National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Siemens Canada Ltd.
RUGGEDCOM Rugged Operating System (ROS)
V4.2.2.F
Running on the M2100F, M2200F, M969F, RSG2100F, RSG2100PF, RSG2200F,
RSG2300F, RSG2300PF, RSG2488F, RS400F, RS416F, RS416PF, RS900F,
RS900GF, RS900GPF, and RS940GF RUGGEDCOM switches
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10877-2018
Dated: August 21, 2018
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jerome F. Myers, Ph.D.
James Donndelinger
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Dragua Zenelaj
Rory Saunders
Curtis Cobb
Aditya Patil
COACT, Inc.
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary...................................................................................................... 1
2. Identification ................................................................................................................. 2
3. Architectural Information............................................................................................ 3
3.1 TOE Introduction.......................................................................................................... 3
3.2 Physical Boundaries...................................................................................................... 4
4. Security Policy............................................................................................................... 6
4.1 Security Audit............................................................................................................... 6
4.2 Cryptographic Support.................................................................................................. 6
4.3 Identification and Authentication ................................................................................. 6
4.4 Security Management ................................................................................................... 7
4.5 Protection of the TSF.................................................................................................... 7
4.6 TOE Access .................................................................................................................. 7
4.7 Trusted Path / Channels ................................................................................................ 7
5. Assumptions................................................................................................................... 8
6. Clarification of Scope ................................................................................................... 8
7. Documentation .............................................................................................................. 9
8. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................ 9
8.1 Developer Testing....................................................................................................... 10
8.2 Evaluation Team Testing............................................................................................ 10
8.2.1 TOE Test Configuration .......................................................................................... 10
8.2.2 Test Tools................................................................................................................. 11
9. Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................ 12
10. Results of the Evaluation.......................................................................................... 12
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE).................................................................. 12
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV) .................................................................... 12
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ....................................................... 13
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ........................................... 13
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ....................... 13
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (AVA)............................................................... 13
10.7 Summary of the Evaluation Results.......................................................................... 14
11. Validator Comments / Recommendations.............................................................. 14
12. Annexes...................................................................................................................... 14
13. Security Target.......................................................................................................... 14
14. Glossary ..................................................................................................................... 14
15. Bibliography.............................................................................................................. 15
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List Of Tables
Table 1 - Evaluation Identifiers.................................................................................. 2
Table 2 - TOE Models Tested Configuration............................................................. 4
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1. Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) documents the assessment of the National Information
Assurance Partnership (NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of the RUGGEDCOM
Rugged Operating System (ROS) v4.2.2.F running on the M2100F, M2200F, M969F,
RSG2100F, RSG2100PF, RSG2200F, RSG2300F, RSG2300PF, RSG2488F, RS400F,
RS416F, RS416PF, RS900F, RS900GF, RS900GPF, and RS940GF RUGGEDCOM
switches, provided by Siemens Canada Ltd. (Siemens). It presents the evaluation results,
their justifications, and the conformance results.
This Validation Report is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information
Technology (IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security
Target (ST), which is where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this
VR, which describes how those security claims were tested and evaluated and any
restrictions on the evaluated configuration. This Validation Report is not an endorsement
of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is
either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the COACT, Inc. Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
(CCTL) in Columbia, Maryland, United States of America, and was completed in July
2018. The information in this report is largely derived from the associated test reports, all
written by COACT, Inc. The evaluation team determined that the product is both
Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant and meets the assurance
requirements set forth in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices
Version 2.0 + Errata 20180314 (CPP_ND_V2.0E).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as the RUGGEDCOM Rugged Operating
System (ROS) 4.2.2.F running on the M2100F, M2200F, M969F, RSG2100F,
RSG2100PF, RSG2200F, RSG2300F, RSG2300PF, RSG2488F, RS400F, RS416F,
RS416PF, RS900F, RS900GF, RS900GPF, and RS940GF RUGGEDCOM switches. The
Target of Evaluation identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP
approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4), as interpreted by the assurance activities
contained in the CPP_ND_V2.0 + Errata 20180314, hereafter referred to as
CPP_ND_V2.0E. This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE
as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the
NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the
testing laboratory in the evaluation test report and the assurance activities report are
consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units of the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and the
Assurance Activity Report (AAR) for the CPP_ND_V2.0E assurance activities. The
validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST).
Therefore, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are
accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The
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conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with
the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Siemens
RUGGEDCOM Rugged Operating System (ROS) v4.2.2.F Security Target and analysis
performed by the Validation Team.
2. Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform
trusted product evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by
commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) in
accordance with the National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP)
accreditation. CCTLs evaluate products against Protection Profiles containing Assurance
Activities, which are interpretations of the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)
work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality
and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products
desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s
evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s
Product Compliant List (PCL).
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1 - Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Siemens RUGGEDCOM Rugged Operating System (ROS) v4.2.2.F running on
the M2100F, M2200F, M969F, RSG2100F, RSG2100PF, RSG2200F,
RSG2300F, RSG2300PF, RSG2488F, RS400F, RS416F, RS416PF, RS900F,
RS900GF, RS900GPF, and RS940GF RUGGEDCOM switches
Protection Profile collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0 + Errata
20180314 (CPP_ND_V2.0E)
Security Target Siemens RUGGEDCOM Rugged Operating System (ROS) v4.2.2.F Security
Target, Version 1.3, August 13, 2018
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Item Identifier
Evaluation Technical Report Siemens RUGGEDCOM Rugged Operating System (ROS) v4.2.2.F Evaluation
Technical Report, August 13, 2018.
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Siemens Canada, Ltd.
Developer Siemens Canada, Ltd.
Common Criteria Testing
Lab (CCTL)
COACT, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Jerome F. Myers, Ph.D., The Aerospace Corporation
James Donndelinger, The Aerospace Corporation
3. Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
3.1 TOE Introduction
The TOE is a hardware and software TOE consisting of the RUGGEDCOM ROS
v4.2.2.F running on the M2100F, M2200F, M969F, RSG2100F, RSG2100PF,
RSG2200F, RSG2300F, RSG2300PF, RSG2488F, RS400F, RS416F, RS416PF, RS900F,
RS900GF, RS900GPF, and RS940GF RUGGEDCOM switches. The purpose of the TOE
is to provide Ethernet switching capabilities in a ruggedized enclosure for customer
networks in virtually any environment.
RUGGEDCOM ROS may be deployed on any of the RUGGEDCOM switches
mentioned in the TOE above and listed in the “Physical Boundaries” section below. The
RUGGEDCOM switches are highly configurable and can be customized with a number
of different line module and power supply combinations. Customers choose a
configuration that suits the targeted network and Siemens assembles the RUGGEDCOM
switches according to the specific configuration. The RUGGEDCOM switches are able to
operate in the most adverse conditions and are primarily deployed in power distribution,
refineries, or traffic control systems.
These RUGGEDCOM switches are designed specifically to withstand harsh
environmental conditions including temperature and humidity extremes, shock, vibration,
and electromagnetic interference.
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3.2 Physical Boundaries
The physical scope and the physical boundary of the TOE is composed of both the
RUGGEDCOM switch hardware and the RUGGEDCOM ROS v4.2.2.F software. For the
evaluated configuration, TOE software (ROS v4.2.2.F) was installed and run in the TOE
hardware configurations shown in the Table 2 below. The line models on each switch
model are configurable and the tested configurations provide a sample of possible
configurations. The line modules provide 10/100/1000BaseTX Ethernet, serial, and fiber
interfaces that are used to send and receive user data. The line modules provide nothing
more than the physical interface.
Table 2 - TOE Models Tested Configuration
Model HW ID/CPU/Description Line Card Configuration
M2100F RSG2100v2
NXP ColdFire MCF5272
M2100FIPS-CC
2x 10FL – Multimode, 850nm, ST, 2km
2x 100FX – Multimode, 1300nm, ST, 2km
2x 100FX – Singlemode, 1310nm, ST, 20km
2x 10/100TX – Micro-D
RSG2100F RSG2100v2
NXP ColdFire MCF5272
RSG2100FIPS-CC
2x 10/100TX – RJ45
2x 10FL – Multimode, 850nm, ST, 2km
2x 100FX – Multimode, 1300nm, ST, 2km
2x 100FX – Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 90km
2x 10/100TX – Micro-D
2x 10/100/1000TX – RJ45
1x 1000SX – Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
RSG2100PF RSG2100v2
NXP ColdFire MCF5272
RSG2100PFIPS-CC
2x 10/100TX – RJ45
2x 100FX – Multimode, 1300nm, ST, 2km
2x 100FX – Multimode, 1300nm, MTRJ, 2km
2x 100FX – Singlemode, 1310nm, SC, 90km
2x 1000LX – Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 25km
1x 1000SX – Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
2x 10/100TX – Micro-D
2x 10/100TX – Micro-D
M2200F RSG2200
NXP ColdFire MCF5272
M2200FIPS-CC
2x 10/100/1000TX – Micro-D
2x 1000SX – Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
2x 1000LX – Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 25km
2x 10/100/1000TX – Micro-D
2x 10/100/1000TX – Micro-D
RSG2200F RSG2200
NXP ColdFire MCF5272
2x 10/100/1000TX – RJ45
2x 1000SX – Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
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RSG2200FIPS-CC 2x 1000LX – Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 25km
2x 1000SX – Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
1x 100FX – Multimode, 1300nm, MTRJ, 2km
RSG2300F RSG2300
NXP ColdFire MCF5272
RSG2300FIPS-CC
2x 10/100TX – RJ45
2x 100FX – Multimode, 1300nm, MTRJ, 2km
2x 1000SX – Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
2x 10/100/1000TX – RJ45
RSG2300PF RSG2300
NXP ColdFire MCF5272
RSG2300PFIPS-CC
2x 10/100TX – RJ45
2x 10/100TX – RJ45
2x 1000SX – Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
2x 100FX – Multimode, 1300nm, MTRJ, 2km
RSG2488F RSG2488v2
NXP PowerQUICC MPC8308
RSG2488FIPS-CC
4x 10/100/1000TX – RJ45
4x 10/100/1000TX – M12 X-Coded
4x 1000SX – Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
4x 1000SX – Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
4x 1000LX – Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 25km
1x Precision Time Protocol (PTP) Module
2x 10/100/1000TX – RJ45
2x 10/100/1000TX – M12 X-Coded
RS416F RSG416v2
NXP ColdFire MCF5272
RS416FIPS-CC
4x 10FL – Multimode, 850nm, ST, 2km
4x RS232/RS422/RS485 & IRIG-B – DB9
4x RS232/RS422/RS485 & IRIG-B – RJ45
2x 10/100TX – RJ45
1x IRIG-B in – BNC
1x IRIG-B out – BNC (Slot 5 only)
RS416PF RS416v2
NXP ColdFire MCF5272
RS416PFIPS-CC
4x 10FL – Multimode, 850nm, ST, 2km
4x RS232/RS422/RS485 & IRIG-B – DB9
4x RS232/RS422/RS485 & IRIG-B – RJ45
1x IRIG-B in – BNC
1x IRIG-B out – BNC (Slot 5 only)
2x 10/100TX – RJ45
RS400F RS400 (40-00-0010 Rev C1)
NXP ColdFire MCF5272
RS400FIPS-CC
1x 100FX – Multimode, 1310nm, LC, 2km
1x 100FX – Singlemode, 1300nm, LC, 20km
4x RS232/RS422/RS485 – DB9
RS940GF RS940G (40-00-0097-000 Rev A)
NXP ColdFire MCF5272
RS940GFIPS-CC
2x 1000SX – Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
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RS900GF RS900Gv2
NXP ColdFire MCF5272
RS900FIPS-CC
2x 1000LX – Singlemode, 1310nm, LC, 25km
RS900GPF RS900GP
NXP ColdFire MCF5272
RS900GFIPS-CC
2x 1000LX – Singlemode, 1310nm, SC, 25km
RS900F RS900v3, Fiber
NXP ColdFire MCF5272
RS900FIPS-CC
2x 100FX – Multimode, 1300nm, ST, 2km
1x 100FX – Singlemode, 1310nm, ST, 20km
1x 100FX – Multimode, 1300nm, SC, 2k
M969F RS969 (v2, 40-00-0090)
NXP ColdFire MCF5272
M969FIPS-CC
2x 1000SX – Multimode, 850nm, LC, 500m
4. Security Policy
This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE.
4.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates audit records for security-relevant actions of the authorized
administrators accessing the TOE via the terminal-based menu and web interface. The
TOE records the identity of the administrator responsible for the log event, where
applicable. To remotely and securely backup the audit logs, an Administrator can
configure the syslog server to call into the TOE and request audit log files be printed to
the syslog server over an SSH connection. The connection to the audit server is secured
using SSH. When logs are filled, the TOE overwrites in two possible ways: the oldest log
record can be overwritten with the new log record or the oldest log file can be overwritten
with the new log file.
4.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE algorithms were validated through the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation
Program (CAVP). The TOE contains cryptographic support that provides key
generation, random bit generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure
hashing, key-hashing, and key establishment features in support of higher level
cryptographic protocols including SSH and TLS.
4.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE provides functionality that requires administrators to verify their claimed
identity. The TOE ensures that only authorized administrators can gain access to
configuration and management settings. Administrators can only view the access banner
prior to authenticating with a valid user name and password. The TOE requires
administrators to use strong passwords. The TOE provides no feedback to Administrators
when they are entering their passwords at the login prompt of the terminal-based menu
for both direct serial and remote SSH connections. Administrators using password-based
authentication are locked out after a configurable number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts and must wait a configurable period of time before they are unlocked. The TOE
can present a certificate to authenticate to external entities and this certificate and the
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trust anchor certificate are stored within a truststore. Certificate revocation status is
verified on certificates uploaded to the TOE using an external Online Certificate Status
Protocol (OCSP) server.
4.4 Security Management
The TOE provides a web interface and a terminal-based menu for administrators to
manage the security functions, configuration, and other features of the TOE. The security
management function specifies user roles with defined access for the management of the
TOE components. Updating the TOE, modifying the configuration file, configuring the
access banner, setting the inactivity timeout, configuring authentication failure
parameters, configuring time and re-enabling the Administrator account are all functions
restricted to the Security Administrator.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE invokes a set of self-tests each time the TOE is powered on to ensure that the
TSF operates correctly. The TOE also provides a reliable timestamp for its own use. An
Administrator can manually set the time for the TOE. A digital signature using an RSA
public key is used to verify all software updates that are applied to the TOE. The TOE
prevents an administrator from reading the keys stored in the TOE. Passwords are stored
in obfuscated form to prevent them from being read in plaintext.
4.6 TOE Access
The TOE terminates local and remote management sessions after an administrator-
configurable time period of inactivity. The TOE also provides administrator’s the
capability to manually terminate the session prior to the inactivity timeout. After an
administrator’s session is terminated, the administrator must log in again to regain access
to TOE functionality. A login banner is displayed at the login screen of the web interface
and prior to authentication over the terminal-based menu.
4.7 Trusted Path / Channels
The cryptographic functionality of the TOE provides the TOE the ability to create trusted
paths and trusted channels. The TOE implements a trusted channel using SSH between
itself and a remote server in order to protect the audit logs as they are being sent.
Additionally, the TOE provides trusted paths between administrators and the web
interface via HTTPS and the terminal-based menu via SSH. The management
communication channels between the TOE and a remote entity are distinct from network
data communication channels and provide mutual identification and authentication. In
addition, the communications are protected from modification and disclosure.
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5. Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the
following document:
 collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0 + Errata
20180314
That information has not been reproduced here and the CPP_ND_V2.0E should be
consulted if there is interest in that material.
6. Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions
that need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and
clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated
configuration meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance
(the assurance activities specified in CPP_NDV2.0E and performed by the
evaluation team).
 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified
in this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit,
vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed
in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily
exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication
and resources.
 The functionality evaluated is scoped strictly to the security functional
requirements specified in the CPP_ND_V2.0E and applicable Technical
Decisions. Any additional security or non-security related functional capabilities
of the product (defined in Section 1.5.3 of the Security Target) were not covered
by this evaluation.
o Specifically, the following product features were not in the scope of
evaluation and thus were not tested:
 Virtual Local Area Network configuration
 Port configuration
 Broadcast Storm filtering
 Quality of Service based on part, tag, MAC16, or IP type of
service
 Multiple Spanning Tree Protocol
 Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol
 Enhanced Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol
o The following services are present in the TOE but are excluded from use
in the evaluated configuration:
 RADIUS
 TACACS+
 RSH
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 Telnet
 TFTP
 ModBus Management
 Remote Syslog
 Management connections over SNMP v1, v2, and v3
 Management via HTTP
 Network Time Protocol (NTP) time synchronisation and service
 RUGGEDCOM Discovery Protocol (RCDP)
 IP Forwarding.
7. Documentation
The following documents were used as evidence for the evaluation of the Siemens
RUGGEDCOM Rugged Operating System (ROS) v4.2.2.F:
 Siemens RUGGEDCOM Rugged Operating System (ROS) v4.2.2.F Guidance
Documentation Supplement, 08/2018
 FAQ - "How to Transfer Secure Audit Logs" (referenced in Guidance
Documentation Supplement)
In addition to these documents, Siemens general installation and user guidance
documents specific to each device (or group of devices) included in the TOE are listed in
section 1.1 of the Guidance Documentation Supplement and were used to install and
configure the TOE in the Common Criteria-evaluated configuration. These documents
can be downloaded from the vendor website. The CC Guidance Documentation
Supplement provides clarifications and changes to the Siemens general product
documentation and should be used as the guiding document for the installation and
administration of the TOE in the CC-evaluated configuration. The Siemens general
installation and user guidance documentation should be referred to and followed only as
directed within the CC Guidance Documentation Supplement and for the performance of
the AGD assurance activities as described in the AAR. Note that only sections referenced
by the CC Guidance Documentation Supplement and/or used during the evaluation of the
AGD assurance activities (as described in the AAR), are covered by the evaluation.
The Security Target used is:
 Siemens RUGGEDCOM Rugged Operating System (ROS) v4.2.2.F Security
Target, Version 1.3, August 13, 2018
8. IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information summarized in the publicly available Assurance Activity
Report Siemens RUGGEDCOM Rugged Operating System (ROS) v4.2.2.F.
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8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Testing
Testing was performed at COACT CC Testing Lab located at: COACT, Inc., 9140
Guilford Road, Suite N Columbia, MD 21046.
The evaluation team verified the product according the Siemens RUGGEDCOM Rugged
Operating System (ROS) v4.2.2.F Guidance Documentation Supplement and performed
the tests and documentation analysis as specified in the CPP_ND_V2.0E and its
Supporting Document (SD).
8.2.1 TOE Test Configuration
The following diagram provides a visual depiction the TOE test configuration.
Figure 1 - The TOE Test Configuration
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The TOE’s connection to a management client accessing the GUI is protected by TLS. The
TOE’s connection to an audit server or a management client accessing the CLI is protected
by SSH.
 The TOE:
a. Siemens ROS switches (see section “Physical Boundaries” section
above)
b. RUGGEDCOM Rugged Operating System (ROS) v4.2.2.F
 Management Workstation is a Dell workstation running MS Windows 10 Pro
with IE 11 (used for the serial port connection also)
 Audit Server – an Ubuntu virtual box hosted on the Management Workstation
machine
 OCSP Server – an Ubuntu virtual box hosted on the Management Workstation
machine used to generate X.509 Certificates and run the OCSP responder.
 Ubuntu 16.04 – a virtual box hosted on the Management Workstation machine
to run the COACT tool.
 Dell Latitude D830 with Kali Linux 2016.1 - used for packet capture
 DELL Precision M6600 with Win 10 Pro used for pen-testing
 DELL Precision M6600 with Ubuntu 16.04 to run the COACT tool for pen-
testing
 OpenVAS-9 – Virtual Box hosted on DELL Precision M6600 Win 10 Pro
8.2.2 Test Tools
 Windows 10 Pro
 Wireshark 2.2.4/2.4.6
 OpenSSL 1.0.0.54/1.0.2g
 VirtualBox 5.1.28r117968/v5.2.10
 Firefox Developer Edition 58.0
 Firefox v1.0
 NMAP v7.31/v7.7
 Tera Term 4.92/4.93
 PuTTY Release 0.67
 BitVise SSH Client 7.29
 HxD Hex Editor 1.7.7.0
 WinPcap 4.1.3
 Rlogin SSH Client 4.22.2
 Ubuntu xenial 16.04.4 LTS
 autossh 1.4e
 OpenSSH_7.2p2
 Python 2.7
 “COACT Protocol Implementation Testing Scripts” (CPITS)
 Kali Linux 2016.1
 minicom version 2.7
 OWASP ZAP v.2.7.0
 GSM Community Edition Version 4.1.7 with OpenVAS-9
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9. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is a hardware and software TOE. For the evaluated configuration, the TOE
software (RUGGEDCOM ROS v4.2.2.F) must be installed and run on one of the
RUGGEDCOM switches listed in the “Physical Boundaries” section above.
The TOE must be configured in the CC evaluated configuration by following the steps
described in the RUGGEDCOM ROS v4.2.2.F User Guide (using the corresponding
document specific to each model configured and evaluated) and the Siemens
RUGGEDCOM ROS Guidance Supplement document.
10. Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR and the Assurance Activities Report (AAR).
The reader of this document can assume that all assurance activities and work units
received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to
the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon
CC version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Siemens
RUGGEDCOM Rugged Operating System (ROS) v4.2.2.F TOE to be Part 2 extended,
and meets the SARs contained the CPP_ND_V2.0E.
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the
ST contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a
statement of security requirements claimed to be met by the Siemens RUGGEDCOM
Rugged Operating System (ROS) v4.2.2.F products that are consistent with the Common
Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit and updated them with
corresponding Assurance Activity defined in CPP_ND_V2.0E and its Supporting
Document. The evaluation team assessed the design documentation and found it adequate
to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security functions. The design
documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the Security Target and
Guidance documents.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
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10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE.
Additionally, the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in
describing how to securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the
design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally,
the evaluator performed additional assurance activities specified in the CPP_ND_V2.0E
and its Supporting Document.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that
the TOE was identified.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set
of tests specified by the assurance activities in the CPP_ND_V2.0E and its Supporting
Document and recorded the results in a Detailed Test Report (proprietary), summarized
in the AAR.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (AVA)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit updated with respective
Assurance Activities defined in the Supporting Document as required by the
CPP_ND_V2.0E. The evaluation team performed a public search for vulnerabilities and
performed vulnerability testing. The information for the public vulnerability sources
searched, keywords used as searching criteria and results and the analysis of these
searches are provided in section 3.1 of the Assurance Activity Report.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM and the SD,
and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
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10.7 Summary of the Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that
it demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the
CPP_ND_V2.0E and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
11. Validator Comments / Recommendations
The validators did not have any specific additional comments or recommendations.
12. Annexes
Not applicable
13. Security Target
Siemens RUGGEDCOM Rugged Operating System (ROS) v4.2.2.F Security Target,
Version 1.1, July 13, 2018.
14. Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology as interpreted by the supplemental guidance
in the NDPP Assurance Activities to determine whether or not the claims made are
justified.
Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
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15. Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, dated: September
2012.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 2:
Security Functional Requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 4, dated: September
2012.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 3:
Security Assurance Requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 4, dated: September
2012.
4. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 4, dated: September 2012.
5. collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0 + Errata
20180314 (CPP_ND_V2.0E).
6. Siemens RUGGEDCOM Rugged Operating System (ROS) v4.2.2.F Security
Target, Version 1.3, August 13, 2018.
7. Siemens RUGGEDCOM Rugged Operating System (ROS) v4.2.2.F Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR), August 13, 2018.
8. Detailed Test Report for Siemens RUGGEDCOM Rugged Operating System
v4.2.2.F (DTR), August 13, 2018.
9. Assurance Activity Report for Siemens RUGGEDCOM Rugged Operating System
v4.2.2.F (AAR), August 13, 2018.
10. Vulnerability Analysis Report for Siemens RUGGEDCOM Rugged Operating
System v4.2.2.F, August 13, 2018.
11. Siemens Canada Ltd. RUGGEDCOM Rugged Operating System v4.2.2.F
Guidance Documentation Supplement (AGD), 08/2018.
a. User Guide (referenced in the AGD, can be downloaded from the vendor
website)
b. Installation Guide (referenced in the AGD, can be downloaded from the
vendor website)
12. FAQ - "How to Implement Secure, Unattended Logging in ROS", V 1.0, 05/2018
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End of Document