Google Pixel Phones on Android 12.0
Security Target
Version 1.0
2/7/2022
Prepared for:
Google LLC
1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
Mountain View, CA 94043
USA
Prepared By:
www.gossamersec.com
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1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................4
1.1 SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE......................................................................................................................4
1.2 TOE REFERENCE............................................................................................................................................4
1.3 TOE OVERVIEW .............................................................................................................................................5
1.4 TOE DESCRIPTION .........................................................................................................................................5
1.4.1 TOE Architecture...................................................................................................................................6
1.4.2 TOE Documentation ..............................................................................................................................8
2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS..............................................................................................................................9
2.1 CONFORMANCE RATIONALE.........................................................................................................................10
3. SECURITY OBJECTIVES ..............................................................................................................................11
3.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ...................................................................11
4. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION ................................................................................................12
5. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.......................................................................................................................15
5.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS .............................................................................................15
5.1.1 Security audit (FAU)............................................................................................................................17
5.1.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)..............................................................................................................20
5.1.3 User data protection (FDP).................................................................................................................26
5.1.4 Identification and authentication (FIA) ...............................................................................................27
5.1.5 Security management (FMT) ...............................................................................................................32
5.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT) ................................................................................................................37
5.1.7 TOE access (FTA)................................................................................................................................39
5.1.8 Trusted path/channels (FTP)...............................................................................................................40
5.2 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS...............................................................................................40
5.2.1 Development (ADV).............................................................................................................................41
5.2.2 Guidance documents (AGD)................................................................................................................41
5.2.3 Life-cycle support (ALC) .....................................................................................................................42
5.2.4 Tests (ATE) ..........................................................................................................................................43
5.2.5 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)...........................................................................................................43
6. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION..............................................................................................................44
6.1 SECURITY AUDIT ..........................................................................................................................................44
6.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT ...........................................................................................................................47
6.3 USER DATA PROTECTION ..............................................................................................................................54
6.4 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION.......................................................................................................58
6.5 SECURITY MANAGEMENT .............................................................................................................................62
6.6 PROTECTION OF THE TSF .............................................................................................................................62
6.7 TOE ACCESS.................................................................................................................................................66
6.8 TRUSTED PATH/CHANNELS ...........................................................................................................................67
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 TOE Common Attributes..............................................................................................................................5
Table 2 Evaluated Devices .........................................................................................................................................5
Table 3 Technical Decisions........................................................................................................................................9
Table 4 TOE Security Functional Components ......................................................................................................17
Table 5 Audit Events .................................................................................................................................................19
Table 6 Security Management Functions ................................................................................................................32
Table 7 WLAN Security Management Functions...................................................................................................36
Table 8 Assurance Components ...............................................................................................................................40
Table 9 Audit Events .................................................................................................................................................46
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Table 10 Asymmetric Key Generation.....................................................................................................................47
Table 11 WFA Certificates .......................................................................................................................................48
Table 12 Salt Nonces..................................................................................................................................................49
Table 13 BoringSSL Cryptographic Algorithms ....................................................................................................49
Table 14 LockSettings Service KDF Cryptographic Algorithms ..........................................................................49
Table 15 Titan M Hardware Cryptographic Algorithms.......................................................................................50
Table 16 SDM845, SDM670, SM7150 Hardware Cryptographic Algorithms .....................................................50
Table 17 SM8150 Hardware Cryptographic Algorithms.......................................................................................50
Table 18 SM7250 Hardware Cryptographic Algorithms.......................................................................................51
Table 19 Google Tensor Hardware Cryptographic Algorithms............................................................................51
Table 20 Functional Categories................................................................................................................................56
Table 21 Fingerprint False Accept/Reject Rates.....................................................................................................59
Table 22 Power-up Cryptographic Algorithm Known Answer Tests...................................................................65
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1. Security Target Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE) identification, ST conventions, ST
conformance claims, and the ST organization. The TOE is Google Pixel Phones on Android 12.0 provided by Google
LLC. The TOE is being evaluated as a mobile device.
The Security Target contains the following additional sections:
• Conformance Claims (Section 2)
• Security Objectives (Section 3)
• Extended Components Definition (Section 4)
• Security Requirements (Section 5)
• TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)
Conventions
The following conventions have been applied in this document:
• Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be
applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
o Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. In the ST,
iteration is indicated by a parenthetical number placed at the end of the component. For example
FDP_ACC.1(1) and FDP_ACC.1(2) indicate that the ST includes two iterations of the FDP_ACC.1
requirement.
o Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated using
bold and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [assignment]). Note that an assignment within a selection
would be identified in italics and with embedded bold brackets (e.g., [[selected-assignment]]).
o Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are indicated
using bold italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [selection]).
o Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold, for additions, and
strike-through, for deletions (e.g., “… all objects …” or “… some big things …”).
• Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as
captions.
1.1 Security Target Reference
ST Title – Google Pixel Phones on Android 12.0 Security Target
ST Version – Version 1.0
ST Date – 2/7/2022
1.2 TOE Reference
TOE Identification – Google Pixel Phones on Android 12.0
TOE Developer – Google LLC
Evaluation Sponsor – Google LLC
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1.3 TOE Overview
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Google Pixel Phones on Android 12.0. All the included phones have the following
information in common:
Android OS Version Architecture Security Patch Level
Android 12 ARMv8 November 2021
Table 1 TOE Common Attributes
The TOE consists of the following devices:
Product Model # SoC Kernel
Google Pixel 6 Pro GF5KQ, G8V0U, GLU0G Google Tensor 5.10
Google Pixel 6 GR1YH, GB7N6, G9S9B Google Tensor 5.10
Google Pixel 5a-5G G4S1M Qualcomm Snapdragon™ 765 4.19
Google Pixel 5 GD1YQ, GTT9Q, G5NZ6 Qualcomm Snapdragon™ 765 4.19
Google Pixel 4a-5G G025E/I/H, G6QU3 Qualcomm Snapdragon™ 765 4.19
Google Pixel 4a G025J/M/N Qualcomm Snapdragon™ 730 4.14
Google Pixel 4 XL G020P/Q/J Qualcomm Snapdragon™ 855 4.14
Google Pixel 4 G020I/M/N Qualcomm Snapdragon™ 855 4.14
Google Pixel 3a XL G020A/B/C Qualcomm Snapdragon™ 670 4.9
Google Pixel 3a G020E/F/G/H Qualcomm Snapdragon™ 670 4.9
Google Pixel 3 XL G013C/D Qualcomm Snapdragon™ 845 4.9
Google Pixel 3 G013A/B Qualcomm Snapdragon™ 845 4.9
Table 2 Evaluated Devices
Google manufacturers some of the phones in two variants, differing in size (normal and large, “XL”, or “Pro”) or build
materials (entry and premium). The only differences between variants of a given device are build materials, screen
type and size, battery capacity, and RAM and Flash storage. The XL or Pro phones are physically larger and have
larger screen sizes, battery capacity and where applicable, RAM (not all XL devices have more RAM). Storage options
vary with each release and may be selectable by the customer of the device at purchase.
The TOE allows basic telephony features (make and receive phone calls, send and receive SMS/MMS messages) as
well as advanced network connectivity (allowing connections to both 802.11 Wi-Fi and 2G/3G/4G LTE/5G mobile
data networks). The TOE supports using client certificates to connect to access points offering WPA2/WPA3
networks with 802.1x/EAP-TLS, or alternatively connecting to cellular base stations when utilizing mobile data.
The TOE offers mobile applications an Application Programming Interface (API) including that provided by the
Android framework and supports API calls to the Android Management APIs.
1.4 TOE Description
The TOE is a mobile device to support enterprises and individual users alike.
Some features and settings must be enabled for the TOE to operate in its evaluated configuration. The following
features and settings must be enabled:
1. Enable a password screen lock
2. Do not use Smart Lock
3. Enable encryption of Wi-Fi and Bluetooth secrets (NIAP mode DPM API)
4. Do not use USB debugging
5. Do not allow installation of applications from unknown sources
6. Enable security logging
7. Disable ‘Usage & Diagnostic’ settings
8. Disable Captive Portal Checking
9. Loaded applications must be implemented utilizing the NIAPSEC library
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Doing this ensures that the phone complies with the PP_MD_V3.1 requirements. Please refer to the Admin Guide on
how to configure these settings and features.
1.4.1 TOE Architecture
The TOE provides a rich API to mobile applications and provides users installing an application the option to either
approve or reject an application based upon the API access that the application requires (or to grant applications access
at runtime).
The TOE also provides users with the ability to protect Data-At-Rest with AES encryption, including all user and
mobile application data stored in the user’s data partition. The TOE uses a key hierarchy that combines a REK with
the user’s password to provide protection to all user and application cryptographic keys stored in the TOE.
The TOE includes an additional hardware security chip (Titan M) that provides dedicated key storage1
. The TOE
makes this secure, hardware key storage available to mobile applications through the StrongBox extensions to
Android’s Keystore. Currently, the StrongBox extension is not used for any system keys, but remains an option for
applications to use should they desire the protections it provides.
Finally, the TOE can interact with a Mobile Device Management (MDM) system (not part of this evaluation) to allow
enterprise control of the configuration and operation of the device so as to ensure adherence to enterprise-wide policies
(for example, restricting use of a corporate provided device’s camera, forced configuration of maximum login
attempts, pulling of audit logs off the TOE, etc.) as well as policies governing enterprise applications and data (in a
an employee-owned device [BYOD] scenario). An MDM is made up of two parts: the MDM agent and MDM server.
The MDM Agent is installed on the phone as an administrator with elevated permissions (allowing it to change the
relevant settings on the phone) while the MDM Server is used to issue the commands to the MDM Agent. Neither
portion of the MDM process is considered part of the TOE, and therefore not being directly evaluated.
The TOE includes several different levels of execution including (from lowest to highest): hardware, a Trusted
Execution Environment, Android’s bootloader, and Android’s user space, which provides APIs allowing applications
to leverage the cryptographic functionality of the device.
1.4.1.1 Physical Boundaries
The TOE’s physical boundary is the physical perimeter of its enclosure. The TOE runs Android as its software/OS,
executing on the Google Tensor or Qualcomm Snapdragon processors. The TOE does not include the user applications
that run on top of the operating system, but does include controls that limit application behavior. Further, the device
provides support for downloadable MDM agents to be installed to limit or permit different functionality of the device.
There is no built-in MDM agent pre-installed on the device.
The TOE communicates and interacts with 802.11-2012 Access Points and mobile data networks to establish network
connectivity, and through that connectivity interacts with MDM servers that allow administrative control of the TOE.
1.4.1.2 Logical Boundaries
This section summarizes the security functions provided by the Pixel phones:
- Security audit
- Cryptographic support
- User data protection
- Identification and authentication
- Security management
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE access
- Trusted path/channels
1
Does not apply to the Pixel 6 Pro and 6
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1.4.1.2.1 Security audit
The TOE implements a security log and logcat that are each stored in a circular memory buffer. An MDM agent can
read/fetch the security logs, can retrieve logcat logs, and then handle appropriately (potentially storing the log to Flash
or transmitting its contents to the MDM server). These log methods meet the logging requirements outlined by
FAU_GEN.1 in PP_MD_V3.1. Please see the Security audit section for further information and specifics.
1.4.1.2.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes multiple cryptographic libraries with ACVP certified algorithms for a wide range of
cryptographic functions including the following: asymmetric key generation and establishment, symmetric key
generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing and keyed-hash message authentication. These functions
are supported with suitable random bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation,
secure key storage, and key and protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to
implement security protocols such as TLS, EAP-TLS, and HTTPS and to encrypt the media (including the
generation and protection of data and key encryption keys) used by the TOE. Many of these cryptographic functions
are also accessible as services to applications running on the TOE allowing application developers to ensure their
application meets the required criteria to remain compliant to PP_MD_V3.1 standards.
1.4.1.2.3 User data protection
The TOE controls access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of the Trust Anchor Database.
Additionally, the TOE protects user and other sensitive data using encryption so that even if a device is physically
lost, the data remains protected. The TOE’s evaluated configuration supports Android Enterprise profiles to provide
additional separation between application and application data belonging to the Enterprise profile. Please see the
Admin Guide for additional details regarding how to set up and use Enterprise profiles.
1.4.1.2.4 Identification and authentication
The TOE supports a number of features related to identification and authentication. From a user perspective, except
for FCC mandated (making phone calls to an emergency number) or non-sensitive functions (e.g., choosing the
keyboard input method or taking screen shots), a password (i.e., Password Authentication Factor) must be correctly
entered to unlock the TOE. Also, even when unlocked, the TOE requires the user re-enter the password to change the
password. Passwords are obscured when entered so they cannot be read from the TOE's display and the frequency of
entering passwords is limited and when a configured number of failures occurs, the TOE will be wiped to protect its
contents. Passwords can be constructed using upper and lower cases characters, numbers, and special characters and
passwords up to 16 characters are supported.
The TOE can also serve as an 802.1X supplicant and can both use and validate X.509v3 certificates for EAP-TLS,
TLS, and HTTPS exchanges.
1.4.1.2.5 Security management
The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions identified throughout this Security
Target as well as other functions commonly found in mobile devices. Many of the available functions are available to
users of the TOE while many are restricted to administrators operating through a Mobile Device Management solution
once the TOE has been enrolled. Once the TOE has been enrolled and then un-enrolled, it will remove Enterprise
applications and remove MDM policies.
1.4.1.2.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features.
It protects particularly sensitive data such as cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible or exportable through
the use of the application processor’s hardware. The TOE disallows all read access to the Root Encryption Key (REK)
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and retains all keys derived from the REK within its Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Application software
can only use keys derived from the REK by reference and receive the result.
The TOE also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log
accountability). It enforces read, write, and execute memory page protections, uses address space layout
randomization, and stack-based buffer overflow protections to minimize the potential to exploit application flaws. It
also protects itself from modification by applications as well as to isolate the address spaces of applications from one
another to protect those applications.
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking so that it might detect
when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any self-tests fail, the TOE will not go into an operational mode. It also includes
mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while
ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE. Digital signature
checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their installation as all applications must have signatures (even
if self-signed).
1.4.1.2.7 TOE access
The TOE can be locked, obscuring its display, by the user or after a configured interval of inactivity. The TOE also
has the capability to display an administrator specified (using the TOE’s MDM API) advisory message (banner) when
the user unlocks the TOE for the first use after reboot.
The TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.
1.4.1.2.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports the use of IEEE 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS and TLS, HTTPS to secure communications
channels between itself and other trusted network devices.
1.4.2 TOE Documentation
Google Pixel Phones on Android 12.0 Administrator Guidance Documentation, Version 1.0, December 15, 2021
[Admin Guide]
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2. Conformance Claims
This TOE is conformant to the following CC specifications:
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
• Part 2 Extended
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
• Part 3 Extended
• Protection Profile:
• Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, 16 June 2017 (PP_MD_V3.1)
• Package Claims:
• General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection
Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients, Version 1.0, 08
February 2016 (PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0)
• Technical Decisions as of December 15, 2021:
TD No. Applied? Rationale
TD0194 –
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0
Yes Impacts required audit events
TD0244 –
PP_MD_V3.1/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_
V1.0
Yes Allows additional TLSC curves
TD0301 – PP_MD_V3.1 Yes
Impacts Assurance Activities and allows for
assignment for FIA_BMG_EXT.1.1
TD0304 – PP_MD_V3.1 Yes Impacts Assurance Activities
TD0305 – PP_MD_V3.1 Yes Impacts Assurance Activities
TD0346 – PP_MD_V3.1 Yes Removes selection from FMT_SMF_EXT.2.1
TD0347 – PP_MD_V3.1 No Use Case 2 not selected
TD0351 – PP_MD_V3.1 Yes Adds DEK selections to FCS_CKM_EXT.2.1
TD0366 – PP_MD_V3.1 Yes FCS_COP.1(5) updated to reflect scrypt
TD0369 – PP_MD_V3.1 Yes LTTCKM present.
TD0371 – PP_MD_V3.1 No Use Case 2 not selected
TD0413 – PP_MD_V3.1 Yes Any Allowed PP-Module
TD0439 –
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0
Yes Adds FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN
TD0468 – PP_MD_V3.1 Yes FIA_BLT_EXT.3.1 applies
TD0470 –
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0
Yes
FCS_SMF_EXT.1.1/WLAN &
FTA_WSE_EXT.1 apply
TD0492 –
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0
Yes FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1/WLAN applies
TD0502 – PP_MD_V3.1 Yes FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.2 apply
TD0517 –
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0
Yes
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1/WLAN and
FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN apply
TD0523 – PP_MD_V3.1 Yes FIA_X509_EXT.1 applies
TD0579 – PP_MD_V3.1 Yes FAU_GEN.1 applies
TD0596 – PP_MD_V3.1 Yes FDP_IFC_EXT.1.1 applies
Table 3 Technical Decisions
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2.1 Conformance Rationale
The ST conforms to the PP_MD_V3.1/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 with Use Case 4 selected for PP_MD_V3.1. As
explained previously, the security problem definition, security objectives, and security requirements have been drawn
from the PP.
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3. Security Objectives
The Security Problem Definition may be found in the PP_MD_V3.1/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 and this section
reproduces only the corresponding Security Objectives for operational environment for reader convenience. The
PP_MD_V3.1/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 offers additional information about the identified security objectives, but
that has not been reproduced here and the PP_MD_V3.1/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 should be consulted if there is
interest in that material.
In general, the PP_MD_V3.1/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 has defined Security Objectives appropriate for mobile
device and as such are applicable to the Google Pixel Phones on Android 12.0 TOE.
3.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
OE.CONFIG TOE administrators will configure the Mobile Device security functions correctly to create the
intended security policy.
OE.NO_TOE_BYPASS Information cannot flow between external and internal networks located in different
enclaves without passing through the TOE.
OE.NOTIFY The Mobile User will immediately notify the administrator if the Mobile Device is lost or stolen.
OE.PRECAUTION The Mobile User exercises precautions to reduce the risk of loss or theft of the Mobile
Device.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all administrator guidance in a
trusted manner.
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4. Extended Components Definition
All of the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the PP_MD_V3.1/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0. The
PP_MD_V3.1/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 defines the following extended requirements and since they are not
redefined in this ST the PP_MD_V3.1/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 should be consulted for more information in regard
to those CC extensions.
Extended SFRs:
- PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Key Support
- PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.2: Extended: Cryptographic Key Random Generation
- PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.3: Extended: Cryptographic Key Generation
- PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Extended: Key Destruction
- PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.5: Extended: TSF Wipe
- PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.6: Extended: Salt Generation
- PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1: Extended: HTTPS Protocol
- PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_IV_EXT.1: Extended: Initialization Vector Generation
- PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
- PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_SRV_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Algorithm Services
- PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_SRV_EXT.2: Extended: Cryptographic Algorithm Services
- PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_STG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Key Storage
- PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_STG_EXT.2: Extended: Encrypted Cryptographic Key Storage
- PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_STG_EXT.3: Extended: Integrity of encrypted key storage
- PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1: Extended: TLS Protocol
- PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN: Extensible Authentication Protocol-Transport Layer
Security
- PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_TLSC_EXT.2: Extended: TLS Protocol
- PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FCS_TLSC_EXT.2/WLAN: TLS Client Protocol
- PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_ACF_EXT.1: Extended: Security access control
- PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_ACF_EXT.2: Extended: Security access control
- PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_DAR_EXT.1: Extended: Protected Data Encryption
- PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_DAR_EXT.2: Extended: Sensitive Data Encryption
- PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_IFC_EXT.1: Extended: Subset information flow control
- PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_PBA_EXT.1: Extended: Storage of Critical Biometric Parameters
- PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_STG_EXT.1: Extended: User Data Storage
- PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_UPC_EXT.1: Extended: Inter-TSF user data transfer protection
- PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_AFL_EXT.1: Extended: Authentication failure handling
- PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.1: Extended: Bluetooth User Authorization
- PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.2: Extended: Bluetooth Mutual Authentication
- PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.3: Extended: Rejection of Duplicate Bluetooth Connections
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- PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.4: Extended: Secure Simple Pairing
- PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.6: Extended: Bluetooth User Authorization
- PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BMG_EXT.1: Extended: Accuracy of Biometric Authentication
- PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FIA_PAE_EXT.1: Port Access Entity Authentication
- PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Extended: Password Management
- PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_TRT_EXT.1: Extended: Authentication Throttling
- PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU_EXT.1: Extended: Authentication for Cryptographic Operation
- PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Extended: Timing of Authentication
- PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_X509_EXT.1: Extended: Validation of certificates
- PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN: X.509 Certificate Validation
- PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_X509_EXT.2: Extended: X509 certificate authentication
- PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN: X.509 Certificate Authentication (EAP-TLS)
- PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_X509_EXT.3: Extended: Request Validation of certificates
- PP_MD_V3.1:FMT_MOF_EXT.1: Extended: Management of security functions behavior
- PP_MD_V3.1:FMT_SMF_EXT.1: Extended: Specification of Management Functions
- PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FMT_SMF_EXT.1/WLAN: Specification of Management Functions (Wireless LAN)
- PP_MD_V3.1:FMT_SMF_EXT.2: Extended: Specification of Remediation Actions
- PP_MD_V3.1:FMT_SMF_EXT.3: Extended: Current Administrator
- PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.1: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (ASLR)
- PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.2: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Memory Page Permissions)
- PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.3: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Overflow Protection)
- PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.4: Extended: Domain Isolation
- PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.5: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (ASLR)
- PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_BBD_EXT.1: Extended: Application Processor Mediation
- PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_JTA_EXT.1: Extended: JTAG Disablement
- PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_KST_EXT.1: Extended: Key Storage
- PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_KST_EXT.2: Extended: No Key Transmission
- PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_KST_EXT.3: Extended: No Plaintext Key Export
- PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_NOT_EXT.1: Extended: Self-Test Notification
- PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TST_EXT.1: Extended: TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing
- PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FPT_TST_EXT.1/WLAN: TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing (Wireless LAN)
- PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TST_EXT.2(1): Extended: TSF Integrity Checking
- PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TST_EXT.2(2): Extended: TSF Integrity Checking
- PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted Update: TSF version query
- PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TUD_EXT.2: Extended: TSF Update Verification
- PP_MD_V3.1:FTA_SSL_EXT.1: Extended: TSF- and User-initiated Locked State
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- PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FTA_WSE_EXT.1: Wireless Network Access
- PP_MD_V3.1:FTP_ITC_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted channel Communication
- PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FTP_ITC_EXT.1/WLAN: Trusted Channel Communication (Wireless LAN)
Extended SARs:
- ALC_TSU_EXT.1: Timely Security Updates
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5. Security Requirements
This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) that
serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to scope the evaluation effort.
The SFRs have all been drawn from the PP_MD_V3.1/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0. The refinements and operations
already performed in the PP_MD_V3.1/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 are not identified (e.g., highlighted) here, rather
the requirements have been copied from the PP_MD_V3.1/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 and any residual operations
have been completed herein. Of particular note, the PP_MD_V3.1/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 made a number of
refinements and completed some of the SFR operations defined in the Common Criteria (CC) and that PP should be
consulted to identify those changes if necessary.
The SARs are also drawn from the PP_MD_V3.1/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 which includes all the SARs for EAL
1. However, the SARs are effectively refined since requirement-specific 'Assurance Activities' are defined in the
PP_MD_V3.1/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0 that serve to ensure corresponding evaluations will yield more practical and
consistent assurance than the EAL 1 assurance requirements alone. The PP_MD_V3.1/PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0
should be consulted for the assurance activity definitions.
5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by Google Pixel Phones on Android 12.0 TOE.
Requirement
Class
Requirement Component
FAU: Security PP_MD_V3.1:FAU_GEN.1: Audit Data Generation
audit PP_MD_V3.1:FAU_SAR.1: Audit Review
PP_MD_V3.1:FAU_STG.4: Prevention of Audit Data Loss
PP_MD_V3.1:FAU_STG.1: Audit Storage Protection
FCS: PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic key generation
Cryptographic
support
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FCS_CKM.1/WLAN: Cryptographic Key Generation
(Symmetric Keys for WPA2 Connections)
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM.2(1): Cryptographic key establishment
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM.2(2): Cryptographic key establishment (While device is
locked)
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FCS_CKM.2/WLAN: Cryptographic Key Distribution
(GTK)
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Key Support
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.2: Extended: Cryptographic Key Random Generation
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.3: Extended: Cryptographic Key Generation
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Extended: Key Destruction
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.5: Extended: TSF Wipe
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.6: Extended: Salt Generation
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_COP.1(1): Cryptographic operation
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_COP.1(2): Cryptographic operation
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_COP.1(3): Cryptographic operation
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_COP.1(4): Cryptographic operation
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_COP.1(5): Cryptographic operation
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1: Extended: HTTPS Protocol
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_IV_EXT.1: Extended: Initialization Vector Generation
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_SRV_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Algorithm Services
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_SRV_EXT.2: Extended: Cryptographic Algorithm Services
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_STG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Key Storage
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PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_STG_EXT.2: Extended: Encrypted Cryptographic Key Storage
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_STG_EXT.3: Extended: Integrity of encrypted key storage
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1: Extended: TLS Protocol
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN: Extensible Authentication
Protocol-Transport Layer Security
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_TLSC_EXT.2: Extended: TLS Protocol
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FCS_TLSC_EXT.2/WLAN: TLS Client Protocol
FDP: User PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_ACF_EXT.1: Extended: Security access control
data protection PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_ACF_EXT.2: Extended: Security access control
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_DAR_EXT.1: Extended: Protected Data Encryption
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_DAR_EXT.2: Extended: Sensitive Data Encryption
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_IFC_EXT.1: Extended: Subset information flow control
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_PBA_EXT.1: Extended: Storage of Critical Biometric Parameters
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_STG_EXT.1: Extended: User Data Storage
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_UPC_EXT.1: Extended: Inter-TSF user data transfer protection
FIA: PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_AFL_EXT.1: Extended: Authentication failure handling
Identification PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.1: Extended: Bluetooth User Authorization
and PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.2: Extended: Bluetooth Mutual Authentication
authentication PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.3: Extended: Rejection of Duplicate Bluetooth
Connections
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.4: Extended: Secure Simple Pairing
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.6: Extended: Bluetooth User Authorization
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BMG_EXT.1: Extended: Accuracy of Biometric Authentication
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FIA_PAE_EXT.1: Port Access Entity Authentication
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Extended: Password Management
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_TRT_EXT.1: Extended: Authentication Throttling
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU.5: Multiple Authentication Mechanisms
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU.6(1): Re-Authentication
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU.6(2): Re-Authentication
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU.7: Protected authentication feedback
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU_EXT.1: Extended: Authentication for Cryptographic
Operation
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Extended: Timing of Authentication
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_X509_EXT.1: Extended: Validation of certificates
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN: X.509 Certificate Validation
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_X509_EXT.2: Extended: X509 certificate authentication
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN: X.509 Certificate
Authentication (EAP-TLS)
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_X509_EXT.3: Extended: Request Validation of certificates
FMT: Security PP_MD_V3.1:FMT_MOF_EXT.1: Extended: Management of security functions
behavior
management PP_MD_V3.1:FMT_SMF_EXT.1: Extended: Specification of Management Functions
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FMT_SMF_EXT.1/WLAN: Specification of Management
Functions (Wireless LAN)
PP_MD_V3.1:FMT_SMF_EXT.2: Extended: Specification of Remediation Actions
PP_MD_V3.1:FMT_SMF_EXT.3: Extended: Current Administrator
FPT: PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.1: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (ASLR)
Protection of
the TSF
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.2: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Memory Page
Permissions)
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.3: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Overflow
Protection)
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.4: Extended: Domain Isolation
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.5: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (ASLR)
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_BBD_EXT.1: Extended: Application Processor Mediation
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_JTA_EXT.1: Extended: JTAG Disablement
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PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_KST_EXT.1: Extended: Key Storage
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_KST_EXT.2: Extended: No Key Transmission
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_KST_EXT.3: Extended: No Plaintext Key Export
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_NOT_EXT.1: Extended: Self-Test Notification
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_STM.1: Reliable time stamps
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TST_EXT.1: Extended: TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FPT_TST_EXT.1/WLAN: TSF Cryptographic
Functionality Testing (Wireless LAN)
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TST_EXT.2(1): Extended: TSF Integrity Checking
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TST_EXT.2(2): Extended: TSF Integrity Checking
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted Update: TSF version query
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TUD_EXT.2: Extended: TSF Update Verification
FTA: TOE PP_MD_V3.1:FTA_SSL_EXT.1: Extended: TSF- and User-initiated Locked State
access PP_MD_V3.1:FTA_TAB.1: Default TOE Access Banners
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FTA_WSE_EXT.1: Wireless Network Access
FTP: Trusted PP_MD_V3.1:FTP_ITC_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted channel Communication
path/channels PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FTP_ITC_EXT.1/WLAN: Trusted Channel Communication
(Wireless LAN)
Table 4 TOE Security Functional Components
5.1.1 Security audit (FAU)
5.1.1.1 Audit Data Generation (PP_MD_V3.1:FAU_GEN.1 & PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FAU_GEN.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FAU_GEN.1.1
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
1. Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions
2. All auditable events for the not selected level of audit
3. All administrative actions
4. Start-up and shutdown of the Rich OS
5. Insertion or removal of removable media
6. Specifically defined auditable events in Table 1 of the PP_MD_V3.1
7. [No other auditable events] (TD0579 applied)
8. [Specifically defined auditable events in Table 5 Audit Events from Table 2 of the
PP_MD_V3.1]
9. [Specifically defined auditable events in Table 5 Audit Events from Table 2 of
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0]
Requirement Audit Event Content
FAU_GEN.1 Start-up and shutdown of the audit
functions
FAU_GEN.1 All administrative actions
FAU_GEN.1 Start-up and shutdown of the Rich OS
FAU_GEN.1 None.
FAU_GEN.1/WLAN None
FAU_SAR.1 None.
FAU_STG.1 None.
FAU_STG.4 None.
FCS_CKM.1 [None]
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FCS_CKM.1/WLAN None.
FCS_CKM.2 None.
FCS_CKM.2/WLAN None.
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 [None]
FCS_CKM_EXT.2 None.
FCS_CKM_EXT.3 None.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 None.
FCS_CKM_EXT.5 [None]
FCS_CKM_EXT.6 None.
FCS_COP.1 None.
FCS_IV_EXT.1 None.
FCS_SRV_EXT.1 None.
FCS_SRV_EXT.2 None.
FCS_STG_EXT.1 Import or destruction of key. Identity of key. Role and
identity of requestor.
FCS_STG_EXT.1 [No other events]
FCS_STG_EXT.2 None.
FCS_STG_EXT.3 Failure to verify integrity of stored key. Identity of key being verified.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN Failure to establish an EAP-TLS
session.
Reason for failure.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN Establishment/termination of an EAP-
TLS session.
Non-TOE endpoint of
connection.
FDP_ACF_EXT.1 None.
FDP_ACF_EXT.2 None.
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 [None]
FDP_DAR_EXT.2 Failure to encrypt/decrypt data.
FDP_IFC_EXT.1 None.
FDP_PBA_EXT.1 None.
FDP_STG_EXT.1 Addition or removal of certificate from
Trust Anchor Database.
Subject name of certificate.
FIA_BLT_EXT.4 None.
FIA_BLT_EXT.6 None.
FIA_BMG_EXT.1 None.
FIA_PAE_EXT.1 None.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 None.
FIA_TRT_EXT.1 None.
FIA_UAU.5 None.
FIA_UAU.7 None.
FIA_UAU_EXT.1 None.
FIA_X509_EXT.1 Failure to validate X.509v3 certificate. Reason for failure of
validation.
FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN None.
FIA_X509_EXT.3 None.
FMT_MOF_EXT.1 None.
FMT_SMF_EXT.1/WLAN None.
FMT_SMF_EXT.2 [none] [none]
FMT_SMF_EXT.3 None.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 None.
FPT_AEX_EXT.2 None.
FPT_AEX_EXT.3 None.
FPT_AEX_EXT.4 None.
FPT_AEX_EXT.5 None.
FPT_BBD_EXT.1 None.
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FPT_JTA_EXT.1 None.
FPT_KST_EXT.1 None.
FPT_KST_EXT.2 None.
FPT_KST_EXT.3 None.
FPT_NOT_EXT.1 [None] [No additional information]
FPT_STM.1 None.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Initiation of self-test.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Failure of self-test.
FPT_TST_EXT.1/WLAN Execution of this set of TSF self-tests:
[none]
(Done as part of
FPT_TST_EXT.1)
FPT_TST_EXT.2(1) Start-up of TOE. No additional information
FPT_TST_EXT.2(1) [none] No additional information
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 None.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 None.
FTA_TAB.1 None.
FTA_WSE_EXT.1 All attempts to connect to access
points.
Identity of access point being
connected to as well as
success and failures (including
reason for failure).
FTP_ITC_EXT.1/WLAN All attempts to establish a trusted
channel. (TD0194 applied)
Identification of the non-TOE
endpoint of the channel.
Table 5 Audit Events
PP_MD_V3.1:FAU_GEN.1.2
The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
1. Date and time of the event
2. type of event
3. subject identity
4. the outcome (success or failure) of the event
5. additional information in Table 5 Audit Events from Table 1 (of the PP_MD_V3.1)
6. [no additional information]
5.1.1.2 Audit Review (PP_MD_V3.1:FAU_SAR.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FAU_SAR.1.1
The TSF shall provide the administrator with the capability to read all audited events and record
contents from the audit records.
PP_MD_V3.1:FAU_SAR.1.2
The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the
information.
5.1.1.3 Audit Storage Protection (PP_MD_V3.1:FAU_STG.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FAU_STG.1.1
The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized deletion.
PP_MD_V3.1:FAU_STG.1.2
The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorized modifications to the stored audit records in the
audit trail.
5.1.1.4 Prevention of Audit Data Loss (PP_MD_V3.1:FAU_STG.4)
PP_MD_V3.1:FAU_STG.4.1
The TSF shall overwrite the oldest stored audit records if the audit trail is full.
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5.1.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)
5.1.2.1 Cryptographic key generation (PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM.1.1
The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [
RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet FIPS PUB 186-4,
'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Appendix B.3,
ECC schemes using ['NIST curves' P-384 and [P-256, P-521] that meet the following: FIPS
PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Appendix B.4,]. (TD0502 applied)
5.1.2.2 Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Keys for WPA2 Connections)
(PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FCS_CKM.1/WLAN)
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FCS_CKM.1.1/WLAN
Refinement: The TSF shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm PRF-384 and [PRF-704] and specified cryptographic key
sizes 128 bits and [256 bits] using a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 that
meet the following: IEEE 802.11-2012 and [IEEE 802.11ac-2014].
5.1.2.3 Cryptographic key establishment (PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM.2(1))
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM.2.1(1)
The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key establishment method:
RSA-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST Special Publication 800-
56B, 'Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer
Factorization Cryptography'
and
[Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST Special
Publication 800-56A, 'Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes
Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography',]. (TD0502 applied)
5.1.2.4 Cryptographic key establishment (While device is locked) (PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM.2(2))
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM.2.1(2)
The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key establishment method:
[RSA-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST Special Publication 800-
56B, 'Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer
Factorization Cryptography']
for the purposes of encrypting sensitive data received while the device is locked.
5.1.2.5 Cryptographic Key Distribution (GTK) (PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FCS_CKM.2/WLAN)
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FCS_CKM.2.1/WLAN
Refinement: The TSF shall decrypt Group Temporal Key in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key distribution method AES Key Wrap in an EAPOL-Key frame that meets the
following: RFC 3394 for AES Key Wrap, 802.11-2012 for the packet format and timing
considerations and does not expose the cryptographic keys.
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5.1.2.6 Extended: Cryptographic Key Support (PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall support [immutable hardware] REK(s) with a [symmetric] key of strength [256
bits].
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.1.2
Each REK shall be hardware-isolated from Rich OS on the TSF in runtime.
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.1.3
Each REK shall be generated by a RBG in accordance with FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
5.1.2.7 Extended: Cryptographic Key Random Generation (PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.2)
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.2.1
All DEKs shall be [randomly generated] with entropy corresponding to the security strength of
AES key sizes of [256] bits. (TD0351 applied)
5.1.2.8 Extended: Cryptographic Key Generation (PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.3)
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall use [
asymmetric KEKs of [128 bits] security strength,
symmetric KEKs of [256-bit] security strength corresponding to at least the security strength of
the keys encrypted by the KEK].
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.3.2
The TSF shall generate all KEKs using one of the following methods:
Derive the KEK from a Password Authentication Factor using according to FCS_COP.1.1(5) and
[Generate the KEK using an RBG that meets this profile (as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1),
Generate the KEK using a key generation scheme that meets this profile (as specified in
FCS_CKM.1),
Combine the KEK from other KEKs in a way that preserves the effective entropy of each factor
by [concatenating the keys and using a KDF (as described in SP 800-108), encrypting one key
with another]]. (TD0366 applied)
5.1.2.9 Extended: Key Destruction (PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.4)
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with the specified cryptographic key
destruction methods:
- by clearing the KEK encrypting the target key
- in accordance with the following rules
-- For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a single direct overwrite [consisting
of zeroes].
-- For non-volatile EEPROM, the destruction shall be executed by a single direct overwrite
consisting of a pseudo random pattern using the TSF's RBG (as specified in
FCS_RBG_EXT.1), followed by a read-verify.
-- For non-volatile flash memory, that is not wear-leveled, the destruction shall be executed [by a
block erase that erases the reference to memory that stores data as well as the data
itself].
-- For non-volatile flash memory, that is wear-leveled, the destruction shall be executed [by a
block erase].
-- For non-volatile memory other than EEPROM and flash, the destruction shall be executed by a
single direct overwrite with a random pattern that is changed before each write.
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.4.2
The TSF shall destroy all plaintext keying material and critical security parameters when no longer
needed.
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5.1.2.10 Extended: TSF Wipe (PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.5)
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.5.1
The TSF shall wipe all protected data by [
Cryptographically erasing the encrypted DEKs and/or the KEKs in nonvolatile memory by
following the requirements in FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1,
Overwriting all Protected Data according to the following rules:
-- For EEPROM, the destruction shall be executed by a single direct overwrite consisting of a
pseudo random pattern using the TSF's RBG (as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1,
followed by a read-verify.
-- For flash memory, that is not wear-leveled, the destruction shall be executed [by a block erase
that erases the reference to memory that stores data as well as the data itself].
-- For flash memory, that is wear-leveled, the destruction shall be executed [by a block erase].
-- For non-volatile memory other than EEPROM and flash, the destruction shall be executed by
a single direct overwrite with a random pattern that is changed before each write.].
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.5.2
The TSF shall perform a power cycle on conclusion of the wipe procedure.
5.1.2.11 Extended: Salt Generation (PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.6)
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.6.1
The TSF shall generate all salts using a RBG that meets FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
5.1.2.12 Cryptographic operation (PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_COP.1(1))
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_COP.1.1(1)
The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm:
AES-CBC (as defined in FIPS PUB 197, and NIST SP 800-38A) mode
AES-CCMP (as defined in FIPS PUB 197, NIST SP 800-38C and IEEE 802.11-2012), and
[AES Key Wrap (KW) (as defined in NIST SP 800-38F),
AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D),
AES-XTS (as defined in NIST SP 800-38E) mode,
AES-GCMP-256 (as defined in NIST SP800-38D and IEEE 802.11ac-2013)]
and cryptographic key sizes 128-bit key sizes and [256-bit key sizes].
5.1.2.13 Cryptographic operation (PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_COP.1(2))
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_COP.1.1(2)
The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm SHA-1 and [SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] and message digest sizes 160 and [256,
384, 512 bits] that meet the following: FIPS Pub 180-4.
5.1.2.14 Cryptographic operation (PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_COP.1(3))
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_COP.1.1(3)
The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes
of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following:
FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Section 4 and
[ECDSA schemes using 'NIST curves' P-384 and [P- 256, P-521] that meet the following: FIPS
PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Section 5].
5.1.2.15 Cryptographic operation (PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_COP.1(4))
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_COP.1.1(4)
The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified
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cryptographic algorithm HMAC-SHA-1 and [HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-
512] and cryptographic key sizes [160, 256, 384, 512] and message digest sizes 160 and [256, 384,
512] bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub 198-1, 'The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code', and FIPS Pub 180-4, 'Secure Hash Standard'.
5.1.2.16 Cryptographic operation (PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_COP.1(5))
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_COP.1.1(5)
The TSF shall perform conditioning in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
HMAC- [SHA-256] using a salt, and [[key stretching with scrypt]] and output cryptographic key
sizes [256] that meet the following: NIST [no standard] (TD0366 applied)
5.1.2.17 Extended: HTTPS Protocol (PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall implement HTTPS using TLS (FCS_TLSC_EXT.1).
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall notify the application and [not establish the connection] if the peer certificate is
deemed invalid.
5.1.2.18 Extended: Initialization Vector Generation (PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_IV_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_IV_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall generate IVs in accordance with Table 11: References and IV Requirements for
NIST-approved Cipher Modes.
5.1.2.19 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation) (PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_RBG_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with NIST
Special Publication 800-90A using [Hash_DRBG (any), HMAC_DRBG (any), CTR_DRBG
(AES)].
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2
The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates entropy from [TSF-
hardware-based noise source] with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the
greatest security strength (according to NIST SP 800-57) of the keys and hashes that it will
generate.
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall be capable of providing output of the RBG to applications running on the TSF that
request random bits.
5.1.2.20 Extended: Cryptographic Algorithm Services (PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_SRV_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_SRV_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism for applications to request the TSF to perform the following
cryptographic operations:
All mandatory and [selected algorithms] in FCS_CKM.2(2)
The following algorithms in FCS_COP.1(1): AES-CBC, [AES-GCM]
All mandatory and selected algorithms in FCS_COP.1(3)
All mandatory and selected algorithms in FCS_COP.1(2)
All mandatory and selected algorithms in FCS_COP.1(4)
[All mandatory and [selected algorithms] in FCS_CKM.1].
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5.1.2.21 Extended: Cryptographic Algorithm Services (PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_SRV_EXT.2)
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_SRV_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism for applications to request the TSF to perform the following
cryptographic operations:
Algorithms in FCS_COP.1(1)
Algorithms in FCS_COP.1(3)
by keys stored in the secure key storage.
5.1.2.22 Extended: Cryptographic Key Storage (PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_STG_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_STG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide [mutable hardware2
, software-based] secure key storage for asymmetric
private keys and [symmetric keys, persistent secrets].
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_STG_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall be capable of importing keys/secrets into the secure key storage upon request of
[the user, the administrator] and [applications running on the TSF].
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_STG_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall be capable of destroying keys/secrets in the secure key storage upon request of [the
user, the administrator].
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_STG_EXT.1.4
The TSF shall have the capability to allow only the application that imported the key/secret the
use of the key/secret. Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized by [a common application
developer].
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_STG_EXT.1.5
The TSF shall allow only the application that imported the key/secret to request that the key/secret
be destroyed. Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized by [a common application developer].
5.1.2.23 Extended: Encrypted Cryptographic Key Storage (PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_STG_EXT.2)
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_STG_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall encrypt all DEKs, KEKs, [WPA2 Wi-Fi- PSK, Bluetooth Keys] and [all software-
based key storage] by KEKs that are
[Protected by the REK with [
encryption by a KEK chaining from a REK,
encryption by a KEK that is derived from a REK],
Protected by the REK and the password with [
encryption by a KEK chaining to a REK and the password-derived or biometric-
unlocked KEK,
encryption by a KEK that is derived from a REK and the password derived or
biometric-unlocked KEK]].
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_STG_EXT.2.2
DEKs, KEKs, [WPA2 Wi-Fi- PSK, Bluetooth Keys] and [all software-based key storage] shall
be encrypted using one of the following methods:
[using a SP800-56B key establishment scheme,
using AES in the [GCM, CCM mode]].
5.1.2.24 Extended: Integrity of encrypted key storage (PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_STG_EXT.3)
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_STG_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall protect the integrity of any encrypted DEKs and KEKs and [long-term trusted
channel key material, all software-based key storage] by [[GCM, CCM] cipher mode for
encryption according to FCS_STG_EXT.2].
2
Does not apply to the Pixel 6 Pro and 6
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PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_STG_EXT.3.2
The TSF shall verify the integrity of the [MAC] of the stored key prior to use of the key.
5.1.2.25 Extended: TLS Protocol (PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and [no earlier TLS versions] as a client that
supports the cipher suites
[TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289] and also
supports functionality for [mutual authentication]. 3
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference identifier according to
RFC 6125.
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the peer certificate is invalid.
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.4
The TSF shall support mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates.
5.1.2.26 Extensible Authentication Protocol-Transport Layer Security
(PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN)
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1/WLAN
The TSF shall implement [TLS 1.0 (RFC 2246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346), TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)] in
support of the EAP-TLS protocol as specified in RFC 5216 supporting the following ciphersuites:
[TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5288,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289]. (TD0492
applied)
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2/WLAN
The TSF shall generate random values used in the EAP-TLS exchange using the RBG specified in
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3/WLAN
The TSF shall use X509 v3 certificates as specified in FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN. (TD0517
applied)
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.4/WLAN
The TSF shall verify that the server certificate presented includes the Server Authentication
purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.5/WLAN
The TSF shall allow an authorized administrator to configure the list of CAs that are allowed to
sign authentication server certificates that are accepted by the TOE.
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.6/WLAN
Removed by TD0492.
3
SFR changed per TRRT 1081 from NIAP
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5.1.2.27 Extended: TLS Protocol (PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_TLSC_EXT.2)
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall present the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension in the Client Hello handshake
message with the following NIST curves: [secp256r1, secp384r1]. (TD0244 applied, supersedes
TD0236)
5.1.2.28 TLS Client Protocol (PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FCS_TLSC_EXT.2/WLAN)
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1/WLAN
The TSF shall present the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension in the Client Hello with the
following NIST curves: [secp256r1, secp384r1]. (TD0244 applied)
5.1.3 User data protection (FDP)
5.1.3.1 Extended: Security access control (PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_ACF_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_ACF_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to restrict the system services that are accessible to an
application.
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_ACF_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall provide an access control policy that prevents [application, groups of applications]
from accessing [all] data stored by other [application, groups of applications]. Exceptions may
only be explicitly authorized for such sharing by [a common application developer (for sharing
between applications), no one (for sharing between personal and enterprise profiles)].
5.1.3.2 Extended: Security access control (PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_ACF_EXT.2)
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_ACF_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall provide a separate [address book, calendar, [keychain]] for each application group
and only allow applications within that process group to access the resource. Exceptions may only
be explicitly authorized for such sharing by [the administrator (for address book), no one (for
calendar, keychain)].
5.1.3.3 Extended: Protected Data Encryption (PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_DAR_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1
Encryption shall cover all protected data.
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_DAR_EXT.1.2
Encryption shall be performed using DEKs with AES in the [XTS] mode with key size [256] bits.
5.1.3.4 Extended: Sensitive Data Encryption (PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_DAR_EXT.2)
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_DAR_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism for applications to mark data and keys as sensitive.
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_DAR_EXT.2.2
The TSF shall use an asymmetric key scheme to encrypt and store sensitive data received while
the product is locked.
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_DAR_EXT.2.3
The TSF shall encrypt any stored symmetric key and any stored private key of the asymmetric
key(s) used for the protection of sensitive data according to FCS_STG_EXT.2.1 selection 2.
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_DAR_EXT.2.4
The TSF shall decrypt the sensitive data that was received while in the locked state upon
transitioning to the unlocked state using the asymmetric key scheme and shall re-encrypt that
sensitive data using the symmetric key scheme.
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5.1.3.5 Extended: Subset information flow control (PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_IFC_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_IFC_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall [provide an interface which allows a VPN client to protect all IP traffic using
IPsec] with the exception of IP traffic needed to manage the VPN connection, and [traffic needed
to determine if the network connection has connectivity to the internet], when the VPN is
enabled. (TD0596 applied)
5.1.3.6 Extended: Storage of Critical Biometric Parameters (PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_PBA_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_PBA_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall protect the authentication template [using a password as an additional factor].
5.1.3.7 Extended: User Data Storage (PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_STG_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_STG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide protected storage for the Trust Anchor Database.
5.1.3.8 Extended: Inter-TSF user data transfer protection (PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_UPC_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_UPC_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide a means for non-TSF applications executing on the TOE to use TLS,
HTTPS, Bluetooth BR/EDR, and [Bluetooth LE] to provide a protected communication channel
between the non-TSF application and another IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels, provides assured identification of its end points, protects channel data
from disclosure, and detects modification of the channel data.
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_UPC_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall permit the non-TSF applications to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
5.1.4 Identification and authentication (FIA)
5.1.4.1 Extended: Authentication failure handling (PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_AFL_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_AFL_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall consider password and [no other] as critical authentication mechanisms.
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_AFL_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall detect when a configurable positive integer within [0 and 50] of [non-unique]
unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to last successful authentication for each
authentication mechanism.
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_AFL_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall maintain the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts that have occurred
upon power off.
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_AFL_EXT.1.4
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has exceeded the maximum
allowed for a given authentication mechanism, all future authentication attempts will be limited to
other available authentication mechanisms, unless the given mechanism is designated as a critical
authentication mechanism.
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_AFL_EXT.1.5
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts for the last available
authentication mechanism or single critical authentication mechanism has been surpassed, the TSF
shall perform a wipe of all protected data.
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_AFL_EXT.1.6
The TSF shall increment the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts prior to notifying the
user that the authentication was unsuccessful.
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5.1.4.2 Extended: Bluetooth User Authorization (PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall require explicit user authorization before pairing with a remote Bluetooth device.
5.1.4.3 Extended: Bluetooth Mutual Authentication (PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.2)
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall require Bluetooth mutual authentication between devices prior to any data transfer
over the Bluetooth link.
5.1.4.4 Extended: Rejection of Duplicate Bluetooth Connections (PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.3)
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall discard pairing and session initialization attempts from a Bluetooth device address
(BD_ADDR) to which an active session already exists. (TD0468 applied)
5.1.4.5 Extended: Secure Simple Pairing (PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.4)
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.4.1
The TOE shall support Bluetooth Secure Simple Pairing, both in the host and the controller.
Furthermore, Secure Simple Pairing shall be used during the pairing process if the remote device
also supports it.
5.1.4.6 Extended: Bluetooth User Authorization (PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.6)
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.6.1
The TSF shall require explicit user authorization before granting trusted remote devices access to
services associated with the following Bluetooth profiles: [OPP, MAP], and shall require explicit
user authorization before granting untrusted remote devices access to services associated with the
following Bluetooth profiles: [OPP, MAP].
5.1.4.7 Extended: Accuracy of Biometric Authentication (PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BMG_EXT.1/Fingerprint)
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BMG_EXT.1.1/Fingerprint
The one-attempt BAF False Accept Rate (FAR) for [fingerprint (available on the Pixel 6/6 Pro,
5a-5G, 5, 4a-5G, 4a, 3a/3a XL, 3/3 XL)] shall not exceed [1:50,000 (Pixel 6/6 Pro), 1:100,000
(all other fingerprint devices)] with a one-attempt BAF False Reject Rate (FRR) not to exceed 1
in [1:20]. (TD0301 applied)
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BMG_EXT.1.2/Fingerprint
The overall System Authentication False Accept Rate (SAFAR) shall be no greater than 1 in
[1:2,500 (Pixel 6/6 Pro), 1:5,000 (all other fingerprint devices)] within a 1% margin.
5.1.4.8 Extended: Accuracy of Biometric Authentication (PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BMG_EXT.1/Face)
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BMG_EXT.1.1/Face
The one-attempt BAF False Accept Rate (FAR) for [face (available on the 4/4 XL)] shall not
exceed [1:50,000] with a one-attempt BAF False Reject Rate (FRR) not to exceed 1 in [1:20].
(TD0301 applied)
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BMG_EXT.1.2/Face
The overall System Authentication False Accept Rate (SAFAR) shall be no greater than 1 in
[1:10,000] within a 1% margin.
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5.1.4.9 Port Access Entity Authentication (PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FIA_PAE_EXT.1)
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FIA_PAE_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall conform to IEEE Standard 802.1X for a Port Access Entity (PAE) in the
'Supplicant' role.
5.1.4.10 Extended: Password Management (PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_PMG_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall support the following for the Password Authentication Factor:
1. Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of [upper and lower case letters],
numbers, and special characters: [! @ # $ % ^ & * ( ) [= + - _ ` ~ \ | ] } [ { ‘ “ ; : / ? . > , < ]]
2. Password length up to [16] characters shall be supported.
5.1.4.11 Extended: Authentication Throttling (PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_TRT_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_TRT_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall limit automated user authentication attempts by [enforcing a delay between
incorrect authentication attempts] for all authentication mechanisms selected in FIA_UAU.5.1.
The minimum delay shall be such that no more than 10 attempts can be attempted per 500
milliseconds.
5.1.4.12 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms (PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU.5)
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU.5.1
The TSF shall provide password and [fingerprint (available on the Pixel 3/3 XL, 3a/3a XL, 4a,
4a-5G, 5, 5a-5G, 6, and 6 Pro), face (only available on the Pixel 4 and 4 XL)] to support user
authentication.
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU.5.2
The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the [following rules:
To authenticate unlocking the device immediately after boot (first unlock after reboot):
- User passwords are required after reboot to unlock the user's Credential encrypted (CE
files) and keystore keys. Biometric authentication is disabled immediately after boot.
To authenticate unlocking the device after device lock (not following a reboot):
- The TOE verifies user credentials (password, fingerprint, or face) via the gatekeeper or
fingerprint trusted application (running inside the Trusted Execution Environment,
TEE), which compares the entered credential to a derived value or template.
To change protected settings or issue certain commands:
- The TOE requires password after a reboot, when changing settings (Screen lock,
Fingerprint, Face unlock, and Smart Lock settings), and when factory resetting.”
].
5.1.4.13 Re-Authentication (PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU.6(1))
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU.6.1(1)
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user via the Password Authentication Factor under the
conditions attempted change to any supported authentication mechanisms.
5.1.4.14 Re-Authentication (PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU.6(2))
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU.6.1(2)
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user via an authentication factor defined in FIA_UAU.5.1 under
the conditions TSF-initiated lock, user-initiated lock, [no other conditions].
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5.1.4.15 Protected authentication feedback (PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU.7)
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU.7.1
The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the device's display to the user while the
authentication is in progress.
5.1.4.16 Extended: Authentication for Cryptographic Operation (PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall require the user to present the Password Authentication Factor prior to decryption
of protected data and encrypted DEKs, KEKs and [all software-based key storage] at startup.
5.1.4.17 Extended: Timing of Authentication (PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU_EXT.2)
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall allow [[
- Take screen shots (stored internally)
- Enter password to unlock
- Make/receive emergency calls
- Take pictures (stored internally) - unless the camera was disabled
- Turn the TOE off
- Restart the TOE
- Enable Airplane mode
- See notifications (note that some notifications identify actions, for example to view a
screenshot; however, selecting those notifications highlights the password prompt and
require the password to access that data)
- Configure sound, vibrate, or mute
- Set the volume (up and down) for ringtone
- Access notification widgets (without authentication):
o Flashlight toggle
o Do not disturb toggle
o Auto rotate toggle
o Sound (on, mute, vibrate)
o Night light filter toggle
]] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU_EXT.2.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
5.1.4.18 Extended: Validation of certificates (PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_X509_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_X509_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:
- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation
- The certificate path must terminate with a certificate in the Trust Anchor Database
- The TSF shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints
extension, that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates, and that any path
constraints are met.
- The TSF shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning purpose in the key usage field
- The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [OCSP as specified in RFC
6960]
- The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
-- Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall
have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the
extendedKeyUsage field
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-- Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-
kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field
-- Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority (RA)
purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the extendedKeyUsage
field [conditional]
-- Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-
kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the EKU field.
-- OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose
(id-dp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the EKU field. [conditional]
(TD0523 applied)
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_X509_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is
present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
5.1.4.19 X.509 Certificate Validation (PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN)
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/WLAN
The TSF shall validate certificates for EAP-TLS in accordance with the following rules:
RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation
The certificate path must terminate with a certificate in the Trust Anchor Database
The TSF shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints
extension and that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates
The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with
OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field
Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with
OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
(TD0439 applied)
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FIA_X509_EXT.1.2/WLAN
The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is
present and the CA flag is set to TRUE. (TD0439 applied)
5.1.4.20 Extended: X509 certificate authentication (PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_X509_EXT.2)
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_X509_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for
[TLS, HTTPS], and [no additional uses].
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_X509_EXT.2.2
When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the revocation status of a certificate, the
TSF shall [not accept the certificate].
5.1.4.21 X.509 Certificate Authentication (EAP-TLS) (PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN)
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FIA_X509_EXT.2.1/WLAN
The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for
EAP-TLS exchanges.
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FIA_X509_EXT.2.2/WLAN
(removed as per TD0517)
5.1.4.22 Extended: Request Validation of certificates (PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_X509_EXT.3)
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_X509_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall provide a certificate validation service to applications.
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_X509_EXT.3.2
The TSF shall respond to the requesting application with the success or failure of the validation.
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5.1.5 Security management (FMT)
5.1.5.1 Extended: Management of security functions behavior (PP_MD_V3.1:FMT_MOF_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FMT_MOF_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the functions in column 3 of Table 6 Security
Management Functions to the user.
PP_MD_V3.1:FMT_MOF_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the functions in column 5 of Table 6 Security
Management Functions to the administrator when the device is enrolled and according to the
administrator-configured policy.
5.1.5.2 Extended: Specification of Management Functions (PP_MD_V3.1:FMT_SMF_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the functions in column 2 of Table 6 Security
Management Functions:
Table 6 Security Management Functions
Management Function
FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.1
Administrator
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.2
1. configure password policy:
a. minimum password length
b. minimum password complexity
c. maximum password lifetime
The administrator can configure the required password characteristics (minimum length,
complexity, and lifetime) using the Android MDM APIs.
Length: an integer value of characters
Complexity: Unspecified, Something, Numeric, Alphabetic, Alphanumeric, Complex.
Lifetime: an integer value of seconds (0 = no maximum).
M M M
2. configure session locking policy:
a. screen-lock enabled/disabled
b. screen lock timeout
c. number of authentication failures
The administrator can configure the session locking policy using the Android MDM APIs.
Screen lock timeout: an integer number of minutes before the TOE locks (0 = no lock timeout)
Authentication failures: an integer number (-2,147,483,648 to 2,147,483,648 [negative
integers and zero means no limit]).
M M M
3. enable/disable the VPN protection:
a. across device
M I I
Status Markers:
M – Mandatory
I – Implemented optional
function
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[ c. no other method]
Both users (using the TOE’s settings UI) and administrator (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can
configure a third-party VPN client and then enable the VPN client to protect traffic. The User
can set up VPN protection, but if an admin enables VPN protection, the user cannot disable it.
4. enable/disable [Bluetooth,
NFC, Wi-Fi, cellular]
The administrator can disable the radios using the TOE’s MDM APIs. Once Bluetooth is
disabled, a user cannot enable it; all other radios can be re-enabled by the user. The TOE’s
radios operate at frequencies of 2.4 GHz (NFC/Bluetooth), 2.4/5 GHz (Wi-Fi), and 850, 900,
1800, 1900 MHz (4G/LTE).
M
M I
I I
5. enable/disable [microphone, camera]:
a. across device (microphone,camera),
[ b. on a per-app basis (microphone, camera)]
An administrator can enable/disable the device’s microphone via an MDM API. Once the
microphone has been disabled, the user cannot re-enable it until the administrator enables it.
In the user’s settings, a user can view a permission by type (i.e. camera, microphone). The user
can access this by going to “Settings” -> “App Permissions” -> Selecting the permission and
revoking any applications.
M
M
I I
6. transition to the locked state
Both users (using the TOE’s settings UI) and administrators (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can
transition the TOE into a locked state.
M M
7. full wipe of protected data
Both users (using the TOE’s settings UI) and administrators (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can
force the TOE to perform a full wipe (factory reset) of data.
M M
8. configure application installation policy by:
a. restricting the sources of applications,
c. c. denying installation of applications]
The administrator using the TOE’s MDM APIs can configure the TOE so that applications
cannot be installed and can also block the use of the Google Market Place.
M M M
9. import keys/secrets into the secure key storage
Both users (using the TOE’s settings UI) and administrators (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can
import secret keys into the secure key storage.
M I
10. destroy imported keys/secrets and [no other keys/secrets] in the secure key storage
Both users and administrators (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can destroy secret keys in the
secure key storage.
M I
11. import X.509v3 certificates into the Trust Anchor Database
Both users (using the TOE’s settings UI) and administrators (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can
import X.509v3 certificates into the Trust Anchor Database.
M M
12. remove imported X.509v3 certificates and [no other certificates] in the Trust Anchor
Database
Both users (using the TOE’s settings UI) and administrators (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can
M I
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remove imported X.509v3 certificates from the Trust Anchor Database as well as disable any
of the TOE’s default Root CA certificates (in the latter case, the CA certificate still resides in the
TOE’s read-only system partition; however, the TOE will treat that Root CA certificate and any
certificate chaining to it as untrusted).
13. enroll the TOE in management
TOE users can enroll the TOE in management according to the instructions specific to a given
MDM. Presumably any enrollment would involve at least some user functions (e.g., install an
MDM agent application) on the TOE prior to enrollment.
M M
14. remove applications
Both users (using the TOE’s settings UI) and administrators (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can
uninstall user and administrator installed applications on the TOE.
M M
15. update system software
Users can check for updates and cause the device to update if an update is available. An
administrator can use MDM APIs to query the version of the TOE and query the installed
applications and an MDM agent on the TOE could issue pop-ups, initiate updates, block
communication, etc. until any necessary updates are completed.
M M
16. install applications
Both users and administrators (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can install applications on the TOE.
M M
17. remove Enterprise applications
An administrator (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can uninstall Enterprise installed applications on
the TOE.
M M
18. configure the Bluetooth trusted channel:
a. disable/enable the Discoverable mode (for BR/EDR)
b. change the Bluetooth device name
[k. no other Bluetooth configuration]
TOE users can enable Bluetooth discoverable mode for a short period of time and can also
change the device name which is used for the Bluetooth name. Additional wireless
technologies include Android Beam which utilizes NFC and Bluetooth, and can be enabled and
disabled by the TOE user.
M
19. enable/disable display notification in the locked state of: [
f. all notifications]
Notifications can be configured to display in the following formats:
Users & administrators: show all notification content
Users: hide sensitive content
Users & administrators: hide notifications entirely
If the administrator sets any of the above settings, the user cannot change it.
M I I
20. enable data-at rest protection
The TOE always encrypts its user data storage.
M
21. enable removable media’s data-at-rest protection
The device does not support removable media.
22. enable/disable location services: M I I
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a. across device
[d. no other method]
The administrator (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can enable or disable location services.
An additional MDM API can prohibit TOE users ability to enable and disable location services.
23. Enable/disable the use of [Biometric Authentication Factor] I I I
24. enable/disable all data signaling over [assignment: list of externally accessible hardware
ports]
25. enable/disable [Wi-Fi hotspot, USB tethering, and Bluetooth tethering]
The administrator (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can enable/disable all tethering methods (i.e.
all or none disabled).
The TOE acts as a server (acting as an access point, a USB Ethernet adapter, and as a Bluetooth
Ethernet adapter respectively) in order to share its network connection with another device.
I I I
26. enable/disable developer modes
The administrator (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can disable Developer Mode.
Unless disabled by the administrator, TOE users can enable and disable Developer Mode.
I I I
27. enable/disable bypass of local user authentication
N/A – It is not possible to bypass local user auth for this TOE
28. wipe Enterprise data
An administrator can remove Enterprise applications and their data.
I I
29. approve [import, removal] by applications of X.509v3 certificates in the Trust Anchor
Database
30. configure whether to establish a trusted channel or disallow establishment if the TSF
cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate
31. enable/disable the cellular protocols used to connect to cellular network base stations
32. read audit logs kept by the TSF I I
33. configure [selection: certificate, public-key] used to validate digital signature on
applications
34. approve exceptions for shared use of keys/secrets by multiple applications
35. approve exceptions for destruction of keys/secrets by applications that did not import the
key/secret
36. configure the unlock banner I I
37. configure the auditable items
38. retrieve TSF-software integrity verification values
39. enable/disable [
a. USB mass storage mode,]
I I
40. enable/disable backup to [all applications] to [remote system] I I I
41. enable/disable [
a. Hotspot functionality authenticated by [pre-shared key],
b. USB tethering authenticated by [no authentication]]
The administrator (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can disable the Wi-Fi hotspot and USB
tethering.
I I I
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Unless disabled by the administrator, TOE users can configure the Wi-Fi hotspot with a pre-
shared key and can configure USB tethering (with no authentication).
42. approve exceptions for sharing data between [groups of application] I I I
43. place applications into application process groups based on [assignment: enterprise
configuration settings]
44. Unenroll the TOE from management I I I
45. Enable/disable the Always On VPN protection I I I
46. Revoke Biometric template
47. [assignment: list of other management functions to be provided by the TSF]
5.1.5.3 Specification of Management Functions (Wireless LAN)
(PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FMT_SMF_EXT.1/WLAN)
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1/WLAN
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
Table 7 WLAN Security Management Functions
Management Function
Function
Implemented
Available
to
User
role
Available
to
Admin
role
Restricted
to
Admin
48. configure security policy for each wireless network:
a. [specify the CA(s) from which the TSF will accept WLAN authentication server
certificate(s)]
b. security type
c. authentication protocol
d. client credentials to be used for authentication
M I
49. specify wireless networks (SSIDs) to which the TSF may connect;
An administrator can specify a list of wireless networks to which the TOE may connect and can
restrict the TOE to only allow a connection to the specified networks.
M M
50. enable/disable certificate revocation list checking;
51. disable ad hoc wireless client-to-client connection capability,
52. disable wireless network bridging capability (for example, bridging a connection between
the WLAN and cellular radios on a smartphone so it can function as a hotspot);
53. disable roaming capability;
54. enable/disable IEEE 802.1X pre-authentication;
55. enable/disable and configure PMK caching:
a. set the amount of time (in minutes) PMK entries are cached;
b. set the maximum number of PMK entries that can be cached.
(TD0470 applied)
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5.1.5.4 Extended: Specification of Remediation Actions (PP_MD_V3.1:FMT_SMF_EXT.2)
PP_MD_V3.1:FMT_SMF_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall offer [wipe of protected data, wipe of sensitive data, remove Enterprise
applications, remove all device stored Enterprise resource data]
upon un-enrollment and [factory reset]. (TD0346 applied)
5.1.5.5 Extended: Current Administrator (PP_MD_V3.1:FMT_SMF_EXT.3)
PP_MD_V3.1:FMT_SMF_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism that allows users to view a list of currently authorized
administrators and the management functions that each administrator is authorized to perform.
5.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.1.6.1 Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (ASLR) (PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide address space layout randomization ASLR to applications.
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2
The base address of any user-space memory mapping will consist of at least 8 unpredictable bits.
5.1.6.2 Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Memory Page Permissions) (PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.2)
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall be able to enforce read, write, and execute permissions on every page of physical
memory.
5.1.6.3 Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Overflow Protection) (PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.3)
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.3.1
TSF processes that execute in a non-privileged execution domain on the application processor
shall implement stack-based buffer overflow protection.
5.1.6.4 Extended: Domain Isolation (PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.4)
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.4.1
The TSF shall protect itself from modification by untrusted subjects.
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.4.2
The TSF shall enforce isolation of address space between applications.
5.1.6.5 Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (ASLR) (PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.5)
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.5.1
The TSF shall provide address space layout randomization (ASLR) to the kernel.
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.5.2
The base address of any kernel-space memory mapping will consist of at least 4 unpredictable bits.
5.1.6.6 Extended: Application Processor Mediation (PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_BBD_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_BBD_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall prevent code executing on any baseband processor (BP) from accessing application
processor (AP) resources except when mediated by the AP.
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5.1.6.7 Extended: JTAG Disablement (PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_JTA_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_JTA_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall [control access by a signing key] to JTAG.
5.1.6.8 Extended: Key Storage (PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_KST_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_KST_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall not store any plaintext key material in readable non-volatile memory.
5.1.6.9 Extended: No Key Transmission (PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_KST_EXT.2)
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_KST_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall not transmit any plaintext key material outside the security boundary of the TOE.
5.1.6.10 Extended: No Plaintext Key Export (PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_KST_EXT.3)
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_KST_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall ensure it is not possible for the TOE user(s) to export plaintext keys.
5.1.6.11 Extended: Self-Test Notification (PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_NOT_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_NOT_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall transition to non-operational mode and [no other actions] when the following types
of failures occur:
failures of the self-test(s)
TSF software integrity verification failures
[no other failures]
5.1.6.12 Reliable time stamps (PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_STM.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_STM.1.1
The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
5.1.6.13 Extended: TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing (PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TST_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TST_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (on power on) to demonstrate the
correct operation of all cryptographic functionality.
5.1.6.14 TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing (Wireless LAN)
(PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FPT_TST_EXT.1/WLAN)
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FPT_TST_EXT.1.1/WLAN
The [TOE] shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (on power on) to demonstrate the
correct operation of the TSF.
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FPT_TST_EXT.1.2/WLAN
The [TOE] shall provide the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code when
it is loaded for execution through the use of the TSF-provided cryptographic services.
5.1.6.15 Extended: TSF Integrity Checking (PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TST_EXT.2(1))
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TST_EXT.2.1(1)
The TSF shall verify the integrity of the bootchain up through the Application Processor OS
kernel stored in mutable media prior to its execution through the use of [an immutable hardware
hash of an asymmetric key].
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5.1.6.16 Extended: TSF Integrity Checking (PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TST_EXT.2(2))
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TST_EXT.2.1(2)
The TSF shall verify the integrity of [[executable code stored in the /system and /vendor
partitions]], stored in mutable media prior to its execution through the use of [an immutable
hardware hash of an asymmetric key].
5.1.6.17 Extended: Trusted Update: TSF version query (PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TUD_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to query the current version of the TOE
firmware/software.
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to query the current version of the hardware
model of the device.
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to query the current version of installed mobile
applications.
5.1.6.18 Extended: TSF Update Verification (PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TUD_EXT.2)
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall verify software updates to the Application Processor system software and
[[baseband processor]] using a digital signature verified by the manufacturer trusted key prior to
installing those updates.
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2
The TSF shall [update only by verified software] the TSF boot integrity [key].
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TUD_EXT.2.3
The TSF shall verify that the digital signature verification key used for TSF updates [matches an
immutable hardware public key].
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TUD_EXT.2.4
The TSF shall verify mobile application software using a digital signature mechanism prior to
installation.
5.1.7 TOE access (FTA)
5.1.7.1 Extended: TSF- and User-initiated Locked State (PP_MD_V3.1:FTA_SSL_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall transition to a locked state after a time interval of inactivity.
PP_MD_V3.1:FTA_SSL_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall transition to a locked state after initiation by either the user or the administrator.
PP_MD_V3.1:FTA_SSL_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall, upon transitioning to the locked state, perform the following operations:
a. clearing or overwriting display devices, obscuring the previous contents;
b. [no other actions].
5.1.7.2 Default TOE Access Banners (PP_MD_V3.1:FTA_TAB.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FTA_TAB.1.1
Before establishing a user session, the TSF shall display an advisory warning message regarding
unauthorized use of the TOE.
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5.1.7.3 Wireless Network Access (PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FTA_WSE_EXT.1)
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FTA_WSE_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall be able to attempt connections only to wireless networks specified as acceptable
networks as configured by the administrator in FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1/WLAN.
5.1.8 Trusted path/channels (FTP)
5.1.8.1 Extended: Trusted channel Communication (PP_MD_V3.1:FTP_ITC_EXT.1)
PP_MD_V3.1:FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall use 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS and [TLS, HTTPS] protocol to provide a
communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct
from other communication channels, provides assured identification of its end points, protects
channel data from disclosure, and detects modification of the channel data.
PP_MD_V3.1:FTP_ITC_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall permit the TSF to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
PP_MD_V3.1:FTP_ITC_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for wireless access point
connections, administrative communication, configured enterprise connections, and [no other
connections].
5.1.8.2 Trusted Channel Communication (Wireless LAN)
(PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FTP_ITC_EXT.1/WLAN)
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1/WLAN
The TSF shall use 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS to provide a trusted communication
channel between itself and a wireless access point that is logically distinct from other
communication channels, provides assured identification of its end points, protects channel data
from disclosure, and detects modification of the channel data.
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FTP_ITC_EXT.1.2/WLAN
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for wireless access point
connections.
5.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The SARs for the TOE are the components as specified in Part 3 of the Common Criteria. Note that the SARs have
effectively been refined with the assurance activities explicitly defined in association with both the SFRs and SARs.
Requirement Class Requirement Component
ADV: Development ADV_FSP.1: Basic Functional Specification
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1: Operational User Guidance
AGD_PRE.1: Preparative Procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.1: Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1: TOE CM Coverage
ALC_TSU_EXT.1: Timely Security Updates
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1: Independent Testing - Conformance
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.1: Vulnerability Survey
Table 8 Assurance Components
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5.2.1 Development (ADV)
5.2.1.1 Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1)
ADV_FSP.1.1d
The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.2d
The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.
ADV_FSP.1.1c
The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each SFR-enforcing
and SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.2c
The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each SFR-enforcing and
SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.3c
The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorization of interfaces as
SFR-non-interfering.
ADV_FSP.1.4c
The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ADV_FSP.1.2e
The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete
instantiation of the SFRs.
5.2.2 Guidance documents (AGD)
5.2.2.1 Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
AGD_OPE.1.1d
The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
AGD_OPE.1.1c
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the useraccessible functions and
privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate
warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2c
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces
provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3c
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and
interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure
values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4c
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-
relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including
changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5c
The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the TOE (including
operation following failure or operational error), their consequences, and implications for
maintaining secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6c
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be
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followed in order to fulfill the security objectives for the operational environment as described in
the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7c
The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
AGD_OPE.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.2.2.2 Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
AGD_PRE.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE, including its preparative procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.1c
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the
delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2c
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the TOE
and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security
objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_PRE.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2e
The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can be prepared
securely for operation.
5.2.3 Life-cycle support (ALC)
5.2.3.1 Labelling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
ALC_CMC.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
ALC_CMC.1.1c
The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.
ALC_CMC.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.2.3.2 TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
ALC_CMS.1.1d
The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
ALC_CMS.1.1c
The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; and the evaluation evidence
required by the SARs.
ALC_CMS.1.2c
The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
ALC_CMS.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
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5.2.3.3 Timely Security Updates (ALC_TSU_EXT.1)
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1d
The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how timely security updates are made to
the TOE.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1c
The description shall include the process for creating and deploying security updates for the TOE
software.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.2c
The description shall express the time window as the length of time, in days, between public
disclosure of a vulnerability and the public availability of security updates to the TOE.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.3c
The description shall include the mechanisms publicly available for reporting security issues
pertaining to the TOE.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.4c
The description shall include where users can seek information about the availability of new
updates including details (e.g. CVE identifiers) of the specific public vulnerabilities corrected by
each update.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.2.4 Tests (ATE)
5.2.4.1 Independent Testing - Conformance (ATE_IND.1)
ATE_IND.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
ATE_IND.1.1c
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
ATE_IND.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.1.2e
The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.
5.2.5 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)
5.2.5.1 Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1)
AVA_VAN.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.1.1c
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
AVA_VAN.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence..
AVA_VAN.1.2e
The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities
in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.1.3e
The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to
determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack
potential.
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6. TOE Summary Specification
This chapter describes the security functions:
- Security audit
- Cryptographic support
- User data protection
- Identification and authentication
- Security management
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE access
- Trusted path/channels
6.1 Security audit
PP_MD_V3.1:FAU_GEN.1:
The TOE uses different forms of logs to meet all the required management logging events specified in Table 1 and
Table 2 of the PP_MD_V3.1:
1. Security Logs
2. Logcat Logs
Each of the above logging methods are described below.
• Security Logs: A full list of all auditable events (for PP_MD_V3.1) can be found here:
https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/admin/SecurityLog#constants_1. Values found in this
list represent Security Log keywords used in this logging function along with a description of what the log
means and any additional information/variables present in the audit record. Additionally, the following link
provides the additional information that can be grabbed when an MDM requests a copy of the logs:
https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/admin/SecurityLog.SecurityEvent. Each log contains
a keyword or phrase describing the event, the date and time of the event, and further event-specific values
that provide success, failure, and other information relevant to the event.
• Logcat Logs: Similar to Security Logs, Logcat Logs contain date, time, and further even-specific values
within the logs. In addition, Logcat Logs provide a value that maps to a user ID to identify which user caused
the event that generated the log. Finally, Logcat Logs are descriptive and do not require the administrator to
know the template of the log to understand its values. Logcat Logs cannot be exported but can be viewed
by an administrator via an MDM agent.
Both types of logs, when full, wrap around and overwrite the oldest log (as the start of the buffer).
The following table enumerates the events that the TOE audits. Requirements appended with “/WLAN” are audit
events required by the WLANEP10. Any requirements that are not marked “/WLAN” are from Table 1 in
PP_MD_V3.1.
Requirement Audit Event Content
FAU_GEN.1
Start-up and shutdown of the
audit functions
All administrative actions
Start-up and shutdown of the
Rich OS
None.
FAU_GEN.1/WLAN None
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FAU_STG.1 None.
FAU_STG.4 None.
FCS_CKM.1 [None]
FCS_CKM.1/WLAN None.
FCS_CKM.2 None.
FCS_CKM.2/WLAN None.
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 [None]
FCS_CKM_EXT.2 None.
FCS_CKM_EXT.3 None.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 None.
FCS_CKM_EXT.5 [None]
FCS_CKM_EXT.6 None.
FCS_COP.1 None.
FCS_IV_EXT.1 None.
FCS_SRV_EXT.1 None.
FCS_SRV_EXT.2 None.
FCS_STG_EXT.1
Import or destruction of key.
Identity of key. Role and identity of
requestor.
[No other events]
FCS_STG_EXT.2 None.
FCS_STG_EXT.3
Failure to verify integrity of
stored key.
Identity of key being verified.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN
Failure to establish an EAP-TLS
session.
Reason for failure.
Establishment/termination of an
EAP-TLS session.
Non-TOE endpoint of connection.
FDP_ACF_EXT.1 None.
FDP_ACF_EXT.2 None.
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 [None]
FDP_DAR_EXT.2 Failure to encrypt/decrypt data.
FDP_IFC_EXT.1 None.
FDP_PBA_EXT.1 None.
FDP_STG_EXT.1
Addition or removal of certificate
from Trust Anchor Database.
Subject name of certificate.
FIA_BLT_EXT.4 None.
FIA_BLT_EXT.6 None.
FIA_BMG_EXT.1 None.
FIA_PAE_EXT.1 None.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 None.
FIA_TRT_EXT.1 None.
FIA_UAU.5 None.
FIA_UAU.7 None.
FIA_UAU_EXT.1 None.
FIA_X509_EXT.1
Failure to validate X.509v3
certificate.
Reason for failure of validation.
FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN None.
FIA_X509_EXT.3 None.
FMT_MOF_EXT.1 None.
FMT_SMF_EXT.1/WLAN None.
FMT_SMF_EXT.2 [none] [none]
FMT_SMF_EXT.3 None.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 None.
FPT_AEX_EXT.2 None.
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FPT_AEX_EXT.3 None.
FPT_AEX_EXT.4 None.
FPT_AEX_EXT.5 None.
FPT_BBD_EXT.1 None.
FPT_JTA_EXT.1 None.
FPT_KST_EXT.1 None.
FPT_KST_EXT.2 None.
FPT_KST_EXT.3 None.
FPT_NOT_EXT.1 [None] [No additional information]
FPT_STM.1 None.
FPT_TST_EXT.1
Initiation of self-test.
Failure of self-test.
FPT_TST_EXT.1/WLAN
Execution of this set of TSF self-
tests:
[none]
(Done as part of FPT_TST_EXT.1)
FPT_TST_EXT.2(1)
Start-up of TOE. No additional information
[none] No additional information
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 None.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 None.
FTA_TAB.1 None.
FTA_WSE_EXT.1
All attempts to connect to access
points.
Identity of access point being connected to as
well as success and failures (including reason
for failure).
FTP_ITC_EXT.1/WLAN
All attempts to establish a trusted
channel.
(TD0194 applied)
Identification of the non-TOE endpoint of the
channel.
Table 9 Audit Events
Some audit records, while logged, are unavailable to the administrator due to a number of reasons. Such audits and
their explanations are identified below:
- FAU_GEN.1 – Shutdown of the audit functions: Upon log shutdown, the security log buffer is deallocated
and no longer available to be read, rendering the viewing of such an audit unavailable for the administrator
to view.
- FAU_GEN.1 – Shutdown of the Rich OS: Since security logs are stored in memory, a shutdown of the system
clears the audit record that is generated stating that the system is shutting down.
- FPT_TST_EXT.1 - Failure of self-test: Self-tests take place prior to the initialization of audit records. While
the self-test success/failure audit is queued up to be logged upon security logs being initialized, when a self-
test failure occurs the boot process is halted prior to security logs being initialized.
PP_MD_V3.1:FAU_SAR.1:
The TOE provides an MDM API to allow a Device-Owner MDM agent to read the security logs.
PP_MD_V3.1:FAU_STG.1:
For security logs, the TOE stores all audit records in memory, making it only accessible to the logd daemon, and only
device owner applications can call the MDM API to retrieve a copy of the logs. Additionally, only new logs can be
added. There is no designated method allowing for the deletion or modification of logs already present in memory,
but reading the security logs clears the buffer at the time of the read.
The TOE stores Logcat Logs in memory and only allows access by an administrator via an MDM Agent. The TOE
prevents deletion of these logs by any method other than USB debugging (and enabling USB Debugging takes the
phone out of the evaluated configuration).
PP_MD_V3.1:FAU_STG.4:
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The security logs and logcat logs are stored in memory in a circular log buffer of 10KB/64KB, respectively. Logcat
logs alone have a configurable size, able to be set by an MDM API. There is no limit to the size that the Logcat log
buffer can be configured to and it is limited to the size of the system’s memory. Each log system retains its own
circular buffer. Once either log is full, it begins overwriting the oldest message in its respective buffer and continues
overwriting the oldest message with each new auditable event. These logs persist until they are either overwritten or
the device is restarted.
6.2 Cryptographic support
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM.1:
The TOE provides generation of asymmetric keys including
Algorithm Key/Curve Sizes Usage
RSA, FIPS 186-4 2048/3072/4096 API/Application & Sensitive Data Protection
(DAR.2)
ECDSA, FIPS 186-4 P-256/384/521 API/Application
ECDHE keys (not domain parameters) P-256/384 TLS KeyEx (WPA2 w/ EAP-TLS & HTTPS)
Table 10 Asymmetric Key Generation
The TOE’s cryptographic algorithm implementations have received NIST algorithm certificates (see the tables in
FCS_COP.1 for all of the TOE’S algorithm certificates). The TOE itself does not generate any RSA/ECDSA
authentication key pairs for TOE functionality (the user or administrator must load certificates for use with WPA2
with EAP-TLS authentication); however, the TOE provides key generation APIs to mobile applications to allow them
to generate RSA/ECDSA key pairs. The TOE generates only ECDH key pairs (as BoringSSL does not support
DH/DHE cipher suites) and does not generate domain parameters (curves) for use in TLS Key Exchange.
The TOE will provide a library for application developers to use for Sensitive Data Protection (SDP). This library
(class) generates asymmetric RSA keys for use to encrypt and decrypt data that comes to the device while in a locked
state. Any data received for a specified application (that opts into SDP via this library), is encrypted using the public
key and stored until the device is unlocked. The public key stays in memory no matter the state of the device (locked
or unlocked). However, when the device is locked, the private key is evicted from memory and unavailable for use
until the device is unlocked. Upon unlock, the private key is re-derived and used to decrypt data received and encrypted
while locked.
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FCS_CKM.1/WLAN:
The TOE adheres to IEEE 802.11-2012 and IEEE 802.11ac-2014 for key generation. The TOE’s wpa_supplicant
provides PRF384 and PRF704 for WPA2 derivation of 128-bit and 256-bit AES Temporal Keys (using the HMAC
implementation provided by BoringSSL) and employs its BoringSSL AES-256 DRBG when generating random
values used in the EAP-TLS and 802.11 4-way handshake. The TOE supports the AES-128 CCMP and AES-256
GCMP encryption modes. The TOE has successfully completed certification (including WPA2 Enterprise) and
received Wi-Fi CERTIFIED Interoperability Certificates from the Wi-Fi Alliance. The Wi-Fi Alliance maintains a
website providing further information about the testing program: http://www.wi-fi.org/certification.
Device Name Model Number Wi-Fi Alliance Certificate Numbers
Pixel 6 GR1YH, GB7N6, G9S9B WFA113889, WFA111718
Pixel 6 Pro GF5KQ, G8V0U, GLU0G WFA113888, WFA113887
Pixel 5a-5G G1F8F, G4S1M WFA102288, WFA102271
Pixel 5 GD1YQ(NA), GTT9Q(ROW), G5NZ6(JP) WFA100151
Pixel 4a-5G G024a-5G(NA), G025I(ROW), G025H(JP),
G6QU3
WFA99858, WFA100153
Pixel 4a G025J(NA), G025N(ROW), G025M(JP) WFA96515
Pixel 4 G020I/M/N WFA90277
Pixel 4 XL G020P/Q/J WFA83133
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Pixel 3a G020E/F/G/H WFA79062
Pixel 3a XL G020A/B/C WFA79063
Pixel 3 G013A/B WFA77734
Pixel 3 XL G013C/D WFA78505
Table 11 WFA Certificates
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM.2(1):
The TOE performs key establishment as part of EAP-TLS and TLS session establishment. Table 10 Asymmetric Key
Generation enumerates the TOE’s supported key establishment implementations (RSA/ECDH for TLS/EAP-TLS).
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM.2.1(2):
The TOE provides an SDP library for applications that uses a hybrid crypto scheme based on 4096-bit RSA based
key establishment. Applications can utilize this library to implement SDP that encrypts incoming data received
while the phone is locked in a manner compliant with this requirement.
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FCS_CKM.2/WLAN:
The TOE adheres to RFC 3394 and 802.11-2012 standards and unwraps the GTK (sent encrypted with the WPA2
KEK using AES Key Wrap in an EAPOL-Key frame). The TOE, upon receiving an EAPOL frame, will subject the
frame to a number of checks (frame length, EAPOL version, frame payload size, EAPOL-Key type, key data length,
EAPOL-Key CCMP descriptor version, and replay counter) to ensure a proper EAPOL message and then decrypt
the GTK using the KEK, thus ensuring that it does not expose the Group Temporal Key (GTK).
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.1:
The TOE includes a Root Encryption Key (REK) stored in a 256-bit fuse bank within the application processor. The
TOE generates the REK/fuse value during manufacturing using its hardware DRBG. The application processor
protects the REK by preventing any direct observation of the value and prohibiting any ability to modify or update
the value. The application processor loads the fuse value into an internal hardware crypto register and the Trusted
Execution Environment (TEE) provides trusted applications the ability to derive KEKs from the REK (using an SP
800-108 KDF to combine the REK with a salt). Additionally, the when the REK is loaded, the fuses for the REK
become locked, preventing any further changing or loading of the REK value. The TEE does not allow trusted
applications to use the REK for encryption or decryption, only the ability to derive a KEK from the REK. The TOE
includes a TEE application that calls into the TEE in order to derive a KEK from the 256-bit REK/fuse value and
then only permits use of the derived KEK for encryption and decryption as part of the TOE key hierarchy. More
information regarding Trusted Execution Environments may be found here:
http://www.globalplatform.org/mediaguidetee.asp.
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.2:
The TOE utilizes its approved RBGs to generate DEKs. When generating AES keys for itself (for example, the TOE’s
sensitive data encryption keys or for the Secure Key Storage), the TOE utilizes the RAND_bytes() API call from its
BoringSSL AES-256 CTR_DRBG to generate a 256-bit AES key. The TOE also utilizes that same DRBG when
servicing API requests from mobile applications wishing to generate AES keys (either 128 or 256-bit).
In all cases, the TOE generates DEKs using a compliant RBG seeded with sufficient entropy so as to ensure that the
generated key cannot be recovered with less work than a full exhaustive search of the key space.
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.3:
The TOE takes the user-entered password and conditions/stretches this value before combining the factor with other
KEK.
The TOE generates all non-derived KEKs using the RAND_bytes() API call from its BoringSSL AES-256
CTR_DRBG to ensure a full 128/256-bits of strength for asymmetric/symmetric keys, respectively. And the TOE
combines KEKs by encrypting one KEK with the other so as to preserve entropy.
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.4:
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The TOE clears sensitive cryptographic material (plaintext keys, authentication data, other security parameters) from
memory when no longer needed or when transitioning to the device’s locked state (in the case of the Sensitive Data
Protection keys). Public keys (such as the one used for Sensitive Data Protection) can remain in memory when the
phone is locked, but all crypto-related private keys are evicted from memory upon device lock. No plaintext
cryptographic material resides in the TOE’s Flash as the TOE encrypts all keys stored in Flash. When performing a
full wipe of protected data, the TOE cryptographically erases the protected data by clearing the Data-At-Rest DEK.
Because the TOE’s keystore resides within the user data partition, the TOE effectively cryptographically erases those
keys when clearing the Data-At-Rest DEK. In turn, the TOE clears the Data-At-Rest DEK and Secure Key Storage
SEK through a secure direct overwrite (BLKSECDISCARD ioctl) of the wear-leveled Flash memory containing the
key followed by a read-verify.
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.5:
The TOE stores all protected data in encrypted form within the user data partition (either protected data or sensitive
data). Upon request, the TOE cryptographically erases the Data-At-Rest DEK protecting the user data partition and
the SDP Master KEK protecting sensitive data files in the user data partition, clears those keys from memory,
reformats the partition, and then reboots. The TOE’s clearing of the keys follows the requirements of
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_CKM_EXT.6:
The TOE generates salt nonces (which are just salt values used in WPA2) using its /dev/urandom.
Salt value and size RBG origin Salt storage location
User password salt (128-bit) BoringSSL’s AES-256 CTR_DRBG Flash filesystem
TLS client_random (256-bit) BoringSSL’s AES-256 CTR_DRBG N/A (ephemeral)
TLS pre_master_secret (384-bit) BoringSSL’s AES-256 CTR_DRBG N/A (ephemeral)
WPA2 4-way handshake supplicant nonce
(SNonce)
BoringSSL’s AES-256 CTR_DRBG N/A (ephemeral)
Table 12 Salt Nonces
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_COP.1:
The TOE implements cryptographic algorithms in accordance with the following NIST standards and has received the
following ACVP algorithm certificates. These algorithms are in software and hardware, depending on the
implementation.
The TOE’s BoringSSL Library (version dcdc7bbc6e59ac0123407a9dc4d1f43dd0d117cd) provides the following
algorithms as validated on Android 12:
SFR Algorithm NIST Standard Cert#
FCS_CKM.1 (Key Gen) RSA IFC Key Generation FIPS 186-4, RSA A1109
ECDSA ECC Key Generation FIPS 186-4, ECDSA A1109
FCS_CKM.2 (Key RSA-based Key Exchange Vendor affirm 800-56B N/A
Establishment) ECC-based Key Exchange SP 800-56A, CVL KAS ECC A1109
FCS_COP.1(1) (AES) AES 128/256 CBC, GCM, KW FIPS 197, SP 800-38A/D/F A1109
FCS_COP.1(2) (Hash) SHA Hashing FIPS 180-4 A1109
FCS_COP.1(3) (Sign/Verify) RSA Sign/Verify FIPS 186-4, RSA A1109
ECDSA Sign/Verify FIPS 186-4, ECDSA A1109
FCS_COP.1(4) (Keyed Hash) HMAC-SHA 1/256/384/512 FIPS 198-1 & 180-4 A1109
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 (Random) DRBG Bit Generation SP 800-90A (Counter) A1109
Table 13 BoringSSL Cryptographic Algorithms
Android’s LockSettings service (version 77561fc30db9aedc1f50f5b07504aa65b4268b88) as validated on Android 12
provides the TOE’s SP 800-108 key based key derivation function for deriving KEKs.
SFR Algorithm NIST Standard Cert#
FCS_CKM_EXT.3 LockSettings service KBKDF SP 800-108 A2168
Table 14 LockSettings Service KDF Cryptographic Algorithms
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The following algorithms used in the TOE are provided by hardware components of the device. As these algorithms
are implemented solely in hardware, they do not utilize Android 12 as their operating environment, but provide lower-
level services upon which some of the security functionality rests.
All Pixel devices include the Titan M security chip, which provides cryptographic algorithm implementations within
a secure microprocessor supporting the Android keystore StrongBox HAL. All devices use revision 57042c8aa of the
H1C2M (Titan M). Titan M supports the Android keystore’s StrongBox hardware abstraction layer, and as such,
provides secure key generation, digital signatures, and other cryptographic functions in a mutual hardware keystore.
SFR Algorithm NIST Standard Cert#
FCS_CKM.1 (Key Gen) RSA IFC Key Generation FIPS 186-4, RSA C1969
ECDSA ECC Key Generation FIPS 186-4, ECDSA C1969
FCS_COP.1(1) (AES) AES 128/256 CBC, GCM FIPS 197, SP 800-38A/D/F C1969
FCS_COP.1(2) (Hash) SHA Hashing FIPS 180-4 C1969
FCS_COP.1(3) (Sign/Verify) RSA Sign/Verify FIPS 186-4, RSA C1969
ECDSA Sign/Verify FIPS 186-4, ECDSA C1969
FCS_COP.1(4) (Keyed Hash) HMAC-SHA 1/256 FIPS 198-1 & 180-4 C1969
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 (Random) DRBG Bit Generation SP 800-90A C1969
FCS_CKM_EXT.3 KBKDF SP 800-108 C1969
Table 15 Titan M Hardware Cryptographic Algorithms
The Pixel 3, 3 XL, 3a, 3a XL, and Pixel 4a’s Wi-Fi chipsets (WCN3998) provide an AES-CCMP implementation,
and the TOE’s application processors (Snapdragon 845 [SDM845], 670 [SDM670], and Snapdragon 730 [SM7150])
provide additional cryptographic algorithms. The Qualcomm SDM845, SDM670, and SM7150 processors use the
same Crypto/PRNG core, and the certificates listed below were tested on the 845, but remain valid for the
implementation within the 845, 670, and 730.
SFR Algorithm NIST Standard Cert#
FCS_COP.1(1) (AES) (Wi-Fi) AES 128/256 CCM/GCM FIPS 197, SP 800-38C 4748
FCS_COP.1(1) (AES) (QTI CEC*) AES 128/256 CBC FIPS 197, SP 800-38A 4959
FCS_COP.1(1) (AES) (QTI UFS**) AES 128/256 XTS FIPS 197, SP 800-38E 4958/4957
FCS_COP.1(2) (Hash) (QTI CEC) SHA 1/256 Hashing FIPS 180-4 4049
FCS_COP.1(2) (Hash) (DRBG) SHA 256 Hashing FIPS 180-4 4047/4048
FCS_COP.1(4) (Keyed Hash) (QTI CEC) HMAC-SHA-1/256 FIPS 198-1 & 180-4 3305
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 (Random) (DRBG) DRBG Bit Generation SP 800-90A (Hash-256) 1788
FCS_CKM_EXT.3 KBKDF SP 800-108 KDF171
Table 16 SDM845, SDM670, SM7150 Hardware Cryptographic Algorithms
*QTI CEC – Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Crypto Engine Core v5.4.1
**QTI UFS - Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Inline Crypto Engine (UFS) v3.1.0
The Pixel 4 and 4 XL’s Wi-Fi chipset (WCN3998) provides an AES-CCMP implementation, and the TOE’s
application processor (Snapdragon 855 [SM8150]) provides additional cryptographic algorithms.
SFR Algorithm NIST Standard Cert#
FCS_COP.1(1) (AES) (Wi-Fi) AES 128/256 CCM/GCM FIPS 197, SP 800-38C 4748
FCS_COP.1(1) (AES) (QTI CEC*) AES 128/256 CBC FIPS 197, SP 800-38A C442
FCS_COP.1(1) (AES) (QTI ICE UFS**) AES 128/256 XTS FIPS 197, SP 800-38E C439/C440
FCS_COP.1(2) (Hash) (QTI CEC) SHA 1/256 Hashing FIPS 180-4 C442
FCS_COP.1(2) (Hash) (DRBG) SHA 256 Hashing FIPS 180-4 C441
FCS_COP.1(4) (Keyed Hash) (QTI CEC) HMAC-SHA-1/256 FIPS 198-1 & 180-4 C442
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 (Random) (DRBG) DRBG Bit Generation SP 800-90A (Hash-256) C443
FCS_CKM_EXT.3 KBKDF SP 800-108 C554
Table 17 SM8150 Hardware Cryptographic Algorithms
*QTI CEC – Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Crypto Engine Core v5.4.2
**QTI UFS - Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Inline Crypto Engine (UFS) v3.1.0
The Pixel 4a-5G/5/5a-5G Wi-Fi chipset (WCN3998-1) provides an AES-CCMP implementation, and the TOE’s
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application processor (Snapdragon 765 [SM7250]) provides additional cryptographic algorithms.
SFR Algorithm NIST Standard Cert#
FCS_COP.1(1) (AES) (Wi-Fi) AES 128/256 CCM/GCM FIPS 197, SP 800-38C 4748
FCS_COP.1(1) (AES) (QTI CEC*) AES 128/256 CBC FIPS 197, SP 800-38A A242
FCS_COP.1(1) (AES) (QTI ICE UFS**) AES 128/256 XTS FIPS 197, SP 800-38E C1552/C1553
FCS_COP.1(2) (Hash) (QTI CEC) SHA 1/256 Hashing FIPS 180-4 A896
FCS_COP.1(2) (Hash) (DRBG) SHA 256 Hashing FIPS 180-4 A214
FCS_COP.1(4) (Keyed Hash) (QTI CEC) HMAC-SHA-1/256 FIPS 198-1 & 180-4 A896
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 (Random) (DRBG) DRBG Bit Generation SP 800-90A (Hash-256) A50
FCS_CKM_EXT.3 KBKDF SP 800-108 A244
Table 18 SM7250 Hardware Cryptographic Algorithms
*QTI CEC – Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Crypto Engine Core v5.5.1
**QTI UFS - Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Inline Crypto Engine (UFS) v3.1.0
The Pixel 6 Pro/6 Wi-Fi chipset (BCM4389) provides an AES-CCMP implementation, and the TOE’s application
processor (Google Tensor) provides additional cryptographic algorithms.
SFR Algorithm NIST Standard Cert#
FCS_COP.1(1) (AES) (Wi-Fi) AES 128/256 CCM/GCM FIPS 197, SP 800-38C 5926, C1025
FCS_COP.1(1) (AES) (UFS ISE*) AES 128/256 XTS FIPS 197, SP 800-38E A1981
FCS_COP.1(2) (Hash) (UFS ISE *) SHA 256 Hashing FIPS 180-4 A1981
FCS_COP.1(4) (Keyed Hash) (UFS ISE*) HMAC-SHA-256 FIPS 198-1 & 180-4 A1981
FCS_COP.1(1) (AES) AES 128/256 CBC FIPS 197, SP 800-38A A1980
FCS_COP.1(2) (Hash) SHA 1/256 Hashing FIPS 180-4 A1980
FCS_COP.1(4) (Keyed Hash) HMAC-SHA-1/256 FIPS 198-1 & 180-4 A1980
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 (Random) (DRBG) DRBG Bit Generation SP 800-90A (Counter) A1980
FCS_CKM_EXT.3 (Trusty**) KBKDF SP 800-108 A1982
Table 19 Google Tensor Hardware Cryptographic Algorithms
*ISE UFS – Google Tensor UFS Inline Storage Engine version de8b6c8621 (the Hash and Keyed Hash functions are implemented in software, not
hardware)
**Trusty – Google Trusty TEE version 7623683
The TOE’s application processor includes a source of hardware entropy that the TOE distributes throughout, and the
TOE’s RBGs make use of that entropy when seeding/instantiating themselves.
The TOE’s BoringSSL library supports the TOE’s cryptographic Android Runtime (ART) methods (through
Android's conscrypt JNI provider) afforded to mobile applications and also supports Android user-space processes
and daemons (e.g., wpa_supplicant). The TOE’s Application Processor provides hardware accelerated cryptography
utilized in Data-At-Rest (DAR) encryption of the user data partition.
The TOE stretches the user’s password to create a password derived key. The TOE stretching function uses a series
of steps to increase the memory required for key derivation (thus thwarting GPU-acceleration, off-line brute force,
and precomputed dictionary attacks) and ensure proper conditioning and stretching of the user’s password.
The TOE conditions the user’s password using two iterations of PBKDFv2 w HMAC-SHA-256 in addition to some
ROMix operations in an algorithm named scrypt. Scrypt consists of one iteration of PBKDFv2, followed by a series
of ROMix operations, and finished with a final iteration of PBKDFv2. The ROMix operations increase the memory
required for key derivation, thus thwarting GPU-acceleration (which can greatly decrease the time needed to brute
force PBKDFv2 alone) and other custom hardware-based brute force attacks.
The password derived key is combined with the hardware REK in storage, preventing the ability to perform offline
attacks, and online attacks are limited due to the TOE’s configuration of the maximum no more than 50 incorrect
password attempts (with at least 4 character passwords). The use of the password derivation function in combination
with the device configuration forces the attacker to only be able to perform an exhaustive key search to unlock the
device without access to the password, and then subject to the configured limit of 50 or less attempts before the device
is wiped.
The following scrypt diagram shows how the password and salt are used with PBKDFv2 and ROMix to fulfil the
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requirements for password conditioning.
The resulting derived key from this operation is used to decrypt the FBE and to derive the User Keystore Daemon
Value.
The TOE uses HMAC as part of the TLS ciphersuites and makes HMAC functionality available to mobile applications.
For TLS, the TOE uses HMAC using SHA-1 (with a 160-bit key) to generate a 160-bit MAC, SHA-256 (with a 256-
bit key) to generate a 256-bit MAC, SHA-384 (with a 384-bit key) to generate a 384-bit MAC. For mobile
applications, the TOE provides all of the previous HMACs as well as SHA-512 (with a 512-bit key) to generate a 512-
bit MAC. FIPS 198-1 & 180-4 dictate the block size used, and they specify block sizes/output MAC lengths of
512/160, 512/160, 1024/384, and 1024/512-bits for HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and
HMAC-SHA-512 respectively.
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1:
The TOE supports the HTTPS protocol (compliant with RFC 2818) so that (mobile and system) applications executing
on the TOE can act as HTTPS clients and securely connect to external servers using HTTPS. Administrators have no
credentials and cannot use HTTPS or TLS to establish administrative sessions with the TOE as the TOE does not
provide any such capabilities.
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_IV_EXT.1:
The TOE generates IVs by reading from /dev/urandom for use with all keys. In all cases, the TOE uses /dev/urandom
and generates the IVs in compliance with the requirements of table 11 of PP_MD_V3.1.
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_RBG_EXT.1:
The TOE provides a number of different RBGs including:
1. An Application Processor DRBG in hardware:
a. An AES-256 CTR_DRBG in Google Tensor processors
b. A SHA-256 Hash_DRBG in Qualcomm Snapdragon processors
2. An AES-256 CTR_DRBG provided by BoringSSL. This is the only accredited and supported DRBG present
in the system and available to independently developed applications. As such, the TOE provides mobile
applications access (through an Android Java API) to random data drawn from its AES-256 CTR_DRBG
3. An SHA-256 HMAC_DRBG provided by the Titan M security chip
The TOE initializes its AP DRBG with enough data from its AP hardware noise source to ensure at least 256-bits of
entropy. The TOE then uses its AP DRBG to continuously fill the Linux Kernel Random Number Generator
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(LKRNG) input pool, and the LKRNG makes entropy easily available to the rest of the system (e.g., the BoringSSL
DRBG draws from the LKRNG).
The TOE seeds its BoringSSL AES-256 CTR_DRBG using 384-bits of data from /dev/urandom, thus ensuring at least
256-bits of entropy. The TOE uses its BoringSSL DRBG for all random generation including salts.
The TOE seeds the Titan M SHA-256 HMAC_DRBG with entropy from its hardware noise and then uses the DRBG
when generating keys and cryptographic random values.
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_SRV_EXT.1:
The TOE provides applications access to the cryptographic operations including encryption (AES), hashing (SHA),
signing and verification (RSA & ECDSA), key hashing (HMAC), keyed message digests (HMAC-SHA-256),
generation of asymmetric keys for key establishment (RSA and ECDH), and generation of asymmetric keys for
signature generation and verification (RSA, ECDSA). The TOE provides access through the Android operating
system’s Java API, through the native BoringSSL API, and through the application processor module (user and kernel)
APIs.
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_SRV_EXT.2:
The TOE provides applications with APIs to perform the functions referenced in FCS_COP.1(1) and FCS_COP.1(3).
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_STG_EXT.1:
The TOE provides the user, administrator, and mobile applications the ability to import and use asymmetric public
and private keys into the TOE’s software-based Secure Key Storage. Certificates are stored in files using UID-based
permissions and an API virtualizes the access. Additionally, the user and administrator can request the TOE to destroy
the keys stored in the Secure Key Storage. While normally mobile applications cannot use or destroy the keys of
another application, applications that share a common application developer (and are thus signed by the same
developer key) may do so. In other words, applications with a common developer (and which explicitly declare a
shared UUID in their application manifest) may use and destroy each other’s keys located within the Secure Key
Storage.
The TOE provides additional protections on keys beyond including key attestation, to allow enterprises and application
developers the ability to ensure which keys have been generated securely within the phone.
The TOE also provides an extension to Android KeyStore, StrongBox, which allows mobile applications to specify
that keys be stored in the Pixel’s hardware-based key storage (provided by the Titan M security chip4
).
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_STG_EXT.2:
The TOE employs a key hierarchy that protects all DEKs and KEKs by encryption with either the REK or by the REK
and password derived KEK.
The TOE encrypts Long-term Trusted channel Key Material (LTTCKM, i.e., Bluetooth and Wi-Fi keys) values using
AES-256 GCM encryption and stores the encrypted values within their respective configuration files.
All keys are 256-bits in size. The TOE generates keys using its BoringSSL AES-256 CTR_DRBG (for the Java and
native layer), the Titan M’s SHA-256 HMAC_DRBG (for StrongBox Android Keystore keys), the Qualcomm
Snapdragon processor SHA-256 Hash_DRBG (for Trusted Applications in TrustZone) or the Google Tensor processor
AES-256 CTR_DRBG (for Trusted Applications in TrustZone). By utilizing only 256-bit KEKs, the TOE ensures
that all keys are encrypted by an equal or larger sized key.
In the case of Wi-Fi, the TOE utilizes the 802.11-2012 KCK and KEK keys to unwrap (decrypt) the WPA2 Group
Temporal Key received from the access point. The TOE protects persistent Wi-Fi keys (user certificates and private
keys) by storing them in the Android Key Store.
PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_STG_EXT.3:
The TOE protects the integrity of all DEKs and KEKs (including LTTCKM keys) stored in Flash by using
authenticated encryption/decryption methods (CCM, GCM).
4
StrongBox is not available on the Pixel 6 and 6 Pro
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PP_MD_V3.1:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/2:
The TOE provides mobile applications (through its Android API) the use of TLS version 1.2 including support for the
selections chosen in section 5 for FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 (and the TOE requires no configuration other than using the
appropriate library APIs as described in the Admin Guidance).
When an application uses the combined APIs provided in the Admin Guide to attempt to establish a trusted channel
connection based on TLS or HTTPS, the TOE supports only Subject Alternative Name (SAN) (DNS and IP address)
as reference identifiers (the TOE does not accept reference identifiers in the Common Name[CN]). The TOE supports
client (mutual) authentication. The TOE in its evaluated configuration and, by design, supports elliptic curves for
TLS (P-256 and P-384) and has a fixed set of supported curves (thus the admin cannot and need not configure any
curves).
No additional configuration is needed to restrict allow the device to use the supported cipher suites, as only the claimed
cipher suites are supported in the aforementioned library as each of the aforementioned ciphersuites are supported on
the TOE by default or through the use of the TLS library.
While the TOE supports the use of wildcards in X.509 reference identifiers (SAN only), the TOE does not support
certificate pinning. If the TOE cannot determine the revocation status of a peer certificate, the TOE rejects the
certificate and rejects the connection.
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/2/WLAN:
The TSF supports TLS versions 1.0, 1.1, and 1.2 and also supports the selected ciphersuites utilizing SHA-1, SHA-
256, and SHA-384 (see the selections in section 5 for FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN) for use with EAP-TLS as part of
WPA2. The TOE in its evaluated configuration and, by design, supports only evaluated elliptic curves (P-256 & P-
384 and no others) and has a fixed set of supported curves (thus the admin cannot and need not configure any curves).
The TOE, allows the user to load and utilize authentication certificates for EAP-TLS used with WPA. The Android
UI (Settings->Security->Credential storage: Install from device storage) allows the user to import an RSA or ECDSA
certificate and designate its use as Wi-Fi.
6.3 User data protection
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_ACF_EXT.1:
The TOE provides the following categories of system services to applications.
1. Normal - A lower-risk permission that gives an application access to isolated application-level features, with
minimal risk to other applications, the system, or the user. The system automatically grants this type of
permission to a requesting application at installation, without asking for the user's explicit approval (though
the user always has the option to review these permissions before installing).
2. Dangerous - A higher-risk permission that would give a requesting application access to private user data or
control over the device that can negatively impact the user. Because this type of permission introduces
potential risk, the system cannot automatically grant it to the requesting application. For example, any
dangerous permissions requested by an application will be displayed to the user and require confirmation
before proceeding or some other approach can be taken to avoid the user automatically allowing the use of
such facilities.
3. Signature - A permission that the system is to grant only if the requesting application is signed with the same
certificate as the application that declared the permission. If the certificates match, the system automatically
grants the permission without notifying the user or asking for the user's explicit approval.
4. SignatureOrSystem - A permission that the system is to grant only to packages in the Android system image
or that are signed with the same certificates. Please avoid using this option, as the signature protection level
should be sufficient for most needs and works regardless of exactly where applications are installed. This
permission is used for certain special situations where multiple vendors have applications built in to a system
image which need to share specific features explicitly because they are being built together.
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An example of a normal permission is the ability to vibrate the device: android.permission.VIBRATE. This permission
allows an application to make the device vibrate, and an application that does not request (or declare) this permission
would have its vibration requests ignored.
An example of a dangerous privilege would be access to location services to determine the location of the mobile
device: android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION. The TOE controls access to Dangerous permissions during
the running of the application. The TOE prompts the user to review the application’s requested permissions (by
displaying a description of each permission group, into which individual permissions map, that an application
requested access to). If the user approves, then the application is allowed to continue running. If the user disapproves,
the devices continues to run, but cannot use the services protected by the denied permissions. Thereafter, the mobile
device grants that application during execution access to the set of permissions declared in its Manifest file.
An example of a signature permission is the android.permission.BIND_VPN_SERVICE that an application must
declare in order to utilize the VpnService APIs of the device. Because the permission is a Signature permission, the
mobile device only grants this permission to an application (2nd
installed app) that requests this permission and that
has been signed with the same developer key used to sign the application (1st
installed app) declaring the permission
(in the case of the example, the Android Framework itself).
An example of a signatureOrSystem permission is the android.permission.LOCATION_HARDWARE, which allows
an application to use location features in hardware (such as the geofencing API). The device grants this permission to
requesting applications that either have been signed with the same developer key used to sign the Android application
declaring the permissions or that reside in the “system” directory within Android (which for Android 4.4 and above,
are applications residing in the /system/priv-app/ directory on the read-only system partition). Put another way, the
device grants systemOrSignature permissions by Signature or by virtue of the requesting application being part of the
“system image”.
Additionally, Android includes the following flags that layer atop the base categories.
1. privileged - this permission can also be granted to any applications installed as privileged apps on the system
image. Please avoid using this option, as the signature protection level should be sufficient for most needs
and works regardless of exactly where applications are installed. This permission flag is used for certain
special situations where multiple vendors have applications built in to a system image which need to share
specific features explicitly because they are being built together.
2. system - Old synonym for 'privileged'.
3. development - this permission can also (optionally) be granted to development applications (e.g., to allow
additional location reporting during beta testing).
4. appop - this permission is closely associated with an app op for controlling access.
5. pre23 - this permission can be automatically granted to apps that target API levels below API level 23
(Marshmallow/6.0).
6. installer - this permission can be automatically granted to system apps that install packages.
7. verifier - this permission can be automatically granted to system apps that verify packages.
8. preinstalled - this permission can be automatically granted to any application pre-installed on the system
image (not just privileged apps) (the TOE does not prompt the user to approve the permission).
For older applications (those targeting Android’s pre-23 API level, i.e., API level 22 [lollipop] and below), the TOE
will prompt a user at the time of application installation whether they agree to grant the application access to the
requested services. Thereafter (each time the application is run), the TOE will grant the application access to the
services specified during install.
For newer applications (those targeting API level 23 or later), the TOE grants individual permissions at application
run-time by prompting the user for confirmation of each permissions category requested by the application (and only
granting the permission if the user chooses to grant it).
The Android 12.0 (Level 31) API (details found here https://developer.android.com/reference/packages) provides
services to mobile applications.
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While Android provides a large number of individual permissions, they are generally grouped into categories or
features that provide similar functionality. Table 20 shows a series of functional categories centered on common
functionality.
Service Features Description
Sensitive I/O Devices & Sensors Location services, Audio & Video capture, Body sensors
User Personal Information & Credentials Contacts, Calendar, Call logs, SMS
Metadata & Device ID Information IMEI, Phone Number
Data Storage Protection App data, App cache
System Settings & Application
Management
Date time, Reboot/Shutdown, Sleep, Force-close application,
Administrator Enrollment
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, USB Access Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, USB tethering, debugging and file transfer
Mobile Device Management &
Administration
MDM APIs
Peripheral Hardware NFC, Camera, Headphones
Security & Encryption Certificate/Key Management, Password, Revocation rules
Table 20 Functional Categories
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_ACT_EXT.1.2:
Applications with a common developer have the ability to allow sharing of data between their applications. A common
application developer can sign their generated APK with a common certificate or key and set the permissions of their
application to allow data sharing. When the different applications’ signatures match and the proper permissions are
enabled, information can then be shared as needed.
The TOE supports Enterprise profiles to provide additional separation between application and application data
belonging to the Enterprise profile. Applications installed into the Enterprise versus Personal profiles cannot access
each other’s secure data, applications, and can have separate device administrators/managers. This functionality is
built into the device by default and does not require an application download. The Enterprise administrative app (an
MDM agent application installed into the Enterprise Profile) may enable cross-profile contacts search, in which case,
the device owner can search the address book of the enterprise profile. Please see the Admin Guide for additional
details regarding how to set up and use Enterprise profiles. Ultimately, the enterprise profile is under control of the
personal profile. The personal profile can decide to remove the enterprise profile, thus deleting all information and
applications stored within the enterprise profile. However, despite the “control” of the personal profile, the personal
profile cannot dictate the enterprise profile to share applications or data with the personal profile; the enterprise profile
MDM must allow for sharing of contacts before any information can be shared.
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_ACF_EXT.2:
The TOE allows an administrator to allow sharing of the enterprise profile address book with the normal profile. Each
application group (profile) has its own calendar as well as keychain (keychain is the collection of user [not application]
keys, and only the user can grant the user’s applications access to use a given key in the user’s keychain), thus
Android’s personal and work profiles do not share calendar appointments nor keys.
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_DAR_EXT.1:
The TOE provides Data-At-Rest AES-256 XTS hardware encryption for all data stored on the TOE in the user data
partition (which includes both user data and TSF data). The TOE also has TSF data relating to key storage for TSF
keys not stored in the system’s Android Key Store. The TOE separately encrypts those TSF keys and data.
Additionally, the TOE includes a read-only file system in which the TOE’s system executables, libraries, and their
configuration data reside. For its Data-At-Rest encryption of the data partition on the internal Flash (where the TOE
stores all user data and all application data), the TOE uses an AES-256 bit DEK with XTS feedback mode to encrypt
each file in the data partition using dedicated application processor hardware.
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_DAR_EXT.2:
The vendor provides the NIAPSEC library for Sensitive Data Protection (SDP) that application developers must use
to opt-in for sensitive data protection. When developers opt-in for SDP, all data that is received on the device destined
for that application is treated as sensitive. This library calls into the TOE to generate an RSA key that acts as a master
KEK for the SDP encryption process. When an application that has opted-in for SDP receives incoming data while
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the device is locked, an AES symmetric DEK is generated to encrypt that data. The public key from the master RSA
KEK above is then used to encrypt the AES DEK. Once the device is unlocked, the RSA KEK private key is re-
derived and can be used to decrypt the AES DEK for each piece of information that was stored while the device was
locked. The TOE then takes that decrypted data and re-encrypts it following FDP_DAR_EXT.1.
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_IFC_EXT.1:
The TOE will route all traffic other than traffic necessary to establish the VPN connection to the VPN gateway (when
the gateway’s configuration specifies so) when the Always-On-VPN is enabled. The TOE includes an interceptor
kernel module that controls inbound and output packets. When a VPN is active, the interceptor will route all incoming
packets to the VPN and conversely route all outbound packets to the VPN before they are output.
Note that when the TOE tries to connect to a Wi-Fi network, it performs a standard captive portal check which sends
traffic that bypasses the full tunnel VPN configuration in order to detect whether the Wi-Fi network restricts Internet
access until one has authenticated or agreed to usage terms through a captive portal. If the administrator wishes to
deactivate the captive portal check (in order to prevent the plaintext traffic), they may do this by following the
instructions in the Admin Guide.
The only exception to all traffic being routed to the VPN is in the instance of ICMP echo requests. The TOE uses
ICMP echo responses on the local subnet to facilitate network troubleshooting and categorizes it as a part of ARP. As
such, if an ICMP echo request is issued on the subnet the TOE is part of, it will respond with an ICMP echo response,
but no other instances of traffic will be routed outside of the VPN.
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_PBA_EXT.1:
The TOE requires the user to enter their password to enroll, re-enroll or un-enroll any biometric templates. When the
user attempts biometric authentication to the TOE, the biometric sensor takes an image of the presented biometric for
comparison to the enrolled templates. The captured image is compared to all the stored templates on the device to
determine if there is a match. The complete biometric authentication process is handled inside the TEE (including
image capture, all processing and match determination). The image is provided to the biometric service to check the
enrolled templates for a match to the captured image.
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_STG_EXT.1:
The TOE’s Trusted Anchor Database consists of the built-in certs and any additional user or admin/MDM loaded
certificates. The built-in certs are individually stored in the device’s read-only system image in the
/system/etc/security/cacerts directory, and the user can individually disable certs through Android’s user interface
[Settings->Security-> Trusted Credentials]. Because the built-in CA certificates reside on the read-only system
partition, the TOE places a copy of any disabled built-in certificate into the /data/misc/user/X/cacerts-removed/
directory, where 'X' represents the user’s number (which starts at 0). The TOE stores added CA certificates in the
corresponding /data/misc/user/X/cacerts-added/ directory and also stores a copy of the CA certificate in the user’s
Secure Key Storage (residing in the /data/misc/keystore/user_X/ directory). The TOE uses Linux file permissions that
prevent any mobile application or entity other than the TSF from modifying these files. Only applications registered
as an administrator (such as an MDM Agent Application) have the ability to access these files, staying in accordance
to the permissions established in FMT_SMF_EXT.1 and FMT_MOF_EXT.1.
PP_MD_V3.1:FDP_UPC_EXT.1:
The TOE provides APIs allowing non-TSF applications (mobile applications) the ability to establish a secure channel
using TLS, HTTPS, and Bluetooth DR/EDR and LE. Additionally, the vendor provides the NIAPSEC library for
application developers to use for Hostname Checking, Revocation Checking, and TLS Ciphersuite restriction.
Application developers must utilize this library to ensure the device behaves in the evaluated configuration. Mobile
applications can use the following Android APIs for TLS, HTTPS, and Bluetooth respectively:
SSL:
javax.net.ssl.SSLContext:
https://developer.android.com/reference/javax/net/ssl/SSLSocket
Developers then need to swap SocketFactory for SecureSocketFactory, part of a private library provided by
Google.
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Developers can request this library by emailing: niapsec@google.com
HTTPS:
javax.net.ssl.HttpsURLConnection:
https://developer.android.com/reference/javax/net/ssl/HttpsURLConnection
Developers then need to swap HTTPSUrlConnections for SecureUrl part of a private library provided by
Google.
Developers can request this library by emailing: niapsec@google.com
Bluetooth:
android.bluetooth:
http://developer.android.com/reference/android/bluetooth/package-summary.html
6.4 Identification and authentication
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_AFL_EXT.1:
The TOE maintains in persistent storage, for each user, the number of failed password logins since the last successful
login (the phone, in its evaluated configuration, only supports password authentication), and upon reaching the
maximum number of incorrect logins, the TOE performs a full wipe of all protected data (and in fact, wipes all user
data). An administrator can adjust the number of failed logins for the password unlock screen from the default of ten
failed logins to a value between 0 (deactivate wiping) and 50 through an MDM. The TOE validates passwords by
providing them to Android’s Gatekeeper (which runs in the Trusted Execution Environment). If the presented
password fails to validate, the TOE increments the incorrect password counter before displaying a visual error to the
user. Android’s Gatekeeper keeps this password counter in persistent secure storage and increments the counter before
validating the password. Upon successful validation of the password, this counter is reset back to zero. By storing
the counter persistently, and by incrementing the counter prior to validating it, the TOE ensures a correct tally of failed
attempts even if it loses power.
The Pixel 4 and 4 XL support Face unlock but not fingerprint authentication, while the Pixel 3, 3a, 3 XL, 3a XL, 4a,
4a-5G, 5, 5a-5G, 6, and 6 Pro support fingerprint but not Face unlock authentication.
Additionally, the phone allows the user to unlock the device using his or her fingerprint or face. The TOE allows
users up to 5 attempts to unlock the device via face unlock before disabling the face camera. The TOE (through a
separate counter) allows users up to 5 attempts to unlock the device via fingerprint before temporarily disabling
fingerprint authentication for 30 seconds. While the TOE has temporarily disabled the finger sensor, the user can
input their password to unlock the phone. After a total of 4 failed rounds of attempted fingerprint authentications (20
total unlock attempts), the TOE completely disables the fingerprint sensor. Once the TOE has disabled the fingerprint
sensor or face unlock entirely, it remains disabled until the user enters their password to unlock the device. Note that
restarting the phone at any point disables the fingerprint sensor and face cameras automatically until the user enters a
correct password and unlocks the phone, and therefore TOE restart disruptions are not applicable for biometric
authentication mechanisms.
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.1:
The TOE requires explicit user authorization before it will pair with a remote Bluetooth device. When pairing with
another device, the TOE requires that the user either confirm that a displayed numeric passcode matches between the
two devices or that the user enter (or choose) a numeric passcode that the peer device generates (or must enter). The
TOE requires this authorization (via manual input) for mobile application use of the Bluetooth trusted channel and in
situations where temporary (non-bonded) connections are formed.
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.2:
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The TOE prevents data transfer of any type until Bluetooth pairing has completed. Additionally, the TOE supports
OBEX (OBject Exchange) through L2CAP (Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol).
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.3:
The TOE rejects duplicate Bluetooth connections by only allowing a single session per paired device. This ensures
that when the TOE receives a duplicate session attempt while the TOE already has an active session with that device,
then the TOE ignores the duplicate session.
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.4:
The TOE’s Bluetooth host and controller supports Bluetooth Secure Simple Pairing and the TOE utilizes this pairing
method when the remote host also supports it.
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BLT_EXT.6:
The TOE requires explicit user authorization before granting trusted remote devices access to services associated with
the OPP and MAP Bluetooth profiles. Additionally, the TOE requires explicit user authorization before granting
untrusted remote devices access to services associated with all following Bluetooth profiles.
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BMG_EXT.1/Fingerprint:
The TOE’s fingerprint sensor provides FAR and FRR rates as shown in Table 21. Each phone provides a FRR of
shown in the table below, along with a rounded up (for the worse) and mapped ratio. Prior to the rounded rate, the
FRR meets the requirements for FIA_BMG_EXT in all cases.
Device: False Accept Rate (FAR):
False Reject Rate
(FRR):
FRR Ratio (Rounded
Up):
Pixel 3/3XL 1:100,000 3.1% 1:25
Pixel 3a/3aXL 1:100,000 1.2% 1:80
Pixel 4a/4a-5G/5/5a-5G 1:100,000 1.2% 1:80
Pixel 6/6 Pro 1:50,000 2.5% 1:40
Table 21 Fingerprint False Accept/Reject Rates
Users have up to 5 attempts to unlock the phone using fingerprint before the fingerprint unlock method is disabled for
30 seconds. After the 4th unsuccessful round of unlock attempts (a total of 20 fingerprint attempts), the fingerprint
sensor is disabled entirely and the user is prompted for their password. The fingerprint unlock remains disabled until
the user enters their password.
Since the user can attempt to unlock the phone a total of 20 times before the fingerprint is disabled, the SAFAR of the
phone is 1:2,500 for the Pixel 6 and 6 Pro and 1:5,000 for all the other fingerprint devices.
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_BMG_EXT.1/Face:
The TOE’s Face Unlock (Pixel 4/4 XL only) provides a FAR of 1:50,000 with an FRR of 4.0%, which is rounded and
mapped to a 1:20 rate which meets the requirements for FIA_BMG_EXT.
Users have up to 5 attempts to unlock the phone using their face before the Face Unlock method is disabled entirely
and the user is prompted for their password. The Face unlock remains disabled until the user enters their password.
Since the user can attempt to unlock the phone a total of 5 times before Face Unlock is disabled, the SAFAR of the
phone is 1:10,000.
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FIA_PAE_EXT.1:
The TOE can join WPA2-802.1X (802.11i) wireless networks requiring EAP-TLS authentication, acting as a
client/supplicant (and in that role connect to the 802.11 access point and communicate with the 802.1X authentication
server).
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_PMG_EXT.1:
The TOE authenticates the user through a password consisting of basic Latin characters (upper and lower case,
numbers, and the special characters noted in the selection (see the selections in section 5 for FIA_PMG_EXT.1)). The
TOE defaults to requiring passwords to have a minimum of four characters but no more than sixteen, contain at least
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one letter; however, an MDM application can change these defaults. The Smart Lock feature is not allowed in the
evaluated configuration as this feature circumvents the requirements for FIA_PMG_EXT.1 and many others.
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_TRT_EXT.1:
Android’s GateKeeper throttling is used to prevent brute-force attacks. After a user enters an incorrect password,
GateKeeper APIs return a value in milliseconds (500ms default) in which the caller must wait before attempting to
validate another password. Any attempts before the defined amount of time has passed will be ignored by GateKeeper.
Gatekeeper also keeps a count of the number of failed validation attempts since the last successful attempt. These two
values together are used to prevent brute-force attacks of the TOE’s password.
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU.5:
The TOE, in its evaluated configuration, allows the user to authenticate using either a password or biometric
(fingerprint on the 3, 3XL, 3a, 3a XL, 4a, 4a-5G, 5, 5a-5G, 6, and 6 Pro; or Face unlock on the 4 and 4 XL). Upon
boot, the first unlock screen presented requires the user to enter their password to unlock the device. The biometric
sensors are disabled until the user enters their password for the first time.
Upon device lock during normal use of the device, the user has the ability to unlock the phone either by entering their
password or by using a biometric (using fingerprint or Face unlock) authentication. Throttling of these inputs can be
read about in the FIA_AFL_EXT.1 section. The entered password is compared to a value derived as described in the
key hierarchy and key table above (FCS_STG_EXT.2 and FCS_CKM_EXT.3, respectively). FIA_BMG_EXT.1
describes the password authentication process and its security measures.
Some security related user settings (e.g. changing the password, modifying, deleting, or adding stored fingerprint
templates, setting up Face unlock, SmartLock settings, etc.) and actions (e.g. factory reset) require the user to enter
their password before modifying these settings or executing these actions. In these instances, biometric authentication
is not accepted to permit the referenced functions.
The TOE’s evaluated configuration disallows other authentication mechanisms, such as pattern, PIN, or Smart Lock
mechanisms (on-body detection, trusted places, trusted devices, trusted face, and trusted voice).
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU.6(1):
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU.6(2):
The TOE requires the user to enter their password or supply their biometric in order to unlock the TOE. Additionally
the TOE requires the user to confirm their current password when accessing the “Settings->Display->LockScreen-
>Screen Security->Select screen lock” menu in the TOE’s user interface. The TOE can disable Smart Lock through
management controls. Only after entering their current user password can the user then elect to change their password.
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU.7:
The TOE allows the user to enter the user's password from the lock screen. The TOE will, by default, display the most
recently entered character of the password briefly or until the user enters the next character in the password, at which
point the TOE obscures the character by replacing the character with a dot symbol. Further, the TOE provides no
feedback other than whether the fingerprint or face unlock attempt succeeded or failed.
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU_EXT.1:
As described before, the TOE’s key hierarchy requires the user's password in order to derive the KEK_* keys in order
to decrypt other KEKs and DEKs. Thus, until it has the user's password, the TOE cannot decrypt the DEK utilized for
Data-At-Rest encryption, and thus cannot decrypt the user’s protected data.
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU_EXT.2:
The TOE, when configured to require a user password, allows a user to perform the actions assigned in
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 (see selections in section 5 for FIA_UAU_EXT.2) without first successfully authenticating.
Choosing the input method allows the user to select between different keyboard devices (say, for example, if the user
has installed additional keyboards). Note that the TOE automatically names and saves (to the internal Flash) any screen
shots or photos taken from the lock screen, and the TOE provides the user no opportunity to name them or change
where they are stored.
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When configured, the user can also launch Google Assistant to initiate some features of the phone. However, if the
command requires access to the user’s data (e.g. contacts for calls or messages), the phone requires the user to
manually unlock the phone before the action can be completed.
Beyond those actions, a user cannot perform any other actions other than observing notifications displayed on the lock
screen until after successfully authenticating. Additionally, the TOE provides the user the ability to hide the contents
of notifications once a password (or any other locking authentication method) is enabled.
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_X509_EXT.1:
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN:
The TOE checks the validity of all imported CA certificates by checking for the presence of the basicConstraints
extension and that the CA flag is set to TRUE as the TOE imports the certificate. Additionally, the TOE verifies the
extendedKeyUsage Server Authentication purpose during WPA2/EAP-TLS negotiation. The TOE’s certificate
validation algorithm examines each certificate in the path (starting with the peer’s certificate) and first checks for
validity of that certificate (e.g., has the certificate expired; or if not yet valid, whether the certificate contains the
appropriate X.509 extensions [e.g., the CA flag in the basic constraints extension for a CA certificate, or that a server
certificate contains the Server Authentication purpose in the ExtendedKeyUsagefield]), then verifies each certificate
in the chain (applying the same rules as above, but also ensuring that the Issuer of each certificate matches the Subject
in the next rung “up” in the chain and that the chain ends in a self-signed certificate present in either the TOE’s trusted
anchor database or matches a specified Root CA), and finally the TOE performs revocation checking for all certificates
in the chain.
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_X509_EXT.2:
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN:
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates during EAP-TLS, TLS, and HTTPS. The TOE comes with a built-in set of default
Trusted Credentials (Android's set of trusted CA certificates), and while the user cannot remove any of the built-in
default CA certificates, the user can disable any of those certificates through the user interface so that certificates
issued by disabled CA’s cannot validate successfully. In addition, a user and an administrator/MDM can import a new
trusted CA certificate into the Trust Anchor Database (the TOE stores the new CA certificate in the Security Key
Store).
The TOE does not establish TLS connections itself (beyond EAP-TLS used for WPA2 Wi-Fi connections), but
provides a series of APIs that mobile applications can use to check the validity of a peer certificate. The mobile
application, after correctly using the specified APIs, can be assured as to the validity of the peer certificate and be
assured that the TOE will not establish the trusted connection if the peer certificate cannot be verified (including
validity, certification path, and revocation [through OCSP]). If, during the process of certificate verification, the TOE
cannot establish a connection with the server acting as the OCSP Responder, the TOE will not deem the server’s
certificate as valid and will not establish a TLS connection with the server.
The user or administrator explicitly specifies the trusted CA that the TOE will use for EAP-TLS authentication of the
server’s certificate. For mobile applications, the application developer will specify whether the TOE should use the
Android system Trusted CAs, use application-specified trusted CAs, or a combination of the two. In this way, the
TOE always knows which trusted CAs to use.
The TOE, when acting as a WPA2 supplicant uses X.509 certificates for EAP-TLS authentication. Because the TOE
may not have network connectivity to a revocation server prior to being admitted to the WPA2 network and because
the TOE cannot determine the IP address or hostname of the authentication server (the Wi-Fi access point proxies the
supplicant’s authentication request to the server), the TOE will accept the certificate of the server.
PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_X509_EXT.3:
Applications needing compliant revocation checking must utilize the NIAPSEC library. The NIAPSEC library created
by the vendor provides the following functions to allow for certificate path validation and revocation checking:
- public boolean isValid(List<Certificate> certs)
- public Boolean isValid(Certificate cert)
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The first function allows for validation and revocation checking against a list of certificates, while the second checks
a singular certificate. Revocation checking is completed using OCSP. Please see the FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN
section for a further explanation on how the TOE handles revocation checking.
6.5 Security management
PP_MD_V3.1:FMT_MOF_EXT.1:
PP_MD_V3.1:FMT_SMF_EXT.1:
The TOE provides the management functions described in Table 6 Security Management Functions in section 5.
The table includes annotations describing the roles that have access to each service and how to access the service. The
TOE enforces administrative configured restrictions by rejecting user configuration (through the UI) when attempted.
It is worth noting that the TOE’s ability to specify authorized application repositories takes the form of allowing
enterprise applications (i.e., restricting applications to only those applications installed by an MDM Agent).
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FMT_SMF_EXT.1/WLAN:
The TOE provides the management functions described in Table 7 WLAN Security Management Functions in
section 5. As with Table 6 Security Management Functions, the table includes annotations describing the roles that
have access to each service and how to access the service. The TOE enforces administrative configured restrictions
by rejecting user configuration (through the UI) when attempted. It is worth noting that the TOE’s ability to specify
authorized application repositories takes the form of allowing enterprise applications (i.e., restricting applications to
only those applications installed by an MDM Agent).
PP_MD_V3.1:FMT_SMF_EXT.2:
The TOE offers MDM agents the ability to wipe protected data, wipe sensitive data, remove Enterprise applications,
and remove all device stored Enterprise resource data upon un-enrollment. The TOE offers MDM agents the ability
to wipe protected data (effectively wiping the device) at any time. Similarly, the TOE also offers the ability to remove
Enterprise applications and a full wipe of managed profile data of the TOE’s Enterprise data/applications at any time.
PP_MD_V3.1:FMT_SMF_EXT.3:
The TOE offers MDM agents and the user (through the “Settings->Security->Device administrators” menu) the ability
to view each application that has been granted admin rights, and further to see what operations each admin app has
been granted.
6.6 Protection of the TSF
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.1:
The Linux kernel of the TOE’s Android operating system provides address space layout randomization utilizing the
get_random_int(void) kernel random function to provide eight unpredictable bits to the base address of any user-space
memory mapping. The random function, though not cryptographic, ensures that one cannot predict the value of the
bits.
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.2:
The TOE utilizes 5.10, 4.19, 4.14 and 4.9 Linux kernels
(https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/kernel/modular-kernels#core-kernel-requirements), whose memory
management unit (MMU) enforces read, write, and execute permissions on all pages of virtual memory and ensures
that write and execute permissions are not simultaneously granted on all memory. The Android operating system
sets the ARM No eXecute (XN) bit on memory pages and the TOE’s ARMv8 Application Processor’s Memory
Management Unit (MMU) circuitry enforces the XN bits. From Android’s documentation
(https://source.android.com/devices/tech/security/index.html), Android supports 'Hardware-based No eXecute (NX)
to prevent code execution on the stack and heap. Section D.5 of the ARMv8 Architecture Reference Manual
contains additional details about the MMU of ARM-based processors:
http://infocenter.arm.com/help/index.jsp?topic=/com.arm.doc.ddi0487a.f/index.html.
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PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.3:
The TOE’s Android operating system provides explicit mechanisms to prevent stack buffer overruns in addition to
taking advantage of hardware-based No eXecute to prevent code execution on the stack and heap. Specifically, the
vendor builds the TOE (Android and support libraries) using gcc-fstack-protector compile option to enable stack
overflow protection and Android takes advantage of hardware-based eXecute-Never to make the stack and heap non-
executable. The vendor applies these protections to all TSF executable binaries and libraries.
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.4:
The TOE protects itself from modification by untrusted subjects using a variety of methods. The first protection
employed by the TOE is a Secure Boot process that uses cryptographic signatures to ensure the authenticity and
integrity of the bootloader and kernels using data fused into the device processor.
The TOE protects its REK by limiting access to only trusted applications within the TEE (Trusted Execution
Environment). The TOE key manager includes a TEE module which utilizes the REK to protect all other keys in the
key hierarchy. All TEE applications are cryptographically signed, and when invoked at runtime (at the behest of an
untrusted application), the TEE will only load the trusted application after successfully verifying its cryptographic
signature.
Additionally, the TOE’s Android operating system provides 'sandboxing' that ensures that each third-party mobile
application executes with the file permissions of a unique Linux user ID, in a different virtual memory space. This
ensures that applications cannot access each other’s memory space or files and cannot access the memory space or
files of other applications (notwithstanding access between applications with a common application developer).
The TOE, in its evaluated configuration has its bootloader in the locked state. This prevents a user from installing a
new software image via another method than Google’s proscribed OTA methods. The TOE allows an operator to
download and install an OTA update through the system settings (Settings->System->Advanced->System update-
>Check for update) while the phone is running, or by separately downloading an OTA image, and then “sideloading”
the OTA update from Android’s recovery mode. In both cases, the TOE will verify the digital signature of the new
OTA before applying the new firmware.
For the first install of the Common Criteria compliant build, the administrator must unlock the device’s bootloader
via the fastboot interface, “sideload” the correct build, reboot the phone back to the fastboot interface, re-lock the
bootloader, and finally start the phone normally. For both the locking and unlocking of the bootloader, the device is
factory reset as part of the process. This prevents an attacker from modifying or switching the image running on the
device to allow access to sensitive data. After this first install of the official build, further updates can be done via
normal OTA updates.
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_AEX_EXT.5:
The TOE models provide Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR) as a hardening feature to randomize
the location of kernel data structures at each boot, including the core kernel as a random physical address, mapping
the core kernel at a random virtual address in the vmalloc area, loading kernel modules at a random virtual address in
the vmalloc area, and mapping system memory at a random virtual address in the linear area. The entropy used to
dictate the randomization is based on the hardware present within the phone. For ARM devices, such as the TOE, 13–
25 bits of entropy are generated on boot, from which the starting memory address is generated.
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_BBD_EXT.1:
The TOE’s hardware and software architecture ensures separation of the application processor (AP) from the baseband
or communications processor (CP) through internal controls of the TOE’s SoC, which contains both the AP and the
CP. The AP restricts hardware access control through a protection unit that restricts software access from the baseband
processor through a dedicated 'modem interface'. The protection unit combines the functionality of the Memory
Protection Unit (MPU), the Register Protection Unit (RPU), and the Address Protection Unit (APU) into a single
function that conditionally grants access by a master to a software defined area of memory, to registers, or to a pre-
decoded address region, respectively. The modem interface provides a set of APIs (grouped into five categories) to
enable a high-level OS to send messages to a service defined on the modem/baseband processor. The combination of
hardware and software restrictions ensures that the TOE’s AP prevents software executing on the modem or baseband
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processor from accessing the resources of the application processor (outside of the defined methods, mediated by the
application processor).
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_JTA_EXT.1:
The TOE’s prevents access to its processor’s JTAG interface by requiring use of a signing key to authenticate prior to
gaining JTAG access. Only a JTAG image with the accompanying device serial number (which is different for each
mobile device) that has been signed by Google’s private key can be used to access a device’s JTAG interface. The
Google private key corresponds to the Google RSA 2048-bit public key (a SHA-256 hash of which is fused into the
TOE’s application processor).
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_KST_EXT.1:
The TOE does not store any plaintext key material in its internal Flash; the TOE encrypts all keys before storing them.
This ensures that irrespective of how the TOE powers down (e.g., a user commands the TOE to power down, the TOE
reboots itself, or battery depletes or is removed), all keys stored in the internal Flash are wrapped with a KEK. Please
refer to section 6.2 of the TSS for further information (including the KEK used) regarding the encryption of keys
stored in the internal Flash. As the TOE encrypts all keys stored in Flash, upon boot-up, the TOE must first decrypt
any keys in order to utilize them.
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_KST_EXT.2:
The TOE itself (i.e., the mobile device) comprises a cryptographic module that utilizes cryptographic libraries
including BoringSSL, application processor cryptography (which leverages AP hardware), and the following system-
level executables that utilize KEKs: vold, wpa_supplicant, and the Android Key Store.
1. vold and application processor hardware provides Data-At-Rest encryption of the user data partition in Flash
a. Qualcomm Inline Cryptographic Engine (ICE) on Snapdragon processors
b. Google Tensor Inline Storage Encryption (ISE) on Tensor processors
2. wpa_supplicant provides 802.11-2014/WPA2 services
3. the Android Key Store application provides key generation, storage, deletion services to mobile applications
and to user through the UI
The TOE ensures that plaintext key material is not exported by not allowing the REK to be exported and by ensuring
that only authenticated entities can request utilization of the REK. Furthermore, the TOE only allows the system-level
executables access to plaintext DEK values needed for their operation. The TSF software (the system-level
executables) protects those plaintext DEK values in memory both by not providing any access to these values and by
clearing them when no longer needed (in compliance with FCS_CKM_EXT.4). Note that the TOE does not use the
user’s biometric (fingerprint or face) to encrypt/protect key material (and instead only relies upon the user’s password).
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_KST_EXT.3:
The TOE does not provide any way to export plaintext DEKs or KEKs (including all keys stored in the Android Key
Store) as the TOE chains or directly encrypts all KEKs to the REK.
Furthermore, the components of the device are designed to prevent transmission of key material outside the device.
Each internal system component requiring access to a plaintext key (for example the Wi-Fi driver) must have the
necessary precursor(s), whether that be a password from the user or file access to key in Flash (for example the
encrypted AES key used for encryption of the Flash data partition). With those appropriate precursors, the internal
system-level component may call directly to the system-level library to obtain the plaintext key value. The system
library in turn requests decryption from a component executing inside the trusted execution environment and then
directly returns the plaintext key value (assuming that it can successfully decrypt the requested key, as confirmed by
the CCM/GCM verification) to the calling system component. That system component will then utilize that key (in
the example, the kernel which holds the key in order to encrypt and decrypt reads and writes to the encrypted user
data partition files in Flash). In this way, only the internal system components responsible for a given activity have
access to the plaintext key needed for the activity, and that component receives the plaintext key value directly from
the system library.
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For a user’s mobile applications, those applications do not have any access to any system-level components and only
have access to keys that the application has imported into the Android Key Store. Upon requesting access to a key,
the mobile application receives the plaintext key value back from the system library through the Android API. Mobile
applications do not have access to the memory space of any other mobile application so it is not possible for a malicious
application to intercept the plaintext key value to then log or transmit the value off the device.
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_NOT_EXT.1:
When the TOE encounters a critical failure (either a self-test failure or TOE software integrity verification failure), a
failure is message is displayed to the screen, and the TOE attempts to reboot. If the failure persists between boots, the
user may attempt to boot to the recovery mode/kernel to wipe data and perform a factory reset in order to recover the
device.
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_STM.1:
The TOE requires time for the Package Manager (which installs and verifies APK signatures and certificates), image
verifier, wpa_supplicant, and Android Key Store applications. These TOE components obtain time from the TOE
using system API calls [e.g., time() or gettimeofday()]. An application (unless a system application is residing in
/system/priv-app or signed by the vendor) cannot modify the system time as mobile applications need the Android
'SET_TIME' permission to do so. Likewise, only a process with root privileges can directly modify the system time
using system-level APIs. The TOE uses the Cellular Carrier time (obtained through the Carrier’s network time server)
as a trusted source; however, the user can also manually set the time through the TOE’s user interface. Further, this
stored time is used both for the time/date tags in audit logs and is used to track inactivity timeouts that force the TOE
into a locked state.
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TST_EXT.1:
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FPT_TST_EXT.1/WLAN:
The TOE automatically performs known answer power on self-tests (POST) on its cryptographic algorithms to ensure
that they are functioning correctly. Each component providing cryptography (application processor, and BoringSSL)
performs known answer tests on their cryptographic algorithms to ensure they are working correctly. Should any of
the tests fail, the TOE displays an error message stating “Boot Failure” and halts the boot process, displays an error to
the screen, and forces a reboot of the device.
Algorithm Implemented in Description
AES encryption/decryption BoringSSL Comparison of known answer to calculated value
ECDH key agreement BoringSSL Comparison of known answer to calculated value
DRBG random bit generation BoringSSL Comparison of known answer to calculated value
ECDSA sign/verify BoringSSL Comparison of known answer to calculated value
HMAC-SHA BoringSSL Comparison of known answer to calculated value
RSA sign/verify BoringSSL Comparison of known answer to calculated value
SHA hashing BoringSSL Comparison of known answer to calculated value
AES encryption/decryption Application Processor Comparison of known answer to calculated value
HMAC-SHA Application Processor Comparison of known answer to calculated value
DRBG random bit generation Application Processor Comparison of known answer to calculated value
SHA hashing Application Processor Comparison of known answer to calculated value
AES-XTS encrypt/decrypt Application Processor Comparison of known answer to calculated value
Table 22 Power-up Cryptographic Algorithm Known Answer Tests
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TST_EXT.2(1):
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TST_EXT.2(2):
The TOE ensures a secure boot process in which the TOE verifies the digital signature of the bootloader software for
the Application Processor (using a public key whose hash resides in the processor’s internal fuses) before transferring
control. The bootloader, in turn, verifies the signature of the Linux kernel it loads. The TOE performs checking of the
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entire /system and /vendor partitions through use of Android’s dm_verity mechanism (and while the TOE will still
operate, it will log any blocks/executables that have been modified).
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TUD_EXT.1:
The TOE’s user interface provides a method to query the current version of the TOE software/firmware (Android
version, baseband version, kernel version, build number, and software version) and hardware (model and version).
Additionally, the TOE provides users the ability to review the currently installed apps (including 3rd party 'built-in'
applications) and their version.
PP_MD_V3.1:FPT_TUD_EXT.2:
The TOE verifies all OTA (Over The Air) updates to the TOE software (which includes baseband processor updates)
using a public key chaining ultimately to the Root Public Key, a hardware protected key whose SHA-256 hash resides
inside the application processor. Should this verification fail, the software update will fail and the update will not be
installed.
The application processor verifies the bootloader’s authenticity and integrity (thus tying the bootloader and subsequent
stages to a hardware root of trust: the SHA-256 hash of the Root Public Key, which cannot be reprogrammed after the
“write-enable” fuse has been blown).
The Android OS on the TOE requires that all applications bear a valid signature before Android will install the
application.
Additionally, Android allows updates through Google Play updates, including both APK and APEX files. Both file
types use Android APK signature format and the TOE verifies the accompanying signature prior to installing the file
(additionally, Android ensures that updates to existing files use the same signing certificate).
PP_MD_V3.1:ALC_TSU_EXT.1:
Google supports a bug filing system for the Android OS outlined here:
https://source.android.com/setup/contribute/report-bugs. This allows developers or users to search for, file, and vote
on bugs that need to be fixed. This helps to ensure that all bugs that affect large numbers of people get pushed up in
priority to be fixed. The method outlined above requires the user to submit their bug to Android’s website. As such,
the user of the device needs to establish a trusted channel web connection to securely file the bug by following the
set-up steps to establish a secure HTTPS/TLS/EAP-TLS connection from the TOE, then visiting the above web
portal to submit the report.
Google also commits to pushing out monthly security updates for the Android operating system (including the Java
layer and kernel, not including applications). Monthly security updates have historically been supported on Google
products for 3 years after release. These systematic updates are designed to address the highest issue problems as
quickly as possible and allows Google to ensure their Pixel products remain as safe as possible and any issues are
addressed promptly.
Google’s creates updates and patches to resolve reported issues as quickly as possible, at which point the update is
provided to the wireless carriers. The delivery time for resolving an issue depends on the severity, and can be as rapid
as a few days before the carrier handoff for high priority cases. The wireless carriers perform additional tests to ensure
the updates will not adversely impact their networks and then plan device rollouts once that testing is complete. Carrier
updates usually take at least two weeks to as much as two months (depending on the type and severity of the update)
to be rolled out to customers. However, the Carriers also release monthly Maintenance Releases in order to address
security-critical issues. Google maintains a security blog (https://android-developers.googleblog.com/) to disseminate
information directly to the public.
6.7 TOE access
PP_MD_V3.1:FTA_SSL_EXT.1:
The TOE transitions to its locked state either immediately after a User initiates a lock by pressing the power button (if
configured) or after a (also configurable) period of inactivity, and as part of that transition, the TOE will display a
lock screen (the KeyGuard lock screen) to obscure the previous contents and play a “lock sound” to indicate the
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phone’s transition; however, the TOE’s lock screen still displays email notifications, calendar appointments, user
configured widgets, text message notifications, the time, date, call notifications, battery life, signal strength, and carrier
network. But without authenticating first, a user cannot perform any related actions based upon these notifications
(they cannot respond to emails, calendar appointments, or text messages) other than the actions assigned in Extended:
Timing of Authentication (PP_MD_V3.1:FIA_UAU_EXT.2).
Note that during power up, the TOE presents the user with an unlock screen stating “unlock for all features and data”.
While at this screen, the TOE has already decrypted Device Encrypted (DE) files within the userdata partition, but
cannot yet decrypt the user’s Credential Encrypted (CE) files. The user can only access a subset of device
functionality before authenticating (e.g. the user can making an emergency call, receive incoming calls, receiving
alarms, and any other “direct boot” functionality). After the user enters their password, the TOE decrypts the user’s
CE files within the user data partition and the user has unlocked the full functionality of the phone. After this initial
authentication, upon (re)locking the phone, the TOE presents the user with the previously mentioned KeyGuard lock
screen. While locked, the actions described in FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 are available for the user to utilize.
PP_MD_V3.1:FTA_TAB.1:
The TOE can be configured to display a user-specified message on the Lock screen, and additionally an administrator
can also set a Lock screen message using an MDM.
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FTA_WSE_EXT.1:
The TOE allows an administrator to specify (through the use of an MDM) a list of wireless networks (SSIDs) to which
the user may direct the TOE to connect to, the security type, authentication protocol, and the client credentials to be
used for authentication. When not enrolled with an MDM, the TOE allows the user to control to which wireless
networks the TOE should connect, but does not provide an explicit list of such networks, rather the user may scan for
available wireless network (or directly enter a specific wireless network), and then connect. Once a user has connected
to a wireless network, the TOE will automatically reconnect to that network when in range and the user has enabled
the TOE’s Wi-Fi radio.
6.8 Trusted path/channels
PP_MD_V3.1:FTP_ITC_EXT.1:
PP_WLAN_CLI_EP_V1.0:FTP_ITC_EXT.1/WLAN:
The TOE provides secured (encrypted and mutually authenticated) communication channels between itself and other
trusted IT products through the use of IEEE 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS and TLS, HTTPS. The TOE permits
itself and applications to initiate communicate via the trusted channel, and the TOE initiates communications via the
WPA2 (IEEE 802.11-2012, 802.1X with EAP-TLS) trusted channel for connection to a wireless access point. The
TOE provides mobile applications and MDM agents access to HTTPS and TLS via published APIs, thus facilitating
administrative communication and configured enterprise connections. These APIs are accessible to any application
that needs an encrypted end-to-end trusted channel.