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Reference: 2019-34-INF-3639- v1
Target: Pública
Date: 03.11.2021
Created by: CERT11
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
Dossier # 2019-34
TOE Huawei 3900 Series LTE eNodeB Core Software V100R015C10SPC270
Applicant 440301192203821 - Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
References
[EXT-5299] Certification Request
[EXT-7069] Evaluation Technical Report
Certification report of the product Huawei 3900 Series LTE eNodeB Core Software
V100R015C10SPC270, as requested in [EXT-5299] dated 13/09/2019, and evaluated by DEKRA
Testing and Certification S.A.U., as detailed in the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-7069] received
on 26/07/2021.
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...........................................................................................................................3
TOE SUMMARY...................................................................................................................................3
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS.............................................................................................4
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS...........................................................................................5
IDENTIFICATION.....................................................................................................................................6
SECURITY POLICIES.................................................................................................................................6
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .........................................................................6
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS..................................................................................6
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY ...............................................................................7
ARCHITECTURE.......................................................................................................................................7
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE ....................................................................................................................7
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE...................................................................................................................7
DOCUMENTS..........................................................................................................................................8
PRODUCT TESTING.................................................................................................................................8
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION ...............................................................................................................8
EVALUATION RESULTS ...........................................................................................................................9
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM.................................................9
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS ...........................................................................................................9
GLOSSARY.............................................................................................................................................10
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....................................................................................................................................10
SECURITY TARGET ................................................................................................................................10
RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS...............................................................................................................11
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)......................................................11
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA).....................................................................11
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the product Huawei
3900 Series LTE eNodeB Core Software V100R015C10SPC270.
The TOE is the core part of the software that is deployed into a LTE eNodeB base station, which is
the wireless access node in LTE/SAE system. It provides the communication with the EPC/Backhaul
network (through S1 and X2 interfaces), the management interfaces and other security related
functionality.
Developer/manufacturer: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Sponsor: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN).
ITSEF: DEKRA Testing and Certification S.A.U.
Protection Profile: None.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R5 EAL4+ (ALC_FLR.1).
Evaluation end date: 01/10/2021.
Expiration Date1
: 04/11/2026.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL4 (augmented with ALC_FLR.1)
have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory DEKRA Testing and Certification
S.A.U. assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are
satisfied for the EAL4 + ALC_FLR.1, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R5 and the CEM v3.1
R5.
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product Huawei 3900 Series LTE eNodeB Core Software V100R015C10SPC270, a positive resolution
is proposed.
TOE SUMMARY
Huawei 3900 Series LTE eNodeB Core Software V100R015C10SPC270 is the base station in LTE radio
networks. The TOE is the core part of the software that is deployed into a Huawei 3900 series LTE
1
This date refers to the expiration date of the certificate recognition within the scope of the mutual recognition
arrangements signed by this Certification Body.
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eNodeB base station and the major security features implemented and included in the evaluation
scope are:
 Management network.
- Identification and Authentication.
- Access control.
- Communications security.
 Telecom network: S1 and X2 backhaul interface protection.
 Resource management: session establishment mechanisms and VLAN separation.
 Security function management: command groups, trusted channels, users, etc.
 Digital signature: for the verification of software packages when loaded.
 Auditing of security events.
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level EAL4 and the
evidences required by the additional component ALC_FLR.1, according to Common Criteria v3.1 R5.
ASSURANCE CLASS ASSURANCE COMPONENT
ASE ASE_CCL.1
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_INT.1
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_SPD.1
ASE.TSS.1
ADV ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.4
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_TDS.3
AGD AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ALC ALC_CMC.4
ALC_CMS.4
ALC_DEL.1
ALC_DVS.1
ALC_FLR.1
ALC_LCD.1
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ALC_TAT.1
ATE ATE_COV.2
ATE_DPT.1
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2
AVA AVA_VAN.3
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements, according to the
Common Criteria v3.1 R5:
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.2
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_SAR.3
FAU_STG.1
FAU_STG.3
FDP_ACC.1/Local
FDP_ACF.1/Local
FDP_ACC.1/Domain
FDP_ACF.1/Domain
FDP_ACC.1/EMSCOMM
FDP_ACF.1/EMSCOMM
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_ATD.1
FIA_UAU.1/Local
FIA_UAU.2/EMSCOMM
FIA_UAU.5
FIA_UID.1/Local
FIA_UID.2/EMSCOMM
FIA_SOS.1
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FTA_TSE.1/SEP
FTA_TSE.1/Local
FCS_COP.1/TLS
FCS_CKM.1/TLS
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FCS_COP.1/IPsec
FCS_CKM.1/IPsec
FCS_COP.1/Sign
FTP_ITC.1
IDENTIFICATION
Product: Huawei 3900 Series LTE eNodeB Core Software V100R015C10SPC270
Security Target: CC HUAWEI LTE eNodeB Core Software V100R015C10SPC270 Security Target
version 1.6 (15 July 2021).
Protection Profile: None.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R5 EAL4 + ALC_FLR.1.
SECURITY POLICIES
The use of the product Huawei 3900 Series LTE eNodeB Core Software V100R015C10SPC270 shall
implement a set of security policies assuring the fulfilment of different standards and security
demands.
The detail of these policies is documented in [ST], chapter 3.3 (Organizational policies).
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The assumptions detailed in [ST], chapter 3.4 (Assumptions) are constraints to the conditions used
to assure the security properties and functionalities compiled by the security target. These
assumptions have been applied during the evaluation in order to determine if the identified
vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these assumptions for its
operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them could not be assumed, it would not
be possible to assure the secure operation of the TOE.
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS
The threats detailed in [ST], chapter 3.2 (Threats) do not suppose a risk for the product Huawei
3900 Series LTE eNodeB Core Software V100R015C10SPC270, although the agents implementing
attacks have the attack potential according to the Enhanced-Basic of EAL4 + ALC_FLR.1 and always
fulfilling the usage assumptions and the proper security policies satisfaction.
For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product security
properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
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OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some of the
objectives of the defined security problem.
The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are detailed in [ST], chapter
4.2 (Security Objectives for the Operational Environment).
The details of the product operational environment (assumptions, threats and organisational
security policies) and the TOE security requirements are included in the associated security target.
ARCHITECTURE
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE
The TOE is pure software and it is divided in three main subsystems:
 Control.
 Baseband
 Transport.
The TOE main security functionalities are:
A. Identification and Authentication (Management network)
B. Access control (Management network)
C. Management interfaces protection (Management network)
D. Backhaul Interface protection (telecom network)
E. Resource management
F. Security function management
G. Digital signature
H. Auditing
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE
The TOE is a software package which includes all the TOE components and it is delivered in a single
compressed file.
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DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made available
together to the users of the evaluated version.
DOCUMENT FORMAT
Security Management Guide of Huawei 3900 Series LTE eNodeB Core Software V0.9 DOC
Installation Guide of Huawei 3900 Series LTE eNodeB Core Software V2.4 DOC
BTS3900&BTS5900 V100R015C10SPC270 MML Command Reference v1.3 ZIP
BTS3900&BTS5900 V100R015C10SPC270 Error codes V0.2 XLSX
PRODUCT TESTING
The developer has executed test for all the security functions. All the tests have been performed by
the developer in its premises, with a satisfactory result.
During the evaluation process it has been verified each unit test checking that the security
functionality that covers is been identified and also that the kind of test is appropriate to the
function that is intended to test.
All the tests have been developed using the testing scenario appropriate to the established
architecture in the security target. It has also been checked that the obtained results during the
tests fit or correspond to the previously estimated results.
To verify the results of the developer tests, the evaluator has repeated all the developer functional
tests, verifying that the obtained results are consistent with the results obtained by the developer.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The software and hardware requirements, as well as the referenced options are indicated below.
Therefore, for the operation of the product Huawei 3900 Series LTE eNodeB Core Software
V100R015C10SPC270 it is necessary the disposition of the following software components:
The TOE is the core part of the software that is deployed into a Huawei 3900 series LTE eNodeB
base station and the version under evaluation is V100R015C10SPC270.
The TOE can be deployed with different physical configurations with no changes in the
functionality, or in the installation procedures to be followed. The configuration used during the
evaluation has been the DBS3900 LTE (Distributed base station).
The elements forming the TOE operational environment are detailed below:
 LTE eNodeB HW elements, including BBU (Baseband Unit) subrack and RRU/AAU (Remote
Radio Unit / Active Antenna Unit).
 LTE eNodeB Operating System: RTOS V200R007C00.
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 U2020 server providing access to the management functions of the TOE via SSL/TLS. U2020
version must be iManager U2020 V300R19C00.
 S-GW: Serving Gateway, Within the EPC the S-GW is responsible for tunnelling user plane
traffic between the eNB and the PDN-GW. To do this its role includes acting as the mobility
anchor point for the User Plane during handovers between eNB as well as data buffering
when traffic arrives for a mobile in the LTE Idle sta
 A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) which is a set of policies, and procedures needed to create,
manage, distribute, use, store, and revoke digital certificates. There exists a well managed
protected public key infrastructure. The certificates used by the TOE and its client are
managed by the PKI.
EVALUATION RESULTS
The product Huawei 3900 Series LTE eNodeB Core Software V100R015C10SPC270 has been
evaluated against the Security Target CC HUAWEI LTE eNodeB Core Software V100R015C10SPC270
Security Target version 1.6 (15 July 2021).
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL4 + ALC_FLR.1 have been
assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory DEKRA Testing and Certification S.A.U.
assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for
the evaluation level EAL4 + ALC_FLR.1, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R5 and the CEM
v3.1 R5.
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM
Next, recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided. These have been
collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be considered when using the product.
 It is mandatory to strictly follow the steps indicated in the installation documentation in
order to download and install the correct version of the TOE in a proper manner.
 The user guidance must be read and understood in order to operate the TOE in an adequate
manner according to the security target.
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product DEKRA Testing and Certification S.A.U., a positive resolution is proposed.
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 It must be noted that the interface between the base station and the user terminal is out of
the scope of the evaluation, so the confidentiality and the integrity of the information
exchanged between these elements have not been evaluated.
GLOSSARY
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
OC Organismo de Certificación
TOE Target Of Evaluation
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the product:
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Version 3.1, R5 Final,
April 2017.
[ST] CC HUAWEI LTE eNodeB Core Software V100R015C10SPC270 Security Target version 1.6 (15
July 2021).
SECURITY TARGET
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is available in the
Certification Body:
- CC HUAWEI LTE eNodeB Core Software V100R015C10SPC270 Security Target version 1.6 (15
July 2021).
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RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under
certain conditions was agreed.
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It
defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at
higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL
4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For "Smartcards and similar devices" a
SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical
Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common
Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The current list of
signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the
agreement can be seen on the website at www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this
agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common
Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers
CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on
assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation
(ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates based on CCRA-
2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of CCRA-
2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification procedures and for Assurance Continuity
(maintenance and re-certification)of old certificates a transition period on the recognition of
certificates according to the rules of CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL
4 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
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As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government representatives from
the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the
United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the
website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this
certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under CCRA for all assurance components up to EAL2 and
ALC_FLR.