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Indian CC Certification Scheme (IC3S)
Certification Report
Report Number: STQC/CC/13-14/11/CR
Product / system: Router operating system: Comware V7.1
running on MSR2000, MSR3000, and MSR4000
Series Routers
Dated: 14 Dec 2014
Version: 1.0
Government of India
Ministry of Communication & Information Technology
Department of Electronics and Information Technology
Standardization, Testing and Quality Certification Directorate
6. CGO Complex, Lodi Road, New Delhi – 110003
India
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STQC CERTIFICATION SERVICES Page 2 of 15
Product developer: Hewlett-Packard Company
TOE evaluation sponsored by: Hewlett‐Packard, 153 Taylor Street, Littleton, MA 01460
Evaluation facility: ERTL(E)-CCTL, ERTL (East), DN-Block,
Sector V, Salt Lake, Kolkata-700091,
India.
EvaluationPersonnel: Debasish Jana
Malabika Ghose
Subhendu Das
Evaluation report: STQC IT (KOL)/STQC/CC/1314/11/ETRv1.0
Validation Personnel: Alok Sain
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Contents
PART A: CERTIFICATION STATEMENT AND BACKGROUND OF THE CERTIFICATION BODY 4
Contents
A1 Certification Statement .................................................................................................................................4
A2. About the Certification Body........................................................................................................................4
A3 Specifications of the Certification Procedure ................................................................................................5
A4 Process of Evaluation and Certification.........................................................................................................5
A5 Publication ....................................................................................................................................................5
PART B: CERTIFICATION RESULTS ....................................................................................................6
B1 Executive Summary.......................................................................................................................................6
B 2 Identification of TOE .................................................................................................................................7
B 3 Security policy ..........................................................................................................................................7
B 4 Assumptions .............................................................................................................................................7
B 5 Evaluated configuration.............................................................................................................................8
B 6 Document evaluation .................................................................................................................................8
B 7 Product Testing ..........................................................................................................................................10
B 8 Evaluation Results ......................................................................................................................................14
B 9 Validator Comments ..................................................................................................................................14
B 10 List of Acronyms.......................................................................................................................................15
B 11 References .............................................................................................................................................15
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PART A: CERTIFICATION STATEMENT AND BACKGROUND OF
THE CERTIFICATION BODY
A1 Certification Statement
The product below has been evaluated under the terms of the Indian Common Criteria
Certification Scheme (IC3S) and has met the stated Common Criteria requirements. The scope of
the evaluation and the assumed usage environment are specified in the body of this report.
Sponsor Hewlett‐Packard,153 Taylor Street, Littleton, MA 01460
Developer Hewlett‐Packard Company
Product and Version Comware V7.1.049 running on MSR2000, MSR3000, and
MSR4000 Series Routers router hardware”
Security Target Security Target identification: Hewlett-Packard Company
Comware V7.1 Running on MSR2000, MSR3000, and MSR4000
Series Routers Security Target, version 1.0
Brief description of product The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is ‘Comware V7.1.049 running
on MSR2000, MSR3000, and MSR4000 Series Routers router
hardware’. The TOE is intended to protect the IP packets
against incorrect routing caused by unauthorized changes in
the networkconfiguration.
There are variations in ‘hardware configuration’ and
‘performance’ among the different models of the routers, as
stated in ST. While the routers have fixed ports, they also
support plug-in modules; transceivers, memory, and power
supplies that provide additional functionality (e.g., various
numbers and types of network connection ports). These plug-in
accessories do not serve to change the security characteristics of
the TOE and as such can optionally be used in thee valuated
configurations. The Comware 7 image files contain the
operating system along with the software components
required for specific hardware of the series.
CC Part 2 [CC-II] Conformant
CC Part 3 [CC-III] Conformant
EAL EAL2
Evaluation Lab Common Criteria Test Laboratory, ERTL(E), Kolkata
Date Authorized December 14, 2014
A2. About the Certification Body
STQC IT Certification Services, the IT Certification Body of Standardization Testing and Quality
Certification – was established in 1998 and offers a variety of services in the context of security
evaluation and validation. It is the first Certification Body in India for BS 7799/ISO 27001
certification of Information Security Management Systems (ISMS). The Indian CC Certification
Scheme (IC3S) is the IT security evaluation & certification Scheme based on Common Criteria
standards, it is established by Govt. of India under Department of Information Technology, STQC
Directorate to evaluate & certify the trustworthiness of security features in Information Technology
(IT) products and systems. The IC3S is an Indian independent third party evaluation and certification
scheme for evaluating the security functions or mechanisms of the IT products. It also provides
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framework for the International Mutual Recognition of such certificates with the member countries
of CCRA (Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of Information
Technology Security). The principal participants in the scheme are-
a) Applicant (Sponsor/Developer) of IT security evaluations;
b) STQC Certification Body (STQC/DeitY/MCIT/Govt. of India);
c) Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs).
A3 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body operates under the official administrative procedures according to the criteria
and procedures laid down in the following:
 ISO/IEC Guide 65, and the requirements laid down in Annex C of CCRA
 Indian Common Certification Scheme (IC3S)
 STQC/CC/DO2: Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for Certification Body - Q u a l i t y Manual
– describes the quality management system for the Scheme.
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC) part 1-3, Version 3.1
 Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) Version 3.1.
A4 Process of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure uniform procedures,
interpretations of the criteria, and ratings. The TOE has undergone the certification procedure at
STQC IT Certification Body. The evaluation of the product was conducted by the evaluation body
Common Criteria Test Laboratory (CCTL), ERTL (East), DN Block, Sector V, Salt Lake, Kolkata-700091,
India. Hereafter this has been referred as CCTL. The evaluation facility is recognized under the
IC3S scheme of STQC IT Certification Body.
Hewlett-Packard Company is the developer of the TOE and Hewlett‐Packard, 153 Taylor Street,
Littleton, MA 01460 is the sponsor.
The certification process is concluded with the completion of this certification report.
This evaluation was completed on 5th Dec 2014 after submission of [ETR] to the certification body.
The confirmation of the evaluation assurance level (EAL) only applies on the condition that
 all stated condition regarding configuration and operation, as given in part B of this report, are
observed,
 The product is operated – where indicated – in the environment described.
This certification report applies only to the version and release of the product indicated here. The
validity of the certificate can be extended to cover new versions and releases of the product,
provided the applicant applies for re-certification of the modified product, in accordance with the
procedural requirements, and provided the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
A5 Publication
The following Certification Results consist of Sections B1 to B12 of this report. The TOE will be
included in the list of the products certified under IC3S Scheme of STQC IT Certification Body. The
list of certified products is published at regular intervals in the Internet at
http://www.commoncriteria-india.gov.in. Further copies of this certification report may be
ordered from the sponsor of the product. The certification report may also be obtained in
electronic form on request to the Certification Body.
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PART B: CERTIFICATION RESULTS
B1 Executive Summary
B 1.1 Introduction
The Certification Report documents the outcome of Common Criteria security evaluation of Router
Operating System, “Comware V7.1 running on MSR2000, MSR3000, and MSR4000 Series Routers”. It
presents the evaluation results and the conformance results. This certificate is intended to assist the
prospective buyers and users when judging the suitability of the IT security of the product for specified
requirements.
Prospective buyers and users are advised to read this report in conjunction with the referred [ST] of the
product, which specifies the functional, environmental and assurance requirements.
The evaluation was performed by Common Criteria Test Laboratory (CCTL), ERTL (East), DN Block, Sector V,
Salt Lake, Kolkata-700091, India. The information in the test report is derived from the [ST] written by the
developer and the Evaluation Technical Report [ETR] written by Common Criteria Test Laboratory [ERTL (E)-
CCTL], ERTL (EAST), Block-DN Sector-V, Kolkata. The evaluation team determined the product to be CC
Version 3.1, Part 2 and Part 3 conformant and concluded that the Common Criteria requirements for
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL 2) have been met.
B 1.2 Evaluated product and TOE
The product evaluated was:
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is ‘Comware V7.1.049 running on MSR2000, MSR3000, and MSR4000 Series
Routers router hardware’. The TOE is intended to protect the IP packets against incorrect routing caused
by unauthorized changes in the networkconfiguration.
There are variations in ‘hardware configuration’ and ‘performance’ among the different models of the
routers, as stated in ST. While the routers have fixed ports, they also support plug-in modules;
transceivers, memory, and power supplies that provide additional functionality (e.g., various numbers and
types of network connection ports). These plug-in accessories do not serve to change the security
characteristics of the TOE and as such can optionally be used in thee valuated configurations. The
‘ Comware 7.1’ image files contain the operating system along with the software components required
for specific hardware of the series.
The evaluated sub-set and configuration of the product is described in this report as the Target of
Evaluation (TOE). The Evaluated Configuration, its security functions, assumed environment, architectural
information and evaluated configuration are given below (Refer B2 to B6).
B 1.3 Security Claims
The [ST] specifies the security objectives of the TOE and the threats that they counter (Refer 4.1 of ST).
All the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) (listed in 6.1 of ST) are taken from CC Part 2.
B 1.4 Conduct of Evaluation
The evaluation was initiated by the IC3S Certification Scheme of STQC IT Certification Body vide
communication no. STQC/CC/13-14/11 dated 30th August 2013.
The TOE as described in the [ST] is a dedicated router operating system running on the specified hardware
platform.
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The TOE was evaluated through evaluation of its documentation, site visit of the delivery gateway; testing
and vulnerability assessment using methodology stated in Common Evaluation Methodology [CEM] and
ERTL (E)-CCTL, Kolkata Operating Procedure OP-07.
The evaluation has been carried out under written agreement [dated April 2014] between ERTL (E)-CCTL,
Kolkata and the sponsor.
B 1.5 Independence of Certifier
The certifier did not render any consulting - or other services for the company ordering the certification
and there was no relationship between them which might have an influence on this assessment.
B 1.6 Disclaimers
The certification results only apply to the version and release of the product as indicated in the certificate.
The certificate is valid for stated conditions as detailed in this report. This certificate is not an endorsement
of the IT product by the Certification Body or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this
certificate. It is also not an endorsement of the target of evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the Government
of India and no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied.
B 1.7 Recommendations and conclusions
The conclusions of the Certification Body are summarized in the Certification Statement at Section A1.
The specific scope of certification should be clearly understood by reading this report along with the [ST].
The TOE should be used in accordance with the environmental assumptions mentioned in the [ST].
The TOE should be used in accordance with the supporting guidance documentation.
This Certification report is only valid for the evaluated configurations of the TOE.
B 2 Identification of TOE
The TOE is identified as:
There are three software packages for these three environments, in the form of .IPE files. The software
images files are uniquely identified according to the scheme, defined in the Configuration Management
system of Hewlett-Packard Company. The integrity of the image files are ensured through validation of its
digital signature during installation. The validation of digital signature is a prerequisite for installation of the
.IPE files on the hardware box/chassis.
B 3 Security policy
There are no organizational security policies that the TOE must meet.
B 4 Assumptions
B 4.1 Personnel assumptions
Assumption code Description
A.DIRECT
Human users within the physically secure boundary protecting the TOE may
attempt to access the TOE from some direct connection (e.g., a console port)
if the connection is part of the TOE.
A.NOEVIL
Authorized administrators are non-hostile and follow all administrator
guidance; however, they are capable of error.
A.REMACC
Authorized administrators may access the TOE remotely from the internal
and external networks
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B 4.2 Physical Environmental Assumptions
Physical Assumptions
Assumption code Description
A.PHYSEC The TOE is physically secure.
IT Environment Assumptions
Assumption code Description
A.GENPUR
There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., the ability to execute
arbitrary code or applications) and storage repository capabilities on the TOE.
A.SINGEN
Information cannot flow among the internal and external networks unless it
passes through the TOE
A.PUBLIC The TOE does not host public data
A.LOWEXP
The threat of malicious attacks aimed at discovering exploitable vulnerabilities
is considered low.
B 5 Evaluated configuration
The TOE operates on three types of hardware. These three types hardware environment were supplied by
the developer during evaluation. There are three software packages for these three environments, in the
form of .IPE files as listed in Table below. The software images files are uniquely identified according to the
scheme, defined in HP CM system. The integrity of the image files are ensured through digital signature,
validation of which is a prerequisite for installation of the .IPE files on the hardware box/chassis. The .IPE
files were installed and configured on respective hardware platforms as per the preparatory guidance
document of the TOE on the respective models for the purpose of evaluation.
While the routers have fixed ports, they also support plug-in modules; transceivers, memory, and power
supplies that provide additional functionality (e.g., various numbers and types of network connection ports).
These plug-in accessories do not serve to change the security characteristics of the TOE and as such can
optionally be used in thee valuated configurations. The three evaluated instantiations of the TOE are
detailed in the table:
The image files Hardware platform File size Hash values (MD5)of the image files
MSR2000-CMW710-R0106P02.IPE HP MSR2000; MSR2003 AC Router (JG411A) 57.1 MB 2830f7647c530b765fb8dbf7b50932c2
MSR3000-CMW710-R0106P02.IPE HP MSR3000; MSR3064 Router (JG404A) 58.1 MB 631b9442dc4ff08c75551052f39583d3
MSR4000-CMW710-R0106P02.IPE HP MSR4000; MSR4060 Router Chassis (JG403A) 80.1 MB ff6341aa40afd735a1b6936e12afef34
The CAVP certificate numbers of the Crypto module used in the TOE are as follows:
a) For Comware 7.1 : AES: #2927, TDES: #1740, DSA: #868, ECDSA: #527, SHA: #2463, RNG: #1291, HMAC: #1854,
Component Test: #330, RSA: #1543
b) For MSR HW Accelerators: AES; #2928, TDES: #1741, DSA: #869, SHA; #2464, HMAC: #1855; RSA: #1541
B 6 Document evaluation
B 6.1 Documentation
The list of documents, those were presented, as evaluation evidences to the evaluators at the evaluation
facility, are given below:
1. Security Target: Hewlett-Packard Company Comware V7.1 Running on MSR2000, MSR3000, and
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MSR4000 Series Routers Security Target, version 1.0 [1]
2. TOE Architecture/Functional Specification and Design description: Hewlett-Packard Company
MSR2000, MSR3000, MSR4000 Series Routers running Comware V7 Design Document Revision
1.3[2]
3. Operational User Guidance: available at www.hp.com
4. Preparative procedures: Preparative Procedures for CC EAL2 Evaluated Hewlett-Packard Company
MSR2000, MSR3000, and MSR4000 Series Routers Running Comware V7.1, Version 1.31 [4]
5. Configuration Management, Capability /scope and TOE delivery: Hewlett-Packard Company Life
Cycle Document, Revision 1.2[5]
6. Test cases, logs and coverage: Test Documentation For MSR2000, MSR3000, MSR4000 Series
Routers Running Comware V7.1, V1.03 [6]
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B 6.2 Analysis of document
The documents related to the following areas were analyzed using [CEM]. The summary of analysis is as
below:
Development process: The evaluators analyzed the functional specification of the TOE and found that the
TOE security function interfaces are described clearly and unambiguously. The evaluators also analyzed
design and architectural descriptions of the TOE and determined that the only subsystem of the TOE (i.e.
router subsystem) is clearly described in the design description. The evaluators determined that
architectural description of the TOE includes secure initialization of the TOE and also means of protection of
the TOE from tampering and bypassing. The architectural description also shows separation among
different planes (Management, Control and Data planes) of ‘Comware v7.1’.
Guidance Documents: The evaluators analysed guidance documents like preparative procedure and
operational user guidance (presented in the form of website links) and determined that preparative
procedure describes clear and unambiguous steps to bring the TOE to its secure state. The operational
user guidance information were used from the linked websites during evaluation and found them clear
and unambiguous.
Life-cycle support documents: The Life cycle support process document, containing information on
Configuration Management and Delivery Procedure were evaluated.
Configuration management: The evaluators analyzed configuration management documentation and
determined that the TOE and its associated documents are clearly identified as configurable items. The
evaluators also analyzed access control measures defined in the documentation and found satisfactory.
Delivery procedure: The delivery procedure document was audited with the objective to ascertain
whether it covers secure delivery of the TOE to the end-users. The secure delivery procedure has been
described in the document and the same has been audited by the evaluators during their virtual site
visit. The end-users can check integrity of the evaluated TOE using hash value of that, if felt necessary.
The final version of the respective evaluation evidences were found to comply with the requirements of
CCv3.1 for EAL 2.
B 7 Product Testing
Testing at EAL 2 consists of the following three steps: Testing by developer, Independent Testing by
Evaluation Team, and Penetration testing.
B 7.1 IT Product Testing by Developer
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test
evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the [ETR].
The evaluators analyzed the developer’s test coverage and found them to be complete and satisfactory.
The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer’s test documentation and the
functional specification and TOE design was complete.
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B 7.2 IT Product Independent Testing by Evaluation Team
The evaluators’ independent functional testing effort is summarized as below.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing
procedures and reproducibility of results.
The evaluators have examined the TOE, ‘Comware V7.1.049 running on MSR2000, MSR3000, and MSR4000
Series Routers router hardware’, and it is found to be configurable as per the description given in the
developer’s preparative guidance document. It is also observed that the test configuration is consistent
with the description as given in the security target document. Highlights of Independent testing are given
below:
The TOE, ‘Comware V7.1.049 running on MSR2000, MSR3000, and MSR4000 Series Routers router
hardware’, has been installed properly as per the preparative procedure AGD_PRE document.
The evaluators have repeated the developer’s test at CCTL, Kolkata to confirm the reproducibility of the
test results.
While making the test strategy for independent testing, consideration is given to cover the security
requirements, as well as the security specification as defined in the security target, interfaces
available to the users to cover each of security functional requirements, TOE design and security
architecture information. Independent testing is designed to verify the correct implementation of
security functionalities available to different levels of users and to check whether audit is being
generated for auditable events.
The tests were designed to cover following TSFs and associated TSFIs of the TOE:
a. Security Audit
The TOE is designed to generate log records for a wide range of security relevant and other events as
they occur. The events, those can cause an audit record, include starting and stopping the audit
function as well as other auditable events as described in “Security Target” document. The audited
events of the TOE include: administrative activities, authentication activities and events, access
control events, failures of trusted channels etc. The logs can be stored in the TOE as well as to
external log server as the TOE is compatible with SYSLOG. The internal audit log operates as a circular
buffer that overwrites the oldest records when it becomes full. The TOE can be configured to send
generated audit records to an external SYSLOG server in to mitigate the possibility of losing audit
records.
b. Cryptographic support
The TOE includes crypto-module providing supporting cryptographic functions. The TOE supports
SSHv2 with AES (CBC) 128 or 256 bit keys in conjunction with HMAC-SHA-1 or HMACSHA-1-96 and
user authentication using RSA key pairs It uses a random number generator to generate keys of 128,
192 or 256-bits which support AES CBC encryption. The AES implementation satisfies FIPS PUB 197.
The TOE implementation of HMAC-SHA-1 and HMACSHA-1-96 meets FIPS PUB 198-1 and FIPS PUB
180-4. The TOE generates RSA key pairs of 2048 bits in accordance with FIPS PUB 186-3, “Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3 for RSA schemes.
The TOE supports SNMPv3 using AES (CBC) with 128 bit keys in conjunction with HMAC-SHA-1-96.The
TOE implementation of SHA-1 meets FIPS PUB 180-4. The TOE supports IPsec AH and ESP using AES
(CBC) with 128, 192 or 256 bit keys and HMAC-SHA-1-96.The TOE does not generate certificates.
Additionally, the TOE is designed to zeroize the cryptographic keys of all types when they are no
longer required by the TOE in a manner designed to conform to FIPS 140-2.
c. User data protection
The TOE is designed to ensure its own internal integrity as well as to protect user data from
potential, unintended reuse by clearing resources (e.g., memory) as they are allocated to create
objects used in the implementation of the
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TOE operations. The TOE includes firewall functions that allow the definition of firewall rules,
collectively known as access control lists (ACLs), that are applied to applicable network traffic as it is
received and would pass through the TOE between connected networks. The ACLs can be basic, with
matching criteria based only on source IP address, or advanced, with matching criteria based on
source and destination addresses, transport layer protocol, and service. ACLs can also be defined
independently for both IPv4 and IPv6 network traffic and can be assigned to specific TOE interfaces.
d. Identification and authentication
The management users of the TOE are required to be identified and authenticated before accessing
the TOE. In the evaluated configuration, users can connect to the TOE via a local console or
remotely using SNMPv3 or SSHv2. In each case, the user is required to log-in, prior to establish a
successful session through which TOE functions can be exercised.
The user must provide an identity and also authentication data (e.g., password or password with
RSA credentials used in conjunction with an SSH session) that matches the provided identity to
establish a session either through console or network.
The TOE uses local authentication by default, however, a Network Administrator can specifically
identify an external authentication mechanisms (local, RADIUS, and/or TACACS+) and the order in
which they will be used. External authentication mechanisms are not part of the TOE. In case of
non-availability of external authentication service (e.g., RADIUS server cannot be reached), the TOE
will use the next configured authentication mechanism.
e. Security management
The TOE provides Command Line interface commands to access the wide range of security
management functions. The TOE implements a role mechanism that is used to specify the role(s)
and corresponding permissions which authenticated users possess. Security management
commands are limited to administrators only, which can be executed after successful identification
and authentication.
The TOE provides the command line interface for user account management (used for
authentication and authorization), system time setting, and system shutdown and re-start. By
providing the access control function for the system management services, the TOE ensures that the
functions are accessible only to users, authorized with the appropriate management privileges; thus
realizing secure management.
f. Protection of the TSF
The hardware of the TOE is a router that includes a hardware-based real-time clock. The embedded
Operating System of the TOE manages the clock and exposes clock-related functions for use by the
TOE. The TOE software can also be configured to utilize the NTP protocol to keep the local
hardware-based real-time clock synchronized with other network devices.
During start-up of the TOE, the TOE first checks the integrity of the Comware and TSF executable
files, and then runs a series of self-tests to ensure it is performing its cryptographic functions
correctly. If any of these checks fails, the device will halt and require Network Administrator
intervention to successfully start-up.
g. TOE access
The TOE can be configured by the Network Administrator to set an interactive ‘session timeout’
value (any integer value in minutes and also optionally in seconds, with 0 disabling the timeout) –
the default timeout is 10 minutes. A session that is inactive (i.e., no commands issuing from the
remote client) for the defined timeout value will be terminated.
The user will be required to re-enter their user id and password, so they can be re-authenticated in
order to establish a new session. The TOE can be configured to display administrator-configured
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advisory banners that will be displayed in conjunction with user login prompts. The banner contents
are configured by a user in the role of Network Administrator role.
h. Trusted Path/Channels
To support secure remote administration, the TOE includes implementations of SSHv2 and SNMPv3.
In each case, a remote host (presumably acting on behalf of an administrator) can initiate a secure
remote connection for the purpose of security management. Note that only the local console is
available by default and each of these remote administration services can be independently enabled
by a Network Administrator.
In the case of SNMPv3, the TOE acts as a SNMPv3 server accepting non-interactive Management
Information Base (MIB) options from an authenticated source. SNMPv3 requires the client to be
authenticated against a locally configured user base and utilizes AES-128 in order to protect this
security management channel.
B 7.3 Vulnerability Analysis and Penetration testing
In search of potential vulnerabilities, the evaluator has conducted public domain search, focusing on
the type of the TOE. The listed vulnerabilities in the public domain for this type of TOE were
analyzed and filtered list was prepared with those which are applicable for the type of TOE under
consideration (i.e. router).
The TOE documents like, Security Target (ST), TOE architecture & Design (TDS), TOE Preparatory
guidance document etc. were analyzed to find out potential security vulnerability and the same is
listed in.
The attack potential for each of the vulnerabilities was calculated using guidance given in CEMv3.1
and considering various factors like the time to identify & exploit the vulnerability, expertise
required, knowledge of the TOE, windows of opportunity and equipment requirement.
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Subsequent to the independent review of public domain vulnerability databases and all evaluation
evidences, potential vulnerabilities were identified with their attack potentials. The potential
vulnerabilities with ‘Basic’ attack potential were considered for penetration testing.
The potential vulnerabilities with higher than ‘Basic’ attack potential are treated as residual vulnerabilities.
Penetration testing scenarios are summarized as below:
 Escalation of privileges that should otherwise be denied
 Bypassing ACL during booting up
 Unauthorized access of management plane through data plane traffic
 Running of untrusted software on the TOE
 Disturbing TSF behavior through flooding the TOE with TCP malformed packets
 To make TOE log unavailable while transporting the same to external log server
 To make external Authentication service unavailable.
The penetration testing could not exploit any vulnerability in the intended operational
environment of the TOE. However, these vulnerabilities may be exploited with higher attack
potential.
B 8 Evaluation Results
The evaluation results have been documented in the [ETR].
The TOE was evaluated through evaluation of its documentation, testing and vulnerability assessment
using methodology stated in [CEM] and laboratory operative procedure [OP-07].
Documentation evaluation results:
The documents for TOE and its development life cycle were analyzed by the evaluator in view of the
requirements of the respective work units of the [CEM]. The final versions of the documents were found
to comply with the requirements of CCv3.1 for EAL 2.
Testing:
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results, giving assurance
that ‘Comware V7.1.049 running on MSR2000, MSR3000, and MSR4000 Series Routers router hardware’
behaves as specified in its [ST], functional specification and TOE design.
Vulnerability assessment and penetration testing:
The penetration testing with ‘Basic’ attack potential could not exploit the potential vulnerabilities
identified through vulnerability assessment.
B 9 Validator Comments
The Validators have reviewed the Evaluation Technical Report [ETR] along with all relevant evaluation
evidences, documents, records, etc. and are in agreement with the conclusion made in it i.e.
 The [ST] has satisfied all the requirements of the assurance class ASE.
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Report No: STQC/CC/13-14/11/CR
 The results of evaluation of product and process documentation, testing and vulnerability
assessment confirm that ‘Comware V7.1.049 running on MSR2000, MSR3000, and MSR4000
Series Routers router hardware’, satisfies all the security functional requirements and
assurance requirements as defined in the [ST]. Hence, the TOE is recommended for EAL 2
Certification.
However it should be noted that there are no Protection Profile compliance claims.
B 10 List of Acronyms
ACL: Access Control List
CC: Common Criteria
CCTL: Common Criteria Test Laboratory
CEM: Common Evaluation Methodology
DVS: Development security
EAL: Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR: Evaluation Technical Report
FSP: Functional Specification
IC3S: Indian Common Criteria Certification Scheme
IT: Information Technology
PP: Protection Profile
ST: Security Target
TOE: Target of Evaluation
TDS: TOE Design Specification.
TSF: TOE Security Function
TSFI: TOE Security Function Interface
B 11 References
1. [CC-I]: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Version 3.1
2. [CC-II]: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 2: Version 3.1
3. [CC-III]: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 3: Version 3.1
4. [CEM]: Common Methodology for Information Methodology: Version 3.1
5. [ST] : Hewlett-Packard Company Comware V7.1 Running on MSR2000, MSR3000, and MSR4000
Series Routers Security Target, version 1.0
6. [ETR]: Evaluation Technical Report No. STQC IT (KOL)/STQC/CC/1314/11/ETR v 1.0
7. [OP-07]: CCTL operating procedure