therefore
A.DADMIN_TRUST can be achieved.
T.SETTING_DATA To counter T.SETTING_DATA, it is required to
prevent to have unauthorized access to, to
change, or to leak TOE setting data via the
operation panel or client PCs.
By O.SETTING_DATA and O.AUDIT_LOG, this
threat can be countered. By O.SETTING_DATA,
the TOE authorizes access to the TOE setting data
only for authenticated right users, and prevent
access to the TOE setting data by unauthorized
users, and prevent change or leak of TOE setting
data. Therefore unauthorized access, change, or
leak of TOE setting data can be prevented.
By O.AUDIT_LOG, the TOE can record auditable
event and provide audit logs. Therefore
unauthorized access to the setting data can be
monitored and tracked.
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T.IMAGE_DATA To counter T.IMAGE_DATA, it is required to
prevent to have unauthorized access to, to leak,
or to alter image data via the operation panel or
client PCs.
By O.ACCESS_CONTROL and O.AUDIT_LOG, this
threat can be countered.
By O.ACCESS_CONTROL, the TOE identifies and
authenticates users accessing via operation panel
or client PCs, and controls access privilege to
image data in order only authorized user can
access to the image data. Therefore TOE can
prevent unauthorized access, leak or alteration of
image data.
By O.AUDIT_LOG, the TOE records auditable
event and provide audit logs. Therefore
unauthorized access to the image data can be
monitored and tracked.
T.NETWORK To counter T.NETWORK, it is required to prevent
eavesdropping or alteration on the image data
and the TOE setting data on the internal network.
By O.NETWORK_ENCRYPTION and O.AUDIT_LOG,
this threat can be countered.
By O.NETWORK_ENCRYPTION, the TOE provide
encrypted communication function required on
network protection. Therefore eavesdropping
and alteration of the image data and the TOE
setting data on the internal network can be
prevented.
By O.AUDIT_LOG, the TOE records auditable
event and provide audit logs. Therefore the
behavior of encryption communication function,
to protect the image data or the TOE setting data
from eavesdropping or alteration, can be
monitored and tracked.
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P.SSD_ENCRYPTION P.SSD_ENCRYPTION of the security objective of
the organization is supposed to encrypt the
image data and the TOE setting data to maintain
confidentiality of these data stored on the SSD.
By O.SSD_ENCRYPTION, the TOE encrypts image
data and TOE setting data stored in SSD.
Therefore this security objective can be achieved.
P.FAX_CONTROL P.FAX_CONTROL in the security objective of the
organization is supposed that received data from
public line is forwarded to the external interface
of TOE according with rules set by authorized
roles when the data is forwarded to the external
interface.
By O.FAX_CONTROL, the TOE controls FAX data
flow to forward received data from public line to
external interfaces of TOE according with rules
set by authorized roles. Therefore this security
objective can be achieved.
P.SOFTWARE_VERIFICATION P.SOFTWARE_VERIFICATION in the security
objective of the organization is supposed that the
TOE executes Self Test that verifies executable
code of TSF in order to detect corruption of
executable code.
By SOFTWARE_VERIFICATION, the TOE executes
Self Test that verifies executable code in the TSF.
Therefore this security objective can be achieved.
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5. Extended Components Definition
No extended components defined.
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6. Security Requirements
This section describes the TOE Security Functional Requirements.
6.1. TOE Security Functional Requirements.
6.1.1. Class FAU: Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
- Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
- All auditable events for the [selection, choose one of: minimum, basic,
detailed, not specified] level of audit; and
- [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events].
[selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified]
⚫ not specified
[assignment: other specifically defined auditable events]
⚫ Auditable data target of TOE shown in Table 6-1
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
- Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and
the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the PP/ST, [assignment: other audit
relevant information].
[assignment: other audit relevant information]
⚫ Target function regarding FDP_ACF.1, Tried user identification regarding
FIA_UID.1, IP address of failed trusted channel (Source IP address is not required
since it is fixed IP address of TOE itself.)
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Table 6-1 Auditable data requirements
Functional
Requirement
Auditable event Actions to be audited
defined by CC
FAU_GEN.1 - There are no auditable
events foreseen.
FAU_GEN.2 - There are no auditable
events foreseen.
FAU_SAR.1 [Not specified]
-
a) Basic: Reading of
information from the
audit records.
FAU_SAR.2 [Not specified]
-
a) Basic: Unsuccessful
attempts to read
information from the
audit records.
FAU_STG.1 - There are no auditable
events foreseen.
FAU_STG.4 [Not specified]
-
a) Basic: Actions taken due
to the audit storage
failure.
FCS_CKM.1(a) [Not specified]
-
a) Minimum: Success and
failure of the activity.
b) Basic: The object
attribute(s), and object
value(s) excluding any
sensitive information (e.g.
secret or private keys).
FCS_CKM.1(b) [Not specified]
-
a) Minimum: Success and
failure of the activity.
b) Basic: The object
attribute(s), and object
value(s) excluding any
sensitive information (e.g.
secret or private keys).
FCS_CKM.1(c) [Not specified]
-
a) Minimum: Success and
failure of the activity.
c) Basic: The object
attribute(s), and object
value(s) excluding any
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sensitive information (e.g.
secret or private keys).
FCS_COP.1(a) [Not specified]
-
a) Minimum: Success and
failure, and the type of
cryptographic operation.
b) Basic: Any applicable
cryptographic mode(s) of
operation, subject
attributes and object
attributes.
FCS_COP.1(b) [Not specified]
-
a) Minimum: Success and
failure, and the type of
cryptographic operation.
b) Basic: Any applicable
cryptographic mode(s) of
operation, subject
attributes and object
attributes.
FCS_COP.1(c) [Not specified]
-
a) Minimum: Success and
failure, and the type of
cryptographic operation.
b) Basic: Any applicable
cryptographic mode(s) of
operation, subject
attributes and object
attributes.
FDP_ACC.1 - There are no auditable
events foreseen.
FDP_ACF.1 [Not specified]
Successful requests to perform an
operation on an object as the
following:
・ Image Data: Read
・ Image Data: Delete
a) Minimum: Successful
requests to perform an
operation on an object
covered by the SFP.
b) Basic: All requests to
perform an operation on
an object covered by the
SFP.
c) Detailed: The specific
security attributes used in
making an access check.
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FDP_IFC.1 - There are no auditable
events foreseen.
FDP_IFF.1 [Not specified] a) Minimum: Decision
permitting requested
information flow.
b) Basic: All decisions
regarding requests for
information flow.
c) Detailed: The specific
security attributes used
on the decision of
information flow.
d) Detailed: The specific
subset of information
that is flow based on the
policy goal (e.g. Degraded
audit of objects).
FIA_AFL.1 [Minimum]
The following actions taken, when
reaching of the threshold for the
unsuccessful authentication
attempts since the last successful
authentication.
・ Perform user account lockout,
and the following action taken
to restore to the normal state.
・ Release the lockout state by a
device administrator.
a) Minimum: the reaching of
the threshold for the
unsuccessful authentication
attempts and the actions
(e.g. disabling of a terminal)
taken and the subsequent, if
appropriate, restoration to
the normal state (e.g.
re-enabling of a terminal).
FIA_ATD.1 - There are no auditable
events foreseen.
FIA_SOS.1 [Minimum]
Rejection by the tested secrete as
shown below:
・ Rejection by quality check of
the login user password, which
was imputed when initially
creating the user information.
a) Minimum: Rejection by
the TSF of any tested
secret;
b) Basic: Rejection or
acceptance by the TSF of
any tested secret;
c) Detailed: Identification of
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・ Rejection by quality check of
the login user password, which
was changed when editing the
user information.
any changes to the
defined quality metrics.
FIA_UAU.1 [Basic]
Both successful and unsuccessful
use of the authentication
mechanism
a) Minimum: Unsuccessful
usage in the
authentication
mechanism;
b) Basic: All usages of
authentication
mechanism;
c) Detailed: All TSF
mediated actions which
were done before user
authentication.
FIA_UAU.7 - There are no auditable
events foreseen.
FIA_UID.1 [Basic]
Both successful and unsuccessful
use of the identification
mechanism
a) Minimum: Unsuccessful
use of user identification
mechanism including
provided user identity
information;
b) Basic: All use of user
identification mechanism
including provided user
identity information;
FIA_USB.1 [Not specified]
-
a) Minimum: Unsuccessful
binding of user security
attributes to a subject
(e.g. creation of a
subject).
b) Basic: Success and failure
of binding of user security
attributes to a subject
(e.g. success or failure to
create a subject).
FMT_MSA.1(a) [Not specified]
-
a) Basic: All modifications of
the values of security
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attributes.
FMT_MSA.3(a) [Not specified]
-
a) Basic: Modifications of
the default setting of
permissive or restrictive
rules.
b) Basic: All modifications of
the initial values of
security attributes.
FMT_MSA.1(b) [Not specified]
-
a) Basic: All modifications of
the values of security
attributes.
FMT_MSA.3(b) [Not specified]
-
a) Basic: Modifications of
the default setting of
permissive or restrictive
rules.
b) Basic: All modifications of
the initial values of
security attributes.
FMT_MTD.1(a) [Not specified]
-
a) Basic: All modifications to
the values of TSF data.
FMT_MTD.1(b) [Not specified]
-
a) Basic: All modifications to
the values of TSF data.
FMT_SMF.1 [Minimum]
Use of the management functions
a) Minimum: Use of the
management functions.
FMT_SMR.1 [Minimum]
Modifications to the group of
users that are part of a role
a) Minimum: Modifications
to the group of users that
are part of a role
b) Detailed: All use of
privilege of roles.
FPT_STM.1 [Minimum]
Changes to the time
a) Minimum: Changes to the
time.
b) Detailed: Provide of time
stamps.
FPT_TST.1 [Not specified]
-
a) Basic: Execution of the
TSF self tests and the
results of the tests.
FTA_SSL.3 [Minimum]
Termination of an interactive
session by the session locking
a) Minimum: Termination of
an interactive session by
the session locking
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mechanism mechanism.
FTP_ITC.1 [Minimum]
Failure of the trusted channel
functions
a) Minimum: Failure of the
trusted channel
functions.
b) Minimum: Identification
of the initiator and target
of failed trusted channel
functions.
c) Basic: All trial of use of
trusted channel
functions.
d) Basic: Identification of the
initiator and target of all
trusted channel
functions.
FAU_GEN.2 User identify association
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to
associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the capability to read
[assignment: list of audit information] from the audit records.
[assignment: authorised users]
⚫ Device Administrator
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[assignment: list of audit information]
⚫ Auditable event of TOE as shown in Table 6-1.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret
the information.
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users
that have been granted explicit read-access.
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized
deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [selection, choose one of: prevent, detect] unauthorized
modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.
[selection: choose one of: prevent, detect]
⚫ prevent
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall [selection, choose one of: “ignore audited events”, “prevent audited
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events, except those taken by the authorised user with special rights”, “overwrite the
oldest stored audit records”] and [assignment: other actions to be taken in case of
audit storage failure] if the audit trail is full.
[selection: choose one of: “ignore audited events”, “prevent audited events, except
those taken by the authorised user with special rights”, “overwrite the oldest stored
audit records”]
⚫ “overwrite the oldest stored audit records”
[assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure]
⚫ None
6.1.2. Class FCS: Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic key generation (Storage Encryption)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1(a) The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation
algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
⚫ KDF(Feedback Mode)
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
⚫ 256 bits
[assignment: list of standards]
⚫ NIST SP800-108
FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (TLS)
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1(b) The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [multiple primitives described below] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [as described below] that meet the following:
[multiple standards as described below].
Table 6-2 Key Generation
Algorithm Key sizes Standards
RSA 2048, 4096 bits FIPS 186-4, Appendix B
AES 128, 256 bits FIPS 197
ChaCha20-Poly1305 256 bits RFC8439
TLS key generation
via DHE or ECDHE
AES 128, 256 bits SP 800-135 Rev.1
TLS key generation
via DHE or ECDHE
HMAC 160, 256, 384
bits
SP 800-135 Rev.1
FCS_CKM.1(c) Cryptographic key generation (IPSec)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1(c) The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation
algorithm] implement [assignment: Diffie-Hellman Groups] that meet the following:
[assignment: list of standards].
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
⚫ IKEv1KDF
[assignment: Diffie-Hellman Groups]
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⚫ Diffie-Hellman Group 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24
[assignment: list of standards]
⚫ SP 800-135 Rev.1, RFC 2409, RFC 5114
FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic operation (Storage Encryption)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(a) The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and
cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following:
[assignment: list of standards].
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
⚫ Encryption of image data and TOE setting data when writing into the SSD
⚫ Decryption of image data and TOE setting data when reading out from the SSD
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
⚫ AES (XTS mode)
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
⚫ 256 bits
[assignment: list of standards]
⚫ FIPS PUB 197, SP800-38E
FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic operation (TLS)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
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FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(b) The TSF shall perform [the operations listed in the table below] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [multiple algorithms described below] and
cryptographic key sizes [as described below] that meet the following: [multiple
standards as described below].
Table 6-3 Cryptographic Operations
Operations Algorithm Key/Hash Size in
Bits
Standards
Encryption,
decryption
AES (CBC mode) 128, 256 bits FIPS 197
SP800-38A
SP800-38D
AES (GCM mode)
ChaCha20-Poly1305 256 bits RFC8439
Cryptographic
Signature
Services
RSA Digital Signature
Algorithm
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)
2048, 4096 bits PKCS #1 v2.2
FIPS 186-4
Hashing SHA-1 160 bits FIPS 180-4
SHA-256, SHA-384 256, 384 bits FIPS 180-4
Keyed Hash
Message
Authentication
Code
HMAC-SHA-1 160 bits RFC 2104
HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384
256, 384 bits
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (IPSec)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(c) The TSF shall perform [the operations listed in the table below] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [multiple algorithms described below] and
cryptographic key sizes [as described below] that meet the following: [multiple
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standards as described below].
Table 6-4 Cryptographic Operations
Operations Algorithm Key/Hash
Size in Bits
Standards
ISAKMP authentication Pre-shared key - RFC 2409
SP800-77 Rev.1
Hashing SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512
256, 384,
512 bits
FIPS 180-4
Data authentication HMAC-SHA256-128 256 bits RFC 2104
RFC 4868
HMAC-SHA384-192 384 bits
HMAC-SHA512-256 512 bits
Encryption, decryption 3DES (CBC mode) 168 bits FIPS 46-3
SP 800-67 Rev.2
AES (CBC mode) 128, 192,
256 bits
FIPS 197
SP800-38A
6.1.3. Class FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Access Control SFP] on [assignment: List of
subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered in SFP].
[assignment: the list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and
objects covered in SFP]
⚫ The list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects shown
in Table 6-5.
[assignment: Access Control SFP]
⚫ User Data Access Control SFP
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FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Access Control SFP] to objects based on the
following: [assignment: the list of users as subjects and objects controlled under the
indicated SFP and for each the SFP related security attribute or the named group of
SFP related security attribute].
[assignment: the list of users as subjects and objects controlled under the
indicated SFP and for each the SFP related security attribute or the named group of
SFP related security attribute]
⚫ The subjects and the objects listed in Table 6-5, and for each, the indicated
security attributes.
[assignment: Access Control SFP]
⚫ User Data Access Control SFP
FDP_ ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [assignment: rules of access
control used to the operations for controlled object among controlled subjects and
controlled objects].
[assignment: rules of access control used to the operations for controlled object
among controlled subjects and controlled objects]
⚫ Access control rules that controls operations among subjects and objects as
listed in Table 6-5
FDP_ ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly
authorise access of subjects to objects].
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of
subjects to objects]
⚫ Explicitly authorize access control rule as shown in Table 6-6
FDP_ ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [assignment:
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rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects
to objects]
⚫ None
Table 6-5 User Data Access Control SFP
Object
(Security
attribute)
Target Function Operation(s) Subject
(Security
attribute)
Access control rule
Image data
(Owner
Information)
Print function
Scan to Send
function
Copy function
Fax send
function
Read, Delete Normal User
(Login User
Name)
Denied, except for his/her own
documents.
When “Owner Information” of
image data matches “Login User
Name” of Normal User, operation
is permitted.
Image data
(Box Owner,
Box
Permission)
Box function Read, Delete Normal User
(Login User
Name)
Denied, except (1) for his/her own
documents, or (2) if authorized by
another role or mechanism if such
functions are provided by a
conforming TOE.
(1) When “Owner Information” of
image data matches “Login User
Name” of Normal User, operation
is permitted.
(2)When “Box Permission” storing
image data is enabled, operation is
permitted.
Image data
(Owner
Information)
Fax receive
function
[assignment:
other
operations]
Any
Operations
Normal User
(Login User
Name)
Denied.
Any Operations by Normal User is
denied.
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Table 6-6 User Data Access Control SFP for Device Administrator
Object
(Security
attribute)
Target
Function
Operation(s) Subject
(Security attribute)
Explicitly authorize access
control rule
Image data
(Owner
Information)
Print
function
Delete Device Administrator
(User Authorization)
Regardless of “Owner
Information” value, operation
is permitted.
Image data
(Owner
Information)
Scan to
Send
function
Delete Device Administrator
(User Authorization)
Regardless of “Owner
Information” value, operation
is permitted.
Image data
(Owner
Information)
Copy
function
Delete Device Administrator
(User Authorization)
Regardless of “Owner
Information” value, operation
is permitted.
Image data
(Owner
Information)
Fax send
function
Delete Device Administrator
(User Authorization)
Regardless of “Owner
Information” value, operation
is permitted.
Image data
(Box Owner)
Box
function
Read, Delete Device Administrator
(User Authorization)
Regardless of “Box Owner”
value, operation is permitted.
Image data
(Owner
Information)
Fax
receive
function
Read, Delete Device Administrator
(User Authorization)
Regardless of “Owner
Information” value, operation
is permitted.
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple Security attributes
FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce [assignment: information flow control SFP] for [assignment:
controlled Subjects used by SFP, or the list of Subjects, Information, and Operations
that trigger information flow controlled by the Subject].
[assignment: controlled Subjects used by SFP, or the list of Subjects, Information, and
Operations that trigger information flow controlled by the Subject]
⚫ The list of Subjects Information, and Operations as listed in Table 6-7
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Table 6-7 The list of Subjects, Information, and Operations that triggers information flow
Subject
(Security
attribute)
Information Subject
(Security
attribute)
Operation Access control rule
A receiving task
from public line
(FAX Forward
setting)
Received
data from
public line
A sending task to
the external
interfaces
(FAX Forward
setting)
Forwarding To forward (Operation)
data (Information)
received from public
line by receiving task
(Subject) to sending task
(Subject) for the
external interface
according with Fax
Forward setting
(Security attributes).
[assignment: information flow control SFP]
⚫ Fax information flow control SFP
FDP_IFF.1 Simple Security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: information flow control SFP] based on the
following types of subjects and information security attributes: [assignment: the list
of subjects and information controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the
correspond security attribute].
[assignment: information flow control SFP]
⚫ Fax information flow control SFP
[assignment: the list of subjects and information controlled under the indicated SFP,
and for each, the correspond security attribute]
⚫ Subjects and information and for each, the correspond security attribute as
listed in Table 6-7
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FDP_ IFF.1.2 The TSF shall authorize information flow among controlled subjects and controlled
information through controlled operations when the rules below maintained:
[assignment: relation, based on security attributes, that must be maintained among
subjects and information security attributes for each operations].
[assignment: relation, based on security attributes, that must be maintained among
subjects and information security attributes for each operations]
⚫ the rules of information flow control that control operations among subjects
and information as listed in Table 6-7
FDP_ IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce [assignment: rules of additional information flow control SFP].
[assignment: rules of additional information flow control SFP]
⚫ None
FDP_ IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authenticate information flow based on the [assignment: rules,
based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize information flow].
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize information
flow]
⚫ None
FDP_ IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny information flow based on the [assignment: rules, based
on security attributes, that explicitly deny information flow].
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny information flow]
⚫ None
6.1.4. Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an
administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable
values]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of
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authentication events].
[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable
positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]]
⚫ an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of
acceptable values]
[assignment: range of acceptable values]
⚫ 1 to 10
[assignment: list of authentication events]
⚫ Consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts since the last successful
authentication occur related to login user name designated by login from an
operational panel.
⚫ Consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts since the last successful
authentication occur related to login user name designated by login from a client
PC.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
[selection: met, surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].
[selection: met, surpassed]
⚫ met
[assignment: list of actions]
⚫ Login from the account is locked out between 1 and 60 minutes and until
the time designated by a device administrator that elapse, or until a device
administrator releases lock status.
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual
users: [assignment: list of security attributes].
[assignment: list of security attributes]
⚫ Login User Name, User Authorization
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FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [assignment: a defined
quality metric].
[assignment: a defined quality metric]
⚫ Password Length ： At least 8 characters
⚫ Character Type ： Alphanumeric or special characters
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict with
access-controlled Functions of the TOE] on behalf of the user to be performed before
the user is authenticated.
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict with
access-controlled Functions of the TOE]
⚫ Obtain a device status
⚫ Display a list of job information
⚫ Display counter information
⚫ Receive FAX data
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
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FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only [assignment: list of feedback] to the user while the
authentication is in progress.
[assignment: list of feedback]
⚫ dummy characters（*：asterisk）
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict with
access-controlled Functions of the TOE] on behalf of the user to be performed before
the user is identified.
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict with
access-controlled Functions of the TOE]
⚫ Obtain a device status
⚫ Display a list of job information
⚫ Display counter information
⚫ Receive FAX data
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
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FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on
the behalf of that user: [assignment: list of user security attributes].
[assignment: list of user security attributes]
⚫ Login User Name, User Authorization
FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security
attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [assignment: rules for the initial
association of attributes].
[assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes]
⚫ None
FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security
attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [assignment: rules
for the changing of attributes].
[assignment: rules for the changing of attributes]
⚫ None
6.1.5. Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_MSA.1 (a) Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 (a) The TSF shall enforce [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control
SFP(s)] to restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete,
[assignment: other operations]] the security attributes [assignment: list of security
attributes] to [assignment: the authorised identified roles].
[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]
⚫ User Data Access Control SFP
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[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
⚫ [assignment: other operations]
[assignment: other operations]
⚫ Operation(s) as listed in Table 6-8
[assignment: list of security attributes]
⚫ Security Attributes as listed in Table 6-8
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
⚫ Role as listed in Table 6-8
Table 6-8 Management of security attributes (Box function)
Security Attributes Operation(s) Role
Box Owner modify Device Administrator
Box Permission modify Device Administrator
Normal User that
matches a Box Owner.
FMT_MSA.3 (a) Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 (a) The TSF shall enforce [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]
to provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other
property]] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]
⚫ User Data Access Control SFP
[selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]
⚫ restrictive
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FMT_MSA.3.2 (a) The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorized identified roles] to specify
alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information
is created.
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
⚫ nobody
FMT_MSA.1 (b) Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 (b) The TSF shall enforce [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control
SFP(s)] to restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete,
[assignment: other operations]] the security attributes [assignment: list of security
attributes] to [assignment: the authorised identified roles].
[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]
⚫ Fax information flow control SFP
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
⚫ [assignment: other operations]
[assignment: other operations]
⚫ Operation(s) as listed in Table 6-9
[assignment: list of security attributes]
⚫ Security Attributes as listed in Table 6-9
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
⚫ Role as listed in Table 6-9
Table 6-9 Management of security attributes (Fax receive function)
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Security Attributes Operation(s) Role
Fax Forward setting modify Device Administrator
FMT_MSA.3 (b) Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 (b) The TSF shall enforce [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]
to provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other
property]] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]
⚫ Fax information flow control SFP
[selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]
⚫ permissive
FMT_MSA.3.2 (b) The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorized identified roles] to specify
alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information
is created.
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
⚫ Nobody
FMT_MTD.1 (a) Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1 (a) The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete,
clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to
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[assignment: the authorized identified roles].
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other
operations]]
⚫ Other operations
[assignment: other operations]
⚫ Operation as listed in Table 6-10
[assignment: list of TSF data]
⚫ TSF data as listed in Table 6-10
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
⚫ Roles as listed in Table 6-10
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Table 6-10 Operation of TSF data
TSF data Roles Operation
Login User Name Device Administrator modify, delete, [assignment:
other operations]
[assignment: other operations]
⚫ Create
Login User Password Device Administrator modify, delete, [assignment:
other operations]
[assignment: other operations]
⚫ Create
User Authorization Device Administrator modify, delete, [assignment:
other operations]
[assignment: other operations]
⚫ Create
Number of Retries until locked
(User Account Lockout Policy Settings)
Device Administrator modify
Lockout Duration
(User Account Lockout Policy Settings)
Device Administrator modify
Lockout List Device Administrator modify
Auto Logout Time Setting Device Administrator modify
Password Policy Settings Device Administrator modify
Date and Time Settings Device Administrator modify
Network Encryption Setting Device Administrator modify
Send Destination Information for
Forwarding Audit Log Report
Device Administrator modify
Encryption Key Device Administrator modify
FMT_MTD.1 (b) Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1 (b) The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete,
clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to
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[assignment: the authorized identified roles].
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other
operations]]
⚫ Other operations
[assignment: other operations]
⚫ Operation as listed in Table 6-11
[assignment: list of TSF data]
⚫ TSF data as listed in Table 6-11
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
⚫ Role as listed in Table 6-11
Table 6-11 Operation of TSF data
TSF data Roles Operation
Login User Password associated
with Normal User
Normal User modify
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF].
[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]
⚫ Functions that manage security attributes (i.e. Box Owner, Box Permission and
Owner Information) related to a Box function, security attributes of Fax Data
Flow Control function(Fax forward setting).
⚫ Functions that manage TSF Data (i.e. Login User Name, Login User Password,
User authorization, Number of Retries until Locked, Lockout Duration, Auto
Logout Time Setting, Password Policy Settings, Date and Time Settings,
Network encryption Setting(TLS, IPsec setting), and Send Destination
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Information for Audit Log Report).
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Table 6-12 Management Functions
Function
Requirement
Management
Functions
Management Items defined by CC
FAU_GEN.1 - There are no management activities
foreseen.
FAU_GEN.2 - There are no management activities
foreseen.
FAU_SAR.1 Management of
Authorization of
Device Administrator
a) Maintenance (deletion, modification,
addition) of the group of users with
read access right to the audit records.
FAU_SAR.2 - There are no management activities
foreseen.
FAU_STG.1 - There are no management activities
foreseen.
FAU_STG.4 None
(Action is fixed and is
not managed.)
a) Maintenance (deletion, modification,
addition) of actions to be taken in case
of audit storage failure.
FCS_CKM.1(a) - There are no management activities
foreseen.
FCS_CKM.1(b) - There are no management activities
foreseen.
FCS_CKM.1(c) - There are no management activities
foreseen.
FCS_COP.1(a) - There are no management activities
foreseen.
FCS_COP.1(b) - There are no management activities
foreseen.
FCS_COP.1(c) - There are no management activities
foreseen.
FDP_ACC.1 - There are no management activities
foreseen.
FDP_ACF.1 None
(Attributes used to
make explicit access
or denial based
decisions is fixed as
Device Administrator,
and this is not needed
a) Managing the attributes used to make
explicit access or denial based
decisions.
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to be managed.)
FDP_IFC.1 - None
FDP_IFF.1 None
(There is no attributes
used to make explicit
access based
decisions, and this is
not needed to be
managed.)
a) Managing the attributes used to make
explicit access based decisions.
FIA_AFL.1 Management of
unsuccessful
authentication
attempts.
a) Management of the threshold for
unsuccessful authentication attempts;
b) Management of actions to be taken in
the event of an authentication failure.
FIA_ATD.1 None
(There are no
additional security
attributes and there
are no additional
security attributes to
be managed.)
a) If so indicated in the assignment, the
authorised administrator might be
able to define additional security
attributes for users.
FIA_SOS.1 Management of Login
User Password Policy
a) The management of the metric used
to verify the secrets.
FIA_UAU.1 Management of login
user password by
Device Administrator.
Management of
Normal User
(him/her) login user
password by Normal
User.
a) Management of the authentication
data by an administrator;
b) Management of the authentication
data by the associated user;
c) Managing the list of actions that can
be taken before the user is
authenticated.
FIA_UAU.7 - There are no management activities
foreseen.
FIA_UID.1 Management of the
user identities
Management of the user identities
FIA_USB.1 None
(Subject security
attributes are fixed
and are not managed.
a) An authorised administrator can
define default subject security
attributes.
b) an authorised administrator can
change subject security attributes.
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FMT_MSA.1(a) None
(The role group is
fixed as Device
Administrator and is
not managed.)
a) Managing the group of roles that can
interact with the security attributes;
b) Management of rules by which
security attributes inherit specified
values.
FMT_MSA.3(a) None
(The role group is
fixed as Device
Administrator and is
not managed.)
a) Managing the group of roles that can
specify initial values;
b) Managing the permissive or restrictive
setting of default values for a given
access control SFP;
c) Management of rules by which
security attributes inherit specified
values.
FMT_MSA.1(b) None
(The role group is
fixed as Device
Administrator and is
not managed.)
a) Managing the group of roles that can
interact with the security attributes;
b) Management of rules by which
security attributes inherit specified
values.
FMT_MSA.3(b) None
(The role group is
fixed as Device
Administrator and is
not managed.)
a) Managing the group of roles that can
specify initial values;
b) Managing the permissive or restrictive
setting of default values for a given
access control SFP;
c) Management of rules by which
security attributes inherit specified
values.
FMT_MTD.1(a) None
(The role group is
fixed as Device
Administrator and is
not managed.)
a) Managing the group of roles that can
interact with the TSF data.
FMT_MTD.1(b) None
(The role group is
fixed as Device
Administrator and is
not managed.)
a) Managing the group of roles that can
interact with the TSF data.
FMT_SMF.1 - There are no management activities
foreseen.
FMT_SMR.1 Manage the group of a) Managing the group of users that are
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users that are user
authorization.
part of a role.
FPT_STM.1 Management of
system time
Defined by PP:
Management of system time
FPT_TST.1 None
(Self test executable
condition is fixed and
is not managed.)
a) Management of the conditions under
which TSF self testing occurs, such as
during initial start-up, regular interval,
or under specified conditions;
b) Management of the time interval if
appropriate.
FTA_SSL.3 Management of
auto-logout time.
a) Specification of the time of user
inactivity after which termination of
the interactive session occurs for an
individual user;
b) Specification of the default time of
user inactivity after which termination
of the interactive session occurs.
FTP_ITC.1 Management of data
protection on the
internal network.
(Network encryption
settings(TLS, IPsec
setting) )
a) Configuring the actions that require
trusted channel, if supported.
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain [assignment: the authorised identified roles].
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
⚫ Device Administrator
⚫ Normal User
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
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6.1.6. Class FPT: TSF Protection
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [selection: during initial start-up, periodically
during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions
[assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]] to demonstrate the
correct operation of [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF].
[selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request
of the authorised user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test
should occur]]
⚫ during initial start-up
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF]
⚫ [assignment: parts of TSF]
[assignment: parts of TSF]
⚫ SSD Encryption Function
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF data], TSF data].
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF data], TSF data]
⚫ [assignment: parts of TSF data]
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[assignment: parts of TSF data]
⚫ Encryption Key
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF].
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF]
⚫ [assignment: parts of TSF]
[assignment: parts of TSF]
⚫ TSF executable module
6.1.7. Class FTA: TOE Access
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [assignment: time interval of
user inactivity].
[assignment: time interval of user inactivity]
⚫ Operation Panel ： No operation after time set by a device administrator
elapsed (between 5 seconds and 495 seconds)
⚫ Web browser ： No operation after 10 minutes elapsed.
*There are no interactive session exists with the exception of an operation panel
and a web browser.
6.1.8. Class FTP: High Trusted Path/Channel
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT
product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides
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assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data
from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product] to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
[selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]
⚫ TSF
⚫ another trusted IT product
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [assignment: the list
of functions that require trusted channel].
[assignment: the list of functions that require trusted channel]
⚫ Scan to Send function
⚫ Print function
⚫ Box to Send function
⚫ Box operation by client PCs (via Web browser)
⚫ Security management function operated by client PCs (via Web browser),
except printer function use in local connection.
6.2. TOE Security Assurance Requirement
Security assurance requirements are described in Table 6-13 Security Assurance
Requirements. The evaluation assurance level of this TOE is EAL2. The security assurance
component, ALC_FLR.2 is added to the assurance components as shown in the Table 6-13.
Table 6-13 Security Assurance Requirements
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures (augmentation of EAL2)
ASE: Security Target evaluation ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
6.3. Security Functional Requirements Rationale
6.3.1. Security Functional Requirements Rationale
Table 6-14 shows the TOE security functional requirements and the corresponding security
objectives.
Table 6-14 Correspondence between Security Functional Requirements
Security
Functional
Requirements
Security Objectives
O.SSD_ENCRYPTION
O.AUDIT_LOG
O.NETWORK_ENCRYPTION
O.FAX_CONTROL
O.SETTING_DATA
O.ACCESS_CONTROL
O.SOFTWARE_VERIFICATION
FAU_GEN.1 ✓
FAU_GEN.2 ✓
FAU_SAR.1 ✓
FAU_SAR.2 ✓
FAU_STG.1 ✓
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Security
Functional
Requirements
Security Objectives
O.SSD_ENCRYPTION
O.AUDIT_LOG
O.NETWORK_ENCRYPTION
O.FAX_CONTROL
O.SETTING_DATA
O.ACCESS_CONTROL
O.SOFTWARE_VERIFICATION
FAU_STG.4 ✓
FCS_CKM.1(a) ✓
FCS_CKM.1(b) ✓
FCS_CKM.1(c) ✓
FCS_COP.1(a) ✓
FCS_COP.1(b) ✓
FCS_COP.1(c) ✓
FDP_ACC.1 ✓
FDP_ACF.1 ✓
FDP_IFC.1 ✓
FDP_IFF.1 ✓
FIA_AFL.1 ✓ ✓
FIA_ATD.1 ✓
FIA_SOS.1 ✓ ✓
FIA_UAU.1 ✓ ✓
FIA_UAU.7 ✓ ✓
FIA_UID.1 ✓ ✓ ✓
FIA_USB.1 ✓
FMT_MSA.1(a) ✓
FMT_MSA.3(a) ✓
FMT_MSA.1(b) ✓
FMT_MSA.3(b) ✓
FMT_MTD.1(a) ✓
FMT_MTD.1(b) ✓
FMT_SMF.1 ✓ ✓ ✓
FMT_SMR.1 ✓ ✓ ✓
FPT_STM.1 ✓
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Security
Functional
Requirements
Security Objectives
O.SSD_ENCRYPTION
O.AUDIT_LOG
O.NETWORK_ENCRYPTION
O.FAX_CONTROL
O.SETTING_DATA
O.ACCESS_CONTROL
O.SOFTWARE_VERIFICATION
FPT_TST.1 ✓
FTA_SSL.3 ✓ ✓
FTP_ITC.1 ✓
The rationale for “Table 6-14 Correspondence between Security Functional Requirements”
demonstrates below.
O.SSD_ENCRYPTION
O.SSD_ENCRYPTION is the security objective to encrypt Image data and TOE setting data
stored in SSD in order to prevent unauthorized decryption.
FCS_CKM.1(a) generates encryption keys in accordance with a specified encryption algorithm.
FCS_COP.1(a) encrypts Image Data and TOE setting data when storing in the SSD using a
specified encryption algorithm and encryption key length, and decrypts Image data and TOE
setting data when reading out from the SSD.
Therefore, O.SSD_ENCRYPTION ensures the encryption of User Data and TSF Data when
storing in SSD.
O.AUDIT_LOG
O.AUDIT_LOG is the security objective to record auditable event and provide audit logs in
order to monitor unauthorized access.
FAU_GEN.1 records the audit log of the events, which should be auditable.
By associating FAU_GEN.2 with FIA_UID.1, the auditable events are associated with
identification information of users.
FPT_STM.1 provides a trusted time stamp function inside the TOE, and records the times when
auditable events occurred.
FAU_SAR.1 provides read capability of audit log information to Device Administrator.
FAU_SAR.2 restricts the access for audit logs except Device Administrator.
FAU_STG.1 protects stored audit logs from unfair deletion or alteration.
FAU_STG.4 overwrites the oldest stored audit log and stores new audit log, when audit logs
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are full.
Therefore, O.AUDIT_LOG records auditable event and provides audit logs, and ensures to
prevent unauthorized disclosure and alteration.
O.NETWORK_ENCRYPTION
O.NETWORK_ENCRYPTION is the security objective to provide encrypted communication
function required on network protection in order to protect image data and TOE setting data
on the internal network from eavesdropping or alteration.
FTP_ITC.1 provides trusted channel by encrypt communication in order to protect image data
and TOE setting data on the internal network from eavesdropping and alteration.
FCS_CKM.1(b), FCS_CKM.1(c), FCS_COP.1(b), and FCS_COP.1(c) support the objective by
requiring the TOE to provide key management and cryptographic functions to protect
management interactions during network transmission.
Therefore, O.NETWORK_ENCRYPTION ensures to provide encrypted communication function
required on network protection in order to protect image data and TOE setting data on the
internal network protected.
O.FAX_CONTROL
O.FAX_CONTROL is the security objective to control FAX data flow to forward received data
from public line to external interfaces of TOE according with rules set by authorized role.
FDP_IFC.1, FDP_IFF.1 use Fax information flow control function on TOE and received data from
public line is forwarded to external interface of TOE according with Fax forward setting that is
set by authenticated role.
FMT_MSA.1 (b) manages operations on the security attributes.
FMT_MSA.3 (b) ensure that FAX forward settings have appropriate default value.
FMT_SMR.1 assigns and maintains user authorization of Device Administrator.
FMT_SMF.1 provides Device Administrator with the security management functions.
Therefore, O.FAX_CONTROL ensures to control FAX data flow to forward received data from
public line to external interfaces of TOE according with rules set by authorized role.
O.ACCESS_CONTROL
O.ACCESS_CONTROL is the security objective to ensure that the TOE identify and authenticate
users, and control access privilege to image data in order to only authorized user can access to
the image data.
FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 implement identification and authentication of users who try to
access from operation panel and client PCs.
FIA_UAU.7 protects authentication feedback to users.
FIA_ATD.1 and FIA_USB.1 maintain user attributes of login user name, user authorization, and
bind the subject security attributes to authorized users.
FIA_AFL.1 lockouts user login when users consecutively fail their authentication.
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FIA_SOS.1 verifies if the secret of user authentication meet the defined quality metrics.
FTA_SSL.3 manages user session and terminates out of session.
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 allow the authorized users only to operate image data.
FMT_MSA.1 (a) manages operation on the security attributes.
FMT_MSA.3 (a) ensures that the owner information of image data, or owner and share
information of the box storing image data have appropriate default values.
FMT_SMR.1 maintains that user authorization of Device Administrator and Normal User are
assigned to the users.
FMT_SMF.1 provides security management function to Device Administrator and Normal User
who own the image data.
Therefore, O.ACCESS_CONTROL ensures that that the TOE identify and authenticate users, and
control access privilege to image data in order to only authorized user can access to the image
data.
O.SETTING_DATA
O.SETTING_DATA is the security objective to authorize access to the TOE setting data only for
authenticated right users, and prevent access to the TOE setting data by unauthorized users,
and prevent change or leak of TOE setting data.
FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 implement identification and authentication of users who try to
access from operation panel and client PCs.
FIA_UAU.7 protects authentication feedback to users.
FIA_AFL.1 lockouts user login when users consecutively fail their authentication.
FIA_SOS.1 verifies if the secret of user authentication meet the defined quality metrics.
FTA_SSL.3 manages user session and terminates out of session.
By FMT_MTD.1(a), operation of TOE setting data is restricted to Device Administrator.
By FMT_MTD.1(b), operation of TOE setting data is restricted to Normal Users who are owner
of the TOE setting data.
FMT_SMR.1 maintains that user authorization of Device Administrator and Normal User are
assigned to the users.
FMT_SMF.1 provides security management function to Device Administrator and Normal User
who own TOE setting data.
Therefore, O.SETTING_DATA ensures that that the TOE identify and authenticate users, and
control access privilege to TOE setting data in order to only authorized user can access to the
TOE setting data.
O.SOFTWARE_VERIFICATION
O.SOFTWARE_VERIFICATION is the security objective to provide self-verification of the TSF
executable code.
FPT_TST.1 runs a suite of self-test during the TOE start-up, and verifies the integrity of parts of
TSF data and verifies the integrity of parts of TSF by operating at arbitrary timing after the
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start-up.
Therefore, O.SOFTWARE_VERIFICATION can provide authorized users with the procedure for
self-verification of the TSF executable code.
6.3.2. Dependency Relationship of the TOE Security Functional Requirements
Table 6-15 shows the dependency relationship of the TOE security functional
requirements.
Table 6-15 Dependency Relationship of the TOE Security Functional Requirements
Functional
Requirements
Dependency
Relationship
Dependencies Not Satisfied
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 －
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
－
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 －
FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.1 －
FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 －
FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.1 －
FCS_CKM.1(a) FCS_COP.1(a)
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4
See Section 6.3.2.1
FCS_CKM.1(b) FCS_COP.1(b)
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4
See Section 6.3.2.1
FCS_CKM.1(c) FCS_COP.1(c)
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4
See Section 6.3.2.1
FCS_COP.1(a) FCS_CKM.1(a)
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4
See Section 6.3.2.1
FCS_COP.1(b) FCS_CKM.1(b)
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4
See Section 6.3.2.1
FCS_COP.1(c) FCS_CKM.1(c)
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4
See Section 6.3.2.1
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 －
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
－
FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFF.1 －
FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFC.1
FMT_MSA.3
－
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FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 －
FIA_ATD.1 No dependencies. －
FIA_SOS.1 No dependencies. －
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 －
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 －
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies. －
FIA_USB.1 FIA_ATD.1 －
FMT_MSA.1(a) FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
－
FMT_MSA.3(a) FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
－
FMT_MSA.1(b) FDP_IFC.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
－
FMT_MSA.3(b) FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
－
FMT_MTD.1(a) FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
－
FMT_MTD.1(b) FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
－
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies. －
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 －
FPT_STM.1 No dependencies. －
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies. －
FTA_SSL.3 No dependencies. －
FTP_ITC.1 No dependencies. －
6.3.2.1. Rationale for why dependency on FCS_CKM.4 is not needed.
The encryption key to encrypt SSD is generated with a unique value only per
device every time main power is turned on, and is stored in the volatile memory.
However, the TOE is physically protected by security objectives in operational
environment, that is OE.ACCESS, even when the main power is turn off. Therefore
the requirement for the encryption key destruction is not needed.
The symmetric session key generated during the handshake by the client, used to
encrypt application data exchanged in the TLS session, is not persistently stored
by either the client or the server. This session key is held in memory and is only
valid for that given session. Once the session is terminated the key cannot be
used to decrypt subsequent sessions. The attack potential required attempting to
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extract the key from the client memory following session termination to decrypt
traffic captured between the client and server is significantly beyond the attack
potential of EAL2. Therefore the requirement for the encryption key destruction
is not needed.
The pre-shared key authentication method is used for the authentication of the
IP-Sec peer. The pre-shared key is set by Device Administrator and not generated
and destructed by the device. The symmetric encryption communication key
obtained by DH IKEv1 Key Derivation Function is not persistently stored by each
peers. This key is held in memory and is only valid with the corresponding
Security Association. Once the SA is terminated the key cannot be used.
Therefore the requirement for the encryption key destruction is not needed.
6.3.3. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
Since this TOE is aimed at countering the threat of exposure of image data by an attacker
with basic attack capability, it is necessary to guarantee counter-ability against basic level
attacks.
EAL2 have an analyze if TOE provides sufficient guidance information for safe use of
security functions, including analysis of security measures at development stage in TOE
(implementation and analysis of tests based on functional specifications, evaluation of
management status of deliverables and delivery procedure). Since the assurance
requirement is EAL2 compliant, the selection of EAL2 is reasonable.
ALC_FLR.2 ensures that instructions and procedures for the reporting and remediation of
identified security flaws are in place, and their inclusion is expected by the consumers of
this TOE.
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7. TOE Summary Specification
This section describes the summary specification for the security functions that are provided
by the TOE.
Table 7-1 shows the relations between the TOE security functions and security functional
requirements
Table 7-1 TOE security functions and security functional requirements
Security
Functions
Functional
Requirements
TSF.USER_AUTHENTICATION
TSF.DATA_ACCESS
TSF.FAXDATAFLOW
TSF.SSD_ENCRYPTION
TSF.AUDIT_LOG
TSF.SECURITY_MANAGEMENT
TSF.SELF_TEST
TSF.NETWORK_PROTECTION
FAU_GEN.1 ✓
FAU_GEN.2 ✓
FAU_SAR.1 ✓
FAU_SAR.2 ✓
FAU_STG.1 ✓
FAU_STG.4 ✓
FCS_CKM.1(a) ✓
FCS_CKM.1(b) ✓
FCS_CKM.1(c) ✓
FCS_COP.1(a) ✓
FCS_COP.1(b) ✓
FCS_COP.1(c) ✓
FDP_ACC.1 ✓
FDP_ACF.1 ✓
FDP_IFC.1 ✓
FDP_IFF.1 ✓
FIA_AFL.1 ✓
FIA_ATD.1 ✓
FIA_SOS.1 ✓
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FIA_UAU.1 ✓
FIA_UAU.7 ✓
FIA_UID.1 ✓ ✓
FIA_USB.1 ✓
FMT_MSA.1(a) ✓
FMT_MSA.3(a) ✓
FMT_MSA.1(b) ✓
FMT_MSA.3(b) ✓
FMT_MTD.1(a) ✓
FMT_MTD.1(b) ✓
FMT_SMF.1 ✓
FMT_SMR.1 ✓
FPT_STM.1 ✓
FPT_TST.1 ✓
FTA_SSL.3 ✓
FTP_ITC.1 ✓
7.1. User Management Function
TSF.USER_AUTHENTICATION
User management function is a function that identifies and authenticates whether persons
are authorized users when users intend to operate the TOE from the operation panel or the
client PCs.
When the TOE is used from the Operation Panel or a Web browser, the login screen is
displayed and a user is required to enter his or her login user name and login password.
When the TOE is accessed from the printer driver or TWAIN driver, the TOE identifies and
authenticates if the person is authorized by referring to the login user name and login user
password obtained from a user job.
(1) FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
When a user intends to login to the TOE, the TOE verifies if the entered login user name
exists in the user information pre-registered in the TOE.
With reception of the device status, the TOE provides information before the user is
identified. With a list of user jobs and counter information, the TOE displays the
information before the user is identified. With fax data reception, the TOE receives fax
data before the user is identified.
(2) FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
When the user is successfully identified by FIA_UID.1, the TOE verifies if the entered login
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user password matches with one pre-registered in the TOE.
With reception of the device status, the TOE provides information before the user is
authenticated. With a list of user jobs and counter information, the TOE displays the
information before the user is authenticated. With fax data reception, the TOE receives
fax data, before the user is authenticated.
(3) FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
The TOE displays login user password entered from the operation panel or a client PC on
the login screen, which is masked by dummy characters (*: asterisk).
(4) FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
The TOE defines and maintains user attributes such as login user name and user
authorization.
(5) FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
The TOE verifies that a login user password meets specified quality metrics such as
password length: no fewer than the minimum number of characters (8 characters),
character and types: Alphanumeric or special characters.
(6) FIA_USB.1 User-subject biding
The TOE associates user attributes such as login user name and user authorization with
subjects.
(7) FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
When the number of consecutive unsuccessful login attempts from the operation panel or
a client PC since the last successful authentication, reaches the threshold, the TOE does
not allow the users to access to the accounts (i.e. state changes to lockout condition).
The number of unsuccessful authentication attempts set by the device administrator can
be within 1 to 10 times.
After changing to lockout state, If time between 1 and 60 minutes and until the lockout
time designated by a device administrator that elapse, or until a device administrator
releases lockout state, the TOE is then back to the normal state.
(8) FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
The auto-logout is activated if no operation is performed from the operation panel or a
web browser for certain period of time.
⚫ Operation Panel
After the user logs on to the TOE and if no operation is performed while the
auto-logout time set by the device administrator elapses, the auto-logout is activated.
The time can be set to 5 to 495 seconds by the device administrator.
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⚫ Web browser
After the user logs on to the TOE and if no operation is performed for 10 minutes, the
auto-logout is activated.
7.2. Data Access Control Function
TSF.DATA_ACCESS
The data access control function is a function that allows authorized users only to access to
image data stored in the TOE using each of the TOE basic function such as copy, scan to send,
print, fax and box function.
(1) FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
The TOE allows authorized users only to access to image data handled by respective basic
functions in accordance with the access control rules for users as shown in Table 7-2.
In Table 7-2 Access Control Rules, login user names and owner information of targeted
assets need to be matched in order to determine if the jobs are executed by themselves.
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Table 7-2 Access Control Rules for Data Access Control Functions
Targeted Assets Operations Users Access Control Rules
Image Data
(Print Function)
Box Print (Job after print
request from a printer
driver), Print from a USB
memory, Delete
Normal User It is allowed for a normal user to
access to job image data executed
by themselves.
Delete Device
Administrator
It is allowed for a device
administrator to access to all job
image data.
Image Data
(Scan to Send
Function)
FTP Send, E-mail Send,
TWAIN Send, Preview
send image, Delete
Normal User It is allowed for a normal user to
access to job image data executed
by themselves.
Delete Device
Administrator
It is allowed for a device
administrator to access to all job
image data.
Image Data
(Copy Function)
Copy Print, Copy preview
image, Delete
Normal User It is allowed for a normal user to
access to job image data executed
by themselves.
Delete Device
Administrator
It is allowed for a device
administrator to access to all job
image data.
Image Data
(Fax Send Function)
FAX Send, Send preview
image, Delete
Normal User It is allowed for a normal user to
access to job image data executed
by themselves.
Delete Device
Administrator
It is allowed for a device
administrator to access to all job
image data.
Image Data
(Box Function)
Box print,
Box preview,
Box Send,
Move, Join and Delete
documents inside a box
Normal User It is allowed for a normal user to
access to image data stored in their
own box set as an owner or a box
that permission is enabled.
Device
Administrator
It is allowed for a device
administrator to access to all job
image data.
Image Data
(Fax Reception
Function)
Print FAX reception, FAX
forward, Delete
Device
Administrator
It is allowed for a device
administrator to access to image
data stored in FAX box.
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(2) FMT_MSA.3(a) Static attribute initialization
The TOE sets default values for image data that is initially generated, and a box. Owner
information is created using a login user name of the user who initially creates the image
data. Box owner is a device administrator who initially creates the box, and the box
permission is disabled.
7.3. Fax Data Flow Control Function
TSF.FAXDATA_FLOW
The Fax Data Flow Control function is a function that controls forwarding the data received
from public line to the TOE’s external interface, following to the FAX forward setting.
(1) FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 Simple Security attribute
TOE controls information flow according with Fax Forward Setting and send received data
from public line to an external interface. Therefore the receiving task from public line
forward the data(information) received from public line to sending task to the external
interface according with Fax Forward Setting.
(2) FMT_MSA.3(b) Static attribute initialization
TOE set default value of newly created FAX forward setting. The default value of the newly
created fax forward setting is an output from printing part.
7.4. SSD Encryption Function
TSF.SSD_ENCRYPTION
Once the basic function of the TOE is executed, image data and TSF data is stored on the SSD.
The SSD encryption function is a function that encrypts data and then stores the data on the
SSD when storing these data on the SSD.
(1) FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic key generation (Storage Encryption)
The TOE generates a 256 bits encryption key to be used in the AES algorithm by using the
encryption key generation algorithm in accordance with NIST SP800-56C. This encryption
key is generated from multiple information including the encryption code which users
register and a unique value on a per device basis, every time each TOE is powered on, and
this encryption key is stored in a volatile memory. Information for encryption key is set
only at the start of operation, and is not changed during the operation.
(2) FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic operation (Storage Encryption)
When storing data on the SSD, the TOE encrypts the data, using the 256 bits encryption
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key generated at the time of booting (FCS_CKM.1(a)) and the AES encryption algorithm
based on FIPS PUB 197, and write into the SSD. When reading out the stored data from
the SSD, the TOE decrypts the data, similarly using the 256 bits encryption key generated
at the time of booting and the AES encryption algorithm.
7.5. Audit Log Function
TSF.AUDIT_LOGGED
The audit log function is a function that generates, records and manages audit logs when
occurring auditable events.
(1) FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
The TOE records audit data as listed in Table 7-3, and generates audit logs when auditable
events shown in Table 7-3 occur.
Table 7-3 Auditable Events and Audit Data
Auditable Events Audit Data Additional Audit Data
Power-on*1 Date and time of the
event,
Type of event,
Identification information
of the user (Including the
identification information
of the user who
attempted to login),
The outcome of the event
(success or failure)
－
Power-off*1 －
Success and failure of the user identification
and authentication
－
Execution of user lockout and release of
lockout status by a device administrator
when the number of consecutive
unsuccessful authentication attempts since
the last successful authentication, reaches
the threshold.
－
Session termination by auto-logout －
Operation of image data
(read, delete)
Identification
information of the
event
Edit of user management information
(Modify user authorization)
－
When registration of login user password is
made, deny by quality check (create, edit)
Use of security management function －
Change of time －
Communication failure of TLS or IPsec Recipient’s
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communication communication IP
address
*1 Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions synchronize power-on and power-off of the TOE, and
thus power-on and power-off of the TOE of the event can be substituted.
(2) FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FIA_UID.1 The timing of identification
For each auditable event, the TOE associates the user identity information that is a cause,
with the audit log.
(3) FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
The TOE provides device administrators only with the capability to read information from
the audit records. Read-access to the audit records is sent (by email) to the email
destination set by a device administrator.
(4) FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
The TOE provides device administrators only with capability to read and delete information
from the audit records, and does not provide normal users other than device
administrators with a function to access to the audit records.
(5) FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
The TOE overwrites the oldest stored audit records and records new auditable events if the
audit log files are full.
(6) FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
The TOE has a system clock inside itself. The TOE records a date and time of the event
with the system clock when auditable events occur. The TOE provides a highly reliable time
stamp by recording the time stamps on audit records without delay when the time is
recorded by the system clock inside the TOE.
7.6. Security Management Function
TSF.SECURITY_MANAGEMENT
Security management function is a function that allows authorized users only to edit user
information, set the TOE security functions and manage. The Security management function
can be performed from the Operation Panel and Client PCs. Web browser is used for
operation from Client PCs.
(1) FMT_MSA.1(a) Management of security attributes
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The TOE allows device administrators only to use box functions for all boxes as shown
below.
• Modify a box owner
• Modify a box permission
Whereas, the TOE allows device administrators only to use box functions for documents as
shown below.
• Modify document owner information
Normal users are allowed to perform the following operation on the self owner boxes.
• Read and modify a box permission
(2) FMT_MSA.1(b) Management of security attributes
The TOE allows only Device Administrator to perform following operation for Fax forward
setting.
• Modify Fax forward setting.
(3) FMT_MTD.1(a) Management of TSF Data
The TOE provides device administrators only with the operation listed in Table 7-4 on TSF
data listed in Table 7-4.
Table 7-4 Operation of TSF Data by Device Administrators
TSF Data Authorized Operation
Register user information
(Login user name, login user password, user
authorization)
Edit,
Delete,
Newly create
User account lockout policy settings
(number of retries until locked, lockout
duration)
Modify
Lockout list Modify
Auto logout time setting Modify
Password policy settings Modify
Date and time settings Modify
Network Encryption Setting Modify
Send destination information for audit log
report
Modify
(4) FMT_MTD.1(b) Management of TSF Data
The TOE provides normal users with the operation listed in Table 7-5 on TSF data listed in
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Table 7-5.
Table 7-5 Operation of TSF Data by Normal Users
TSF Data Authorized Operation
Edit user information
(Login user password associated to the users)
Edit
(5) FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
The TOE maintains the user authorizations of device administrators and normal users, and
associates users to the user authorizations.
(6) FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management function
The TOE provides management function of security attributes for box functions as
mentioned in (1), and security management function shown in Table 7-4 and Table 7-5 on
TSF data shown in Table 7-4 and Table 7-5.
7.7. Self-Test Function
TSF.SELF_TEST
The self-test function is a function that performs the following self-test.
(1) FPT_TST.1 TSF test
The TOE performs the following self-test.
• Check if SSD encryption function is correctly performed.
• Check the integrity of the encryption key
• Check the integrity of executable module of the security function
At the TOE start-up, the TOE simultaneously checks if SSD encryption function is correctly
performed and the integrity of the encryption key is verified by confirming encryption and
decryption operations using the encryption key. Also, the TOE checks the integrity of
executable module of the security functions when receiving an instruction from a device
administrator.
In case abnormal operation is found by check at the TOE start-up, the users are notified
of this abnormal status by displaying it on the Operation Panel of the TOE. If no
abnormal item is found on the Operation Panel, the users assume the TOE correctly
operates and so the users can use the TOE.
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7.8. Network Protection Function
TSF.NETWORK_PROTECT
The network protection function is a function that encrypts all data in transit over the
internal network and prevents unauthorized alteration and disclosure. It is protected by
encrypted data flow on the internal network when a user uses Scan to Send function, Printer
driver function, and Web browser function.
(1) FTP_ITC.1 Trusted channel between TSF
When the TOE communicates with each type of server or a Client PC that are trusted IT
products, communication starts between them via a trusted channel. This communication
can start from either of the TOE or the trusted IT product. The following functions are
provided.
• Scan to send function
• Print function
• Box function (Send Function)
• Operation of a box function from a client PC (web browser)
• Operation of security management function from a client PC (web browser)
However, use of print function for a direct connection with the TOE is exception.
The TOE provides trusted channel communications listed below.
Table 7-6 Trusted channel communications provided by the TOE
Destination Protocols Encryption algorithm
Client PC TLSv1.2, TLSv1.3 AES(128 bits, 256 bits), ChaCha20-Poly1305
Mail Server IPsec with ESP 3DES(168 bits), AES(128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits)
FTP Server IPsec with ESP 3DES(168 bits), AES(128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits)
(2) FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (TLS)
Secure Communications requires generation of a certificate with an RSA public-private key
pair.
The TOE creates session keys following the TLS protocol specification and using the DRBG
implemented in OpenSSL.
(3) FCS_CKM.1(c) Cryptographic key generation (IPSec)
ISAKMP and IKEv1 are used to establish the Security Association (SA) and keys for the IPSec
exchanges.
(4) FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic operation (TLS)
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TLS 1.2 (RFC5246) is used to establish secure channel between client PCs and TOE. The TOE
sends the server certificate chain to the client. The client performs certificate path
validation of the server certificate during the TLS handshake. If the certificate cannot be
successfully validated (e.g. it has expired or has been revoked) the TLS session is not
established.
The TOE only allows the establishment of a TLS secure channel using TLSv1.2 and TLSv1.3.
The TOE denies any attempt by a TLS client to establish communication using the following
versions of the SSL or TLS protocols: SSLv1.0, SSLv2.0, SSLv3.0, TLSv1.0 or TLSv1.1. The TOE
creates session keys following the TLS protocol specification and using the DRBG
implemented in OpenSSL. This session key is held in memory and is only valid for that
given session. Once the session is terminated the key cannot be used to decrypt
subsequent sessions. The TOE supports the following cipher suites:
⚫ TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (RFC8446)
⚫ TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (RFC8446)
⚫ TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (RFC8439)
⚫ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (RFC5289)
⚫ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (RFC5289)
⚫ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (RFC5289)
⚫ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (RFC5289)
⚫ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 (RFC7905)
⚫ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (RFC5288)
⚫ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (RFC5288)
⚫ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 (RFC7905)
⚫ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (RFC5288)
⚫ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (RFC5288)
⚫ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (RFC5246)
⚫ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (RFC5246)
⚫ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 (RFC5246)
⚫ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (RFC5246)
⚫ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (RFC5246)
⚫ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (RFC5246)
⚫ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 (RFC5246)
⚫ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (RFC5246)
⚫ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (RFC5246)
⚫ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (RFC5246)
(5) FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (IPSec)
IPSec with ESP is required for network datagram exchanges with Mail Server/FTP Server.
IPSec provide confidentiality, integrity and authentication of the endpoints. Supported
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encryption options for ESP are 3DES and AES. HMAC-SHA256-128, HMAC-SHA384-192, and
HMAC-SHA512-256 are supported for Data authentication.
ISAKMP and IKEv1 are used to establish the Security Association (SA) and keys for the IPSec
exchanges. Diffie-Hellman is used for IKEv1 Key Derivation Function as specified in
RFC2409, using Oakley Groups 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, or 24. In the ISAKMP
exchange, a pre-shared keys is configured by administrators and validated between
endpoints.
The key size specified in the SA exchange is 128, 192, or 256 bits and the encryption
algorithm is 3DES or AES-CBC and the Hash Authentication Algorithm may be SHA-256,
SHA-384, or SHA-512 (as configured by administrators).
Keys generated for the IKEv1 exchanges are performed per RFC2409. If an incoming IP
datagram does not use IPSec with ESP, the datagram is discarded. All keys are held in
memory and is only valid with the corresponding SA. Once the SA is terminated the key
cannot be used.
7.9. Deviations From Allowed Cryptographic Standards
The following deviations from the Allowed Cryptographic Standards in 188 Scheme Crypto
Policy are noted:
1. Hashing: SHA-1 is supported for backward compatibility with remote systems.
2. Block cipher: AES-XTS is supported for storage encryption.
3. Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data: ChaCha20-Poly1305 is supported
for TLSv1.3 communication.
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8. Acronyms and Terminology
8.1. Definition of terms
The definitions of the terms used in this ST are indicated in Table 8-1.
Table 8-1 Definitions of terms used in this ST
Terms Definitions
FAX System 12 This is provided as an optional product of MFP to use
faxfunction. FAX function can be used by installing FAX board
separately on MFP.
TWAIN This function is to read image from scanner and send the image
to a client PC. The term, “TWAIN” indicates the API
specification.
FAX Data Reception It indicates an action that includes reception of incoming FAX
data to TOE. (the process such as printing and forwarding of
data is not included.)
Job This is the operation processing unit to perform copy function,
print function, scan to send function, fax function and
document box function of TOE.
Job Information It indicates information that job holds. It mainly indicates
jobs in operation. However, it also indicates histories of
execution results.
A list of Job
Information
One that list job information.
Box Information Information that is stored in an area, called “box” when using
box function. For example, box name, box number, box size etc.
Security attributes such as box owner and box permission are
also included in this information.
Edit An operation that modifies data registered by users, such as user
information and box information.
Move It is to move document stored in a box to another box.
Join It is to join multiple documents stored in a box, and create a
new joined document. Original documents remain.
Preview Send Image This is one of scan to send function and FAX function operation.
A function that displays image preview read from a scanner of
TOE for sending on the operation panel.
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Preview Copy Image This is one of copy function operation.
A function that displays image preview read from a scanner of
TOE for copying on the operation panel.
Box Preview This is one of box function operation.
It is to display the preview of the document stored in a box on
the operation screen.
Device Status Information that shows TOE status. Remaining toner volume,
papers and mechanical errors are displayed.
Counter Information Information about counting jobs performed by TOE. When
print function performs, print counter increases. When scan
to send function performs, send counter increases.
Image Data It indicates the image information that is processed inside the
MFP when TOE normal users use copy function, scan to send
function, print function, FAX function and box function.
Client PC It indicates the computers that connect to the network, and
utilize the TOE services (functions) of the TOEs that are
connected to the network.
FIPS PUB 180-4 This is an algorithm about a hash function, which is
standardized by the NIST, U.S.(National Institute of Standards
and Technology).
FIPS PUB 197 This is an algorithm about the common cryptographic key,
which is standardized by the NIST, U.S. (National Institute of
Standards and Technology). Also, this is called “AES”.
Operation Panel This is installed on the uppermost part of the MFP, and is
constituted by a liquid crystal panel.
It is an external interface, and users can utilize the TOE via this
operation panel.
Task to be executed
on behalf of user
This is an executed process on behalf of users(Normal User,
Device Administrator).
Task to receive data
from public line
This is a process received from public line.
Task to send data to
an external interface
This is a process to send to an external interface.
8.2. Definition of acronyms
The definitions of the acronyms used in this ST are indicated in Table 8-2.
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Table 8-2 Definitions of acronyms used in this ST
Acronyms Definitions
A. assumption (when used in hierarchical naming)
ADMIN. administrator (when used in hierarchical naming)
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
FAX facsimile
IT information technology
MFP Multi Functional Printer
NCU Network Control Unit
NAND Not AND
O.
Security Objective (of the TOE) (when used in hierarchical
naming)
OE.
Security Objective (of the operational environment) (when
used in hierarchical naming)
OSP organizational security policy
P.
organizational security policy (when used in hierarchical
naming)
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security target
T. threat (when used in hierarchical naming)
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE security functionality
USB Universal Serial Bus
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