National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Google Pixel Devices on Android 14
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11419-2024
Dated: March 27, 2024
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Lauren Brandt
Jenn Dotson
Sheldon Durrant
Randy Heimann
Lisa Mitchell
Linda Morrison
Clare Parran
Lori Sarem
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Tammy Compton
Douglas Kalmus
Raymond Smoley
Matai Spivey
Rizheng Sun
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary................................................................................................................ 1
2 Identification........................................................................................................................... 2
3 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ................................................................................... 3
4 Architectural Information ....................................................................................................... 4
4.1 TOE Description............................................................................................................. 5
4.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms ............................................................................................... 5
4.3 TOE Architecture............................................................................................................ 5
4.4 Physical Boundaries........................................................................................................ 6
5 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 6
5.1 Security audit .................................................................................................................. 6
5.2 Cryptographic support .................................................................................................... 7
5.3 User data protection ........................................................................................................ 7
5.4 Identification and authentication..................................................................................... 7
5.5 Security management...................................................................................................... 8
5.6 Protection of the TSF...................................................................................................... 8
5.7 TOE access...................................................................................................................... 8
5.8 Trusted path/channels ..................................................................................................... 8
6 Documentation........................................................................................................................ 9
7 Evaluated Configuration ......................................................................................................... 9
8 IT Product Testing .................................................................................................................. 9
8.1 Developer Testing........................................................................................................... 9
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ........................................................................... 9
9 Results of the Evaluation ...................................................................................................... 10
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)...................................................................... 10
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)........................................................................ 10
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ........................................................... 10
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)............................................... 11
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ........................... 11
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)................................................................... 11
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results.................................................................................... 12
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .......................................................................... 12
11 Annexes............................................................................................................................. 12
12 Security Target.................................................................................................................. 12
13 Glossary ............................................................................................................................ 12
14 Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 13
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)
validation team of the evaluation of Google Pixel Devices on Android 14 solution provided by
Google LLC. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results.
This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the
U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common Criteria
Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was completed in
March 2024. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security Solutions. The evaluation
determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Extended, and
meets the assurance requirements of the PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals,
Biometric enrolment and verification – for unlocking the device, Bluetooth, MDM Agents, and
WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 16 August 2023 (CFG_MDF-BIO-BT-MDMA-WLANC_V1.0)
which includes the Base PP: Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.3, 12
September 2022 (MDFPP33) with the collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and
verification - for unlocking the device - [BIOPP-Module], Version 1.1, 12 September 2022
(BIO11), the PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0, 15 April 2021 (BT10), the PP-Module for
MDM Agents, Version 1.0, 25 April 2019 (MDMA10), and the PP-Module for WLAN Clients,
Version 1.0, 31 March 2022 (WLANC10) with the Functional Package for Transport Layer
Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 01 March 2019 (PKGTLS11).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Google Pixel Devices on Android 14.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP
approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the
TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the
NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and successive
versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product
satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target
(ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are accurate,
the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Google Pixel Devices on
Android 14 - Security Target, Version 1.0, March 22, 2024 and analysis performed by the
validation team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation Methodology
(CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP)
accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security
evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon successful
completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Google Pixel Devices on Android 14
(Specific models identified in Section 7)
Protection Profile PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Biometric enrolment and
verification – for unlocking the device, Bluetooth, MDM Agents, and WLAN Clients,
Version 1.0, 16 August 2023 (CFG_MDF-BIO-BT-MDMA-WLANC_V1.0) which
includes the Base PP: Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.3,
12 September 2022 (MDFPP33) with the collaborative PP-Module for Biometric
enrolment and verification - for unlocking the device - [BIOPP-Module], Version 1.1,
12 September 2022 (BIO11), the PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0, 15 April 2021
(BT10), the PP-Module for MDM Agents, Version 1.0, 25 April 2019 (MDMA10), and
the PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 31 March 2022 (WLANC10) with the
Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 01 March 2019
(PKGTLS11)
ST Google Pixel Devices on Android 14 - Security Target, Version 1.0, March 22, 2024
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Google Pixel Devices on Android 14, version 0.3,
March 26, 2024
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 extended
Sponsor Google LLC
Developer Google LLC
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Item Identifier
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators The MITRE Corporation
3 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.3, 12 September 2022
(MDFPP33)
• collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification - for unlocking the
device - [BIOPP-Module], Version 1.1, 12 September 2022 (BIO11)
• PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0, 15 April 2021 (BT10)
• PP-Module for MDM Agents, Version 1.0, 25 April 2019 (MDMA10)
• PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 31 March 2022 (WLANC10)
• Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 01 March 2019
(PKGTLS11)
That information has not been reproduced here and the MDFPP33/BIO11/BT10/MDMA10/
WLANC10/PKGTLS11 should be consulted if there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
MDFPP33/BIO11/BT10/MDMA10/WLANC10/PKGTLS11 as described for this TOE in the
Security Target. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this
evaluation. All other functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no
further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities specified
in the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile with the Biometric, Bluetooth,
MDM Agents, and WLAN Clients Modules and the TLS Package and performed by the
evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
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• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific Mobile
Device models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to
be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that
were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines
an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the MDFPP33/BIO11/BT10/MDMA10/WLANC10/ PKGTLS11 and
applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of
the TOE were not covered by this evaluation.
4 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the Security
Target.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Google Pixel Phones on Android 14. All the included phones
have the following information in common:
Android OS Version Device Policy Version Architecture Security Patch Level
Android 14 101 ARMv8 November 2023
TOE Common Attributes
The TOE consists of the following devices:
Product Model # SoC Kernel
Google Pixel 8 Pro G1NMW, GC3VE Google Tensor G3 5.15
Google Pixel 8 GKWS6, G9BQD Google Tensor G3 5.15
Google Tablet GTU8P Google Tensor G2 5.10
Google Fold G9FPL, G0B96 Google Tensor G2 5.10
Google Pixel 7 Pro GVU6C, G03Z5, GQML3 Google Tensor G2 5.10
Google Pixel 7 GE2AE, GFE4J, GP4BC Google Tensor G2 5.10
Google Pixel 7a GWKK3, GHL1X, G82U8, G0DZQ Google Tensor G2 5.10
Google Pixel 6 Pro GF5KQ, G8V0U, GLU0G Google Tensor 5.10
Google Pixel 6 GR1YH, GB7N6, G9S9B Google Tensor 5.10
Google Pixel 6a GX7AS, GB62Z, G1AZG, GB17L Google Tensor 5.10
Google Pixel 5a-5G G4S1M Qualcomm Snapdragon™ 765 4.19
Evaluated Devices
Google manufacturers some of the phones in multiple variants, differing in size (the designations
vary, from the “base” device not having any, and other models having something like “a” or “Pro”)
or build materials (entry and premium). The only differences between variants of a given device
are build materials, screen type and size, battery capacity, cameras, RAM and Flash storage. The
Pro phones are normally physically larger and have larger screen sizes, battery capacity and
possibly RAM, while the “a” phones may have a smaller screen or different build materials.
Storage options vary with each release and may be selectable by the customer of the device at
purchase.
The TOE allows basic telephony features (make and receive phone calls, send and receive
SMS/MMS messages) as well as advanced network connectivity (allowing connections to both
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802.11 Wi-Fi and 5G/4G LTE/3G/2G mobile data networks). The TOE supports using client
certificates to connect to access points offering WPA2/WPA3 networks with 802.1x/EAP-TLS, or
alternatively connecting to cellular base stations when utilizing mobile data.
The TOE offers mobile applications an Application Programming Interface (API) including that
provided by the Android framework and supports API calls to the Android Management APIs.
4.1 TOE Description
The TOE is a mobile device to support enterprises and individual users alike.
Some features and settings must be enabled for the TOE to operate in its evaluated configuration.
The following features and settings must be enabled:
1. Enable a password screen lock
2. Do not use Smart Lock
3. Enable encryption of Wi-Fi and Bluetooth secrets (NIAP mode DPM API)
4. Do not use USB debugging
5. Do not allow installation of applications from unknown sources
6. Enable security logging
7. Disable ‘Usage & Diagnostic’ settings
8. Disable Captive Portal Checking
9. Loaded applications must be implemented utilizing the NIAPSEC library
Doing this ensures that the phone complies with the PP_MDF_V3.3 requirements. Please refer to
the Admin Guide on how to configure these settings and features.
4.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 7 below.
4.3 TOE Architecture
The TOE provides a rich API to mobile applications and provides users installing an application
the option to either approve or reject an application based upon the API access that the application
requires (or to grant applications access at runtime).
The TOE also provides users with the ability to protect Data-At-Rest with AES encryption,
including all user and mobile application data stored in the user’s data partition. The TOE uses a
key hierarchy that combines a REK with the user’s password to provide protection to all user and
application cryptographic keys stored in the TOE.
The TOE includes an additional hardware security chip (Titan M or Titan M2, depending on the
device, collectively called Titan security chip) that provides dedicated key storage1. The TOE
makes this secure, hardware key storage available to mobile applications through the StrongBox
extensions to the Android Keystore. Currently, the StrongBox extension is not used for any system
keys, but remains an option for applications to use should they desire the protections it provides.
1
Does not apply to the Pixel 6 Pro/6/6a
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Finally, the TOE can interact with a Mobile Device Management (MDM) system to allow
enterprise control of the configuration and operation of the device so as to ensure adherence to
enterprise-wide policies (for example, restricting use of a corporate provided device’s camera,
forced configuration of maximum login attempts, pulling of audit logs off the TOE, etc.) as well
as policies governing enterprise applications and data (in a an employee-owned device [BYOD]
scenario). An MDM is made up of two parts: the MDM Agent and MDM Server. The MDM Agent
is installed on the phone as an administrator with elevated permissions (allowing it to change the
relevant settings on the phone) while the MDM Server is used to issue the commands to the MDM
Agent. The TOE includes an MDM Agent as part of the evaluated configuration. A user may
choose to install a third party MDM Agent, which is out-of-scope for this evaluation.
The TOE includes several different levels of execution including (from lowest to highest):
hardware, a Trusted Execution Environment, Android’s bootloader, and Android’s user space,
which provides APIs allowing applications to leverage the cryptographic functionality of the
device.
4.4 Physical Boundaries
The TOE’s physical boundary is the physical perimeter of its enclosure. The TOE runs Android
as its software/OS, executing on the Google Tensor or Qualcomm Snapdragon processors. The
TOE does not include the user applications that run on top of the operating system, but does include
controls that limit application behavior. Further, the device provides a built-in MDM Agent
(downloadable MDM Agents are not considered in-scope) to be installed to limit or permit
different functionality of the device.
The TOE communicates and interacts with 802.11-2012 Access Points and mobile data networks
to establish network connectivity, and through that connectivity interacts with MDM servers that
allow administrative control of the TOE.
5 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. User data protection
4. Identification and authentication
5. Security management
6. Protection of the TSF
7. TOE access
8. Trusted path/channels
5.1 Security audit
The TOE implements the SecurityLog and logcat that are stored in a circular memory buffers. An
MDM agent can read/fetch the logs (both the SecurityLog and logcat) and then handle
appropriately (potentially storing the log to Flash or transmitting its contents to the MDM server).
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These log methods meet the logging requirements outlined by FAU_GEN.1 in PP_MDF_V3.3.
Please see the Security audit section in the ST for further information and specifics.
5.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes multiple cryptographic libraries with CAVP certified algorithms for a wide
range of cryptographic functions including the following: asymmetric key generation and
establishment, symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing and
keyed-hash message authentication. These functions are supported with suitable random bit
generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and
key and protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to implement
security protocols such as TLS, EAP-TLS, and HTTPS and to encrypt the media (including the
generation and protection of data and key encryption keys) used by the TOE. Many of these
cryptographic functions are also accessible as services to applications running on the TOE
allowing application developers to ensure their application meets the required criteria to remain
compliant to PP_MDF_V3.3 standards.
5.3 User data protection
The TOE controls access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of the
Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE protects user and other sensitive data using
encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data remains protected. The TOE’s
evaluated configuration supports Android Enterprise profiles to provide additional separation
between application and application data belonging to the Enterprise profile. Please see the Admin
Guide for additional details regarding how to set up and use Enterprise profiles.
5.4 Identification and authentication
The TOE supports a number of features related to identification and authentication. From a user
perspective, except for FCC mandated (making phone calls to an emergency number) or non-
sensitive functions (e.g., choosing the keyboard input method or taking screen shots), a password
(i.e., Password Authentication Factor) must be correctly entered to unlock the TOE. Also, even
when unlocked, the TOE requires the user re-enter the password to change the password.
Passwords are obscured when entered so they cannot be read from the TOE's display and the
frequency of entering passwords is limited and when a configured number of failures occurs, the
TOE will be wiped to protect its contents. Passwords can be constructed using upper and lower
cases characters, numbers, and special characters and passwords up to 16 characters are supported.
The TOE can also be configured to utilize a biometric authentication factor (fingerprints), to
unlock the device (this only works after the password has been entered after the device powers
on).
The TOE can also serve as an 802.1X supplicant and can both use and validate X.509v3 certificates
for EAP-TLS, TLS, and HTTPS exchanges.
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5.5 Security management
The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions identified
throughout this Security Target as well as other functions commonly found in mobile devices.
Many of the available functions are available to users of the TOE while many are restricted to
administrators operating through a Mobile Device Management solution once the TOE has been
enrolled. Once the TOE has been enrolled and then un-enrolled, it will remove Enterprise
applications and remove MDM policies.
5.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of
its security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as cryptographic keys so that they
are not accessible or exportable through the use of the application processor’s hardware. The TOE
disallows all read access to the Root Encryption Key (REK) and retains all keys derived from the
REK within its Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Application software can only use keys
derived from the REK by reference and receive the result. The TEE is a Separate Execution
Environment (SEE), running outside the Android operating system on the device.
The TOE also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is
available (e.g., for log accountability). It enforces read, write, and execute memory page
protections, uses address space layout randomization, and stack-based buffer overflow protections
to minimize the potential to exploit application flaws. It also protects itself from modification by
applications as well as to isolate the address spaces of applications from one another to protect
those applications.
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking so that
it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any self-tests fail, the TOE will not go into
an operational mode. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each
new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce
malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE. Digital signature checking also extends to
verifying applications prior to their installation as all applications must have signatures (even if
self-signed).
5.7 TOE access
The TOE can be locked, obscuring its display, by the user or after a configured interval of
inactivity. The TOE also has the capability to display an administrator specified (using the TOE’s
MDM API) advisory message (banner) when the user unlocks the TOE for the first use after reboot.
The TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.
5.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports the use of IEEE 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS and TLS, HTTPS to
secure communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Google Pixel Phones on Android 14 Administrator Guidance Documentation, Version 1.0,
March 22, 2024
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online
was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied upon when
configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in
the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to download the
configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as evaluated.
7 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the following devices:
Product Model # SoC Kernel
Google Pixel 8 Pro G1NMW, GC3VE Google Tensor G3 5.15
Google Pixel 8 GKWS6, G9BQD Google Tensor G3 5.15
Google Tablet GTU8P Google Tensor G2 5.10
Google Fold G9FPL, G0B96 Google Tensor G2 5.10
Google Pixel 7 Pro GVU6C, G03Z5, GQML3 Google Tensor G2 5.10
Google Pixel 7 GE2AE, GFE4J, GP4BC Google Tensor G2 5.10
Google Pixel 7a GWKK3, GHL1X, G82U8, G0DZQ Google Tensor G2 5.10
Google Pixel 6 Pro GF5KQ, G8V0U, GLU0G Google Tensor 5.10
Google Pixel 6 GR1YH, GB7N6, G9S9B Google Tensor 5.10
Google Pixel 6a GX7AS, GB62Z, G1AZG, GB17L Google Tensor 5.10
Google Pixel 5a-5G G4S1M Qualcomm Snapdragon™ 765 4.19
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is derived
from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Google Pixel Devices on
Android 14, Version 0.3, March 26, 2024 (DTR), as summarized in the Assurance Activity Report
for Google Pixel Devices on Android 14, version 0.3, March 26, 2024 (AAR).
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification document
and ran the tests specified in the MDFPP33/BIO11/BT10/MDMA10/WLANC10/PKGTLS11
including the tests associated with optional requirements.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented
in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all assurance
activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Pixel Devices on Android 14
TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the
MDFPP33/BIO11/BT10/MDMA10/WLANC10/PKGTLS11.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains
a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security
requirements claimed to be met by the Google Pixel Devices on Android 14 products that are
consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the
requirements.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the design
documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security
functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the
Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator performed the assurance
activities specified in the MDFPP33/BIO11/BT10/MDMA10/ WLANC10/PKGTLS11 related to
the examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely
administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of the
evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
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in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the TOE
was identified.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the assurance activities in the MDFPP33/BIO11/BT10/MDMA10/
WLANC10/PKGTLS11 and recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a
public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any
residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) on <> with the following search terms: “Google”, “Google LLC”,
“Google Tensor”, “Google Tensor G2”, “Google Tensor G3”, “Qualcomm Snapdragon 765”,
“Android 14”, “Android”, “Pixel 5”, “Pixel 5a5G”, “Pixel 6”, “Pixel 6a”, “Pixel 6 Pro”, “Pixel
7”, “Pixel 7 Pro”, “Pixel 7a”, “Pixel Tablet”, “Pixel Fold”, “Pixel 8 “, “Pixel 8 Pro”,
“BoringSSL”, “Android Locksettings service KBKDF”, “QTI Crypto Engine Core”, “QTI Inline
Crypto Engine”, “QTI Random Number Generator”.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
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9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the
ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of the
claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and correctly
verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Google Pixel Phones on Android 14
Administrator Guidance Documentation, Version 1.0, March 22, 2024 and any additional guidance
that it references. No versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or later, were evaluated.
Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the ST. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as
part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by devices in the operational environment
needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
Note that Section 1.4 of the ST lists features and settings that must be enabled for the TOE to
operate in its evaluated configuration, including disabling USB debugging. The Admin Guide
should be consulted on how to configure these features and settings.
11 Annexes
Not applicable
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Google Pixel Devices on Android 14 - Security Target, Version
1.0, March 22, 2024.
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation
is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common
Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or
the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common
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Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound
and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be
evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT
product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the
CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a
Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for
overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme.
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction
and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.3, 12 September 2022
(MDFPP33).
[5] collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification - for unlocking the
device - [BIOPP-Module], Version 1.1, 12 September 2022 (BIO11).
[6] PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0, 15 April 2021 (BT10).
[7] PP-Module for MDM Agents, Version 1.0, 25 April 2019 (MDMA10).
[8] PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 31 March 2022 (WLANC10).
[9] Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 01 March 2019
(PKGTLS11).
[10] Google Pixel Devices on Android 14 - Security Target, Version 1.0, March 22, 2024 (ST).
[11] Assurance Activity Report for Google Pixel Devices on Android 14, Version 0.3, March
26, 2024 (AAR).
[12] Detailed Test Report for Google Pixel Devices on Android 14, Version 0.3, March 26, 2024
(DTR).
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[13] Evaluation Technical Report for Google Pixel Devices on Android 14, Version 0.3,
March 26, 2024 (ETR).
[14] Google Pixel Phones on Android 14 Administrator Guidance Documentation, Version
1.0, March 22, 2024.
[15] Google Pixel Devices on Android 14 – Key Management Description, Version 1.0, March
22, 2024.