C088 Certification Report
Micro Focus Voltage SecureData Appliance (SDA) v6.4
and SecureData Simple API v5.10
File name: ISCB-5-RPT-C088-CR-v1
Version: v1
Date of document: 20 December 2017
Document classification: PUBLIC
For general inquiry about us or our services,
please email: mycc@cybersecurity.my
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C088 Certification Report
Micro Focus Voltage SecureData Appliance (SDA)
v6.4 and SecureData Simple API v5.10
20 December 2017
ISCB Department
CyberSecurity Malaysia
Level 5, Sapura@Mines,
No 7 Jalan Tasik,The Mines Resort City
43300 Seri Kembangan, Selangor, Malaysia
Tel: +603 8992 6888 • Fax: +603 8992 6841
http://www.cybersecurity.my
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Document Authorisation
DOCUMENT TITLE: C088 Certification Report
DOCUMENT REFERENCE: ISCB-5-RPT-C088-CR-v1
ISSUE: v1
DATE: 20 December 2017
DISTRIBUTION: UNCONTROLLED COPY - FOR UNLIMITED USE AND
DISTRIBUTION
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Copyright and Confidentiality Statement
The copyright of this document, which may contain proprietary information, is the
property of CyberSecurity Malaysia. The document shall not be disclosed, copied,
transmitted or stored in an electronic retrieval system, or published in any form, either
wholly or in part without prior written consent.
The document shall be held in safe custody and treated in confidence.
©CyberSecurity Malaysia, 2017
Registered office:
Level 5, Sapura@Mines
No 7, Jalan Tasik,
The Mines Resort City,
43300 Seri Kembangan
Selangor Malaysia
Registered in Malaysia – Limited by Guarantee
Company No. 726630-U
Printed in Malaysia
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Foreword
The Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification (MyCC) Scheme has been
established under the 9th
Malaysian Plan to increase Malaysia’s competitiveness in quality
assurance of information security based on the Common Criteria (CC) standard and to
build consumers’ confidence towards Malaysian information security products.
The MyCC Scheme is operated by CyberSecurity Malaysia and provides a model for
licensed Malaysian Security Evaluation Facilities (MySEFs) to conduct security evaluations
of ICT products, systems and protection profiles against internationally recognised
standards. The results of these evaluations are certified by the Malaysian Common
Criteria Certification Body (MyCB) Unit, a unit established within Information Security
Certification Body (ISCB) Department, CyberSecurity Malaysia.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the MyCB asserts that the product complies
with the security requirements specified in the associated Security Target. A Security
Target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation
activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the Security Target, in
addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any
assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its
security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level)
that the product satisfies the security requirements.
This certification report is associated with the certificate of product evaluation dated 20
December 2017 and the Security Target (Ref [6]). The certification report, Certificate of
product evaluation and security target are posted on the MyCC Scheme Certified Product
Register (MyCPR) at www.cybersecurity.my/mycc and the Common Criteria Portal (the
official website of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement).
Reproduction of this report is authorised provided the report is reproduced in its
entirety.
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Disclaimer
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report and its
associated certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed evaluation facility
established under the Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification (MyCC)
Scheme (Ref [4]) using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, version 3.1
revision 4 (Ref [3]), for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation,
version 3.1 revision 4 (Ref [2]). This certification report and its associated certificate
apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of
the MyCC Scheme and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation
technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certification report and
its associated certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CyberSecurity
Malaysia or by any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certification
report and its associated certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by CyberSecurity
Malaysia or by any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
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Document Change Log
RELEASE DATE PAGES
AFFECTED
REMARKS/CHANGE REFERENCE
d1 5 December 2017 All Initial draft of certification report
d2
13 December
2017
All 2nd
draft of certification report
v1
20 December
2017
All Final certification report
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Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Voltage SecureData Appliance (SDA) v6.4 and SecureData
Simple API v5.10 from Micro Focus.
The TOE provides protection of sensitive data, such as credit card numbers and Social Security
numbers. It enables enterprises to ensure that sensitive data residing in databases and used in
applications is protected as it is collected, used, stored, and distributed to less controlled
environments. SDA provides the ability to implement a comprehensive solution for data protection
offering data de-identification, data masking, and data redaction that requires minimal changes to
the underlying systems.
The SecureData Simple API provides a set of functions that are callable from existing C, C#/.NET,
and Java applications. It allows data protection functionality to be included into any such
application and enables applications to communicate with the SDA to obtain keys.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target (Ref [6]) which identifies
assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the TOE, the security
functional requirements, and the evaluation assurance level at which the product is intended to
satisfy the security requirements. Prospective consumers are advised to verify that their operating
environment is consistent with the evaluated configuration, and to give due consideration to the
comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
This report confirms the findings of the security evaluation of the TOE to the Common Criteria
(CC) Evaluation Assurance Level 2 (EAL2) Augmented ALC_FLR.1. This report confirms that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the relevant criteria and the requirements of the
Malaysia Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification (MyCC) Scheme (Ref [4]).
The evaluation was performed by BAE Systems Applied Intelligence MySEF (Malaysia Security
Evaluation Facility) and completed on 29 November 2017.
The Malaysia Common Criteria Certification Body (MyCB), as the MyCC Scheme Certification
Body, declares that the TOE evaluation meets all the Arrangements on the Recognition of
Common Criteria certificates and the product will be listed in the MyCC Scheme Certified Products
Register (MyCPR) at http://www.cybersecurity.my/mycc and the Common Criteria portal (the
official website of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) at
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that Voltage SecureData Appliance (SDA) v6.4 and
SecureData Simple API v5.10 meets their requirements. It is recommended that a potential user
of the TOE refer to the Security Target (Ref [6]) and this Certification Report prior to deciding
whether to purchase the product.
The TOE, Voltage SecureData Appliance (SDA) v6.4 and SecureData Simple API v5.10, has
been rebranded from Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE) to Micro Focus. All HPE guidance
documentation is effectively in the process of being renamed to Micro Focus and the contents of
the documents themselves remain unchanged and are applicable to the TOE.
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Table of Contents
Document Authorisation ....................................................................................ii
Copyright and Confidentiality Statement .....................................................iii
Foreword................................................................................................................iv
Disclaimer...............................................................................................................v
Document Change Log.......................................................................................vi
Executive Summary............................................................................................vii
Table of Contents..............................................................................................viii
Index of Tables.....................................................................................................ix
Index of Figures ...................................................................................................ix
1 Target of Evaluation...........................................................................1
1.1 TOE Description .................................................................................................1
1.2 TOE Identification ...............................................................................................1
1.3 Security Policy ....................................................................................................2
1.4 TOE Architecture ................................................................................................2
1.4.1 Logical Boundaries .............................................................................................4
1.5 Clarification of Scope..........................................................................................6
1.6 Assumptions .......................................................................................................6
1.7 Evaluated Configuration .....................................................................................6
1.8 Delivery Procedures ...........................................................................................7
1.9 Documentation....................................................................................................8
2 Evaluation..............................................................................................9
2.1 Evaluation Analysis Activities .............................................................................9
2.1.1 Life-cycle support................................................................................................9
2.1.2 Development.....................................................................................................10
2.1.3 Guidance documents........................................................................................11
2.1.4 IT Product Testing ............................................................................................12
3 Result of the Evaluation..................................................................16
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3.1 Assurance Level Information........................................................................16
3.2 Recommendation ........................................................................................... 16
Annex A References ..........................................................................................17
A.1 References.......................................................................................................17
A.2 Terminology....................................................................................................17
A.2.1 Acronyms ........................................................................................................17
A.2.2 Glossary of Terms.......................................................................................... 18
Index of Tables
Table 1: TOE identification................................................................................................................ 1
Table 2: List of Acronyms............................................................................................................ 17
Table 3: Glossary of Terms ......................................................................................................... 18
Index of Figures
Figure 1: Example Single-Server Deployment.................................................................................. 3
Figure 2: Example Multi-Server Deployment .................................................................................... 4
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1 Target of Evaluation
1.1 TOE Description
1 The TOE is Voltage SecureData Appliance (SDA) v6.4 and SecureData Simple API v5.10
from Micro Focus. The TOE provides protection of sensitive data, such as credit card
numbers and Social Security numbers, stored in databases and applications. It enables
enterprises to ensure that sensitive data residing in databases and used in applications is
protected as it is collected, used, stored, and distributed to less controlled environments.
2 SDA provides the ability to implement a comprehensive solution for data protection offering
data de-identification, data masking, and data redaction that requires minimal changes to the
underlying systems. The SecureData Simple API provides a set of functions that are callable
from existing C, C#/.NET, and Java applications. It allows data protection functionality to be
included into any such application and enables applications to communicate with the SDA to
obtain keys.
3 The functionality defined in the Security Target (Ref [6]) that was subsequently evaluated is
as follows:
• Security Audit
• Cryptographic Support
• User Data Protection
• Identification & Authentication
• Security Management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE Access
• Trusted Path/Channels
1.2 TOE Identification
4 The details of the TOE are identified in
5 Table 1 below.
Table 1: TOE identification
Evaluation Scheme
Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification
(MyCC) Scheme
Project Identifier C088
TOE Name
Voltage SecureData Appliance (SDA) v6.4 and SecureData
Simple API v5.10
TOE Version SDA v6.4 and SecureData Simple API v5.10
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Security Target Title
Voltage SecureData Appliance and SecureData Simple API
Security Target
Security Target Version Version 1.0
Security Target Date 1 November 2017
Assurance Level Evaluation Assurance Level 2 Augmented ALC_FLR.1
Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, September 2012, Version 3.1, Revision 4 (Ref [2])
Methodology Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, September 2012, Version 3.1, Revision 4 (Ref [3])
Protection Profile
Conformance None
Common Criteria
Conformance
CC Part 2 Conformant
CC Part 3 Conformant
Package conformant to EAL 2 with Augmented ALC_FLR.1
Sponsor
Leidos Inc.
6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive, Columbia, Maryland 21046
Developer
Micro Focus
1140 Enterprise Way, Sunnyvale CA, 94089
Evaluation Facility
BAE Systems Applied Intelligence – MySEF (Malaysia Security
Evaluation Facility)
Level 28, Menara Binjai, 2 Jalan Binjai, 50450 Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia
1.3 Security Policy
6 There are no organisational security policies that have been defined regarding the use of the
TOE.
1.4 TOE Architecture
7 The TOE includes both logical and physical boundaries as described in Section 2.5 and 2.6 of
the Security Target (Ref [6]).
8 The TOE architecture consists of the following components:
1) Key Management Server:
The Key Management Server supports centralized Voltage SecureData key
management. Voltage SecureData is built around a centralized key management system
that coordinates the generation and issuance of FPE keys, AES keys, and IBE keys.
Unlike traditional systems using randomly generated keys that require complex backup
and recovery procedures, the Key Management Server provides stateless key generation
through the use of a Key Derivation Function (KDF).
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2) Management Console:
The Management Console provides a web-based interface to support centralized
configuration and reporting across the Voltage SecureData solution.
3) Web Service Server (SOAP and REST APIs):
The Web Service Server provides a data protection interface that can be used by web
applications capable of consuming WSDL information. Web Services are an industry
standard method of integrating applications with external services. Web implementations
are available in a diverse set of application platforms from web browsers to mainframes.
The Web Service allows practically any application to make use of the functionality in
Voltage SecureData.
4) SecureData Simple API:
The SecureData Simple API client provides a set of functions that are callable from
existing C, C#, and Java applications. The SecureData Simple API allows users to
include data protection functionality in their applications, and to communicate with the
Key Management Server to obtain keys.
9 The TOE supports a number of different deployment architectures, but they can essentially be
characterized as follows:
i. A single-server system that includes all SDA components on one computer:
Figure 1: Example Single-Server Deployment
In a single-server system, the Management Console, Key Server, and Web Services Server
are installed together on a single server.
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ii. A multi-server system that distributes SDA components among at least two computers:
A multi-server system includes multiple servers that are managed from a single Management
Console. In a multi-server system, the Management Console, Key Server, and Web Service
Server can all be placed on separate servers.
10 The TOE includes the following components:
I. Key Management Server
II. Management Console
III. Web Services Server (SOAP and REST APIs)
IV. SecureData Simple API
1.4.1 Logical Boundaries
11 The scope of the evaluation was limited to those claims made in the Security Target (Ref [6])
and includes only the following evaluated security functionality:
12 Audit: The TOE is able to generate audit records of security relevant and other events as
they occur, including: starting and stopping the audit function; all use of user identification and
authentication mechanisms; and all use of management functions.
Generated audit records include the following information: date and time of the event; type of
event; subject identity; and a description of the event and its outcome. Generated audit
events resulting from the actions of identified users include the identity of the user that caused
the event.
Figure 2: Example Multi-Server Deployment
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Generated audit records are stored in a database and protected from unauthorized deletion.
The audit records are digitally signed and the TOE is able to detect if stored audit records
have been modified. The TOE provides authorized users with the capability to read audit
information from the audit records. The audit records are displayed in a manner suitable for
the authorized user to interpret the information. The TOE provides capabilities to search audit
data for review based on specified search criteria and to select audit data for review based on
time interval, audit record fields and specific values of selected fields.
13 Cryptographic Support: The TOE provides implementations of the following cryptographic
capabilities: Format Preserving Encryption (FPE); embedded Format Preserving Encryption
(eFPE); Identity-Based Encryption (IBE); and Identity-Based Symmetric Encryption (IBSE). In
support of these capabilities, the TOE generates master keys from which encryption keys are
derived and destroys master keys when they are no longer required.
14 User Data Protection: The TOE enforces an access control policy on Web Service clients
that authorizes clients to perform protection and access operations on data based on the
client’s identity, authentication credentials, and IP address.
15 Identification and Authentication: The users of the TOE comprise administrators, who
manage the TOE and its configuration, and clients, who request key management services
from the TOE.
The TOE supports the local (i.e., on device) definition of administrators with usernames and
passwords and enforces minimum requirements for the construction of administrator
passwords. Additionally, the TOE can be configured to use an LDAP directory to support
remote user authentication. Once configured, any user belonging to the specified LDAP
group(s) is granted automatic login access to the Management Console without having to
explicitly create a local account for that user.
When the TOE receives client requests for encryption or decryption keys, the clients must first
be authenticated. The administrator configures one or more authentication methods for a
district. An authentication method defines rules for authenticating the identity of a key
requester, including identity patterns, IP addresses, and the type of authentication. The TOE
supports the following client authentication types in its evaluated configuration: shared secret;
LDAP username and password; certificate.
16 Security Management: The SDA implements two management interfaces—the Appliance
Menu, which is used for initial configuration of the SDA, and the Management Console, which
provides the capabilities necessary to manage the TOE security functionality.
17 Protection of the TSF: When the TOE is configured as a multi-server system,
communications between distributed components of the TOE occur over TLS, which provides
confidentiality and integrity of transmitted data. In addition, the Simple API client software
communicates with the SDA over TLS.
The SDA includes a Linux-based operating system that provides a reliable time stamp derived
from the hardware clock of the computer on which the SDA software is installed. The system
time can be set manually by an administrator via the Appliance Menu, or the SDA can be
configured to synchronize its clock using NTP.
18 TOE Access: The TOE will terminate interactive sessions after 15 minutes of inactivity. The
TOE also allows user-initiated termination of the user’s own interactive session by explicitly
logging off. The TOE can be configured to limit remote access to IP addresses matching
administrator-configured IP addresses or address patterns.
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19 Trusted Path/Channels: The TOE provides a trusted channel to communicate securely with
SecureData clients in the operational environment. The trusted channel is implemented using
TLS, which ensures all communication over the channel is protected from disclosure and
modification.
The TOE provides a trusted path for administrators to communicate with the TOE. The trusted
path is implemented using HTTPS (i.e., TLS over HTTP) for access to the Management
Console and SSH for remote access to the Appliance Menu. The trusted path is used for
initial authentication and all subsequent administrative actions. The use of HTTPS and SSH
ensures all communication over the trusted path is protected from disclosure and
modification.
1.5 Clarification of Scope
20 The TOE is designed to be suitable for use in accordance with user guidance that is supplied
with the product.
21 Section 1.4 of this document describes the scope of the evaluation, which is limited to those
claims made in the Security Target (Ref [6]).
22 The following features and capabilities of the TOE described in the guidance documentation
are not included within the scope of the evaluation:
• KMS for Hadoop TDE (outside TOE boundary)
• Web Front End Server (outside TOE boundary)
23 Potential consumers of the TOE are advised that some functions and services of the overall
product have not been evaluated as part of this evaluation. Potential consumers of the TOE
should carefully consider their requirement for using functions and services outside of the
evaluated configuration.
1.6 Assumptions
24 This section summarises the assumptions regarding the operational environment and the
intended usage of the TOE, as described in the Security Target (Ref [6]):
a) There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE and the
security of the information it contains.
b) The TOE software critical to security policy enforcement will be protected from
unauthorised physical modification.
1.7 Evaluated Configuration
25 As stated in the ST (Ref [6]), there are four (4) main components of the TOE that make up
the evaluated configuration, namely the Management Console, Key Management Server,
Web Service Server (SOAP and REST APIs) and SecureData Simple API.
26 The TOE components are deployed either as a single-server or a multi-server environment in
an enterprise network. The Management Console component of the TOE provides a web-
based interface to support centralised configuration and reporting across the Voltage
SecureData solution. The Key Management Server supports centralised Voltage SecureData
key management. Voltage SecureData is built around a centralised key management system
that coordinates the generation and issuance of FPE keys, AES keys, and IBE keys. The
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Web Service Server provides an application programming interface (API) for protecting and
accessing data. It also provides specialised operations for protecting and accessing
commonly used data formats, such as credit card numbers and Social Security numbers, and
it provides array interfaces to FPE calls in order to optimise the performance of batch
operations. The SecureData Simple API provides a set of functions that are callable from
existing C, C#/.NET, and Java applications. It allows data protection functionality to be
included into any such application and enables applications to communicate with the SDA to
obtain keys.
27 The SDA also includes the following components during the installation process that are
outside the TOE boundary:
• Web Front End Server (FES)
• KMS for Hadoop TDE
28 The evaluated configuration requires that all communications between distributed
components of the TOE occur over TLS, which provides confidentiality and integrity of
transmitted data. The TOE can be configured in either of two modes: non-FIPS mode and
FIPS 140-2 compliant mode. However, the evaluated configuration mode of operation is non-
FIPS as FIPS mode limits client access to only the REST API, as stated in the ST (Ref. [6]).
29 The TOE supports the following components in the operational environment; however, they
are not required in the evaluated configuration:
• NTP server to provide time synchronisation to the TOE platform
• LDAP server to support user authentication
• HSM to support storage of root keys
1.8 Delivery Procedures
30 The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it describes all
procedures that are necessary to maintain security when distributing versions of the TOE or
parts of it to the consumer.
31 The delivery procedures should consider, if applicable, issues such as:
• ensuring that the TOE received by the consumer corresponds precisely to the evaluated
version of the TOE;
• avoiding or detecting any tampering with the actual version of the TOE;
• preventing submission of a false version of the TOE;
• avoiding unwanted knowledge of distribution of the TOE to the consumer: there might be
cases where potential attackers should not know when and how it is delivered;
• avoiding or detecting the TOE being intercepted during delivery; and
• avoiding the TOE being delayed or stopped during distribution.
32 The TOE delivery procedures are as follows:
• Product Orders: A customer contacts Micro Focus – Data Security Sales to identify and
purchase a SecureData deployment of the TOE that is suitable to meet the customer’s
needs. Contact can be made via the Micro Focus – Data Security Contact Sales page or
telephone. When Micro Focus Voltage receives an order for a product, the Voltage
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Support team will be notified to trigger the creation of a Voltage Downloads Portal
account for the customer. The Portal provides customers access to the product, manual,
and updates.
• TOE Download: The Voltage Downloads Portal (https://downloads.voltage.com/) will be
used to download the software, updates, and manuals. Micro Focus Voltage Customer
Support will be notified when a customer purchases the SDA or Simple API, and will
create a Voltage Downloads Portal account for the customer. Access is granted for up to
6 users per customer. An email will be sent to the customer after the account has been
created. Customers log in using the provided credentials and are encouraged to change
the password. If an existing customer is purchasing additional options, Voltage Customer
Support will simply provide the customer access to the options or products they have
purchased.
33 All delivery process details are described in Section 4 of the Life Cycle documentation.
1.9 Documentation
34 It is important that the TOE is used in accordance with the guidance documentation in order
to ensure secure usage of the product.
The following documentation is provided by the developer to the end user as guidance to
ensure secure delivery, installation and operation of the product. Note: All Hewlett Packard
Enterprise (HPE) guidance documentation is effectively in process of being renamed to Micro
Focus. The contents of the documents are unaffected by the naming change.
• SecureData Appliance Version 6.4 Release Notes, October 2017
• HPE SecureData Administrator Guide, version 6.4, October 2017
• HPE SecureData Architecture Guide, version 6.4, October 2017
• HPE SecureData Atalla HSM Supplement, version 6.4, October 2017
• HPE SecureData Appliance Installation Guide, version 6.4, October 2017
• HPE SecureData REST API Developer Guide, version 6.4, October 2017
• HPE SecureData SOAP API Developer Guide, version 6.4 October 2017
• HPE SecureData Simple API Developer Guide Version 5.10, May 2017
• HPE SecureData Simple API Installation Guide Version 5.10, May 2017
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2 Evaluation
35 The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Common Criteria,
version 3.1 Revision 4 (Ref [2]) and the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), version 3.1 Revision 4 (Ref [3]). The evaluation was conducted at Evaluation
Assurance Level 2. The evaluation was performed conformant to the MyCC Scheme Policy
(MyCC_P1) (Ref [4]) and MyCC Scheme Evaluation Facility Manual (MyCC_P3) (Ref [4]).
2.1 Evaluation Analysis Activities
36 The evaluation activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE, including the following
components:
• The evaluators’ testing consisted of independent testing efforts, which comprise both
functional and penetration test cases to address testing requirements for ATE_IND.2 and
AVA_VAN.2 evaluation components.
• For functional testing, the focus was on testing the claimed security functionality (SFRs
within the ST) through the interfaces specified in the functional specification (TSFI). For
the penetration testing, the effort was limited to attacks that are commensurate to an
attacker with equal or less than Basic attack potential. The testing approach for both
testing commensurate with the respective assurance components (ATE_IND.2 and
AVA_VAN.2).
2.1.1 Life-cycle support
2.1.1.1 Configuration Management Capability
37 The evaluators confirmed that the TOE provided for evaluation is labelled with its reference.
38 The evaluators confirmed that the TOE references used are consistent.
39 The evaluators examined the method of identifying configuration items and determined that it
describes how configuration items are uniquely identified.
40 The evaluators examined the configuration items in the configuration item list and determined
that they are identified in a way that is consistent with the CM documentation.
2.1.1.2 Configuration Management Scope
41 The evaluators confirmed that the configuration list includes the following set of items:
• the TOE itself;
• the parts that comprise the TOE; and
• the evaluation evidence required by the SARs in the ST.
42 The evaluators confirmed that the configuration list uniquely identifies each configuration item.
43 The evaluators confirmed that the configuration list indicates the developer of each TSF
relevant configuration item.
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2.1.1.3 TOE Delivery
44 The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it describes all
procedures that are necessary to maintain security when distributing versions of the TOE or
parts of it to the consumer.
2.1.1.4 Basic Flaw Remediation
45 The evaluator examined the flaw remediation procedures documentation and determined that
it describes the procedures used to track all reported security flaws in each release of the
TOE.
46 The evaluator examined the flaw remediation procedures and determined that the application
of these procedures would produce a description of each security flaw in terms of its nature
and effects.
47 The evaluator examined the flaw remediation procedures and determined that the application
of these procedures would identify the status of finding a correction to each security flaw.
48 The evaluator checked the flaw remediation procedures and determined that the application
of these procedures would identify the corrective action for each security flaw.
49 The evaluator examined the flaw remediation procedures documentation and determined that
it describes a means of providing the TOE users with the necessary information on each
security flaw.
2.1.2 Development
2.1.2.1 Architecture
50 The evaluators examined the security architecture description and determined that the
information provided in the evidence is presented at a level of detail commensurate with the
descriptions of the SFR-enforcing abstractions contained in the functional specification and
TOE design.
51 The security architecture description describes the security domains maintained by the TSF.
52 The initialisation process described in the security architecture description preserves security.
53 The evaluators examined the security architecture description and concluded that it contains
sufficient information to demonstrate that the TSF is able to protect itself from tampering by
untrusted active entities. The security architecture description presents an analysis that
adequately describes how the SFR-enforcing mechanisms cannot be bypassed.
2.1.2.2 Functional Specification
54 The evaluators examined the functional specification and determined that:
• the TSF is fully represented,
• it states the purpose of each TSF Interface (TSFI),
• the method of use for each TSFI is given,
55 The evaluators also examined the presentation of the TSFI and determined that:
• it completely identifies all parameters associated with every TSFI,
• it completely and accurately describes all error messages resulting from an invocation of
each SFR-enforcing TSFI,
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56 The evaluators also confirmed that the developer supplied tracing that links the SFRs to the
corresponding TSFIs.
2.1.2.3 TOE Design Specification
57 The evaluators examined the TOE design and determined that the structure of the entire TOE
is described in terms of subsystems. The evaluators also determined that all subsystems of
the TSF are identified. The evaluators determined that interactions between the subsystems
of the TSF were described.
58 The evaluators examined the TOE and determined that each SFR supporting or SFR-non-
interfering subsystem of the TSF was described such that the evaluators could determine that
the subsystem is not SFR-enforcing.
59 The evaluators found the TOE design to be a complete, accurate, and detailed description of
the SFR-enforcing behaviour of the SFR-enforcing subsystems.
60 The evaluators examined the TOE design and determined that it provides a description of the
interactions among SFR-enforcing subsystems of the TSF, and between the SFR-enforcing
subsystems of the TSF and other subsystems of the TSF.
61 The evaluators determined that the TOE design contained a complete and accurate mapping
from the TSFI described in the functional specification to the subsystems of the TSF
described in the TOE design.
62 The evaluators determined that all SFRs were covered by the TOE design, and concluded
that the TOE design was an accurate instantiation of all SFRs.
2.1.3 Guidance documents
2.1.3.1 Operational Guidance
63 The evaluators examined the operational user guidance and determined that it describes, for
each user role, the user-accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a
secure processing environment, including appropriate warnings. For each role, the secure
use of available TOE interfaces is described. The available security functionality and
interfaces are described for each user role – in each case, all security parameters under the
control of the user are described with indications of secure values where appropriate.
64 The operational user guidance describes, for each user role, each type of security-relevant
event relative to the user functions that need to be performed, including changing the security
characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF and operation following failure or
operational error.
65 The evaluators examined the operational user guidance (in conjunction with other evaluation
evidence and determined that the guidance identifies all possible modes of operation of the
TOE (including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences and
implications for maintaining secure operation.
66 The evaluators determined that the operational user guidance describes, for each user role,
the security measures to be followed in order to fulfil the security objectives for the operational
environment as described in the ST.
67 The evaluators found that the operational user guidance is clear and reasonable.
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2.1.3.2 Preparation Guidance
68 The evaluators examined the provided delivery acceptance documentation and determined
that they describe the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the TOE in accordance with
the developer's delivery procedures.
69 The evaluators determined that the provided installation procedures describe the steps
necessary for secure installation of the TOE and the secure preparation of the operational
environment in accordance with the security objectives in the ST.
70 The evaluators performed all user procedures necessary to prepare the TOE during testing
and determined that the TOE and its operational environment can be prepared securely using
only the supplied preparative user guidance.
2.1.4 IT Product Testing
71 Testing at EAL2 consists of assessing developer tests, performing independent functional
tests, and conducting penetration tests. The TOE testing was conducted by the evaluators of
BAE Systems Applied Intelligence MySEF. The detailed testing activities, including
configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and actual results are documented in
a separate Test Plan Report.
2.1.4.1 Assessment of Developer Tests
72 The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining
their test plans, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the Evaluation Technical
Report (Ref [7]) (not a public document because it contains information proprietary to the
developer and/or the evaluator).
2.1.4.2 Independent Functional Testing
73 At EAL2, independent functional testing is the evaluation conducted by evaluators based on
the information gathered by examining design and guidance documentation, examining
developer’s test documentation, executing a subset of the developer’s test plan and creating
test cases that are independent of the developer’s tests.
74 All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of
the testing procedures and results. The results of the independent functional tests were
recorded by the evaluators and are consistent with the expected test results in the test
documentation.
Test ID Description SFRs
TEST-IND-001-APP • Verify that all users are successfully identified
and authenticated based on authentication
mechanisms and user attributes before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions.
• Verify that authorised users are able to
perform management of TSF data functions.
• Verify that authorised users are able to
determine and modify the behaviour of security
management functions.
• Verify that the TSF shall maintain security
roles.
• Verify that the TSF data is protected from
FIA_ATD.1.1,
FIA_SOS.1.1 ,
FIA_UAU.2.1,
FIA_UAU.5.1,
FIA_UID.2.1,
FMT_SMF.1.1,
FMT_SMR.1.1,
FMT_SMR.1.2,
FPT_STM.1.1,
FTA_SSL.4,
FTP_TRP.1.1,
FTP_TRP.1.2,
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Test ID Description SFRs
disclosure or modification when it is
transmitted between separate parts of the
TOE, and all communication between the TOE
and other trusted IT products/remote users are
initiated via trusted path/channels.
• Verify that the TSF is able to provide reliable
timestamps.
FTP_TRP.1.3
TEST-IND-002-MC • Verify that all users are successfully identified
and authenticated based on authentication
mechanisms and user attributes before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions.
• Verify that authorised users are able to
perform management of TSF data functions.
• Verify that authorised users are able to
determine and modify the behaviour of security
management functions.
• Verify that authorised users are able to
manage the rules used in enforcing the Access
Control policy on Web Service clients and that
the TSF provides restrictive default values or
specifies alternative values to override the
default settings.
• Verify that the TSF shall maintain security
roles.
• Verify that the TSF data is protected from
disclosure or modification when it is
transmitted between separate parts of the
TOE, and all communication between the TOE
and other trusted IT products/remote users are
initiated via trusted path/channels.
• Verify that the TSF generates audit records for
auditable events and provides a means for
authorised users to view the audit logs and
provides reliable timestamps.
FAU_GEN.1.1,
FAU_GEN.1.2,
FAU_GEN.2.1,
FAU_SAR.1.1,
FAU_SAR.1.2,
FCS_CKM.1.1(1),
FCS_CKM.1.1(2),
FCS_CKM.4.1,
FIA_ATD.1.1,
FIA_SOS.1.1,
FIA_UAU.2.1,
FIA_UAU.5.1,
FIA_UAU.5.2,
FIA_UID.2.1,
FMT_MSA.1.1,
FMT_MSA.3.1,
FMT_MSA.3.2,
FMT_SMF.1.1,
FMT_SMR.1.1,
FMT_SMR.1.2,
FPT_STM.1.1,
FTA_SSL.4.1,
FTP_TRP.1.1,
FTP_TRP.1.2,
FTP_TRP.1.3
TEST-IND-003-MC • Verify that the TSF performs TOE access
functions such as user session termination and
inactive session termination.
• Verify that the TSF is able to deny session
establishment based on the IP address of the
source of a session request.
• Verify that the TOE generates audit records for
auditable events and provides a means for
authorised users to view the audit logs.
• Verify that the TSF restricts access to audit
records, provides the capability to select and
order audit records and protects audit records
from unauthorised deletion and modification.
FTA_TSE.1.1,
FTA_SSL.3.1,
FAU_SAR.3.1,
FAU_STG.1.1,
FAU_STG.1.2
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Test ID Description SFRs
TEST-IND-004-
SOAP
• Verify that all users are successfully identified
and authenticated based on authentication
mechanisms and user attributes before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions.
• Verify that the TSF is able to perform
cryptographic operations based on the keys
defined.
• Verify that the TSF is able to enforce access
control policy on Web Service clients that
authorises clients to perform protection and
access operations on data, based on the
client’s identity, authentication credentials, and
IP address.
• Verify that the TSF data is protected from
disclosure or modification when it is
transmitted between separate parts of the
TOE, and all communication between the TOE
and other trusted IT products/remote users are
initiated via trusted path/channels.
• Verify that the TOE generates audit records for
auditable events and provides a means for
authorised users to view the audit logs.
FAU_GEN.1.1,
FAU_GEN.1.2,
FIA_UAU.2.1,
FIA_UAU.5.1,
FIA_UAU.5.2,
FIA_UID.2.1,
FCS_CKM.1.1(1),
FCS_CKM.1.1(2),
FCS_COP.1.1(1),
FCS_COP.1.1(2) ,
FDP_ACC.1.1,
FDP_ACF.1.1,
FDP_ACF.1.2,
FDP_ACF.1.3,
FDP_ACF.1.4,
FPT_ITT.1.1,
FTP_ITC.1.1,
FTP_ITC.1.2,
FTP_TRP.1.1,
FTP_TRP.1.2,
FTP_TRP.1.3
TEST-IND-005-
SIMPLE
• Verify that all users are successfully identified
and authenticated based on authentication
mechanisms and user attributes before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions.
• Verify that the TSF is able to perform
cryptographic operations based on the keys
defined.
• Verify that the TSF is able to enforce access
control policy on Web Service clients that
authorises clients to perform protection and
access operations on data, based on the
client’s identity and LDAP authentication
credentials.
• Verify that the TSF data is protected from
disclosure or modification when it is
transmitted between separate parts of the
TOE, and all communication between the TOE
and other trusted IT products/remote users are
initiated via trusted path/channels.
FIA_ATD.1.1,
FIA_SOS.1.1 ,
FIA_UAU.2.1,
FIA_UAU.5.1,
FIA_UID.2.1,
FMT_SMF.1.1,
FMT_SMR.1.1,
FMT_SMR.1.2,
FPT_STM.1.1,
FTA_SSL.4,
FTP_TRP.1.1,
FTP_TRP.1.2,
FTP_TRP.1.3
75 All testing performed by evaluators produced the expected results and as such the TOE
behaved as expected.
2.1.4.3 Penetration Testing
76 The evaluators performed vulnerability analysis of the TOE in order to identify potential
vulnerabilities in the TOE. This vulnerability analysis considered public domain sources and
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an analysis of guidance documentation, functional specification, and TOE design and security
architecture description.
77 From the vulnerability analysis, the evaluators conducted penetration testing to determine that
the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing a basic attack potential.
The following factors have been taken into consideration during penetration tests:
a) Time taken to identify and exploit (elapsed time);
b) Specialist technical expertise required (specialist expertise);
c) Knowledge of the TOE design and operation (knowledge of the TOE);
d) Window of opportunity; and
e) IT hardware/software or other equipment required for exploitation.
78 The penetration tests focused on:
a) Port Scan
b) General Vulnerability Scan
c) Common Web Vulnerability Scan
d) Cookie Injection/ Broken Authentication
e) Input and Data Validation
f) Weak Cipher Strength
79 The results of the penetration testing demonstrate that the TOE is resistant to an attacker
possessing a basic attack potential. However, it is important to ensure that the TOE is used
only in its evaluated configuration and in a secure environment as specified in the Security
Target (Ref [6]).
2.1.4.4 Testing Results
80 Tests conducted for the TOE produced the expected results and demonstrated that the
product behaved as specified in its Security Target (Ref [6]) and its functional specification. In
addition, the documentation supplied as evidence for the EAL2 with Augmented ALC_FLR.1
Common Criteria evaluation of the TOE was analysed to identify possible vulnerabilities.
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3 Result of the Evaluation
81 After due consideration during the oversight of the execution of the evaluation by the certifiers
and of the Evaluation Technical Report (Ref [7]), the Malaysian Common Criteria Certification
Body certifies the evaluation of Micro Focus Voltage SecureData Appliance (SDA) v6.4 and
SecureData Simple API v5.10 performed by BAE Systems Applied Intelligence MySEF.
82 BAE Systems Applied Intelligence MySEF found that Micro Focus Voltage SecureData
Appliance (SDA) v6.4 and SecureData Simple API v5.10 upholds the claims made in the
Security Target (Ref [6]) and supporting documentation, and has met the requirements of the
Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Level 2 (EAL2) Augmented ALC_FLR.1.
83 Certification is not a guarantee that a TOE is completely free of exploitable vulnerabilities.
There will remain a small level of risk that exploitable vulnerabilities remain undiscovered in
its claimed security functionality. The risk is reduced as the certified level of assurance
increases for the TOE.
3.1 Assurance Level Information
84 EAL 2 provides assurance by a full Security Target and analysis of the SFRs in that Security
Target (Ref [6]), using functional and interface specifications, guidance documentation and a
basic description of the design and architecture of the TOE, to understand the security
behaviours of the TOE.
85 The analysis is supported by an independent testing of the TSF, evidence of developer
testing based on the functional specification, selective independent confirmation of the
developer test results, and a vulnerability analysis (based upon the functional specification,
TOE design, security architecture description and guidance evidence provided) demonstrating
resistance to an attacker possessing a Basic attack potential.
86 EAL 2 also provides assurance through use of a configuration management system, evidence
of secure delivery procedures and basic flaw remediation (ALC_FLR.1).
3.2 Recommendation
87 The following recommendations are made:
a) Potential purchasers of the TOE should review the intended operational environment
and ensure that they are comfortable that the stated security objectives for the
operational environment can be suitably addressed.
b) Potential purchasers of the TOE should consider the use of a CA signed certificate, as
opposed to a self-signed certificate to fully secure access to the TOE environment.
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Annex A References
A.1 References
[1] Arrangement on the recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of
Information Technology Security, July, 2014.
[2] The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] The Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[4] MyCC Scheme Policy (MyCC_P1), v1d, CyberSecurity Malaysia, February 2016.
[5] MyCC Scheme Evaluation Facility Manual (MyCC_P3), v1c, February 2016.
[6] Voltage SecureData Appliance and SecureData Simple API Security Target, Version
1.0, 1 November 2017
[7] EAU000426.06-S042-ETR 1.0, Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.0, 29 November
2017
A.2 Terminology
A.2.1 Acronyms
Table 2: List of Acronyms
Acronym Expanded Term
CB Certification Body
CC Common Criteria (ISO/IEC15408)
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology (ISO/IEC 18045)
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
ISO International Organisation for Standardization
ISCB Information Security Certification Body
MyCB Malaysian Common Criteria Certification Body
MyCC Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification
Scheme
MyCPR MyCC Scheme Certified Products Register
MySEF Malaysian Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
ST Security Target
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Acronym Expanded Term
TOE Target of Evaluation
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
FPE Format Preserving Encryption—an encryption method that
encrypts data so that the cipher text has the same length and
character set as the input data
HSM Hardware Security Module—a physical computing device that
manages and safeguards cryptographic keys and may support
other cryptographic operations
IBE Identity-Based Encryption—an asymmetric encryption
algorithm that encrypts data without preserving its length or
character set
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
NTP Network Time Protocol
REST Representational state transfer—a software architecture for
distributed systems, including RESTful API web services
SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol—a protocol specification for
exchanging structured information in the implementation of
web services in computer networks.
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
A.2.2 Glossary of Terms
Table 3: Glossary of Terms
Term Definition and Source
CC International
Interpretation
An interpretation of the CC or CEM issued by the CCMB that
is applicable to all CCRA participants.
Certificate The official representation from the CB of the certification of
a specific version of a product to the Common Criteria.
Certification Body An organisation responsible for carrying out certification and
for overseeing the day-today operation of an Evaluation and
Certification Scheme. Source CCRA
Consumer The organisation that uses the certified product within their
infrastructure.
Developer The organisation that develops the product submitted for CC
evaluation and certification.
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Term Definition and Source
Evaluation The assessment of an IT product, IT system, or any other
valid target as defined by the scheme, proposed by an
applicant against the standards covered by the scope defined
in its application against the certification criteria specified in
the rules of the scheme. Source CCRA and MS-ISO/IEC Guide
65
Evaluation and Certification
Scheme
The systematic organisation of the functions of evaluation
and certification under the authority of a certification body
in order to ensure that high standards of competence and
impartiality are maintained and that consistency is achieved.
Source CCRA.
Interpretation Expert technical judgement, when required, regarding the
meaning or method of application of any technical aspect of
the criteria or the methodology. An interpretation may be
either a national interpretation or a CC international
interpretation.
Certifier The certifier responsible for managing a specific certification
task.
Evaluator The evaluator responsible for managing the technical aspects
of a specific evaluation task.
Maintenance Certificate The update of a Common Criteria certificate to reflect a
specific version of a product that has been maintained under
the MyCC Scheme.
National Interpretation An interpretation of the CC, CEM or MyCC Scheme rules that
is applicable within the MyCC Scheme only.
Security Evaluation Facility An organisation (or business unit of an organisation) that
conducts ICT security evaluation of products and systems
using the CC and CEM in accordance with Evaluation and
Certification Scheme policy
Sponsor The organisation that submits a product for evaluation and
certification under the MyCC Scheme. The sponsor may also
be the developer.
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