TrustCB B.V.
Registered address:
Van den Berghlaan 48, 2132 AT
Hoofddorp, The Netherlands
nscib@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/nscib/
https://nscib.nl
TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK),
under number 858360275.
Version
2022-03
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Certification Report
NXP JCOP 5.1 on SN100.C48 Secure Element
Sponsor and developer: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Troplowitzstrasse 20, D-22529
Hamburg
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2200049-01-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2200049-01
Author(s): Andy Brown
Date: 19 April 2023
Number of pages: 13
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 7
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 7
2.2 Security Policy 7
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 8
2.5 Documentation 8
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 9
2.6.3 Test configuration 9
2.6.4 Test results 9
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 10
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 10
2.9 Evaluation Results 10
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 10
3 Security Target 12
4 Definitions 12
5 Bibliography 13
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the NXP
JCOP 5.1 on SN100.C48 Secure Element. The developer of the NXP JCOP 5.1 on SN100.C48
Secure Element is NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany and they also
act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist
prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their
particular requirements.
The TOE is a composite TOE, consisting of a Java Card smart card operating system and an
underlying platform, which is a secure micro controller. The TOE provides Java Card 3.0.5
functionality with post-issuance applet loading, card content management and secure channel
features as specified in Global Platform 2.3.
It includes also NXP Proprietary Functionality: Secure Box, Config Applet, OS Update Component,
Restricted Mode and Error Detection Code (EDC) API.
Cryptographic functionality includes 3DES, AES, RSA and RSA CRT; SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512 hash algorithms, HMAC, ECC over GF(p). Furthermore, the TOE provides random
number generation according to class DRG.3 of AIS 20.
Note that proprietary applications such as FeliCa and Mifare API have been included in the TOE, but
as there are no security claims on these applications in this certificate, these applications have not
been assessed, only the self-protection of the TSF.
The TOE was previously evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was
certified under the accreditation of TÜV Rheinland Nederland on 30 April 2019 (CC-19-221699)
The first re-evaluation of the TOE was also conducted by SGS Brightsight B.V and was completed on
29 November 2019 with the approval of the ETR under the accreditation of TÜV Rheinland Nederland
(CC-19-221699-2).
The second issue of the Certification Report was a result of a "recertification with major changes". The
major changes were related to a change of the commercial name, reduced claims in the ST due to
reduced claims in the underlying ST without change of the software, a minor change in the guidance
not impacting the security functionality of the certified product. The identification of the maintained
product was modified to NXP JCOP5.1 eSE on SN100.C48 Secure Element.
Users of the previous certificate are reminded that the following SFRs were removed due to the
changes in the underlying ST: FCS_CKM.2 and FCS_CKM.3. The SFR FCS_RNG changed from
DRG.4 to DRG.3.
The security evaluation re-used the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up to
date vulnerability analysis was not made. No renewed testing was necessary.
This current evaluation of the TOE has also been conducted by SGS Brightsight B.V. and was
completed on 19 April 2023 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of
IT Security [NSCIB].
The major changes from previous evaluations are:
- The ST has been updated to modify the version of the user manuals;
- The User Guidance Manual has been updated;
- A development site has been added.
The certification took into account that the security evaluation reused the evaluation results of
previously performed evaluations. A full, up-to-date vulnerability analysis has been made. Additional
testing has been performed.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the NXP JCOP 5.1 on SN100.C48 Secure
Element, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which
the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the NXP JCOP 5.1 on
SN100.C48 Secure Element are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the
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security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in
this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures), AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis), ASE_TSS.2 (TOE summary
specification with architectural design summary) and ALC_FLR.1(Basic flaw remediation).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the NXP JCOP 5.1 on SN100.C48 Secure
Element from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware SN100x IC Package (as part of SN100 certificate) B2.1 C48
Software Factory OS (part of SN100 certificate) 4.2.0
Boot OS (part of SN100 certificate) 4.2.0
Flash Driver Software (part of SN100 certificate) 4.0.8
Services Software (part of SN100 certificate, specific to C48) 4.13.7.1
Crypto Library (part of SN100 certificate) 1.0.0
JCOP5.1 OS, native applications and OS Update Component R1.00.1
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the NXP JCOP 5.1 on
SN100.C48 Secure Element. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 1.3.2.
2.2 Security Policy
This TOE is a composite TOE, consisting of a Java Card smart card operating system, an OS updater,
a restricted mode and an underlying platform, which is composed of a library which provides
cryptographic functions and a secure micro-controller. The TOE provides Java Card 3.0.5 functionality
with post-issuance applet loading, card content management and secure channel features as
specified in Global Platform 2.3 including SCP03. It includes also NXP proprietary functionalities:
• Secure Box: Enables the TOE to run third party native code (Secure Box Native Lib) on the
micro-controller.
• Config Applet: JCOP5.1 OS includes a Config Applet that can be used for configuration of the
TOE.
• OS Update Component: Proprietary functionality that can update JCOP5.1 OS or UpdaterOS.
• Restricted Mode: In Restricted Mode only very limited functionality of the TOE is available
such as,e.g.: reading logging information or resetting the Attack Counter.
• Error Detection Code (EDC) API.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 5.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
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Note that proprietary applications such as FeliCa and Mifare API have been included in the TOE, but
as there are no security claims on these applications in this certificate, these applications have not
been assessed, only the self-protection of the TSF.
2.4 Architectural Information
The logical architecture, originating from the Security Target 1ST], of the TOE can be depicted as
follows:
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
JCOP 5.1 R1.00.1 User Guidance Manual Rev 2.3
JCOP 5.1 R1.00.1 User Guidance Manual Addendum SEMS Rev 1.1
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The tests cover all security functions and aspects of the TSF. Testing is performed during
development as well as for acceptance/release. The developer used a set of test suites (industry
standard and proprietary ones) and tools to test the TOE as well as an emulator, PC Platform and
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FPGA tool as some tests could only be performed in such environment. The identification was
checked based on the SVN number. The developer uses a distributed test environment to allow usage
of a vast amount of simultaneously driven testing equipment.
The developer has performed extensive testing on TSFI, subsystem, module and module interface
level. The tests are performed by NXP through execution of the test scripts using an automated and
distributed system. Test tools and scripts are extensively used to verify that the tests return expected
values.
Code coverage analysis is used by NXP to verify overall test completeness. Test benches for the
various TOE parts are executed using code coverage measurement and analysis tools to determine
the code coverage (i.e. lines, branches and/or instructions, depending on tool) of each test bench.
Cases with incomplete coverage are analysed. For each tool, the developer has investigated and
documented inherent limitations that can lead to coverage being reported as less than 100%. In such
cases the developer provided a "gap" analysis with rationales (e.g. attack counter not hit due to
redundancy checks).
The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations, as
the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
• When evaluating the evidence in the classes ADV and AGD potential vulnerabilities were
identified from generating questions to the type of TOE and the specified behaviour. From the
ASE class, no potential vulnerabilities were identified.
• For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review was performed on the TOE.
During this attack oriented analysis the protection against the attack scenarios was analysed
using the knowledge gained from all previous evaluation classes. This resulted in the
identification of additional potential vulnerabilities. This analysis was performed according to
the attack list in [JIL- AP]. An important source for assurance against attacks in this step is the
[HW-ETRfC] of the underlying platform; no additional potential vulnerabilities were concluded
from this.
• All potential vulnerabilities were analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation
classes and the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that these potential
vulnerabilities are not exploitable. For most of the potential vulnerabilities a penetration test
was defined. Several potential vulnerabilities were found to be not exploitable due to an
impractical attack path.
For the second re-certification the vulnerability analysis did not lead to additional testing.
For this current evaluation, the vulnerability analysis was refreshed again. The vulnerability analysis
was assured via selected testing: 50% were perturbation attacks, 50% were side channel testing.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The TOE was tested in the following configuration: NXP JCOP5.1 R1.00.1 (J5U2M001F3560600). A
subset of the test campaign was performed on a previously certified product JCOP5.0
R1.11.0(J5T2M001B39100, NSCIB-CC-195714) as the potential vulnerabilities tested are shared
between both products. For details see [ETRfC].
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
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The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities. These activities revealed that for some cryptographic
functionality the security level could be reduced from an algorithmic security level above 100 bits to a
practical remaining security level lower than 100 bits. The remaining security level still exceeds 80 bits,
so this is considered sufficient. Therefore, no exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the
independent penetration tests.
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been
reused, but vulnerability analysis has been renewed.
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of 6 Site Technical Audit Report{s}.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number NXP JCOP 5.1 on SN100.C48 Secure
Element.
The TOE can only be in a single evaluated configuration. Changes that can be made using the Config
Applet are within this configuration.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents, and Site Technical Audit Report(s) for the site(s)
[STAR] 2. To support composite evaluations according to [COMP] a derived document [ETRfC] was
provided and approved. This document provides details of the TOE evaluation that must be
considered when this TOE is used as platform in a composite evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the NXP JCOP 5.1 on
SN100.C48 Secure Element, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the
requirements of EAL 5 augmented with AVA_VAN.5, ALC_DVS.2, ASE_TSS.2 and ALC_FLR.1.
This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ‘demonstrable’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
2 The Site Technical Audit Report contains information necessary to an evaluation lab and
certification body for the reuse of the site audit report in a TOE evaluation.
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customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
Users of the first certificate are reminded that the following SFRs have been removed from
subsequent certifications of the TOE due to the changes in the underlying ST: FCS_CKM.2 and
FCS_CKM.3. The SFR FCS_RNG has changed from DRG.4 to DRG.3.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: MIFARE and Felica.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
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3 Security Target
The NXP JCOP 5.1 on SN100.C48 Secure Element Security Target, Revision 2.8, 17 March 2023 [ST]
is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
ECB Electronic Code Book (a block-cipher mode of operation)
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMA Electromagnetic Analysis
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MAC Message Authentication Code
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP Protection Profile
RMI Remote Method Invocation
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SPA/DPA Simple/Differential Power Analysis
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRNG True Random Number Generator
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “NXP JCOP 5.1 SN100.C48 Secure Element” –
EAL5+, 22-RPT-055, Version 2.0, 31 March 2023
[ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition "NXP JCOP 5.1 SN100.C48
Secure Element"– EAL5+, 23-RPT-053, Version 2.0, 31 March 2023
[HW-CERT] SN100 Series – Secure Element with Crypto Library SN100_SE B2.1
C25/C48/C58, CC-22-174263, 174263_6, 29 November 2022
[HW-ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition SN100 Series - Secure Element
with Crypto Library B2.1 C25, C48, and C58, Product Update F EAL6+, Version
2.0, 25 November 2022
[HW-ST] Security Target, SN100 Series - Secure Element with Crypto Library, version
v3.5, 21 April 2021
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.1, June 2020
[JIL-AAPHD] Application of Attack Potential to Hardware Devices with Security Boxes,
Version 3.0, July 2020
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
22 August 2022
[PP] Java Card Protection Profile - Open Configuration, Version 3.0.5, December
2017, registered under BSI-CC-PP-0099-2017
[ST] NXP JCOP 5.1 on SN100.C48 Secure Element Security Target, Revision 2.8,
17 March 2023
[ST-lite] NXP JCOP 5.1 on SN100.C48 Secure Element, Revision 2.7, 17 March 2023
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)