Date of Issue: 2016/10/14
Copyright CANON INC 2016
1
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE
C55900KG/C5500 Series
2600 model
Security Target
Version 1.07
2016/10/14
Canon Inc.
Significant portions of this document were excerpted from IEEE Std 2600.1 and 2600.2,
-2009 - copyright IEEE 2009 and reproduced with permission from IEEE. , All rights
reserved. An use beyond what is permitted, please contact mailto:stds-ipr@ieee.org.
This document is a translation of the evaluated and certified
security target written in Japanese.
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Table of Contents
1 ST introduction.....................................................................................................................................4
1.1 ST reference..............................................................................................................................4
1.2 TOE reference...........................................................................................................................4
1.3 TOE overview...........................................................................................................................4
1.4 Terms and Abbreviations..........................................................................................................5
1.5 TOE description ........................................................................................................................7
1.6 Scope of the TOE......................................................................................................................9
1.6.1 Physical Scope of the TOE................................................................................................9
1.6.2 Logical Scope of the TOE ...............................................................................................10
1.7 Users of the TOE.....................................................................................................................12
1.8 Assets ......................................................................................................................................12
1.8.1 User Data.........................................................................................................................12
1.8.2 TSF Data..........................................................................................................................12
1.8.3 Functions .........................................................................................................................13
2 Conformance claims...........................................................................................................................14
2.1 CC Conformance claim...........................................................................................................14
2.2 PP claim, Package claim .........................................................................................................14
2.3 SFR Packages..........................................................................................................................14
2.3.1 SFR Packages reference ..................................................................................................14
2.3.2 SFR Package functions....................................................................................................15
2.3.3 SFR Package attributes....................................................................................................16
2.4 PP Conformance rationale.......................................................................................................16
3 Security Problem Definition...............................................................................................................19
3.1 Notational conventions............................................................................................................19
3.2 Threats agents .........................................................................................................................19
3.3 Threats to TOE Assets ............................................................................................................20
3.4 Organizational Security Policies for the TOE.........................................................................20
3.5 Assumptions............................................................................................................................21
4 Security Objectives ............................................................................................................................22
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE.............................................................................................22
4.2 Security Objectives for the IT environment............................................................................22
4.3 Security Objectives for the non-IT environment.....................................................................22
4.4 Security Objectives rationale ..................................................................................................23
5 Extended components definition (APE_ECD)...................................................................................26
5.1 FPT_CIP_EXP Confidentiality and integrity of stored data...................................................26
5.2 FPT_FDI_EXP Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces......................................27
6 Security requirements.........................................................................................................................29
6.1 Security functional requirements ............................................................................................29
6.1.1 User Authentication Function..........................................................................................29
6.1.2 Function Use Restriction Function..................................................................................32
6.1.3 Job Output Restriction Functions ....................................................................................34
6.1.4 Forward Received Jobs Function ....................................................................................38
6.1.5 HDD Data Erase Function...............................................................................................38
6.1.6 HDD Data Encryption Function......................................................................................38
6.1.7 LAN Data Protection Function........................................................................................39
6.1.8 Self-Test Function ...........................................................................................................40
6.1.9 Audit Log Function .........................................................................................................41
6.1.10 Management Function.....................................................................................................43
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements...........................................................................................48
6.3 Security functional requirements rationale .............................................................................48
6.3.1 The completeness of security requirements.....................................................................48
6.3.2 The sufficiency of security requirements ........................................................................50
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6.3.3 The dependencies of security requirements.....................................................................51
6.4 Security assurance requirements rationale..............................................................................53
7 TOE Summary specification ..............................................................................................................54
7.1 User Authentication Function .................................................................................................54
7.2 Function Use Restriction Function..........................................................................................54
7.3 Job Output Restriction Functions............................................................................................55
7.3.1 Job Cancel .......................................................................................................................56
7.3.2 In The JOB Access Control.............................................................................................56
7.3.3 Temporarily Stored FAX TX Jobs ..................................................................................58
7.4 Forward Received Jobs Function............................................................................................59
7.5 HDD Data Erase Function ......................................................................................................59
7.6 HDD Data Encryption Function..............................................................................................59
7.6.1 Encryption/Decryption Function.....................................................................................59
7.6.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function .....................................................................60
7.7 LAN Data Protection Function ...............................................................................................60
7.7.1 IP Packet Encryption Function........................................................................................60
7.7.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function .....................................................................60
7.8 Self-Test Function...................................................................................................................61
7.9 Audit Log Function.................................................................................................................61
7.10 Management Functions...........................................................................................................62
7.10.1 User Management Function.............................................................................................62
7.10.2 Device Management Function.........................................................................................63
Trademark Notice
- Canon, the Canon logo, imageRUNNER, imageRUNNER ADVANCE, imagePRESS, MEAP, and the MEAP logo are
trademarks of Canon Inc.
- Microsoft, Windows, Windows Server 2012, Windows 7, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, and Active Directory are trademarks or
registered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation in the US.
- Mac OS is a trademark of Apple Computer Inc. in the US.
- Oracle and Java are registered trademarks of Oracle Corporation and its affiliates in the United States and in other
countries.
- All names of companies and products contained herein are trademarks or registered trademarks of the respective
companies.
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1 ST introduction
1.1 ST reference
This section provides the Security Target (ST) identification information.
ST name: Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C55900KG/C5500 Series 2600 model Security
Target
Version: 1.07
Issued by: Canon Inc.
Date of Issue: 2016/10/14
1.2 TOE reference
This section provides the TOE identification information.
TOE name: Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C55900KG/C5500 Series 2600 model
Version: 1.0
The TOE is comprised of the following software, hardware, and licenses.
iR-ADV Security Kit-P1 for IEEE 2600 Common Criteria Certification Ver 1.00
Super G3 FAX Board-AS(Standard-equipment on "F" model)
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C55900KG/C5500 Series
Note that the sales names of Fax Boards are different depending on the region as shown
below. Procurers needs to confirm and purchase appropriate fax board:
Japan: Super G3 FAX Board-AS1
U.S. and Korea: Super G3 FAX Board-AS2
Other regions: Super G3 FAX Board-AS1
1.3 TOE overview
The TOE is a digital multi-function product (MFP) known as < Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE
C55900KG/C5500 Series 2600 model >. This is a version of the standard model < Canon
imageRUNNER ADVANCE C55900KG/C5500 Series > which by installing/attaching the following 2
products and making the proper settings, makes up the < Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE
C55900KG/C5500 Series 2600 model > or TOE.
- iR-ADV Security Kit-P1 for IEEE 2600 Common Criteria Certification
- Fax Board (Standard-equipment on "F" model)
< iR-ADV Security Kit-P1 for IEEE 2600 Common Criteria Certification> contains the < Canon
imageRUNNER ADVANCE C55900KG/C5500 Series > control software and security kit license.
The HDD of the TOE may be a removable drive.
Fax Board is hardware to use fax functionality.
< Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C55900KG/C5500 Series 2600 model > is capable of fully
implementing the Protection Profile (PP) for Multi-Function Products indicated below, as well as the
security functions required by the 7 SFR Packages defined in the PP.
Protection Profile
- U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy
Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std 2600.2™-2009)
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SFR Packages
- 2600.2-PRT, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions, Operational Environment B
- 2600.2-SCN, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions, Operational Environment B
- 2600.2-CPY, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions, Operational Environment B
- 2600.2-FAX, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions, Operational Environment B
- 2600.2-DSR, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Document Storage and Retrieval (DSR) Functions,
Operational Environment B
- 2600.2-NVS, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Nonvolatile Storage Functions, Operational
Environment B
- 2600.2-SMI, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface Functions, Operational
Environment B
1.4 Terms and Abbreviations
The following terms and abbreviations are used throughout this ST.
Table 1 —Terms and Abbreviations
Terms/Abbreviations Description
Multi-Function
Product (MFP)
A machine which incorporates the functionality of multiple devices in one, such as
copier, fax, printer, and Universal Send, and containing a large capacity HDD to
facilitate such capabilities.
Control software Software that runs on the hardware of the device, and controls security functions.
Control panel One of the hardware elements of the MFP, consisting of a touch panel and
operation keys, which provides the interface for operation of the MFP.
Remote UI An interface that provides access to the MFP from a Web browser via the LAN, to
allow the acquisition of operating status, perform job operations or BOX
operations, and making various settings.
HDD Hard disk drive mounted on the MFP, where control software and assets are stored.
I-Fax Short for Internet Fax. Uses the Internet to receive and send faxes.
Image file Image data generated within the MFP, from operations such as scan, print, and
receive.
Temporary image file Image files generated during jobs such as Copy and Print, which are needed only
until the job completes.
Roles Used by access restriction functions to restrict the functions that each user can use.
One role is associated with each user. In addition to pre-defined default roles,
default roles may be modified to create custom roles. The default roles are:
Administrator, Power User, General User, Limited User, and Guest User.
A user assigned the Administrator role is capable of using management operations
(administrative privileges).
Administrator User assigned the Administrator role and has administrative privileges.
Equivalent to U.ADMINISTRATOR defined in the PP.
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Terms/Abbreviations Description
Job When a user uses the functions of the TOE to execute an operation on a document,
a Job is the intended document data combined with the user instructions for
processing those data.
The operations that can be performed on a document are: Scan, Print, Copy, Fax
TX, Save, and Delete. The processing phases for a Job issued by the user are:
generation, execution, and completion.
Document data User data processed within the MFP, consisting of image files and print setting.
Memory RX
(Reception)
Allows data received by fax/I-fax to be stored in the Memory RX Inbox for later
processing.
Box Collective name for Mail Boxes, Fax Inboxes, or the Memory RX Inbox wherein
data from operations such as scan, print, and received faxes are stored in the MFP.
*Use of Fax Inboxes is not included in this TOE.
Mail Box Whether a general user feeds data to the MFP directly, or specifies a document for
printing from a PC, data can be stored here to be printed later.
Memory RX Inbox When memory reception is set, documents received by fax/I-fax are stored in the
Memory RX Inbox. Stored documents can be printed or sent later.
Mail server Server that facilitates I-fax transmission or email transmission of document data in
the MFP.
User authentication
server
Server that maintains user information such as user ID and password, for user
authentication over the network.
Firewall Device or system designed to protect the internal LAN against threats from the
Internet.
Time server Server that uses the Network Time Protocol to provide the accurate time over the
Internet.
[Print] A button on the control panel that activates the function to operate on-hold print
jobs.
[Copy] A button on the control panel that activates the Copy function.
[Fax] A button on the control panel that activates the Fax function.
[Scan] Indicates the [Scan and Store] and [Scan and Send] buttons on the control panel,
that allow the user to scan paper documents to be stored as files, or scanned
documents to be sent to some location such as to an email address or a shared
folder in a PC, respectively.
[Fax/I-Fax Inbox] A button on the control panel that activates the Fax/I-Fax Inbox function.
There are two types of Fax/I-Fax Inbox: the Memory RX Inbox and Confidential
Fax Inbox. You can use both inboxes to store files received by Fax and I-Fax.
[Access Stored Files] A button on the control panel that allows the user to access files stored in a Mail
Box/Inbox.
Remote UI
[Access
Received/Stored
Files]
A button on the remote UI that allows the user to access files stored in a Mail
Box/Inbox.
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1.5 TOE description
The TOE is a MFP that offers Copy, Print, Universal Send, Fax, I-Fax RX, and Mail Box capabilities. The
TOE, which conforms to "U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection
Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std 2600.2™-2009)" is designed to operate in an
environment such as the one shown below (as excerpted from "IEEE Standard Protection Profile for
Hardcopy Devices in IEEE Std 2600TM-2008" clause "1.1 Scope").
This standard is for a Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices in a commercial information processing
environment in which a moderate level of document security, network security, and security assurance are
required. Typically, the day-to-day proprietary and nonproprietary information needed to operate an
enterprise will be handled by this environment. This environment will be known as “Operational
Environment B."
Figure 1 shows the environment for which the TOE or < Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE
C55900KG/C5500 Series 2600 model > has been designed, with options included. Since not all of
these features may be required, the actual operational environment is expected to differ than what is
shown here.
Figure 1 The assumed operational environment of the MFP
< Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C55900KG/C5500 Series >
PC
HDD
LAN
Firewall
Mail server
P
r
i
n
t
（
P
r
i
n
t
/
S
t
o
r
e
）
Mail Box
Memory
RX
Inbox
N
e
t
w
o
r
k
f
a
x
Send via I-Fax/E-Mail
Receive I-Fax
Paper
document
s
C
o
p
y
S
t
o
r
e
i
n
M
a
i
l
B
o
x
S
e
n
d
Paper
document
s
C
o
p
y
P
r
i
n
t
Web browser
Internet
R
e
m
o
t
e
U
I
Multi-Function
Product
User authentication
server
User authentication
Authentication result
Time server
PC
Print via
USB
connection
Fax RX
Fax TX
PSTN
In Figure 1, the MFP is connected by an internal LAN, to all of the other major components, namely the
Mail Server, User Authentication Server, PC, and Firewall. Furthermore, the internal LAN is protected by
Firewall from threats from the Internet. To send (via I-Fax or email) a previously scanned document or
when receiving a document by I-Fax for example, the MFP connects to the Mail Server. By using a PC with
a Web browser1
, functions such as printing, storing, or I-Fax can also be executed remotely. However, in
order to print from a PC, the appropriate printer driver needs to be installed in the PC. Alternatively, a USB
cable could be used to connect the PC directly, and print or store document data from the PC. In this case,
1 This evaluation was performed using Microsoft Internet Explorer 11 as the Web browser.
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some configuration is required initially, in order to protect against data being taken out of the MFP and
stored in a PC or USB device.
The TOE also obtains accurate time from the Time server for time synchronization, and supports user
authentication through the External Authentication Server. The functions available to the MFP in such an
environment are listed below:
- Copy function
Produces duplicates of the hardcopy document by scanning and printing.
- Print function
Produces a hardcopy document from its electronic form (contained in the MFP or sent from a
PC).
- I-Fax RX (receive) function
Uses the Internet to receive faxes. Data received by I-fax is not printed immediately; rather it is
stored in Memory RX Inbox for processing at a later time. Stored documents can be printed,
sent or deleted later.
- Fax RX (receive) function
Uses a fax line to receive faxes. Data received by fax is not printed immediately; rather it is
stored in Memory RX Inbox for processing at a later time. Stored documents can be printed, sent
or deleted later.
- Fax TX (send) function
Scanned document data or electronic documents stored in Mail Box/Memory RX Inbox can be
retrieved for transmission by fax.
- Universal Send function
Scanned document data or electronic documents stored in Mail Box/Memory RX Inbox can be
transmitted by email or I-fax, or sent to a shared folder on a PC, in TIFF or PDF file format.
- Mail Box function
Refers to the storage of image files into a Mail Box or in Memory RX Inbox, or to functions
that utilize the Mail Box/inbox functionality.
- Image files Stored in Mail Box
Scanned document data or electronic data specified for storage from a PC, are stored in a
Mail Box.
- Functions that utilize Mail Box functionality
The following functions can be executed on data stored in a Mail Box.
– Edit (document/print setting)
– Print
– Send
– Delete
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1.6 Scope of the TOE
The TOE conforms to “: U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection
Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std 2600.2™-2009)” and is designed to meet the
requirements specified therein, as described below.
The physical and logical scopes of the TOE are described below.
1.6.1 Physical Scope of the TOE
The TOE is a MFP consisting of hardware and software components. The physical scope of the TOE is
illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2 Hardware and software components of the TOE
Control Software
(TOE Software)
Fax board
("F model" is
equipped with Fax
Board by default)
(TOE: Hardware)
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C55900KG/C5500 Series
MFP Main Unit
(TOE: Hardware)
In Figure 2, "Control Software" refers to the < iR-ADV Security Kit-P1 for IEEE 2600 Common Criteria
Certification>.
Note also that the “MFP Main Unit" together with the < iR-ADV Security Kit-P1 for IEEE 2600 Common
Criteria Certification> make up the MFP main unit.
The TOE or < Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C55900KG/C5500 Series 2600 model >
consists of the MFP main unit combined with the Fax Board.
< Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C55900KG/C5500 Series >, or the hardware making up the TOE,
refers to the following product lineup.
Table 2 —Line of Products
Products
iR-ADV C55960KG/C55950KG/C55940KG/C55935KG
iR-ADV C5560/C5560i/C5560F
iR-ADV C5550/C5550i/C5550F
iR-ADV C5540/C5540i/C5540F
iR-ADV C5535/C5535i/C5535F
The Fax Board composing the TOE is called differently as follows, depending on the sales region. By
procuring appropriate fax board and combining with the TOE, the Fax Board is identified and makes up the
TOE.
Japan: Super G3 FAX Board-AS1
U.S and Korea: Super G3 FAX Board-AS2
Other regions: Super G3 FAX Board-AS1
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The documentation for the TOE are listed below.
(English Name)
- iR-ADV Security Kit-P1 for IEEE 2600 Common Criteria Certification Administrator Guide
[FT6-1510 (000)]
- Before Using the iR-ADV Security Kit-P1 for IEEE 2600 Common Criteria Certification
[FT6-1511 (000)]
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE C5500 Series 2600 model e-Manual CD （USE Version） [FT6-1512
(000)]
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE C5500 Series 2600 model e-Manual CD （APE Version） [FT6-1513
(000)]
(Japanese Name)
- iR-ADV Security Kit-P1 for IEEE 2600 Administrator Guide [FT6-1507 (000)]
- Before Using the iR-ADV Security Kit-P1 for IEEE 2600 [FT6-1508 (000)]
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE C5500 Series 2600 model e-Manual CD [FT6-1509 (000)]
1.6.2 Logical Scope of the TOE
The logical scope of the TOE is illustrated in Figure 3 (excluding: User, User Authentication Server, Mail
Server, PC, and Time Server). In the table, the security functions of the TOE are shown in blue.
Figure 3 Functional configuration of the TOE
LAN Data Protection Function
HDD
UI Func
User
User Auth Server
LAN Data Protection
User Auth Function
Mail Server
LAN Data Protection
Email Function
PC
LAN Data Protection
Web Browser
DocData
DocData
AuthInfo
Hardcopy
document
Time Server
Time Function
TimeInfo
Output Func
Input Func
Print
Scan Send
Copy Mailbox/Inbox
Function Use Restriction
Job Output Restriction
User Authentication HDD Data Erase
HDD Data Encryption
Management Function
Self-Test Audit Log
LAN Data Protection
Flow of data
Operate/
Display
Hardcopy
document
Forward Received Jobs
Receive
TOE
PC
Document data
USB connection
FAX
Document data
Phone line
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In addition to the capabilities described in Section 1.5, the TOE embodies the following basic functionality.
- UI Functionality
Enables the user to operate the TOE from the control panel, and the TOE to display information
on the control panel.
- Output Functionality
Enables the TOE to output hardcopy documents.
- Input Functionality
Enables the TOE to input hardcopy documents.
The TOE embodies the following security functions.
- User Authentication Function
Performs authentication on the user, to prevent any unauthorized access to the TOE.
Two types of user authentication are supported: Internal Authentication wherein authentication
takes place internally within the TOE, and External Authentication which uses an external user
authentication server. External authentication uses Kerberos2
or LDAP3
authentication.
- Function Use Restriction Function
Uses role management to restrict the functions that each authenticated user can use.
- Job Output Restriction Function
This function restricts access to print, cancel, and other job operations, to the user that executed
the job.
- Forward Received Jobs Function
This function restricts the machine from forwarding received data directly to the LAN. It is
provided as a countermeasure against threats arising from misuse of the fax line.
- HDD Data Erase Function
Function for erasing unnecessary data from the hard disk by overwriting the data, in order to
prevent unauthorized use of previously generated image data.
- HDD Data Encryption Function
All data stored in the HDD are encrypted by the encryption chip mounted on the MFP in order to
prevent removal of HDD and unauthorized access to the HDD data.
- LAN Data Protection Function
To protect LAN data from IP packet sniffing, IP packets are encrypted using IPSec.
- Self-Test Function
When the machine starts, this function checks to see that the primary security functions are
running properly.
- Audit Log Function
Allows auditing of user operations by generating logs which are stored in the HDD. Stored audit
logs are protected and can be viewed.
The date/time recorded on the audit log is provided by the TOE. The TOE's date/time information
is set by the Management Function, or is set by time synchronization when the accurate time is
2 This evaluation was performed using Active Directory Domain Services as the authentication server
software for Kerberos.
3 This evaluation was performed using eDirectory 8.8 SP8 as the authentication server software for LDAP
authentication.
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obtained from the Time Server.
- Management Function
Consists of user management functions such as user registration and role management, and device
management functions which enable proper operation of various security functions, which can only be
specified by Administrators.
1.7 Users of the TOE
The TOE has two types of users (U.USER): U.NORMAL and U.ADMINISTRATOR
Table 3 —Users
Designation Definition
U.USER Any authorized User.
U.NORMAL A User who is authorized to perform User Document Data processing
functions of the TOE.
U.ADMINISTRATOR A User who has been specifically granted the authority to manage some
portion or all of the TOE and whose actions may affect the TOE security
policy (TSP). Administrators may possess special privileges that provide
capabilities to override portions of the TSP.
1.8 Assets
There are three types of assets: user data, TSF data, and functions.
1.8.1 User Data
User data are created by the user, and have no effect on TOE security functions. There are two types
of user data: D.DOC and D.FUNC.
Table 4 — User Data
Designation Definition
D.DOC User Document Data consists of the information contained in a user's document. This
includes the original document itself in either hardcopy or electronic form, image data, or
residually-stored data created by the hardcopy device while processing an original
document and printed hardcopy output.
D.FUNC User Function Data are the information about a user's document or job to be processed by
the TOE.
1.8.2 TSF Data
TSF Data are data that have an effect on TOE security functions. There are two types of TSF data:
D.PROT and D.CONF.
Table 5 — TSF Data
Designation Definition
D.PROT TSF Protected Data are assets for which alteration by a User who is neither an
Administrator nor the owner of the data would have an effect on the operational security of
the TOE, but for which disclosure is acceptable.
D.CONF TSF Confidential Data are assets for which either disclosure or alteration by a User who is
neither an Administrator nor the owner of the data would have an effect on the operational
security of the TOE.
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A list of the TSF data used in this TOE is given in Table 6.
Table 6 — List of TSF data
Type TSF data Description Stored in
D.PROT User name User identification information used by the user
identification and authentication function.
HDD
Role Used by access restriction functions to restrict the
functions that each user can use.
HDD
Lockout policy
settings
Settings for the lockout function, such as number of
attempts before lockout and the lockout time.
HDD
Password policy
settings
Policy for the password for user authentication, such as
minimum password length, allowed characters, and
combination of character types.
HDD
Auto Reset Time
setting
Settings for session timeout in the control panel. HDD
Date/Time setting Specifies the date and time that is set. RTC
HDD Data Erase
setting
Settings for the HDD Data Erase function, including the
settings to enable or disable the HDD Data Erase
function.
HDD
IPSec settings Settings for the LAN Data Protection function, including
the settings to enable or disable the LAN Data Protection
function.
HDD
D.CONF Password Password used to authenticate the user in the User
Identification and Authentication function.
HDD
Audit logs Logs generated by the Audit Log function. HDD
Box PIN PIN used for access control to the Mail Box or the
Memory RX Inbox where the data is stored, for Job
Output Restriction functions.
HDD
1.8.3 Functions
Refer to the functions listed in Table 7.
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2 Conformance claims
2.1 CC Conformance claim
This ST conforms to the following Common Criteria (CC).
- Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Release 4
- Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant
- Assurance level: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
2.2 PP claim, Package claim
This ST conforms to the following Protection Profile (PP).
- Title: U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy
Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std 2600.2™-2009)
- Version: 1.0
This ST is package-conformant to and package-augmented by the following SFR Packages:
- 2600.2-PRT conformant
- 2600.2-SCN conformant
- 2600.2-CPY conformant
- 2600.2-FAX conformant
- 2600.2-DSR conformant
- 2600.2-NVS augmented
- 2600.2-SMI augmented
2.3 SFR Packages
2.3.1 SFR Packages reference
Title: 2600.2-PRT, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions, Operational Environment B
Package version: 1.0, dated March 2009
Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2
Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 and Part 3 conformant
Package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
Usage: This SFR Package shall be used for HCD products (such as printers, paper-based fax machines, and
MFPs) that perform a printing function in which electronic document input is converted to physical document
output.
Title: 2600.2-SCN, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions, Operational Environment B
Package version: 1.0, dated March 2009
Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2
Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 and Part 3 conformant
Package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
Usage: This SFR Package shall be used for HCD products (such as scanners, paper-based fax machines, and
MFPs) that perform a scanning function in which physical document input is converted to electronic document
output.
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Title: 2600.2-CPY, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions, Operational Environment B
Package version: 1.0, dated March 2009
Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2
Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 and Part 3 conformant
Package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
Usage: This Protection Profile shall be used for HCD products (such as copiers and MFPs) that perform a copy
function in which physical document input is duplicated to physical document output.
Title: 2600.2-FAX, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions, Operational Environment B
Package version: 1.0, dated March 2009
Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2
Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 and Part 3 conformant
Package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
Usage: This SFR Package shall be used for HCD products (such as fax machines and MFPs) that perform a
scanning function in which physical document input is converted to a telephone-based document facsimile (fax)
transmission, and a printing function in which a telephone-based document facsimile (fax) reception is converted
to physical document output.
Title: 2600.2-DSR, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Document Storage and Retrieval (DSR) Functions,
Operational Environment B
Package version: 1.0, dated March 2009
Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2
Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 and Part 3 conformant
Package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
Usage: This SFR Package shall be used for HCD products (such as MFPs) that perform a document storage and
retrieval feature in which a document is stored during one job and retrieved during one or more subsequent jobs.
Title: 2600.2-NVS, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Nonvolatile Storage Functions, Operational Environment
B
Package version: 1.0, dated March 2009
Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2
Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant
Package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
Usage: This SFR Package shall be used for products that provide storage of User Data or TSF Data in a
nonvolatile storage device (NVS) that is part of the evaluated TOE but is designed to be removed from the TOE
by authorized personnel. This package applies for TOEs that provide the ability to protect data stored on
Removable Nonvolatile Storage devices from unauthorized disclosure and modification. If such protection is
supplied only by the TOE environment, then this package cannot be claimed.
Title: 2600.2-SMI, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface Functions, Operational
Environment B
Package version: 1.0, dated March 2009
Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2
Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant
Package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
Usage: This SFR Package shall be used for HCD products that transmit or receive User Data or TSF Data over a
communications medium which, in conventional practice, is or can be simultaneously accessed by multiple users,
such as wired network media and most radio frequency wireless media. This package applies for TOEs that
provide a trusted channel function allowing for secure and authenticated communication with other IT systems.
If such protection is supplied only by the TOE environment, then this package cannot be claimed.
2.3.2 SFR Package functions
Functions perform processing, storage, and transmission of data that may be present in HCD products. The
functions that are allowed, but not required in any particular conforming Security Target or Protection
Profile, are listed in Table 7:
Table 7 —SFR Package functions
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Designation Definition
F.PRT Printing: a function in which electronic document input is converted to physical document
output
F.SCN Scanning: a function in which physical document input is converted to electronic
document output
F.CPY Copying: a function in which physical document input is duplicated to physical document
output
F.FAX Faxing: a function in which physical document input is converted to a telephone-based
document facsimile (fax) transmission, and a function in which a telephone-based
document facsimile (fax) reception is converted to physical document output
F.DSR Document storage and retrieval: a function in which a document is stored during one job
and retrieved during one or more subsequent jobs
F.NVS Nonvolatile storage: a function that stores User Data or TSF Data on a nonvolatile storage
device that is part of the evaluated TOE but is designed to be removed from the TOE by
authorized personnel
F.SMI Shared-medium interface: a function that transmits or receives User Data or TSF Data over
a communications medium which, in conventional practice, is or can be simultaneously
accessed by multiple users, such as wired network media and most radio-frequency
wireless media
2.3.3 SFR Package attributes
When a function is performing processing, storage, or transmission of data, the identity of the function is
associated with that particular data as a security attribute. This attribute in the TOE model makes it possible
to distinguish differences in Security Functional Requirements that depend on the function being performed.
The attributes that are allowed, but not required in any particular conforming Security Target or Protection
Profile, are listed in Table 8:
Table 8 —SFR Package attributes
Designation Definition
+PRT Indicates data that are associated with a print job.
+SCN Indicates data that are associated with a scan job.
+CPY Indicates data that are associated with a copy job.
+FAXIN Indicates data that are associated with an inbound (received) fax job.
+FAXOUT Indicates data that are associated with an outbound (sent) fax job.
+DSR Indicates data that are associated with a document storage and retrieval job.
+NVS Indicates data that are stored on a nonvolatile storage device.
+SMI Indicates data that are transmitted or received over a Shared-medium
interface.
2.4 PP Conformance rationale
In addition to the primary functionality of the MFP (Copy, Print, Scan, and Fax), the TOE implements the
document storage function, HDD encryption function, and the LAN data encryption function. As such, it is
appropriate to conform to all of the SFR Package defined in the PP(Chapter 2.2 PP claim, Package claim).
The PP to which this ST claims to be conformant conforms to IEEE Standard Protection Profile for Hardcopy
Devices in IEEE Std 2600-2008, Operational Environment B and includes the contents defined in CCEVS
Policy Letter #20 are also included.
In the following, the ST is compared against the PP containing all seven of the aforementioned SFR
Packages.
In terms of the Security Problem Definition, the ST is equivalent to the PP:
In terms of the functional requirements, the ST compared with the PP contains all functional requirements
of the PP including the seven SFR Packages, as well as additional functional requirements, as shown in
Table 9.
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Table 9 — Functional requirements specified in the PP and the ST
PP_Package PP functional requirement ST functional requirement
Common FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
Common FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.2
Common FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1
Common FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.2
Common FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.1
Common FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.4
Common FDP_ACC.1(a) FDP_ACC.1(delete-job)
Common FDP_ACC.1(b) FDP_ACC.1(exec-job)
Common FDP_ACF.1(a) FDP_ACF.1(delete-job)
Common FDP_ACF.1(b) FDP_ACF.1(exec-job)
Common FDP_RIP.1 FDP_RIP.1
Common FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1
Common FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
Common FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
Common FIA_USB.1 FIA_USB.1
Common FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_MSA.1(delete-job)
Common FMT_MSA.3(a) FMT_MSA.3(delete-job)
Common FMT_MSA.1(b) FMT_MSA.1(exec-job)
Common FMT_MSA.3(b) FMT_MSA.3(exec-job)
Common FMT_MTD.1(FMT_MTD.1.1(a)) FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt)
Common FMT_MTD.1(FMT_MTD.1.1(b)) FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt)
Common FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
Common FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
Common FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM.1
Common FPT_TST.1 FPT_TST.1
Common FTA_SSL.3 FTA_SSL.3(lui), FTA_SSL.3(rui)
PRT FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(in-job)
PRT FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job)
SCN FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(in-job)
SCN FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job)
CPY FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(in-job)
CPY FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job)
FAX FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(in-job)
FAX FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job)
DSR FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(in-job)
DSR FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job)
NVS FPT_CIP_EXP.1 FPT_CIP_EXP.1
SMI FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
SMI FPT_FDI_EXP.1 FPT_FDI_EXP.1
SMI FTP_ITC.1 FTP_ITC.1
Common - FIA_AFL.1
Common - FIA_SOS.1
Common - FIA_UAU.7
NVS - FCS_COP.1(h)
NVS - FCS_CKM.1(h)
SMI - FCS_CKM.1(n)
SMI - FCS_COP.1(n)
SMI - FCS_CKM.2
Note the following:
For FDP_ACF.1(a) in the PP, the Subject for a Delete of +FAXIN D.DOC, and Delete of +FAXIN D.FUNC
is specified as U.NORMAL.
For FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) in the ST, the Subject is specified as U.ADMINISTRATOR, with Access
Control rule for U.NORMAL specified as "Denied".
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For FDP_ACC.1 in the PP, the Subject for a Read of +FAXIN D.DOC is specified as U.NORMAL.
For FDP_ACC.1(in-job) in the ST, the Subject for a Read is specified as U.ADMINISTRATOR, with
Access Control rule for U.NORMAL specified as "Denied".
The ST functional requirements as mentioned above, are restrictive in the scope of Subjects allowed to
Delete or Read, and restrains U.NORMAL from having access to any Object. As such, the ST functional
requirements specify greater restrictions than the corresponding PP functional requirements.
For FDP_ACF.1(a) in the PP, the Subject for a Modify of +FAXIN D.FUNC is specified as U.NORMAL.
For FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) in the ST, the Subject is specified as U.User, with Access Control rule
specified as "Denied".
The ST functional requirement as mentioned above, does not allow use of the function to any Subject. As
such, the ST functional requirement specifies greater restriction than the corresponding PP functional
requirement.
Consequently, the SFRs of the ST are equivalent or more restrictive than SFRs of the PP.
As such:
‐All TOEs that would meet the SFRs in the ST would also meet the SFRs in the PP.
In terms of the Security Assurance Requirements, the ST and PP are equivalent.
As such, this ST compared with the PP, specifies equal or greater restrictions on the TOE, and at most equal
restrictions on the operational environment of the TOE.
Therefore, this ST claims demonstrable conformance to the PP.
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3 Security Problem Definition
3.1 Notational conventions
a) Defined terms in full form are set in title case (for example, “Document Storage and Retrieval").
b) Defined terms in abbreviated form are set in all caps (for example, “DSR").
c) In tables that describe Security Objectives rationale, a checkmark (“") placed at the intersection of
a row and column indicates that the threat identified in that row is wholly or partially mitigated by
the objective in that column.
d) In tables that describe completeness of security requirements, a bold typeface letter “P" placed at the
intersection of a row and column indicates that the requirement identified in that row performs a
principal fulfillment of the objective indicated in that column. A letter “S" in such an intersection
indicates that it performs a supporting fulfillment.
e) In tables that describe the sufficiency of security requirements, a bold typeface requirement name and
purpose indicates that the requirement performs a principal fulfillment of the objective in the same
row. Requirement names and purposes set in normal typeface indicate that those requirements
perform supporting fulfillments.
f) In specifications of Security Functional Requirements (SFRs):
1) Bold typeface indicates the portion of an SFR that has been completed or refined in this
Protection Profile, relative to the original SFR definition in Common Criteria Part 2 or an
Extended Component Definition.
2) Italic typeface indicates the portion of an SFR that must be completed by the ST Author in a
conforming Security Target.
3) Bold italic typeface indicates the portion of an SFR that has been partially completed or refined
in this Protection Profile, relative to the original SFR definition in Common Criteria Part 2 or an
Extended Component Definition, but which also must be completed by the ST Author in a
conforming Security Target.
g) The following prefixes in Table 10 are used to indicate different entity types:
Table 10— Notational prefix conventions
Prefix Type of entity
U. User
D. Data
F. Function
T. Threat
P. Policy
A. Assumption
O. Objective
OE. Environmental objective
+ Security attribute
3.2 Threats agents
This security problem definition addresses threats posed by four categories of threat agents:
a) Persons who are not permitted to use the TOE who may attempt to use the TOE
b)Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to use TOE functions for which they
are not authorized.
c) Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to access data in ways for which they
are not authorized.
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d)Persons who unintentionally cause a software malfunction that may expose the TOE to unanticipated
threats.
The threats and policies defined in this Protection Profile address the threats posed by these threat agents.
3.3 Threats to TOE Assets
This section describes threats to assets described in clause 1.8.
Table 11—Threats to User Data for the TOE
Threat Affected asset Description
T.DOC.DIS D.DOC User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons
T.DOC.ALT D.DOC User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
T.FUNC.ALT D.FUNC User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
Table 12—Threats to TSF Data for the TOE
Threat Affected asset Description
T.PROT.ALT D.PROT TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
T.CONF.DIS D.CONF TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons
T.CONF.ALT D.CONF TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
3.4 Organizational Security Policies for the TOE
This section describes the Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) that apply to the TOE. OSPs are used to
provide a basis for Security Objectives that are commonly desired by TOE Owners in this operational
environment but for which it is not practical to universally define the assets being protected or the threats to
those assets.
Table 13—Organizational Security Policies for the TOE
Name Definition
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION To preserve operational accountability and security, Users will be
authorized to use the TOE only as permitted by the TOE Owner
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION To detect corruption of the executable code in the TSF, procedures
will exist to self-verify executable code in the TSF
P.AUDIT.LOGGING To preserve operational accountability and security, records that
provide an audit trail of TOE use and security-relevant events will
be created, maintained, and protected from unauthorized
disclosure or alteration, and will be reviewed by authorized
personnel
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT To prevent unauthorized use of the external interfaces of the TOE,
operation of those interfaces will be controlled by the TOE and its
IT environment
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3.5 Assumptions
The Security Objectives and Security Functional Requirements defined in subsequent sections of this Protection
Profile are based on the condition that all of the assumptions described in this section are satisfied.
Table 14—Assumptions
Assumption Definition
A.ACCESS.MANAGED The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides
protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data
interfaces of the TOE.
A.USER.TRAINING TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their
organization, and are trained and competent to follow those policies and
procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRAINING Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their
organization, are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer's guidance
and documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance
with those policies and procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRUST Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.
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4 Security Objectives
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the Security Objectives that are satisfied by the TOE.
Table 15— Security Objectives for the TOE
Objective Definition
O.DOC.NO_DIS The TOE shall protect User Document Data from unauthorized
disclosure.
O.DOC.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect User Document Data from unauthorized
alteration.
O.FUNC.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect User Function Data from unauthorized
alteration.
O.PROT.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect TSF Protected Data from unauthorized
alteration.
O.CONF.NO_DIS The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorized
disclosure.
O.CONF.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorized
alteration.
O.USER.AUTHORIZED The TOE shall require identification and authentication of Users,
and shall ensure that Users are authorized in accordance with
security policies before allowing them to use the TOE.
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED The TOE shall manage the operation of external interfaces in
accordance with security policies.
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED The TOE shall provide procedures to self-verify executable code
in the TSF.
O.AUDIT.LOGGED The TOE shall create and maintain a log of TOE use and
security-relevant events, and prevent its unauthorized disclosure
or alteration.
4.2 Security Objectives for the IT environment
This section describes the Security Objectives for the IT environment.
Table 16— Security Objectives for the IT environment
Objective Definition
OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED If audit records are exported from the TOE to another trusted IT
product, the TOE Owner shall ensure that those records are
protected from unauthorized access, deletion and modifications.
OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED If audit records generated by the TOE are exported from the
TOE to another trusted IT product, the TOE Owner shall ensure
that those records can be accessed in order to detect potential
security violations, and only by authorized persons
OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED The IT environment shall provide protection from unmanaged
access to TOE external interfaces.
4.3 Security Objectives for the non-IT environment
This section describes the Security Objectives for non-IT environments.
Table 17— Security Objectives for the non-IT environment
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Objective Definition
OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED The TOE shall be placed in a secure or monitored area that
provides protection from unmanaged physical access to the TOE.
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED The TOE Owner shall grant permission to Users to be authorized
to use the TOE according to the security policies and procedures
of their organization.
OE.USER.TRAINED The TOE Owner shall ensure that Users are aware of the security
policies and procedures of their organization and have the
training and competence to follow those policies and procedures.
OE.ADMIN.TRAINED The TOE Owner shall ensure that TOE Administrators are aware
of the security policies and procedures of their organization; have
the training, competence, and time to follow the manufacturer's
guidance and documentation; and correctly configure and operate
the TOE in accordance with those policies and procedures.
OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED The TOE Owner shall establish trust that TOE Administrators
will not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.
OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED The TOE Owner shall ensure that audit logs are reviewed at
appropriate intervals for security violations or unusual patterns of
activity.
4.4 Security Objectives rationale
This section demonstrates that each threat, organizational security policy and assumption is mitigated/eased
by at least one security objective, and that such security objectives counter the threat, implement the
security policy and support assumption.
Table 18—Completeness of Security Objectives
Threats. Policies, and Assumptions
Objectives
O.DOC.NO_DIS
O.DOC.NO_ALT
O.FUNC.NO_ALT
O.PROT.NO_ALT
O.CONF.NO_DIS
O.CONF.NO_ALT
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED
O.AUDIT.LOGGED
OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED
OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED
OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED
OE.PHYISCAL.MANAGED
OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED
OE.ADMIN.TRAINED
OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED
OE.USER.TRAINED
T.DOC.DIS     
T.DOC.ALT     
T.FUNC.ALT    
T.PROT.ALT    
T.CONF.DIS    
T.CONF.ALT   
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION 
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION     
P.AUDIT.LOGGING  
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT    
A.ACCESS.MANAGED    
A.ADMIN.TRAINING    
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Threats. Policies, and Assumptions
Objectives
O.DOC.NO_DIS
O.DOC.NO_ALT
O.FUNC.NO_ALT
O.PROT.NO_ALT
O.CONF.NO_DIS
O.CONF.NO_ALT
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED
O.AUDIT.LOGGED
OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED
OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED
OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED
OE.PHYISCAL.MANAGED
OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED
OE.ADMIN.TRAINED
OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED
OE.USER.TRAINED
A.ADMIN.TRUST 
A.USER.TRAINING 
Table 19—Sufficiency of Security Objectives
Threats. Policies, and
Assumptions
Summary Objectives and rationale
T.DOC.DIS User Document Data may be
disclosed to unauthorized
persons
O.DOC.NO_DIS protects D.DOC from
unauthorized disclosure
O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user
identification and authentication as the basis for
authorization
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately
grant authorization
T.DOC.ALT User Document Data may be
altered by unauthorized persons
O.DOC.NO_ALT protects D.DOC from
unauthorized alteration
O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user
identification and authentication as the basis for
authorization
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately
grant authorization
T.FUNC.ALT User Function Data may be
altered by unauthorized persons
O.FUNC.NO_ALT protects D.FUNC from
unauthorized alteration
O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user
identification and authentication as the basis for
authorization
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately
grant authorization
T.PROT.ALT TSF Protected Data may be
altered by unauthorized persons
O.PROT.NO_ALT protects D.PROT from
unauthorized alteration
O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user
identification and authentication as the basis for
authorization
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately
grant authorization
T.CONF.DIS TSF Confidential Data may be
disclosed to unauthorized
O.CONF.NO_DIS protects D.CONF from
unauthorized disclosure
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persons O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user
identification and authentication as the basis for
authorization
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately
grant authorization
T.CONF.ALT TSF Confidential Data may be
altered by unauthorized persons
O.CONF.NO_ALT protects D.CONF from
unauthorized alteration
O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user
identification and authentication as the basis for
authorization
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately
grant authorization
P.USER.AUTHORIZ
ATION
Users will be authorized to use
the TOE
O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user
identification and authentication as the basis for
authorization to use the TOE
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately
grant authorization
P.SOFTWARE.VERIF
ICATION
Procedures will exist to
self-verify executable code in
the TSF
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED provides procedures
to self-verify executable code in the TSF
P.AUDIT.LOGGING An audit trail of TOE use and
security-relevant events will be
created, maintained, protected,
and reviewed.
O.AUDIT.LOGGED creates and maintains a log
of TOE use and security-relevant events, and
prevents unauthorized disclosure or alteration
OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED protects
exported audit records from unauthorized access,
deletion and modifications
OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED
establishes responsibility of, the TOE Owner to
provide appropriate access to exported audit
records
OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to ensure that
audit logs are appropriately reviewed
P.INTERFACE.MAN
AGEMENT
Operation of external interfaces
will be controlled by the TOE
and its IT environment .
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED manages the
operation of external interfaces in accordance
with security policies
OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED establishes a
protected environment for TOE external
interfaces
A.ACCESS.MANAG
ED
The TOE environment provides
protection from unmanaged
access to the physical
components and data interfaces
of the TOE.
OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED establishes a
protected physical environment for the TOE
A.ADMIN.TRAININ
G
TOE Users are aware of and
trained to follow security
policies and procedures
OE.ADMIN.TRAINED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to provide
appropriate Administrator training.
A.ADMIN.TRUST Administrators do not use their
privileged access rights for
malicious purposes.
OE.ADMIN.TRUST establishes responsibility of
the TOE Owner to have a trusted relationship
with Administrators.
A.USER.TRAINING Administrators are aware of and
trained to follow security
policies and procedures
OE.USER.TRAINED establishes responsibility
of the TOE Owner to provide appropriate User
training.
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5 Extended components definition (APE_ECD)
Protection Profile defines components that are extensions to Common Criteria 3.1 Revision 2, Part 2. These
extended components are defined in the Protection Profile but are used in SFR Packages, and therefore, are
employed only in TOEs whose STs conform to those SFR Packages.
5.1 FPT_CIP_EXP Confidentiality and integrity of stored data
Family behaviour:
This family defines requirements for the TSF to protect the confidentiality and integrity of both TSF and User
Data.
Confidentiality and integrity of stored data is an important security functionality in the case where the storage
container is not, or not always, in a protected environment. Confidentiality and integrity of stored data is often
provided by functionality that the TSF uses for both TSF and User Data in the same way. Examples are full disk
encryption functions, where the TSF stores its own data as well as User Data on the same disk. Especially when
a disk is intended to be removable and therefore may be transported into an unprotected environment, this
becomes a very important functionality to achieve the Security Objectives of protection against unauthorized
access to information.
Component leveling:
FPT_CIP_EXP.1 Confidentiality and integrity of stored data provides for the protection of user and TSF Data
stored on a storage container that cannot be assumed to be protected by the TOE environment.
Management: FPT_CIP_EXP.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) Management of the conditions under which the protection function is activated or used;
b) Management of potential restrictions on the allowance to use this function.
Audit: FPT_CIP_EXP.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the
PP/ST:
a) Basic: failure condition that prohibits the function to work properly and detected attempts to bypass
this functionality (e.g., detected modifications.)
FPT_CIP_EXP.1 Confidentiality and integrity of stored data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_CIP_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a function that ensures the confidentiality and
integrity of user and TSF Data when either is written to [assignment: media used
to store the data].
FPT_CIP_EXP.1.2 The TSF shall provide a function that detects and performs
[assignment: list of actions] when it detects alteration of user and TSF Data when
FPT_CIP_EXP.1 Confidentiality and integrity of stored data 1
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either is written to [assignment: media used to store the data].
Rationale:
The Common Criteria defines the protection of User Data in its FDP class and the protection of TSF Data in its
FPT class. Although both classes contain components that define confidentiality protection and integrity
protection, those components are defined differently for User Data and TSF Data and, therefore, are difficult to
use in cases where a TOE provides functionality for the confidentiality and integrity for both types of data in an
identical way.
This Protection Profile defines an extended component that combines the confidentiality and integrity protection
for both types of data in a single component. The authors of this Protection Profile view this as an approach that
simplifies the statement of Security Functional Requirements significantly and therefore enhances the readability
and applicability of this Protection Profile. Therefore, the authors decided to define an extended component to
address this functionality.
This extended component protects both User Data and TSF Data, and it could therefore be placed in either the
FDP or FPT class. Since it is intended to protect data that are exported to storage media, and in particular,
storage media that might be removable from the TOE, the authors believed that it was most appropriate to place
it in the FPT class. It did not fit well in any of the existing families in either class, and this led the authors to
define a new family with just one member.
5.2 FPT_FDI_EXP Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces
Family behaviour:
This family defines requirements for the TSF to restrict direct forwarding of information from one external
interface to another external interface.
Many products receive information on specific external interfaces and are intended to transform and process this
information before it is transmitted on another external interface. However, some products may provide the
capability for attackers to misuse external interfaces to violate the security of the TOE or devices that are
connected to the TOE's external interfaces. Therefore, direct forwarding of unprocessed data between different
external interfaces is forbidden unless explicitly allowed by an authorized administrative role. The family
FPT_FDI_EXP has been defined to specify this kind of functionality.
Component leveling:
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces, provides for the functionality to require
TSF controlled processing of data received over defined external interfaces before these data are sent out on
another external interface. Direct forwarding of data from one external interface to another one requires explicit
allowance by an authorized administrative role.
Management: FPT_FDI_EXP.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) Definition of the role(s) that are allowed to perform the management activities
b) Management of the conditions under which direct forwarding can be allowed by an administrative
role
c) Revocation of such an allowance.
Audit: FPT_FDI_EXP.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the
PP/ST:
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces 1
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There are no auditable events foreseen.
Rationale:
Quite often a TOE is supposed to perform specific checks and process data received on one external interface
before such (processed) data are allowed to be transferred to another external interface. Examples are firewall
systems but also other systems that require a specific work flow for the incoming data before it can be
transferred. Direct forwarding of such data (i.e., without processing the data first) between different external
interfaces is therefore a function that—if allowed at all—can only be allowed by an authorized role.
It has been viewed as useful to have this functionality as a single component that allows specifying the property
to disallow direct forwarding and require that only an authorized role can allow this. Since this is a function that
is quite common for a number of products, it has been viewed as useful to define an extended component.
The Common Criteria defines attribute-based control of User Data flow in its FDP class. However, in this
Protection Profile, the authors needed to express the control of both user data and TSF data flow using
administrative control instead of attribute-based control. It was found that using FDP_IFF and FDP_IFC for this
purpose resulted in SFRs that were either too implementation-specific for a Protection Profile or too unwieldy
for refinement in a Security Target. Therefore, the authors decided to define an extended component to address
this functionality.
This extended component protects both User Data and TSF Data, and it could therefore be placed in either the
FDP or FPT class. Since its purpose is to protect the TOE from misuse, the authors believed that it was most
appropriate to place it in the FPT class. It did not fit well in any of the existing families in either class, and this
lead the authors to define a new family with just one member.
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.
FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on
[assignment: list of external interfaces] from being forwarded without further
processing by the TSF to [assignment: list of external interfaces].
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6 Security requirements
6.1 Security functional requirements
This section describes the security functional requirements for the TOE.
The text in brackets following the component identifier or element name denotes iteration operations.
6.1.1 User Authentication Function
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an
administrator configurable positive integer within[assignment: range of acceptable
values]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of
authentication events].
[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable
positive integer within[assignment: range of acceptable values]]
- an administrator configurable positive integer within 1 to 10
[assignment: list of authentication events]
- Login attempts from the control panel or remote UIs.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
[selection: met, surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].
[selection: met, surpassed]
- met
[assignment: list of actions]
- Lockout
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to
individual users: [assignment: list of security attributes].
[assignment: list of security attributes].
- User name, role
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FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict
with access-controlled Functions of the TOE] on behalf of the user to be performed
before the user is authenticated.
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict with
access-controlled Functions of the TOE]
- Submission of print jobs, fax jobs, I-fax jobs
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU .7.1 The TSF shall provide only [assignment: list of feedback] to the user while the
authentication is in progress.
[assignment: list of feedback]
- *
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict
with access-controlled Functions of the TOE] on behalf of the user to be performed
before the user is identified.
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict with
access-controlled Functions of the TOE]
- Submission of print jobs, fax jobs, I-fax jobs
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
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FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting
on the behalf of that user: [assignment: list of user security attributes].
[assignment: list of user security attributes].
- User name, role
FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security
attributes with the subjects acting on behalf of users: [assignment: rules for the
initial association of attributes].
[assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes].
- None
FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security
attributes with the subjects acting on behalf of users: [assignment: rules for the
changing of attributes].
[assignment: rules for the changing of attributes]
- None
FTA_SSL.3(lui) TSF-initiated termination
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTA_SSL.3.1(lui) The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [assignment: time
interval of userinactivity].
[assignment: time interval of userinactivity].
- User inactivity at the control panel lasting for the specified period of time.
FTA_SSL.3(rui)TSF-initiated termination
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTA_SSL.3.1(rui) The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [assignment: time
interval of userinactivity].
[assignment: time interval of userinactivity].
- User inactivity at the remote UI lasting for 15 minutes.
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6.1.2 Function Use Restriction Function
FMT_MSA.1(exec-job) Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1(exec-job) The TSF shall enforce the TOE Function Access Control SFP,
[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] to restrict the
ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other
operations]] the security attributes [assignment: list of security attributes] to
[assignment: the authorised identified roles].
[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]
- None
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
- query, modify, delete, create
[assignment: list of security attributes]
- Role
[assignment: the authorised identified roles].
- U.ADMINISTRATOR
FMT_MSA.3(exec-job) Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1(exec-job) The TSF shall enforce the TOE Function Access Control Policy,
[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] to provide
[selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]
default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]
- None
[selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]
- Restrictive
[refinement]
- TOE Function Access Control Policy -> TOE Function Access Control SFP
FMT_MSA.3.2(exec-job) The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or
information is created.
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
- Nobody
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FDP_ACC.1(exec-job) Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1(exec-job) The TSF shall enforce the TOE Function Access Control SFP on users
as subjects, TOE functions as objects, and the right to use the functions as
operations.
FDP_ACF.1(exec-job) Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1(exec-job) The TSF shall enforce the TOE Function Access Control SFP to objects
based on the following: users and [assignment: list of TOE functions and the
security attribute(s) used to determine the TOE Function Access Control SFP].
[assignment: list of TOE functions and the security attribute(s) used to determine
the TOE Function Access Control SFP]
- objects controlled under the TOE Function Access Control SFP in Table 20,
and for each, the indicated security attributes in Table 20.
FDP_ACF.1.2(exec-job) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [selection: the user is
explicitly authorized by U.ADMINISTATOR to use a function, a user that is
authorized to use the TOE is automatically authorized to use the functions
[assignment: list of functions], [assignment: other conditions]].
[selection: the user is explicitly authorized by U.ADMINISTATOR to use a
function, a user that is authorized to use the TOE is automatically authorized to
use the functions [assignment: list of functions], [assignment: other conditions]]
- [assignment: other conditions]
[assignment: other conditions]
- rules specified in the TOE Function Access Control SFP in Table 20
governing access among controlled users as subjects and controlled objects using
controlled operations on controlled objects
FDP_ACF.1.3(exec-job) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: the user acts in the role U.ADMINISTRATOR,
[assignment: other rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise
access of subjects to objects].
[assignment: other rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise
access of subjects to objects]
- None
FDP_ACF.1.4(exec-job) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of
subjects to objects].
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of
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subjects to objects]
- None
Table 20—TOE Function Access Control SFP
Object Attribute Operation(s) Subject Attribute Access control rule
[Print] +PRT
Use of the
function, using
pointer to the
Object.
U.USER
Role
For the attribute of the Object,
the role associated with the
Subject, must be authorized to
perform the Operation.
[Copy]
+CPY
+DSR
Use of the
function, using
pointer to the
Object.
U.USER
Role For the attribute of the Object,
the role associated with the
Subject, must be authorized to
perform the Operation.
[Scan]
+SCN
+DSR
Use of the
function, using
pointer to the
Object.
U.USER
Role For the attribute of the Object,
the role associated with the
Subject, must be authorized to
perform the Operation.
[Fax] +FAXOUT
Use of the
function, using
pointer to the
Object.
U.USER
Role For the attribute of the Object,
the role associated with the
Subject, must be authorized to
perform the Operation.
[Fax/I-Fax Inbox] +FAXIN
Use of the
function, using
pointer to the
Object.
U.USER
Role For the attribute of the Object,
the role associated with the
Subject, must be authorized to
perform the Operation.
[Access Stored
Files]
+DSR
Use of the
function, using
pointer to the
Object.
U.USER
Role For the attribute of the Object,
the role associated with the
Subject, must be authorized to
perform the Operation.
Remote UI
[Access
Received/Stored
Files]
+DSR
+FAXIN
Use of the
function, using
pointer to the
Object.
U.USER
Role
If the role associated with the
Subject is Administrator, the
Operation is permitted.
6.1.3 Job Output Restriction Functions
6.1.3.1 Delete Job
FMT_MSA.1(delete-job) Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22,
[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] to restrict the
ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other
operations]] the security attributes [assignment: list of security attributes] to
[assignment: the authorised identified roles].
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[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]
- In The Job Access Control SFP in Table 23
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
- Refer to “Operation" in Table 21.
[assignment: list of security attributes]
- Refer to “Security Attributes" in Table 21.
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
- Refer to “Role" in Table 21.
Table 21—Management of security attributes
Security Attributes Operation Role
User name delete, create, query U.ADMINISTRATOR
Box PINs modify, create U.ADMINISTRATOR
PIN of own Mail Box modify U.NORMAL
FMT_MSA.3(delete-job) Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22,
[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] to provide
[selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]
default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]
- Common Access Control SFP in Table 22
- In The Job Access Control SFP in Table 23
[selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]
- restrictive
FMT_MSA.3.2(delete-job) The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or
information is created.
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
- Nobody
FDP_ACC.1(delete-job)Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22 on
the list of users as subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects
covered by the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22.
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FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22 to
objects based on the following: the list of users as subjects and objects controlled
under the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22, and for each, the indicated
security attributes in Table 22.
FDP_ACF.1.2(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: rules specified in the
Common Access Control SFP in Table 22 governing access among controlled users
as subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects.
FDP_ACF.1.3(delete-job) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes,
that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects].
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of
subjects to objects]
- U.ADMINISTRATOR is authorized to delete any D.DOC/D.FUNC.
- U.ADMINISTRATOR is authorized to modify any +CPY, +SCN, +DSR,
+FAXOUT D.FUNC.
FDP_ACF.1.4(delete-job) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of
subjects to objects].
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of
subjects to objects]
- None
Table 22—Common Access Control SFP
Object Attribute Operation(s) Subject Access control rule
D.DOC +PRT,+SCN,+CPY,
+FAXOUT,
+DSR
Delete U.NORMAL Denied, except for his/her own
documents
D.DOC +FAXIN Delete U.NORMAL Denied
D.FUNC +PRT,+SCN,+CPY,
+FAXOUT
+DSR
Modify;
Delete
U.NORMAL Denied, except for his/her own
function data
D.FUNC +FAXIN Modify U.USER Denied
D.FUNC +FAXIN Delete U.NORMAL Denied
6.1.3.2 In The Job
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FDP_ACC.1(in-job) Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1(in-job) The TSF shall enforce the In The Job Access Control SFP in Table 23
on the list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered
by the In The Job Access Control SFP in Table 23.
FDP_ACF.1(in-job) Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1(in-job) The TSF shall enforce the In The Job Access Control SFP in
Table 23 to objects based on the following: the list of subjects and objects controlled
under the In The Job Access Control SFP in Table 23, and for each, the indicated
security attributes in Table 23.
FDP_ACF.1.2(in-job) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: rules
specified in the In The Job Access Control SFP in Table 23 governing access among
Users and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects.
FDP_ACF.1.3(in-job) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security
attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects].
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of
subjects to objects]
- U.ADMINISTRATOR is authorized to read any +FAXIN/+DSR D.DOC
FDP_ACF.1.4(in-job) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of
subjects to objects].
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of
subjects to objects]
- None
Table 23—In The Job Access Control SFP
Object Attribute(s) Operation Subject Access control rule
D.DOC +PRT Read U.USER Denied, except for his/her own documents
D.DOC +SCN Read U.USER Denied, except for his/her own documents
D.DOC +CPY Read U.USER Denied
D.DOC +FAXIN Read U.NORMAL Denied
D.DOC +FAXOUT Read U.USER Denied, except for his/her own documents
D.DOC +DSR Read U.NORMAL Denied, except for his/her own documents
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6.1.4 Forward Received Jobs Function
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.
FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on any
external Interface from being forwarded without further processing by the TSF to
any Shared-medium Interface.
6.1.5 HDD Data Erase Function
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the [selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the
resource from] the following objects: D.DOC, [assignment: list of objects].
[selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from]
- deallocation of the resource from
[assignment: list of objects]
- None
6.1.6 HDD Data Encryption Function
6.1.6.1 Encryption/Decryption Function
FCS_COP.1(h) Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(h) The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic
algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that
meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
- Encryption of data written to the HDD
- Decryption of data read out from the HDD
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
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- AES
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
- 256 bit
[assignment: list of standards]
- FIPS PUB 197
FPT_CIP_EXP.1 Confidentiality and integrity of stored data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_CIP_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a function that ensures the confidentiality and
integrity of user and TSF data when either is written to [assignment: a Removable
Nonvolatile Storage device].
[assignment: a Removable Nonvolatile Storage device]
- HDD
FPT_CIP_EXP.1.2 The TSF shall provide a function that detects and performs
[assignment: list of actions] when it detects alteration of user and TSF data when
either is written to [assignment: a Removable Nonvolatile Storage device].
[assignment: list of actions]
- no action
[assignment: a Removable Nonvolatile Storage device]
- HDD
APPLICATION NOTE 1. Today many manufacturers are looking at hardware solutions such as fully encrypting
disks to meet disk encryption requirements. Some of these drives will not allow data to be written to the drive unless the
correct credentials (either the key itself or credentials required to unlock the key stored in a secure area of the drive) are
presented. Assuming that this functionality cannot be bypassed, detection of modifications is not a useful function
within the TOE and therefore it should be possible to instantiate "no action" in the assignment for the "list of actions" in
FPT_CIP_EXP.1.2, arguing that unauthorized modification is prevented by the design of the system.
Quote from [PP Guide]
6.1.7 LAN Data Protection Function
6.1.7.1 IP Packet Encryption Function
FCS_COP.1(n) Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(n) The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic
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algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that
meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
- Encryption of IP packets sent to the LAN
- Decryption of IP packets received from the LAN
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
- Refer to "Cryptographic Algorithm" in Table 24.
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
- Refer to "Cryptographic Key Sizes" in Table 24.
[assignment: list of standards]
- Refer to "List of Standards" in Table 24.
Table 24— IPSec cryptographic algorithm, key sizes and standards
cryptographic algorithm cryptographic key sizes list of standards
3DES-CBC 168 bit FIPS PUB 46-3
AES-CBC 128 bit, 192bit, 256 bit FIPS PUB 197
AES-GCM 128 bit, 192bit, 256 bit SP800-38D
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another
trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels
and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the
communicated data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit the TSF, another trusted IT product to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for communication
of D.DOC, D.FUNC, D.PROT, and D.CONF over any Shared-medium Interface.
6.1.8 Self-Test Function
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [selection: during initial start-up,
periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the
conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]] to
demonstrate the correct operation of [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the
TSF].
[selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the
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request of the authorised user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under
which self test should occur]]
- during initial start-up
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF]
- Cryptographic algorithms used with the LAN Data Protection Function
(AES, 3DES)
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity
of [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF data].
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF data]
- [assignment: parts of TSF]
[assignment: parts of TSF]
- Cryptographic key
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity
of stored TSF executable code.
6.1.9 Audit Log Function
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the [selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified] level
of audit; and
c) All Auditable Events as each is defined for its Audit Level (if one is specified) for the Relevant
SFR in Table 25; [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events].
[selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified]
- not specified
[assignment: other specifically defined auditable events]
- None
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or
failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components
included in the PP/ST, for each Relevant SFR listed in Table 25: (1) information as defined by its
Audit Level (if one is specified), and (2) all Additional Information (if any is required);
[assignment: other audit relevant information].
[assignment: other audit relevant information]
- None
Table 25—Audit data requirements
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Auditable event Relevant SFR Audit level Additional
information
Job completion FDP_ACF.1 Not specified Type of job
Both successful and unsuccessful use of the
authentication mechanism
FIA_UAU.1 Basic None required
Both successful and unsuccessful use of the
identification mechanism
FIA_UID.1 Basic Attempted user
identity, if available
Use of the management functions FMT_SMF.1 Minimum None required
Modifications to the group of users that are
part of a role
FMT_SMR.1 Minimum None required
Changes to the time FPT_STM.1 Minimum None required
Termination of an interactive session by the
session locking mechanism4
FTA_SSL.3 Minimum None required
Failure of the trusted channel functions FTP_ITC.1 Minimum None required
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to
associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the capability to read
[assignment: list of audit information] from the audit records.
[assignment: authorised users]
- U.ADMINISTRATOR
[assignment: list of audit information]
- Refer to the audit logs listed in Table 25.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to
4 See “Section 14.1 IEEE Std 2600.1 Errata" in the PP Guide.
In IEEE Std 2600.1, this is indicated as “Locking of an interactive session by the session locking mechanism"
but notes that this is a transcription error.
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interpret the information.
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those
users that have been granted explicit read-access.
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised
deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [selection, choose one of: prevent, detect] unauthorised
modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.
[selection, choose one of: prevent, detect]
- prevent
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall [selection, choose one of: “ignore audited events", “prevent
audited events, except those taken by the authorised user with special rights",
“overwrite the oldest stored audit records"] and [assignment: other actions to
be taken in case of audit storage failure] if the audit trail is full.
[selection, choose one of: “ignore audited events", “prevent audited events,
except those taken by the authorised user with special rights", “overwrite the
oldest stored audit records"]
- “overwrite the oldest stored audit records"
[assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure]
- None
6.1.10 Management Function
6.1.10.1 User Management Function
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FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [assignment: a
defined quality metric].
[assignment: a defined quality metric]
- Use a password 4 to 32 characters in length
- Prohibit the use of 3 or more consecutive characters
- Use at least one uppercase character (A to Z)
- Use at least one lowercase character (a to z)
- Use at least one number (0-9)
- Use at least one non-alphabet characters (^-@[]:;,./¥!"#$%&'()=~|{`+*}_?><)
- Allowed characters
- All characters other than control characters
FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) Management of TSF Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1 (user-mgt) The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query,
modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF
Data associated with a U.NORMAL or TSF Data associated with documents or
jobs owned by a U.NORMAL] to [selection, choose one of: Nobody, [selection:
U.ADMINISTRATOR, the U.NORMAL to whom such TSF Data are associated]].
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other
operations]]
- Refer to “Operation" in Table 26.
[assignment: list of TSF Data associated with a U.NORMAL or TSF Data
associated with documents or jobs owned by a U.NORMAL]
- Refer to “TSF Data" in Table 26.
[selection, choose one of: Nobody, [selection: U.ADMINISTRATOR, the
U.NORMAL to whom such TSF Data are associated]]
- Refer to “Role" in Table 26.
Table 26— User information management
TSF data Role Operation
User name U.ADMINISTRATOR delete, create, query
role U.ADMINISTRATOR modify, delete, create, query
Passwords U.ADMINISTRATOR modify, delete, create
Own password U.NORMAL modify
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FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles U.ADMINISTRATOR, U.NORMAL, [selection:
Nobody, [assignment: the authorised identified roles]].
[selection: Nobody, [assignment: the authorised identified roles]]
- Nobody
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles, except for the role “Nobody" to
which no user shall be associated.
6.1.10.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function
FCS_CKM.1(h) Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1(h) The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key
generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
- Random number generation algorithm according to SP800-90A using
Hash_DRBG
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
- 256 bit
[assignment: list of standards]
- Not specified
FCS_CKM.1(n) Cryptographic key distribution
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1(n) The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key
generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
- Cryptographic key generation algorithm according to FIPS PUB 186-2
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
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- 128bit, 168bit, 192bit, 256 bit
[assignment: list of standards]
- FIPS PUB 186-2
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key distribution method [assignment: cryptographic key distribution
method] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].
[assignment: cryptographic key distribution method]
- DH (Diffie Hellman) and ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman)
[assignment: list of standards]
- SP800-56A
6.1.10.3 Device Management Function
FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt) Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1(device-mgt)The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query,
modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF
data] to [selection, choose one of: Nobody, [selection: U.ADMINISTRATOR,
[assignment: the authorized identified roles except U.NORMAL]]].
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other
operations]]
- Refer to “Operation" in Table 27.
[assignment: list of TSF data]
- Refer to “TSF Data Table 27.
[selection, choose one of: Nobody, [selection: U.ADMINISTRATOR, [assignment:
the authorized identified roles except U.NORMAL]]]
- Refer to “Role" in Table 27.
Table 27— Device management function
TSF Data Role Operation
Date/Time settings U.ADMINISTRATOR modify
HDD Data Erase settings U.ADMINISTRATOR query, modify
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TSF Data Role Operation
IPSec settings U.ADMINISTRATOR query, modify
Auto Reset settings U.ADMINISTRATOR query, modify
Lockout policy settings U.ADMINISTRATOR query, modify
Password policy settings U.ADMINISTRATOR query, modify
Audit log U.ADMINISTRATOR query, delete
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF].
[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]
- Refer to “Management Function" in Table 28.
Table 28—The management of security requirements
Management Function Operation
Date/Time settings modify
HDD Data Erase settings query, modify
IPSec settings query, modify
Auto Reset settings query, modify
Lockout policy settings query, modify
Password policy settings query, modify
Audit log query, delete
Username delete, create, query
role modify, delete, create, query
Password modify, delete, create
Box PIN modify, create
Own password modify
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Management Function Operation
PIN of own Mail Box
modify
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements
Table 29 lists the Security Assurance Requirements for 2600.2-PP, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices,
Operational Environment B, and related SFR Packages, EAL 2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
Table 29— IEEE 2600.2 Security Assurance Requirements
Assurance class Assurance components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures (augmentation of EAL2)
ASE: Security Target evaluation ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
6.3 Security functional requirements rationale
6.3.1 The completeness of security requirements
Table 30 provides a mapping of TOE Security Objectives and security functional requirements. This shows
how each of the security functional requirements corresponds to at least one TOE Security Objective.
Bold typeface items provide principal (P) fulfillment of the objectives, and normal typeface items provide
supporting (S) fulfillment.
Table 30—The completeness of security requirements
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SFRs
Objectives
O.DOC.NO_DIS
O.DOC.NO_ALT
O.FUNC.NO_ALT
O.PROT.NO_ALT
O.CONF.NO_DIS
O.CONF.NO_ALT
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED
O.AUDIT.LOGGED
FIA_AFL.1 S
FIA_ATD.1 S
FIA_UAU.1 P P
FIA_UAU.7 S
FIA_UID.1 S S S S S S P P S
FIA_USB.1 P
FTA_SSL.3(lui) P P
FTA_SSL.3(rui) P P
FMT_MSA.1(exec-job) S
FMT_MSA.3(exec-job) S
FDP_ACC.1(exec-job) P
FDP_ACF.1(exec-job) S
FMT_MSA.1(delete-job) S S S
FMT_MSA.3(delete-job) S S S
FDP_ACC.1(delete-job) P P P
FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) S S S
FDP_ACC.1(in-job) P
FDP_ACF.1(in-job) S
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 P
FDP_RIP.1 P
FPT_CIP_EXP.1 P P P P P P
FCS_COP.1(h) S S S S S S
FCS_COP.1(n) S S S S S S
FTP_ITC.1 P P P P P P
FCS_CKM.1(h) S S S S S S
FCS_CKM.1(n) S S S S S S
FCS_CKM.2 S S S S S S
FPT_TST.1 P
FAU_GEN.1 P
FAU_GEN.2 P
FAU_SAR.1 P
FAU_SAR.2 P
FAU_STG.1 P
FAU_STG.4 P
FPT_STM.1 S
FIA_SOS.1 S
FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) P P P
FMT_SMR.1 S S S S S S S
FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt) P P P
FMT_SMF.1 S S S S S S
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6.3.2 The sufficiency of security requirements
This section provides the rationale on how the security functional requirements are sufficient to satisfy the
Security Objectives.
O.DOC.NO_DIS is the security objective that ensures user document data is protected from unauthorized
disclosure. O.DOC.NO_DIS is addressed by the following:
Based on user identification information resulting from FIA_UID.1, roles managed by FMT_SMR.1 are
assigned for access control.
The identified users are allowed to cancel only his/her own job according to
FMT_MSA.1(delete-job)/FMT_MSA.3(delete-job), FDP_ACC.1(delete-job)/FDP_ACF.1(delete-job).
The identified users are allowed to access only his/her own document data in print job, according to
FDP_ACC.1(in-job)/FDP_ACF.1(in-job), and Nobody is allowed to access any document data in other job
types.
Furthermore, by FDP_RIP.1, complete deletion of residual information of user document data created as a result
of job processing is ensured. By FPT_CIP_EXP.1, FCS_COP.1(h), and FCS_CKM.1(h), user data and TSF data
in the HDD are protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. By FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1,
FCS_CKM.1(n), and FCS_CKM.2, user data and TSF data sent over the LAN are protected from unauthorized
alteration and disclosure. By FMT_SMF.1, management functions related to these actions, are provided.
O.DOC.NO_ALT is the security objective that ensures protection of user document data from unauthorized
alteration. O.DOC.NO_ALT is addressed by the following:
Based on user identification information resulting from FIA_UID.1, roles managed by FMT_SMR.1 are
assigned for access control.
The identified users are allowed to operate only his/her own job according to
FMT_MSA.1(delete-job)/FMT_MSA.3(delete-job), FDP_ACC.1(delete-job)/FDP_ACF.1(delete-job).
Furthermore, by FPT_CIP_EXP.1, FCS_COP.1(h), and FCS_CKM.1(h), user data and TSF data in the HDD are
protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. By FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1(n), and
FCS_CKM.2, user data and TSF data sent over the LAN are protected from unauthorized alteration and
disclosure. By FMT_SMF.1, management functions related to these actions, are provided.
O.FUNC.NO_ALT is the security objective that ensures protection of user document data from
unauthorized alteration. O.FUNC.NO_ALT is addressed by the following:
Based on user identification information resulting from FIA_UID.1, roles managed by FMT_SMR.1 are
assigned for access control.
The identified users are allowed to operate only his/her own job according to
FMT_MSA.1(delete-job)/FMT_MSA.3(delete-job), FDP_ACC.1(delete-job)/FDP_ACF.1(delete-job).
Furthermore, by FPT_CIP_EXP.1, FCS_COP.1(h), and FCS_CKM.1(h), user data and TSF data in the HDD are
protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. By FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1(n), and
FCS_CKM.2, user data and TSF data sent over the LAN are protected from unauthorized alteration and
disclosure. By FMT_SMF.1, management functions related to these actions, are provided.
O.PROT.NO_ALT is the security objective that ensures protection of TSF protected data from unauthorized
alteration. O.PROT.NO_ALT is addressed by the following:
Based on user identification information managed by FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) and resulting from FIA_UID.1,
roles managed by FMT_SMR.1 are assigned for the Device Management function as specified by FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt), and FMT_SMF.1.
Furthermore, by FPT_CIP_EXP.1, FCS_COP.1(h), and FCS_CKM.1(h), user data and TSF data in the HDD are
protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. By FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1(n), and
FCS_CKM.2, user data and TSF data sent over the LAN are protected from unauthorized alteration and
disclosure.
O.CONF.NO_DIS is the security objective that ensures protection of TSF confidential data from
unauthorized disclosure. O.CONF.NO_DIS is addressed by the following:
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Based on user identification information managed by FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) and resulting from FIA_UID.1,
roles managed by FMT_SMR.1 are assigned for the Device Management function as specified by FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt), and FMT_SMF.1.
Furthermore, by FPT_CIP_EXP.1, FCS_COP.1(h), and FCS_CKM.1(h), user data and TSF data in the HDD are
protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. By FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1(n), and
FCS_CKM.2, user data and TSF data sent over the LAN are protected from unauthorized alteration and
disclosure.
O.CONF.NO_ALT is the security objective that ensures protection of TSF confidential data from
unauthorized alteration. O.CONF.NO_ALT is addressed by the following:
Based on user identification information managed by FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) and resulting from FIA_UID.1,
roles managed by FMT_SMR.1 are assigned for the Device Management function as specified by FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt), and FMT_SMF.1.
Furthermore, by FPT_CIP_EXP.1(h), FCS_COP.1, and FCS_CKM.1(h), user data and TSF data in the HDD are
protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. By FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1(n), and
FCS_CKM.2, user data and TSF data sent over the LAN are protected from unauthorized alteration and
disclosure.
O.USER.AUTHORIZED is the security objective that ensures user identification and authentication.
O.USER.AUTHORIZED is addressed by the following:
Users authenticated by the identification and authentication mechanism specified by FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1,
FIA_UAU.7, and FIA_AFL.1, with user sessions managed by FIA_ATD.1, FIA_USB.1, and
FTA_SSL.3(lui)/FTA_SSL.3(rui), are granted use of the function, as determined by access control specified by
FDP_ACC.1(exec-job)/FDP_ACF.1(exec-job).
Furthermore, authorized user information are managed by FIA_SOS.1, FMT_MSA.1(exec-job),
FMT_MSA.3(exec-job), FMT_SMR.1.
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED is the security objective that ensures control of operations of the I/O
interfaces in accordance with security policy. O.INTERFACE.MANAGED is addressed by the following:
By FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1, FTA_SSL.3(lui)/FTA_SSL.3(rui), the user interface is managed.
By FPT_FDI_EXP.1, restricted forwarding of data to the LAN is specified.
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED is addressed by providing the self-test procedures specified by FPT_TST.1.
O.AUDIT.LOGGED is addressed by providing the Audit Log function as specified by FAU_GEN.1,
FAU_GEN.2, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2, FAU_STG.1, and FAU_STG.4. FIA_UID.1 and FPT_STM.1 provide
the means for user information and timestamps generated on audit logs.
6.3.3 The dependencies of security requirements
This section provides the justification for any dependencies not met.
Table 31—The dependencies of security requirements
Functional
Requirement
Dependencies
required by CC
Dependencies
satisfied by ST
Reason for not meeting
dependencies
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FIA_ATD.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies)
FIA_USB.1 FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FTA_SSL.3(lui) No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies)
FTA_SSL.3(rui) No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies)
FMT_MSA.1(exec-jo
b)
[FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1]
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACC.1(exec-job)
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
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Functional
Requirement
Dependencies
required by CC
Dependencies
satisfied by ST
Reason for not meeting
dependencies
FMT_MSA.3(exec-jo
b)
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1(exec-job)
FMT_SMR.1
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FDP_ACC.1(exec-job
)
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(exec-job)
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FDP_ACF.1(exec-job
)
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1(exec-job)
FMT_MSA.3(exec-job)
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FMT_MSA.1(delete-j
ob)
[FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1]
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACC.1(delete-job)
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FMT_MSA.3(delete-j
ob)
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1(delete-job)
FMT_SMR.1
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FDP_ACC.1(delete-j
ob)
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(delete-job)
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FDP_ACF.1(delete-jo
b)
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1(delete-job)
FMT_MSA.3(delete-job)
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FDP_ACC.1(in-job) FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job) N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FDP_ACF.1(in-job)
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1(in-job)
FMT_MSA.3(delete-job)
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FPT_FDI_EXP.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FDP_RIP.1 No dependencies. No dependencies.
N/A (no dependencies)
FPT_CIP_EXP.1 No dependencies. No dependencies.
N/A (no dependencies)
FCS_COP.1(h)
[FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1(h)]
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1(h)
FCS_CKM.4 is not claimed because:
Cryptographic keys are stored in RAM,
and disappear when power is shut off.
Also, extraction of cryptographic keys is
prevented by the design of the system. As
such, cryptographic keys are managed
securely enough not to require any
method for their destruction.
FTP_ITC.1 No dependencies. No dependencies.
N/A (no dependencies)
FCS_COP.1(n)
[FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1(n)]
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1(n)
FCS_CKM.4 is not claimed because:
Cryptographic keys are stored in RAM,
and disappear when power is shut off.
Also, extraction of cryptographic keys is
prevented by the design of the system. As
such, cryptographic keys are managed
securely enough not to require any
method for their destruction.
FCS_CKM.1(h)
FCS_COP.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1(h)
FCS_CKM.4 is not claimed because:
Cryptographic keys are stored in RAM,
and disappear when power is shut off.
Also, extraction of cryptographic keys is
prevented by the design of the system. As
such, cryptographic keys are managed
securely enough not to require any
method for their destruction.
FCS_CKM.1(n)
[FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1]
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1(n)
FCS_CKM.4 is not claimed because:
Cryptographic keys are stored in RAM,
and disappear when power is shut off.
Also, extraction of cryptographic keys is
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Functional
Requirement
Dependencies
required by CC
Dependencies
satisfied by ST
Reason for not meeting
dependencies
prevented by the design of the system. As
such, cryptographic keys are managed
securely enough not to require any
method for their destruction.
FCS_CKM.2
[FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1(n)]
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1(n)
FCS_CKM.4 is not claimed because:
Cryptographic keys are stored in RAM,
and disappear when power is shut off.
Also, extraction of cryptographic keys is
prevented by the design of the system. As
such, cryptographic keys are managed
securely enough not to require any
method for their destruction.
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies)
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FAU_GEN.2
FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FPT_STM.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies)
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FIA_SOS.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FMT_MTD.1(user-m
gt)
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FMT_MTD.1(device-
mgt)
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
N/A (dependencies are satisfied)
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies)
6.4 Security assurance requirements rationale
This Protection Profile has been developed for Hardcopy Devices to be used in commercial information
processing environments that require a moderate level of document security, network security, and security
assurance. The TOE will be exposed to only a low level of risk because it is assumed that the TOE will be
located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides almost constant protection from unauthorized
and unmanaged access to the TOE and its data interfaces. Agents cannot physically access any nonvolatile
storage without disassembling the TOE except for removable nonvolatile storage devices, where protection
of User and TSF Data are provided when such devices are removed from the TOE environment. Agents
have limited or no means of infiltrating the TOE with code to effect a change and the TOE self-verifies its
executable code to detect unintentional malfunctions. As such, the Evaluation Assurance Level 2 is
appropriate.
EAL 2 is augmented with ALC_FLR.2, Flaw reporting procedures. ALC_FLR.2 ensures that instructions
and procedures for the reporting and remediation of identified security flaws are in place, and their
inclusion is expected by the consumers of this TOE.
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7 TOE Summary specification
This section describes the TOE summary specifications.
7.1 User Authentication Function
- Supported functional requirements: FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_ATD.1,
FIA_USB.1, FIA_AFL.1, FTA_SSL.3(lui), FTA_SSL.3(rui)
When the control panel or a remote UI is used to operate the MFP, before permitting such operations, the
TOE requires user authentication in order to identify and authenticate valid users. However, the submission
of print jobs, fax jobs, and I-fax jobs is always permitted. [FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1]
Two methods of user authentication are supported:
- External Authentication
Authentication is based on user information registered in the authentication server. This may be
an Active Directory server that uses Kerberos authentication, or LDAP server that uses LDAP
authentication.
- Internal Authentication
Authentication is based on user information registered in the device.
For user authentication, the TOE prompts input of the user name, password, and the login destination. User
authentication succeeds only if the user name and password matches the one at the specified destination.
For security, note that the password is masked by asterisks in the text field. [FIA_UAU.7]
The TOE issues an Access Control Token (ACT) to each user successfully authenticated.
The ACT is an object that contains the user's name and role, as well as the access permissions to the
application functions that are specified for each user role. [FIA_ATD.1, FIA_USB.1]
The TOE provides a lockout function in order to minimize invalid login attempts. [FIA_AFL.1]
- This function locks out any user that fails to login successfully within the maximum number of
failed authentication attempts. A value from 1 to 10 can be specified as the number of attempts
before lockout (Initial value: 3).
- Any user that is locked out will not be able to login until the lockout time passes. A value from
1 to 60 minutes can be specified as the lockout time (Initial value: 3 minutes).
The TOE terminates an interactive session when there is no user activity at the control panel or remote UI
lasting for a specified period of time. [FTA_SSL.3(lui), FTA_SSL.3(rui)]
- At the control panel, session timeout occurs after a specified period of user inactivity. A value
from 10 seconds to 9 minutes can be specified (Initial value: 2 minutes).
- At a remote UI, session timeout occurs after 15 minutes of user inactivity.
7.2 Function Use Restriction Function
- Supported functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1(exec-job), FDP_ACF.1(exec-job),
FMT_MSA.1(exec-job), FMT_MSA.3(exec-job), FMT_SMF.1
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For each UI, the TOE provides Function Use Restriction, which controls access based on the contents of
the ACT issued to authenticated users. Any queries, modifications, deletions, and additions to the role
contained in the ACT, are performed by U.ADMINISTRATORs only. For Function Use Restriction, the
attribute of the Object is the functions itself, and is therefore fixed.
When the control panel is used, Function Use Restriction Function permits or denies use of functions
depending on the settings in “Application Restrictions", which are based on the role contained in the ACT.
When a remote UI is used, Function Use Restriction Function permits or denies use of functions based on
attribute values associated with the role in the ACT.
Only U.ADMINISTRATORs are allowed use of all functions.
Table 32— Function Use Restriction Policy
UI Object Condition Operation
Control panel Pointer to [Print] The role associated with U.USER must
have permission to the [Print] function.
Executed by
activating the
Object.
Pointer to [Copy] The role associated with U.USER must
have permission to the [Copy] function
Executed by
activating the
Object.
Pointer to [Scan and
Send]
The role associated with U.USER must
have permission to the [Scan and Send]
function
Executed by
activating the
Object.
Pointer to [Fax] The role associated with U.USER must
have permission to the [Scan and Send]
function
Executed by
activating the
Object.
Pointer to [Fax/I-Fax
Inbox]
The role associated with U.USER must
have permission to the [Access Stored
Files] function
Executed by
activating the
Object.
Pointer to [Access
Stored Files]
The role associated with U.USER must
have permission to the [Access Stored
Files] function
Executed by
activating the
Object.
Pointer to [Scan and
Store]
The role associated with U.USER must
have permission to the [Scan and Store]
function
Executed by
activating the
Object.
Remote UI Pointer to [Access
Received/Stored Files]
The role associated with U.USER is
anything other than Administrator.
Cannot be executed.
7.3 Job Output Restriction Functions
For Print, Copy, Scan, and Fax TX jobs, the TOE provides the following security functions. Job Output
Restriction restricts access to submitted jobs, to the user that executed the job.
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7.3.1 Job Cancel
- Supported functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1(delete-job), FDP_ACF.1(delete-job),
FMT_MSA.1(delete-job), FMT_MSA.3(delete-job), FMT_SMF.1
TOE can delete Print, Copy, Scan, and Fax TX jobs according to following. The user name of these jobs is
initialized by username of the user that executed the job.
- U.NORMAL is authorized to delete his/her own job.
- U.ADMINISTRATOR is authorized to delete all jobs.
With the cancellation of the job, the attribute value to be attached to the job is deleted.
7.3.2 In The JOB Access Control
- Supported functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1(in-job), FDP_ACC.1(delete-job),
FDP_ACF.1(in-job), FDP_ACF.1(delete-job), FMT_MSA.1(delete-job),
FMT_MSA.3(delete-job), FMT_SMF.1
TOE provides the following access control functions for documents in each jobs. User name of these jobs is
initialized by username of the user that executed the job.
Copy, Scan, Fax TX Jobs
- Nobody is authorized to read documents in any copy jobs.
- Nobody is authorized to read documents in any scan, and Fax TX jobs, except in case of 7.3.3
Temporarily Stored FAX TX Jobs.
Temporarily Stored Print Jobs
If a print job is submitted, the job is temporarily stored in the machine without being output. Additionally, it
uses the user name associated with the print job to determine its owner, in order to realize access restriction
as described below.
For temporarily stored jobs, the following operations are available to U.USERs, only if the user's name
matches the user name associated with the desired job.
- Print
- Change priority for printing
- Delete
For jobs to which print is instructed, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed to execute the following:
- Delete
Received Fax Jobs
For documents received by fax/I-fax, the TOE provides the Memory RX Inbox where these jobs may be
stored as files, to be output at a later time. Since these are stored in the Memory RX Inbox, access control
to this inbox, is equivalent to access control to the stored document data. A seven digit PIN can be assigned
to the Memory RX Inbox, to prevent unauthorized access by a user.
Only U.ADMINISTRATORs are authorized to initialize, set, modify, or delete the PIN on the Memory RX
Inbox, which means only U.ADMINISTRATORS are allowed access to the stored document data. The
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TOE realizes access restriction, by determining the U.ADMINISTRATOR that enters the correct PIN to be
the owner of the stored document data, preventing any U.NORMAL from executing print or send
operations on the document data.
If the control panel is used, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed access to the following operations without
entering any PIN.
- Print
- Send
- Delete
If a remote UI is used, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed access to the following operations only by
entering the correct PIN.
- Print
- Send
- Delete
Document Data Stored in Mail Box
For Copy, Scan, or Send jobs, the TOE provides Mail Boxes where these jobs may be stored as document
data, to be printed or sent at a later time. Since these are stored in Mail Boxes, access control to Mail Boxes,
is equivalent to access control to the stored document data.
A seven digit PIN can be assigned to a Mail Box, to help prevent unauthorized access by a user.
No PIN is required when storing document data in a Mail Box. The TOE realizes access restriction, by
determining the U.USER that enters the correct PIN, to be the owner of the stored document data.
For document data stored in a Mail Box, the following operations are made available to U.NORMAL only
by entering the correct PIN.
- Print
- Change print settings
- Preview
- Send
- Delete
If the control panel is used, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed access to the following operations without
entering any PIN.
- Print
- Change print settings
- Preview
- Send
- Delete
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If a remote UI is used, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed access to the following operations only by
entering the correct PIN.
- Print
- Change print settings
- Preview
- Send
- Delete
[Box PIN]
For the PIN set on Mail Boxes/Memory RX Inbox, only U.ADMINISTRATORs assigned the Administrator
role are allowed to set, change any PIN. Note however, that U.NORMALs are allowed to change the PIN
for the Mail Box they use.
7.3.3 Temporarily Stored FAX TX Jobs
- Supported functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1(in-job), FDP_ACF.1(in-job),
FDP_ACC.1(delete-job), FDP_ACF.1(delete-job)
There are two types of Send Jobs: Fax TX job and Scan job. And there are Delayed Send function and
Preview function as Temporarily Stored FAX TX Jobs function to store jobs temporarily.
Delayed Send
When the TOE receives a FAX TX job with transmission time specified, it is first stored temporarily, until
sending at the specified time.
For temporarily stored FAX TX jobs, the following operations are available to U.NORMALs, only if the
user's name matches the user name associated with the desired job.
- Change destination
For all temporarily stored FAX TX jobs, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed to execute the following:
- Change destination
Preview
When the TOE receives a FAX TX job with Preview setting, it is first stored temporarily and previewed,
later it is send.
For temporarily stored FAX TX jobs, the following operations are available to U.USERs, only if the user's
name matches the user name associated with the desired job.
- Preview
- Delete Pages
- Delete Jobs
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7.4 Forward Received Jobs Function
- Supported functional requirements: FPT_FDI_EXP.1
The design of the TOE prevents received data from being forwarded directly to a server or computer. This
function enables the user to restrict forwarding of received jobs to the LAN.
7.5 HDD Data Erase Function
- Supported functional requirements: FDP_RIP.1
By overwriting with random data, the TOE permanently erases document data (including temporary image
files) in the HDD, to ensure that no trace of the document data remains on the HDD.
The user can choose one of the following erasure methods:
- Overwrite using the DoD standard
- Overwrite with random data three times
- Overwrite once with random data
- Overwrite once with null data
The timing in which data are erased is specified below.
- Image files temporarily stored in the HDD as a result of job processing is completely erased
during or after processing of the job.
- Document data are completely erased from the HDD, immediately after being deleted from Mail
Box/Memory RX Inbox.
- Residual information that remained unerased due to a sudden power shutdown, are completely
erased from the HDD upon startup of the TOE.
7.6 HDD Data Encryption Function
- Supported functional requirements: FPT_CIP_EXP.1
The security functions provided by the HDD data encryption chip mounted on the TOE controller board are
described below.
The encryption/decryption function provides confidentiality and integrity protection for user data and TSF
data stored in the HDD.
7.6.1 Encryption/Decryption Function
- Supported functional requirements: FCS_COP.1(h)
To protect the confidentiality and integrity of user data and TSF data stored in the HDD, the TOE performs
the following cryptographic operations to encrypt all data stored in the HDD.
- Encryption of data written to the HDD.
- Decryption of data read out from the HDD.
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The cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic key size are specified below:
- AES algorithm (FIPS PUB 197)
- 256 bit key length
7.6.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function
- Supported functional requirements: FCS_CKM.1(h)
The TOE uses the following specifications for generating the cryptographic key that is used by the HDD
data encryption function.
- Uses a random number generation algorithm according to NIST SP800-90A
Hash_DRBG(SHA-256) for cryptographic key generation
- Generates a cryptographic key with 256 bit key length
The cryptographic key is managed as follows.
- Upon startup, the TOE reads the seed information stored in FlashROM and generates a
cryptographic key.
- After generating the cryptographic key, the TOE stores the key in RAM.
No method is available for acquiring the seed from the encryption chip. Note also, that because the
cryptographic key is stored in volatile RAM memory, it disappears when power is shut off.
7.7 LAN Data Protection Function
LAN Data Protection Function encrypts/decrypts all IP packets that are used in communication with an IT
device.
7.7.1 IP Packet Encryption Function
- Supported functional requirements: FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1
To ensure confidentiality and integrity of user data and TSF data communicated to and from an IT device,
the TOE uses IPSec to encrypt/decrypt all IP packets.
- Encryption of IP packets sent to the LAN
- Decryption of IP packets received from the LAN
The following cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic key sizes are used.
- See Table 24
7.7.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function
- Supported functional requirements: FCS_CKM.1(n), FCS_CKM.2
The TOE uses the following specifications for generating the cryptographic key that is used by the IP
packet encryption function.
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- Uses a cryptographic key generation algorithm according to FIPS PUB 186-2
- Generates a cryptographic key with 128/168/192/256 bit key length
The following method is used by the TOE, to transmit the cryptographic key used by the IP Packet
Encryption Function, to the other party
- ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman) and DH (Diffie Hellman) according to SP800-56A
7.8 Self-Test Function
- Supported functional requirements: FPT_TST.1
At startup, the TOE performs the following self-test.
- Checks whether cryptographic algorithms are running properly (AES, 3DES)
- Checks the integrity of the cryptographic key
- Checks the integrity of the executable code of the cryptographic algorithm
7.9 Audit Log Function
- Supported functional requirements: FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FPT_STM.1, FAU_SAR.1,
FAU_SAR.2, FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.4
The TOE generates logs for the following events.
- Startup
- Shutdown
- Job completion
- User authentication success/failure
- Logout
- Use of device management functions
- Use of user management functions
- Changes to the date/time setting
- IPSec connection failures
The items that are recorded on each log, are listed below. The date/time is provided by the TOE. The TOE's
date/time information is set by the Management Function, or is set by time synchronization when the
accurate time is obtained from the Time Server.
- Date/Time, User Name, Event Type, Outcome (Success/Failed)
Other log events may have additional items as described below.
- Job type (job completion)
- Name of the user that failed authentication (authentication failure)
Also, export of audit logs can be performed from a remote UI, in order to read out log records, although use
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of this function is restricted to U.ADMINISTRATORs only.
Users other than U.ADMINISTRATOR are not allowed to export audit logs when logged in to the TOE
from a remote UI.
When accessing the TOE from a remote UI, another capability restricted to U.ADMINISTRATORs only is
the deletion of log records from the [Deleting Collected Logs] menu.
Users other than U.ADMINISTRATOR are not allowed access to this capability when logged in to the TOE
from a remote UI, thus preventing unauthorized alterations from occurring.
A maximum of 40,000 audit records can be maintained. Once this becomes full, the oldest audit record is
overwritten with the newest.
7.10 Management Functions
7.10.1 User Management Function
- Supported functional requirements: FIA_SOS.1 , FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) ,
FMT_MSA.1(exec-job) FMT_MSA.1(delete-job), FMT_MSA.3(delete-job) ,FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
In the TOE, only U.ADMINISTRATORs assigned the Administrator role can set, change, or delete user,
role, and access restriction information and box PINs.
General users or U.NORMAL, can only change their own passwords and the PIN for the Mail Box they
use.
[Setting/Changing/Deleting User, Role, and Access Restriction Information]
New users are registered by setting the user name and password, and assigning a role to the user. Registered
user information can be modified by changing the password, or the assigned role, or the user's registration
can be deleted altogether. User specified passwords are checked to see that they are consistent with the
password policy.
Five roles exist, which are called "Base Roles": Administrator, Power User, General User, Limited User,
and Guest User. To create a new "Custom Role" different than these, any one of four base roles excluding
Guest User, is used as a template for the new role, which can then be registered.
The Administrator role is a role whose base role is "Administrator", and has administrative privileges.
The initial value for "Base Role" can be changed to any one of four base roles except Guest User.
The access restriction information that determines whether use of certain functions is permitted or denied,
is specified by the “Application Restrictions" setting, which depends on what role is assigned. Although the
initial value for “Application Restrictions" is fixed for base roles, the initial value of “Application
Restrictions" can be changed for custom roles.
[Types of Users]
There are two types of users: U.ADMINISTRATOR and U.NORMAL.
- U.ADMINISTRATOR
User assigned the Administrator role and has administrative privileges.
- U.NORMAL
General user assigned a role other than Guest User role or Administrator role.
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7.10.2 Device Management Function
- Supported functional requirements: FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt), FMT_SMF.1
To provide for the effective enforcement of security functions, the TOE allows only
U.ADMINISTRATORs to set the device management settings in Table 27.
The following settings are also provided.
[Password Policy Settings]
To encourage the use of strong passwords, the following password policy may be set.
- Use a password 4 to 32 characters in length
- Prohibit the use of 3 or more consecutive characters
- Use at least one uppercase characters (A to Z)
- Use at least one lowercase characters (a to z)
- Use at least one number (0-9)
- Use at least one non-alphabet characters (^-@[]:;,./¥!"#$%&'()=~|{`+*}_?><)
- Allowed characters:
All characters other than control characters
[Lockout Policy Settings]
The number of attempts before lockout and the lockout time can be set.
- Number of attempts before lockout
Select a value from 1 to 10 (Initial value: 3)
- Lockout time
Select a value from 1 to 60 minutes (Initial value: 3 minutes)
END