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Reference: 2017‐28‐INF‐2492‐v1
Target: Público
Date: 30.08.2018
Created by: CERT11
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
Dossier # 2017‐28
TOE THD89 Secure Microcontroller version 1.0 with Crypto Library version 1.01
Applicant TMC ‐ Tongxin Microelectronics Co., Ltd.
References
[EXT‐3501] Certification Request
[EXT‐4231] Evaluation Technical Report
Certification report of the product THD89 Secure Microcontroller version 1.0 with Crypto Library
version 1.01, as requested in [EXT‐3501] dated 29/08/2017, and evaluated by Applus Laboratories,
as detailed in the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT‐4231] received on 28/08/2018.
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...........................................................................................................................3
TOE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................................3
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ...........................................................................................4
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS..........................................................................................5
IDENTIFICATION ....................................................................................................................................5
SECURITY POLICIES................................................................................................................................5
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .......................................................................6
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON‐COVERED THREATS.................................................................................6
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY..............................................................................6
ARCHITECTURE ......................................................................................................................................6
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE....................................................................................................................6
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE..................................................................................................................7
DOCUMENTS..........................................................................................................................................9
PRODUCT TESTING ................................................................................................................................9
PENETRATION TESTING .....................................................................................................................9
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION ............................................................................................................10
EVALUATION RESULTS ........................................................................................................................10
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM.............................................11
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................................................11
GLOSSARY............................................................................................................................................11
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....................................................................................................................................12
SECURITY TARGET / SECURITY TARGET LITE (IF APPLICABLE) ...........................................................12
RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS..............................................................................................................13
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS‐MRA)....................................................13
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA) ...................................................................13
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the product THD89
Secure Microcontroller version 1.0 with Crypto Library version 1.01.
The TOE is a secure microcontroller with crypto library suitable to support ID cards, banking cards,
ePassport applications, etc.
Developer/manufacturer: Tongxin Microelectronics Co., Ltd.
Sponsor: Tongxin Microelectronics Co., Ltd..
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN).
ITSEF: Applus Laboratories.
Protection Profile: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, BSI‐CC‐PP‐0084‐2014 (version 1.0,
13.01.2014).
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1, R5 ‐
EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5.
Evaluation end date: 28/08/2018.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL5 (augmented with ALC_DVS.2
and AVA_VAN.5) have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Applus
Laboratories assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are
satisfied for the assurance level EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5, as defined by the Common
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1, R5 and the Common
Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1, R5.
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product THD89 Secure Microcontroller version 1.0 with Crypto Library version 1.01, a positive
resolution is proposed.
TOE SUMMARY
The TOE is a secure microcontroller with crypto library which consists of hardware and IC dedicated
software. The hardware is based on a 32‐bit CPU with ROM (Non‐Volatile Read‐Only Memory),
NVM (Non‐volatile Programmable Memory) and RAM (Volatile Memory). The hardware of the TOE
also incorporates communication peripherals and cryptographic coprocessors for execution and
acceleration of symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms. The IC dedicated software
consists of boot code and a library of cryptographic services.
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SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level EAL5 +
ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5 and the evidences required by the additional components ALC_DVS.2 and
AVA_VAN.5, according to Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version
3.1, R5.
Security assurance requirements Titles
Class ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Architectural design
ADV_FSP.5 Functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation
ADV_INT.2 TSF internals
ADV_TDS.4 TOE design
Class AGD: Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative user guidance
Class ALC: Life‐cycle support
ALC_CMC.4 CM capabilities
ALC_CMS.5 CM scope
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery
ALC_DVS.2 Development security
ALC_LCD.1 Life‐cycle definition
ALC_TAT.2 Tools and techniques
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Class ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.2 Coverage
ATE_DPT.3 Depth
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing
Class AVA: Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Vulnerability analysis
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SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements, according to the
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1, R5:
Security functional requirement Title
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FDP_SDC.1 Stored data confidentiality
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
FCS_RNG.1[PTG.2] Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_COP.1[TDES] Cryptographic operation – TDES
FCS_COP.1[RSA] Cryptographic operation – RSA
IDENTIFICATION
Product: THD89 Secure Microcontroller version 1.0 with Crypto Library version 1.01.
Security Target: THD89 Secure Microcontroller with Crypto Library Security Target, version 1.6.
Protection Profile: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, BSI‐CC‐PP‐0084‐2014 (version 1.0,
13.01.2014).
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1, R5 ‐
EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5.
SECURITY POLICIES
The use of the product THD89 Secure Microcontroller version 1.0 with Crypto Library version 1.01
shall implement a set of security policies assuring the fulfilment of different standards and security
demands.
The detail of these policies is documented in the Security Target, section 3.3.
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ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the security properties and
functionalities compiled by the security target. These assumptions are obtained from the Security IC
Platform Protection Profile and they have been applied during the evaluation in order to determine if
the identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these assumptions for its
operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them could not be assumed, it would not
be possible to assure the secure operation of the TOE.
The detail of these assumptions is documented in the Security Target, section 3.4.
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON‐COVERED THREATS
The threats defined in the Security Target do not suppose a risk for the product THD89 Secure
Microcontroller version 1.0 with Crypto Library version 1.01, although the agents implementing
attacks have the attack potential according to the High attack potential of EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 +
AVA_VAN.5 and always fulfilling the usage assumptions and the proper security policies satisfaction
as well as observing al security recommendations defined in the guidance documents of the TOE.
For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product security
properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
The threats covered by the security properties of the TOE are those defined in the Security IC
Platform Protection Profile and they are documented in the Security Target, section 3.2.
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some of the
objectives of the defined security problem.
The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are those defined in the
Security IC Platform Protection Profile and they are documented in the Security Target, section 4.3.
ARCHITECTURE
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE
The TOE provides ROM for executing the boot code and crypto library code, NVM for the code and
data access, and RAM for the temporary data access.
The Memory management unit is performed by the AHBMMU, and it also performs the access
control of boot mode, test mode and normal mode.
There are two communication interfaces available, including ISO/IEC 14443 contactless interface,
ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface. SPI interface and I2C interface are not available to the user.
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The TOE provides the system control functions to handle the reset, clock, interrupt signals, etc.
The TOE provides the test circuitry to perform the TOE testing under the test mode.
The TOE provides the timers for the security IC embedded software to abort irregular executions of
the program.
The TOE provides power management functionality under boot mode, test mode, and normal
mode, also contact and contactless interfaces.
The TOE provides a true random number generator, which is accessible by the crypto library. The
true random number generator is composed of entropy sources, self‐test circuit and post‐
processing circuit. The self‐test circuit includes the total failure test and online test. The total failure
test is performed on the entropy source. The on line testing is performed on the raw random
number sequence, aiming to prevent malfunctioning. The true random number also fulfils the
AIS20/31 PTG.2 level.
The TOE provides the following cryptographic services to the Security IC embedded software:
 TDES
 RSA
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE
The main functional blocks of the TOE hardware are shown in the figure below. The orange blocks
are out of the scope of the evaluation.
The hardware of the TOE has the following components:
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 ARMSC000 CPU
 NVM (192kB)
 ROM (384kB)
 RAM (14kB)
 AHBMMU
 Interfaces I/O:
- ISO/IEC 14443 contactless interface
- ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface
 True Random Number Generator
 TDES Co‐Processor
 Hardware Crypto Co‐Processor for RSA support
 System control circuitry
 Test circuitry
 Timers
 Security Circuitry
 Sensors
- Voltage sensor
- Glitch sensor
- Frequency sensor
- High frequency filter
- Temperature sensor
- Light sensor
 Power Management Circuitry
 Clock circuitry
 Reset circuitry
The AHBMMU is a bus component which also provides user controllable bus masking.
ISO/IEC 14443 contactless interface and ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface are the interfaces available
for the user.
The product contains the following functions, but the security of these functions are not claimed
by the TOE and are out of the scope of the certificate.
 Chinese domestic crypto Co‐Processor
 AES Co‐Processor
 Deterministic Random Number Generator.
 CRC Co‐Processor
 Interfaces I/O:
-SPI interface
- I2C interface
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DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made available
together to the users of the evaluated version:
 THD89 Operational guidance, version 0.9.
(sha256 - 3e2dd603c82783c49929ec6540460ad22839081210e3848f724761c45a7e0c9a)
 THD89 Secure Microcontroller with Crypto Library Preparative guidance, version 0.9.
(sha256 - 0d18e2e65ebd68750e87f59b87caa155bb428db20dbf42bacc538f1588cbc6d8)
 THD89 Secure Microcontroller Security guidelines, version 0.8.
(sha256 - b0a2615f934da250064c00a9363f1505fc10ccd9aab52c69ad87fea022d883cd)
 THD89 Cryptographic Algorithm API version 1.7.
(sha256 - 6baf8d5ff72d04668f70832fe7996fd1b77bffeea9f4456b3ce69d2652971372)
PRODUCT TESTING
The developer has executed test for all the security functions. All the tests have been performed by
the developer in its premises, with a satisfactory result.
During the evaluation process it has been verified each unit test checking that the security
functionality that covers is been identified and also that the kind of test is appropriate to the
function that is intended to test.
All the tests have been developed using the testing scenario appropriate to the established
architecture in the security target. It has also been checked that the obtained results during the
tests fit or correspond to the previously estimated results.
To verify the results of the developer tests, the evaluator has repeated all the developer functional
tests in the evaluator premises. In addition, the lab has devised a test for each of the security
function of the product verifying that the obtained results are consistent with the results obtained
by the developer.
It has been checked that the obtained results conform to the expected results and in the cases
where a deviation in respect to the expected results was present, the evaluator has confirmed that
this variation neither represents any security problem nor a decrease in the functional capacity of
the product.
PENETRATION TESTING
Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational environment,
the evaluation team has devised attack scenarios for penetration tests according to JIL supporting
documents [JILAAPS] and [JILADVARC]. Within these activities all aspects of the security
architecture which were not covered by functional testing have been considered.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test
results. No attack scenario with the attack potential High has been successful in the TOE’s
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operational environment as defined in the security target when all security measures required by
the developer in the security guidance defined in DOCUMENTS section are applied.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The software and hardware requirements, as well as the referenced options are indicated below.
Therefore, for the operation of the product THD89 Secure Microcontroller version 1.0 with Crypto
Library version 1.01 it is necessary the disposition of the following components:
 THD89 HW module.
 Crypto Library.
 Boot code.
 Header file.
Among all the possibilities offered by these software and hardware requirements, the configuration
selected for the evaluation is the following:
Type Name Version Package
Hardware THD89 1.0 Module
Software Crypto Library 1.01 SW library in ROM
Boot code 1.0 Boot code in ROM
Header file 0.1 cryptolib.h
sha256-205d4a423e27c9ef3d8a57fc4abacc60351f971ffd0e7a4e4fd7ce5ad317ae29
The preparative guidance THD89 Secure Microcontroller with Crypto Library Preparative guidance,
version 0.9 in section 3 describes the steps to be followed to identify the TOE configuration.
EVALUATION RESULTS
The product THD89 Secure Microcontroller version 1.0 with Crypto Library version 1.01 has been
evaluated against the Security Target THD89 Secure Microcontroller with Crypto Library Security
Target, version 1.6.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Applus Laboratories assigns the
“PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the
evaluation level EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5, as defined by the Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1, R5 and the Common Methodology for
Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1, R5.
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COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM
Next, recommendations of the evaluation team regarding the secure usage of the TOE are
provided. These have been collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be
considered when using the product.
 The laboratory encourages the users to follow the THD89 Secure Microcontroller Security
Guidelines documents provided by the developer.
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product THD89 Secure Microcontroller version 1.0 with Crypto Library version 1.01, a positive
resolution is proposed.
The CCN Certification Body strongly recommends to the TOE consumer to strictly follow the
security recommendations that can be found on guidance documents, taking special care of those
included in document THD89 Secure Microcontroller Security guidelines, version 0.8, as well as to
observe the operational environment requirements and assumptions defined in the applicable
security target. The scope of the certificate only covers those product configurations that
implement all security recommendations defined in THD89 Secure Microcontroller Security
guidelines, version 0.8, otherwise the certificate is not applicable.
The TOE consumer should also observe the application notes defined in the applicable security
target. The recommended cryptographic algorithms and key lengths are those defined in SOGIS
Agreed Cryptographic Mechanisms, version 1.1. All other algorithms and key lengths are out of the
scope of the certificate. The algorithms and key sizes within the scope of the certificate are:
SFR Algorithm Key Lengths Recommendation
FCS_COP.1 [TDES] TDES1
112 and 168 bits only for legacy use
FCS_COP.1 [RSA] RSA‐CRT2
> 1900 bits < 3000 bits only for legacy use
GLOSSARY
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
1
NIST SP800‐67 and NIST SP800‐38A.
2
PKCS #1 RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Laboratories, version 2.2. 2012.
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OC Organismo de Certificación
TOE Target Of Evaluation
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the product:
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Version 3.1, R5 Final,
April 2017.
[JILAAPS] Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, version 2.9. Jan.2013. Joint Interpretation
Library.
[JILADVARC] Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for Smart Cards and similar devices,
version 2.2. Jan. 2013. Joint Interpretation Library.
[CCDB‐2006‐04‐004] Common Criteria. Additional CCRA Supporting Documents. ST sanitising for
publication. Document number 2006‐04‐004, April 2006.
SECURITY TARGET / SECURITY TARGET LITE (IF APPLICABLE)
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is stored and
protected in the Certification Body premises. This document is identified as:
- THD89 Secure Microcontroller with Crypto Library Security Target, version 1.6 (June 2018).
The public version of this document constitutes the ST Lite. The ST Lite has also been reviewed for
the needs of publication according to [CCDB‐2006‐04‐004], and it is published along with this
certification report in the Certification Body and CCRA websites. The ST Lite identifier is:
- THD89 Secure Microcontroller with Crypto Library Security Target Lite, version 1.0 (August
2018).
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RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates ‐ as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC ‐ under
certain conditions was agreed.
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS‐MRA)
The SOGIS‐Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS‐MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It
defines the recognition of certificates for IT‐Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at
higher recognition levels for IT‐Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL
4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For "Smartcards and similar devices" a
SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical
Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common
Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The current list of
signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the
agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogis.org.
The SOGIS‐MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this
agreement by the nations listed at https://www.sogis.org.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under SOGIS‐MRA for all assurance components selected.
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common
Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA‐2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers
CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on
assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation
(ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA‐2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA‐2000). Certificates based on CCRA‐
2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of CCRA‐
2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification procedures and for Assurance Continuity
(maintenance and re‐certification)of old certificates a transition period on the recognition of
certificates according to the rules of CCRA‐2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL
4 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA‐2014 are government representatives from
the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
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Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the
United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the
website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this
certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed at
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The certificate of this TOE is recognised under CCRA for all assurance components up to EAL2 and
ALC_FLR.