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Reference: 2022-45-INF-4348- v1
Target: Limitada al expediente
Date: 28.08.2024
Created by: I003
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
Dossier # 2022-45
TOE V2X subsystem on Transceiver module MQBw version 0353
Applicant 107-86-14075 - LG ELECTRONICS INC.
References
[EXT-8029] 2022-09-30_2022-YY_solicitud_certificacion
[EXT-9086]2024-06-04_2022-45_ETR_v1.2
Certification report of the product V2X subsystem on Transceiver module MQBw version 0353, as
requested in [EXT-8029] dated 30/09/2022, and evaluated by DEKRA Testing and Certification
S.A.U., as detailed in the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-9086] received on 04/06/2024.
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...........................................................................................................................3
TOE SUMMARY...................................................................................................................................3
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................4
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS...........................................................................................5
IDENTIFICATION.....................................................................................................................................6
SECURITY POLICIES.................................................................................................................................6
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .........................................................................6
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS..................................................................................6
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY ...............................................................................6
ARCHITECTURE.......................................................................................................................................7
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE ....................................................................................................................7
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE...................................................................................................................8
DOCUMENTS..........................................................................................................................................8
PRODUCT TESTING.................................................................................................................................9
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION ...............................................................................................................9
EVALUATION RESULTS ...........................................................................................................................9
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM...............................................10
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................................................10
GLOSSARY.............................................................................................................................................10
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....................................................................................................................................11
SECURITY TARGET / SECURITY TARGET LITE (IF APPLICABLE)..............................................................11
RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS...............................................................................................................12
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)......................................................12
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA).....................................................................12
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the product V2X
subsystem on Transceiver module MQBw version 0353.
The TOE is a part of the software code that runs on a compatible hardware platform such as the
transceiver module and handles the V2X communications via CAM and DEMN messages.
Developer/manufacturer: LG ELECTRONICS INC.
Sponsor: LG ELECTRONICS INC..
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI).
ITSEF: DEKRA Testing and Certification S.A.U.
Protection Profile: None.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria 3.1 R5 EAL2 + ALC_FLR.1.
Evaluation end date: 21/06/2024
Expiration Date1: 13/08/2029
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL2 (augmented with ALC_FLR.1)
have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory DEKRA Testing and Certification
S.A.U. assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are
satisfied for the EAL2 + ALC_FLR.1, as defined by the Common Criteria 3.1 R5 and the CEM 3.1 R5.
Considering the obtained evidence during the instruction of the certification request of the product
V2X subsystem on Transceiver module MQBw version 0353, a positive resolution is proposed.
TOE SUMMARY
The TOE is a part of the software code that runs on a compatible hardware platform such as the
transceiver module and handles the V2X communications via CAM and DEMN messages.
The TOE has to be deployed in a MQBw UNECE configuration pertaining to combustion vehicle.
MQB stands for “Modularer Querbaukasten” in German, which translates to “Modular Transverse
Matrix” in English. Among the various lines of the MQB platform, MQBw UNECE can be considered
as the superset of the TOE and is applied to some vehicle models such as Golf and Passat. Thus, the
TOE is a software that acts as a communications system placed in the vehicle in order to provide
1
This date refers to the expiration date of the certificate recognition within the scope of the mutual recognition
arrangements signed by this Certification Body.
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different ITS services (active road, co-operative traffic efficiency, co-operative local services, Global
Internet services, etc.).
The TOE is used by integrating it into the application processor (AP) and the microcontroller unit
(MCU) elements of the transceiver module. The TOE consists of system interface for
communication, C2X stack and service layer. Furthermore, they are packaged in one binary file.
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level EAL2 and the
evidence required by the additional component ALC_FLR.1 to the table, according to Common
Criteria 3.1 R5.
ASSURANCE CLASS ASSURANCE COMPONENT
ADV ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.2
ADV_TDS.1
AGD AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ALC ALC_CMC.2
ALC_CMS.2
ALC_DEL.1
ALC_FLR.1
ASE ASE_CCL.1
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_INT.1
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_SPD.1
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ASE_TSS.1
ATE ATE_COV.1
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2
AVA AVA_VAN.2
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements, according to the
Common Criteria v3.1 R5:
Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_TDC.1 / Certificates Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
FPT_TDC.1 / Software update Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
Class FCO: Communication
FCO_NRO.2 Enforced proof of origin
Class FDP: User data protection
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_ACC.1 / Access control Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 / Access control Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1 / Software update Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 / Software update Security attribute based access control
Class FMT: Security management
FMT_MSA.1 / Message protection Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 / Message protection Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MSA.1 / Access control Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 / Access control Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MSA.1 / Software update Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 / Software update Static attribute initialisation
FMT_SMF.1 / Trust elements update Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1 / Access control Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1 / Privacy Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Class FIA: Identification and authentication
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Class FTP: Trusted path/channels
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
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IDENTIFICATION
Product: V2X subsystem on Transceiver module MQBw version 0353
Security Target: V2X subsystem on Transceiver Module MQBw Security Target, version 1.5 (2024-
05-31).
Protection Profile: None.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria 3.1 R5 EAL2 + ALC_FLR.1.
SECURITY POLICIES
The use of the product V2X subsystem on Transceiver module MQBw version 0353 shall implement
a set of security policies assuring the fulfilment of different standards and security demands.
The detail of these policies is documented in the Security Target, section 5.4 (“Organizational
Security Policies”).
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the security properties
and functionalities compiled by the security target. These assumptions have been applied during
the evaluation in order to determine if the identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these assumptions for its
operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them could not be assumed, it would not
be possible to assure the secure operation of the TOE.
The detail of these assumptions is documented in the Security Target, section 5.5 (“Assumptions”).
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS
The following threats do not suppose a risk for the product V2X subsystem on Transceiver module
MQBw version 0353, although the agents implementing attacks have the attack potential according
to the Basic of EAL2 + ALC_FLR.1 and always fulfilling the usage assumptions and the proper
security policies satisfaction.
For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product security
properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
The threats covered by the security properties of the TOE are those defined in the Security Target,
section 5.3 (“Threats”).
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some of the
objectives of the defined security problem.
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The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are those defined in the
Security Target, section 6.2 (“Security Objectives for the operational Environment”).
ARCHITECTURE
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE
The logical scope of the TOE consists of the following security features:
V2X Secure Association and Message Protection
• The TOE can establish a secure association with C-ITS stations to send or receive secure
messages through CAM and DEMN messages. These messages include the payload, the
payload signature and the public key certificate used for signature.
- TOE uses the HSM in the environment to verify the signature of the messages. The
TOE adds a signature generated by the HSM for outgoing messages.
- The TOE verifies the certificate format, validity and revocation of the certificates
included in the CAM and DEMN messages. The TOE also uses the HSM in the
environment to verify the certificate signature.
- The messages include geo-position information and timestamps that are used to
verify the validity of the messages.
Privacy
• Provide services supporting the simultaneous change of communication identifiers (station
ID, network ID, MAC address) and credentials used for secure communications, within the
ITS station.
• The TOE does not communicate identical data values that are linkable to more than one AT.
• The authorization tickets are updated at certain conditions under certain conditions of time
and distance of travel.
Access control
• The TOE provides V2X administration capabilities (check CTL, CRL, TLM, RCA, EA, AA and
HSM status and disable V2X communication).
• The TOE provides different user roles (EPTI, Basic, Production, Extended, Superuser, E2E)
and the corresponding authentication and access control. Protected services can only be
executed prior authentication and identification.
Trust elements update
• The TOE provides URLs to connect to the PKI to download appropriate information.
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• The TOE verifies the validity of ECTL, CRL, CTL certificates and the valid period of
Authorization Tickets.
Software update
• The TOE verifies the software binaries prior the update. The software update is performed
only if the signature is valid, and the version is equal or greater than the current version.
HSM communication
• The TOE opens a communication channel with the HSM in the environment to request
cryptographic services that are used in the TOE operation.
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE
Volkswagen is considered the unique TOE user and the only client for which the TOE is developed.
Therefore, the following information is oriented to the Volkswagen employees.
The release package for the TOE consists of a software package and the guidance documents
described in the next section. The TOE software package is generated in PDX packaged file form.
Both the software and guidance can be obtained through an internal Volkswagen file exchange
platform, DoRIS (Document Retrieval and Information System) that is accessible through a VPN for
specific Volkswagen and LGE users who have been granted access.
Type Delivery Item Version Format SHA256
Software FL_5QS035741_0353_TMALLO
RU3_V001_S
0353 .pdx 28921cef2245b1cae9a4eb986
5fb6dc2717c5d328272c8f232
0635b8caf4370e
DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made available
together to the users of the evaluated version.
Type Delivery Item Version Format SHA256
Guidance V2X subsystem on
Transceiver Module MQBw
User Guidance
V1.5 .pdf 468600a647c3a283bd7f9743
020ba13c26e612833d9c9338
3588385ca68f4b6c
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Guidance V2X subsystem on
Transceiver Module MQBw
DTAB
V0.1 xlsx fcb2cc9062901a9e46fda8571
8fe6744c3081f64f309bce9d90
754cf81dc8a0c
PRODUCT TESTING
The developer has executed tests for all the TSFIs. All the tests have been performed by the
developer in its premises, with a satisfactory result.
During the evaluation process it has been verified each unit test checking that the security
functionality that covers has been identified and that the kind of test is appropriate to the function
that is intended to test.
All the tests have been developed using the testing scenario appropriate to the established
architecture in the security target. It has also been checked that the obtained results during the
tests fit or correspond to the previously estimated results.
To verify the results of the developer tests, the evaluator has repeated all the developer functional
tests in the developer premises in the testing platform implemented in the evaluation facility.
In addition, the lab has devised a test for each of the TSFI of the product verifying that the obtained
results are consistent with the results obtained by the developer.
It has been checked that the obtained results conform to the expected results and in the cases
where a deviation in respect to the expected results was present, the evaluator has confirmed that
this variation neither represents any security problem nor a decrease in the functional capacity of
the product.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The evaluated configuration is the production version of the TOE. Although the development
version has been used for testing purposes, the evaluated configuration covers the production
firmware that is going to be installed in real vehicles. The production version does not include
different modes of operations or specific configurations that enable/disable especial functionality.
EVALUATION RESULTS
The product V2X subsystem on Transceiver module MQBw version 0353 has been evaluated against
the Security Target V2X subsystem on Transceiver Module MQBw Security Target, version 1.5
(2024-05-31).
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All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL2 + ALC_FLR.1 have been
assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory DEKRA Testing and Certification S.A.U.
assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for
the evaluation level EAL2 + ALC_FLR.1, as defined by the COMMON CRITERIA 3.1 R5 and the CEM
3.1 R5.
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM
Next, recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided. These have been
collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be considered when using the product.
• It is mandatory to strictly follow the steps indicated in the installation documentation in
order to download and install the correct version of the TOE and the cumulative update in a
proper manner.
• The user guidance must be read and understood in order to operate the TOE in an adequate
manner according to the security target.
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidence during the instruction of the certification request of the product
V2X subsystem on Transceiver module MQBw version 0353, a positive resolution is proposed.
GLOSSARY
CAM Cooperative Awareness Message
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
DENM Decentralized Environmental Notification Message
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
OC Organismo de Certificación
TOE Target Of Evaluation
V2X Vehicle to other entities
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the product:
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Version 3.1, R5 Final,
April 2017.
[ST] V2X subsystem on Transceiver Module MQBw Security Target, version 1.5 (2024-05-31).
SECURITY TARGET / SECURITY TARGET LITE (IF APPLICABLE)
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is available in the
Certification Body:
• V2X subsystem on Transceiver Module MQBw Security Target, version 1.5 (2024-05-31).
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RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS
In order to avoid multiple certifications of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under
certain conditions was agreed.
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It
defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at
higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL
4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For "Smartcards and similar devices" a
SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical
Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common
Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The current list of
signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the
agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this
agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common
Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers
CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on
assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation
(ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates based on CCRA-
2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of CCRA-
2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification procedures and for Assurance Continuity
(maintenance and re-certification) of old certificates a transition period on the recognition of
certificates according to the rules of CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL
4 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
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As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government representatives from
the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the
United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the
website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this
certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under CCRA for all assurance components selected.