TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
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Version
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Certification Report
Cortex M33 r0p4
Sponsor and developer: Arm Limited
110 Fulbourn Road
Cambridge
England CB1 9NJ
Evaluation facility: Brightsight
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-202003-CR
Report version: 1.1
Project number: 202003
Author(s): Wouter Slegers, Hans-Gerd Albertsen
Date: 15 June 2020
Number of pages: 13
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS:
Foreword 3
Recognition of the certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 8
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.7 Re-used evaluation results 10
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 10
2.9 Results of the Evaluation 10
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 10
3 Security Target 12
4 Definitions 12
5 Bibliography 13
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a license is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation,
the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos on the certificate
indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS
agreement and will be recognised by the participating nations.
International recognition
The CCRA has been signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC. Starting September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual
recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components
up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification
schemes can be found on: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) version 3 effective from April
2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation
level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (resp. E3-basic) is
provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was initially signed by
Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy
joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations, approved certification
schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies can be found on:
http://www.sogisportal.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Cortex
M33 r0p4. The developer of the Cortex M33 r0p4 is Arm Limited located in 06560 Valbonne, France
and Arm Limited located in Cambridge, England CB1 9NJ act as the sponsor of the evaluation and
certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the
suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is the set of functionalities, encoded in Verilog, for a processor in a Security microcontroller
IC. The intended environment for the TOE is the Security IC for smart card applications or similar
services as identified and described in [PP]. The TOE provides the functionality for software execution
and controlling access to memory addresses in a Security IC.
The TOE is not in itself a Security IC, it supports development of a Security IC.
The evaluation and certification of this TOE was performed to enable re-use of the processor into an
EAL6+ Security IC, hence to fulfil the composition requirements [JIL-COMP] assurance up to and
including EAL6 augmented (EAL6(+)) is needed.
Due to the form of the TOE (Verilog), only a limited amount of attacks is directly applicable and
countered by the TOE. For example, physical attacks are not countered by this TOE. Users of the
TOE, developers of a Security IC, must strictly follow the guidance and must successfully pass
a composite CC evaluation against [PP] to claim full EAL4+ and/or AVA_VAN.5 resistance.
During the composition into a full Security IC, significant vulnerability analysis and testing must be
performed. However, the [ETRfC] and the guidance enable efficient re-use.
The TOE has been evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The evaluation
was completed on 13-02-2020 with the approval of the ETR. This certification report has been updated
on 15-06-2020 with a minor clarification without impact on the certificate. The certification procedure
has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in
the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Cortex M33 r0p4, the security requirements,
and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the
security requirements. Consumers of the Cortex M33 r0p4 are advised to verify that their own
environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments,
observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provides sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL6 augmented (EAL6+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.1 (Basic Flaw Remediation)
and ASE_TSS.2 (TOE Summary Specification with architectural design summary).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC].
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. It should be noted that the certification results only apply
to the specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator and is not releasable for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Cortex M33 r0p4 from Arm Limited located in
06560 Valbonne, France.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Name Version
Hardware
2
Cortex-M33 Synthesizable Verilog AT623-MN-22110-r0p4-00rel0
Software Cortex-M33 Execution Test Bench AT623-MN-22010-r0p4-00rel0
Cortex-M33 Functional Test Source AT623-VE-70006-r0p4-00rel0
Cortex-M33 RAM Integration Test Bench AT623-MN-70002-r0p4-00rel0
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided together with the Cortex M33 r0p4.
Details can be found in section 2.5 of this report.
The life cycle covers the development of the TOE (i.e. phase 2 of [PP]. For a detailed and precise
description of the TOE lifecycle refer to the [ST], chapter 2.6.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE is the set of functionalities for a processor in a Security microcontroller IC. The intended
environment for the TOE is the Security IC for smart card applications or similar services as identified
and described in [PP]. The TOE provides the functionality for software execution and controlling
access to memory addresses in a Security IC.
The user of the TOE is the designer of a Security IC microcontroller product that integrates the TOE
into their design for the microcontroller product. The user is referred to as the IC Designer. The user of
the TOE is also the programmer of the Security IC dedicated software and the programmer of the
Security IC embedded software that use the TOE programming interfaces consisting of the TOE
instruction set and exception handling. It is the responsibility of the IC designer to instruct the
programmer how to use the TOE.
The TOE is delivered as source code to be integrated by the IC Designer into the source code of their
Security microcontroller product.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. Detailed information on these
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment can be found in section 5.1.1 and
5.2.1 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The TOE is the set of functionalities, encoded in Verilog, for a processor in a Security microcontroller
IC. The intended environment for the TOE is the Security IC for smart card applications or similar
services as identified and described in [PP]. The TOE provides the functionality for software execution
and controlling access to memory addresses in a Security IC.
2
This TOE comprises the design of a processor. As such, no physical hardware is delivered, but the
synthesizable Verilog is intended to be integrated into a hardware solution.
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The TOE is not in itself a Security IC, it supports development of a Security IC.
The evaluation and certification of this TOE was performed to enable re-use of the processor into an
EAL6+ Security IC, hence to fulfil the composition requirements [JIL-COMP] assurance up to and
including EAL6 augmented (EAL6(+)) is needed.
Due to the form of the TOE (Verilog), only a limited amount of attacks is directly applicable and
countered by the TOE. For example, physical attacks are not countered by this TOE. Users of
the TOE, developers of a Security IC, must strictly follow the guidance and must successfully
pass a composite CC evaluation against [PP] to claim full EAL4+ and/or AVA_VAN.5
resistance.
During the composition into a full Security IC, significant vulnerability analysis and testing must be
performed. However, the [ETRfC] and the guidance enable efficient re-use.
See chapter [ST] chapter 5.1.3 and 5.2.3 for details regarding threats and policies that are countered
by the environment.
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE is the set of functionalities for a processor in a Security microcontroller IC.
The logical architecture, originating from the Security Target [ST] of the TOE can be depicted as
follows:
Figure 1. Logical architecture of the TOE.
Note that Figure 1 only shows the main interfaces of the TOE. For more detailed descriptions of all
interfaces, see [IIM] and [TRM]. Although the MPU is part of the MPU extension and therefore can be
optionally included or excluded during processor integration, it should always be included for a
certified configuration. Components in blue are configurable during processor integration. For
example, the number of programmable memory regions in the MPU and SAU can be configured
during processor integration.
The TOE has the following features:
• Processor core (Core)
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• Security attribution and memory protection (MPU/SAU)
• Floating Point Unit (FPU)
• Nested Vectored Interrupt Controller (NVIC)
• Wake-up Interrupt Controller (WIC)
• Power, clock, and reset control (PCR)
• Cross Trigger Interface Unit (CTI)
• Matrix
Additionally, the TOE provides the following debug features:
• Embedded Trace Macrocell (ETM)
• Micro Trace Buffer (MTB)
• Debug and trace additional components
§ Configurable Breakpoint Unit (BPU)
§ Configurable Data Watchpoint and Trace unit (DWT)
§ Instruction Trace Macrocell (ITM)
§ ROM table
As per Security Guidance [SG] (see table in chapter 2.5), the debug functionality shall not be used in
the certified configuration. For more information on each individual component, see [ST].
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Reference Name Version
[ERR] Arm® Cortex®-M33 Product Errata Notice AT623-DC-11000-r0p4-00rel0
[RN] Arm® Cortex®-M33 Release Note AT623-DC-06003-r0p4-00rel0
[TRM] Arm® Cortex®-M33 Processor Technical Reference
Manual
AT623-DA-03001-r0p4-00rel0
[IIM] Arm® Cortex®-M33 Processor Integration and
Implementation Manual
AT623-DC-70047-r0p4-00rel0
[UGRM] Arm® Cortex®-M33 Processor User Guide
Reference Manual
AT623-DA-03005-r0p4-00rel0
[AS] Arm® Cortex®-M33 v8-M Architecture Supplement AT623-DC-50000-r0p4-00rel0
[SG] Arm® Cortex®-M33 r0p4 Security Guidance PJDOC-466751330-8803 3.1
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer has tested the TOE according to the developer’s IP verification strategy. A verification
plan has been made that covers the complete development life-cycle of the TOE, and testing has
been performed at all development stages, commensurate with the maturity of the product at the
corresponding stage. The testing comprises:
• (Multi-)Unit level tests, which test (combinations of) parts of the TOE based on the UVM
methodology,
• Top level tests, which test the whole TOE using both pre-defined and randomised test suites,
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• System level tests, which test the TOE in some example environments with simple payloads,
and
• Formal verification, which is applied at various levels using System Verilog.
Additionally, the developer has performed an analysis of the coverage provided by the testing, both
from a code and a functional perspective. Any gaps in the coverage have been assessed and they
have either been amended by additional testing, or shown to be irrelevant.
The developer tested the TOE in the following configuration: Cortex-M33 r0p4. This is the same
configuration as stated in the ST.
Almost all test results were as expected. For the tests where this was not the case, the developer
provided a proper rationale for this.
For unit-level tests and top-level RIS tests, these ‘false failures’ are analysed as follows. Each run
corresponds to a randomly generated seed that results in a number of error messages or signatures.
• During regression testing, all seeds are examined for each signature.
• During cumulative testing, one seed is examined per signature, unless it is a critical error.
It is then confirmed whether these are indeed ‘false failures’.
For system level tests all results were as expected.
The evaluator has witnessed at the developer’s premises at least one test for each (multi-)unit level
test bench not related to debug functionality, one test for each top level test bench, and a single
system level payload. This collection of tests provided a good coverage of security features.
All tests were witnessed on the M35P TOE (certified under certification ID 201210), because the
functionality of the M35P TOE is a superset of that of the M33 TOE. The developer verification
strategy of the M35P TOE uses the verification results of the M33 TOE as a basis, and the evaluator
witnessed cases where justifications for the M35P TOE referenced the test results of the M33 TOE.
The evaluator has defined an independent test subset aimed at verifying the presence of claimed
security functions and security mechanisms. These tests were chosen as they investigate behaviour
that is not directly visible at the functional interfaces, whereas the developer has already shown
through their coverage and depth analysis that all functional interfaces and design aspects are
properly tested.
2.6.2 Independent Penetration Testing
The methodical vulnerability analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
• When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considers
whether potential vulnerabilities can already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified
behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
• For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review is performed on the TOE.
During this attack oriented analysis the protection of the TOE is analysed using the knowledge
gained from all previous evaluation classes. This results in the identification of (additional)
potential vulnerabilities. For this analysis will be performed according to the attack methods in
[JIL-AAPS].
• All potential vulnerabilities are analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation
classes and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that
these potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities are addressed
by penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed appropriate.
2.6.3 Test Configuration
The penetration testing has not been performed on a final product (as the TOE is not a final product),
but on an FPGA that implements the TOE in the environment (i.e. representative of a final product).
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This is similar to performing penetration testing on an Integrated Circuit TOE without Operating
System and Application which is also not a final product. Some modifications were made to the RTL to
enable testing of resistance against sidechannel and perturbation attacks. These modifications
consisted of adding lines that are connected to an external bus and to an internal signal in order to
alter the internal signal by XOR-ing it with the output of the external bus (or some other logical
operation).
2.6.4 Testing Results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No potential vulnerabilities that resulted in penetration testing have been identified. This is due to the
fact that most JIL attack categories do not apply, as the protection against them is an objective for the
environment. As a result only the categories ‘Exploitation of Test Features’ and ‘Software Attacks’
apply, and no potential vulnerabilities that resulted in testing or in an additional guidance element were
identified for these categories.
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
2.7 Re-used evaluation results
There has been re-use of the ALC aspects for the site involved in the development and production of
the TOE, by use of one Site Certificate and one Site Technical Audit Report (for Arm Sophia Antipolis).
The site Austin has been visited as part of this evaluation. A Site Technical Audit Report [STAR] has
been created. See also chapter 2.9.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Cortex M33 r0p4. The TOE can be
identified using the procedure described in the Arm Cortex-M33 Processor Release Note [RN], which
includes verifying the checksums of the received files.
2.9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR] and Site Technical Audit Report
for the Austin site [STAR]
3
which references ASE Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
To support composite evaluations according to [CCDB-2007-09-01] a derived document [ETRfC] was
provided and approved. This document provides details of the TOE evaluation that have to be
considered when this TOE is used as platform in a composite evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Cortex M33 r0p4, to be CC
Part 2 conformant, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 6 augmented with
ALC_FLR.1 and ASE_TSS.1. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements
specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target is based on [PP] but does not claim conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
Nevertheless, composite evaluations based on this TOE can claim [PP] conformance.
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against
attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of the TOE. There are no particular
3
The Site Technical Audit Report contains information necessary to an evaluation lab and certification
body for the reuse of the site audit report in a TOE evaluation.
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obligations or recommendations for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that
the documents contain relevant details with respect to the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he
should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from
the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated because no cryptographic
operations are part of the TOE. Therefore, rating is not applicable.
The independent vulnerability analysis has been performed according to [CC] and other methods and
standards as listed in Appendix B of [ETRfC]. The ratings have been calculated according to [JIL-
AAPS]. No potential vulnerabilities that resulted in penetration testing have been identified. This is due
to the fact that most JIL attack categories do not apply, as the protection against them is an objective
for the environment. This is clearly stated in both the [ST] and the guidance documentation,
specifically [SG] Section 4.3. As a result only the categories ‘Exploitation of Test Features’ and
‘Software Attacks’ apply, and no potential vulnerabilities that resulted in testing or in an additional
guidance element were identified for these categories.
The composite evaluator should note the following regarding the rating of required knowledge of this
TOE (i.e., the processor design). The TOE comprises the implementation representation which is
available under a licensing agreement with the developer. Hence, any required knowledge of the
implementation representation of the TOE shall not be rated higher than Restricted in an attack
potential calculation.
The TOE does not perform speculative execution, and as such attacks relying on this feature (e.g.
Spectre, Meltdown) are not applicable. Attacks that rely on the physical implementation of the TOE
(e.g. row hammer) shall be considered by the composite evaluator if they are applicable.
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3 Security Target
The Arm Cortex-M33 r0p4 Security Target, Version 4.1, 16.01.2020 [ST] is included here by
reference.
Please note that for the need of publication a public version [ST-Lite] has been created and verified
according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of Acronyms and the glossary of terms contains elements that are not already defined by the
CC or CEM:
BPU Break Point Unit
CTI Cross Triger Interface
DWT Data Watchpoint and Trace
EMA Electromagnetic Analysis
ETM Embedded Trace Macrocell
FPU Floating Point Unit
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITM Instruction Trace Macrocell
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MPU Memory Protection Unit
MTB Micro Trace Buffer
MTX Matrix
NSCIB Netherlands scheme for certification in the area of IT security
NVIC Nested Vectored Interrupt Controller
PCR Power, clock, and reset control
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
SAU Security Attribution Unit
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SPA/DPA Simple/Differential Power Analysis
TOE Target of Evaluation
WIC Wake-up Interrupt Controller
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report:
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and III,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, April 2017.
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “Cortex-M33 r0p4” and “Cortex-M35P r1p1”-EAL6+,
19-RPT-895, Version 5.0, 06-02-2020.
[ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition “Cortex-M33 r0p4”-EAL6+, 19-RPT-
896, Version 5.0, 06-02-2020.
[JIL-AAPS] JIL, (Mandatory) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 2.9,
January 2013
[JIL-COMP] JIL, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices, version
1.5.1 May 2018.
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5, 28
March 2019.
[PP] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, Version 1.0,
registered and certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI) under the referenced BSI-PP-0084-2014.
[ST] Arm Cortex-M33 r0p4 Security Target, Version 4.1, 16.01.2020.
[ST-Lite] Arm Cortex-M33 r0p4 Lite Security Target, Version 1.1, 16.01.2020
[STAR] Site Technical Audit Report Arm Austin,19-RPT-672, Version 3.0, 06.02.2020
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004, April
2006.
(This is the end of this report).