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Reference: 2017-23-INF-2630-v1
Target: Expediente
Date: 11.12.2018
Created by: CERT10
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
Dossier # 2017-23
TOE Big Switch Networks Big Cloud Fabric 4.7.0
Applicant 4804334 - Big Switch Networks, Inc.
References
[EXT-3456] Certification Request
[EXT-4492] Evaluation Technical Report
Certification report of the product Big Switch Networks Big Cloud Fabric 4.7.0, as requested in [EXT-
3456] dated 20/06/2017, and evaluated by Epoche & Espri S.L.U., as detailed in the Evaluation
Technical Report [EXT-4492] received on 23/10/2018.
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...........................................................................................................................3
TOE SUMMARY...................................................................................................................................3
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................4
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS...........................................................................................4
IDENTIFICATION.....................................................................................................................................6
SECURITY POLICIES.................................................................................................................................6
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .........................................................................6
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS..................................................................................6
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY ...............................................................................7
ARCHITECTURE.......................................................................................................................................7
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE ....................................................................................................................7
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE...................................................................................................................9
DOCUMENTS........................................................................................................................................10
PRODUCT TESTING...............................................................................................................................10
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION .............................................................................................................11
EVALUATION RESULTS .........................................................................................................................12
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM...............................................12
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................................................12
GLOSSARY.............................................................................................................................................12
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....................................................................................................................................13
SECURITY TARGET / SECURITY TARGET LITE (IF APPLICABLE)..............................................................13
RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS...............................................................................................................14
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)......................................................14
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA).....................................................................14
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the product Big
Switch Networks Big Cloud Fabric 4.7.0.
Big Switch Networks Big Cloud Fabric 4.7.0 software is a Software-Defined Network (SDN) that
provides network scalability and resilience, centralized network management and automation for
data centres, and reduced costs due to the disaggregation of network device hardware and
software through the use of brite-box switches. Big Cloud Fabric (BCF) provides Layer 2 (L2)
switching, Layer 3 (L3) routing, and higher layer services through service insertion and chaining.
Developer/manufacturer: Big Switch Networks, Inc.
Sponsor: Big Switch Networks, Inc..
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI).
ITSEF: Epoche and Espri.
Protection Profile: None.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria EAL2+ ALC_FLR.2.
Evaluation end date: 23/10/2018.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL2 (augmented with ALC_FLR.2)
have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Epoche & Espri S.L.U. assigns
the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the EAL2,
as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R5 and the CEM v3.1 R5.
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product Big Switch Networks Big Cloud Fabric 4.7.0, a positive resolution is proposed.
TOE SUMMARY
BCF is installed on a Clos architecture switching fabric comprised of dual BCF Controllers configured
in a High Availability (HA) cluster, and leaf-spine switches (see Figure 2). The HA cluster provides
redundancy for continued network management and traffic forwarding in the event of a controller
failure. The leaf-spine architecture optimizes bandwidth between switch ports within the data
centre by creating a high-capacity fabric using multiple spine switches that interconnect the edge
ports on each leaf switch. This design provides consistent latency and minimizes the hops between
servers in different racks. The fabric design is modular and scalable; leaf switches can be added to
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increase the number of switch edge ports, whereas fabric bandwidth can be increased by adding
more spine switches.
The fabric traffic is separated into control, management, and data networks. Control network traffic
includes the configurations and policies pushed from the BCF Controller to the switches running
Switch Light OS. Control network traffic is secured using SSH and TLS v1.2. The management
network traffic includes traffic between the BCF Controller and the management console, RADIUS
server, and Operational Environment (OE) components. Management network traffic is secured
using HTTPS, SSH, and TLS v1.2. Data network traffic includes production data between the leaf and
spine switches. Production data from other networks in the data centre or the internet can only
ingress and egress the TOE via a leaf switch. This includes external production data from other
networks, internal or external to the data centre, or the Internet.
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level EAL2 and the
evidences required by the additional component ALC_FLR.2, according to Common Criteria v3.1 R5.
Class Family/Component
ASE: Security Target Evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 , ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_OBJ.2, ASE_REQ.2,
ASE_SPD.1 and ASE_TSS.1
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.2 and ADV_TDS.1
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 and AGD_PRE.1
ALC: Life cycle support ALC_CMC.2, ALC_CMS.2, ALC_DEL.1 and ALC_FLR.2
ATE: Tests ATE_COV.1, ATE_FUN.1 and ATE_IND.2
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.2
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements, according to
Common Criteria v3.1 R5:
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Class Component
FAU (Security Audit)
FAU_GEN.1 - Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.2 - User Identity Association
FAU_SAR.1 - Audit review
Cryptographic Support (FCS)
FCS_CKM.1 - Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4 - Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1 - Cryptographic operation
User Data Protection (FDP)
FDP_IFC.1(a) - Subset information flow control (BCF
Controller)
FDP_IFC.1(b) - Subset information flow control (BCF Switch)
FDP_IFF.1(a) - Simple security attributes (BCF Controller)
FDP_IFF.1(b) - Simple security attributes (BCF Switch)
Identification and
Authentication (FIA)
FIA_UAU.2 - User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.5 - Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.7 - Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UID.2 - User authentication before any action
Security Management (FMT)
FMT_MSA.1(a) - Management of security attributes (BCF
Controller)
FMT_MSA.1(b) - Management of security attributes (BCF
Switch)
FMT_MSA.3(a) - Static attribute initialization (BCF
Controller)
FMT_MSA.3(b) - Static attribute initialization (BCF Switch)
FMT_SMF.1 - Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 - Security roles
Protection of the TSF (FPT)
FPT_FLS.1 - Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_ITT.1 - Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
TOE Access (FTA) FTA_SSL.4 - User-initiated termination
Trusted Path/Channel (FTP)
FTP_ITC.1 - Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_TRP.1 - Trusted path
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IDENTIFICATION
Product: Big Switch Networks Big Cloud Fabric 4.7.0
Security Target: Big Switch Networks Big Cloud Fabric 4.7.0 Security Target, v 0.8, October 5 2018
Protection Profile: None.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R5 EAL2 + ALC_FLR.2
SECURITY POLICIES
An Organizational Security Policy (OSP) is a set of security rules, procedures, or guidelines imposed
by an organization on the operational environment of the TOE. There are no OSPs defined for this
Security Target.
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The assumptions detailed in [ST], chapter 3.3 (Assumptions), are constraints to the conditions used
to assure the security properties and functionalities compiled by the security target. These
assumptions have been applied during the evaluation in order to determine if the identified
vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these assumptions for its
operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them could not be assumed, it would not
be possible to assure the secure operation of the TOE.
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS
The threats detailed in [ST], chapter 3.1 (Threats to Security), do not suppose a risk for the product
Big Switch Networks Big Cloud Fabric 4.7.0, although the agents implementing attacks have the
attack potential according to the Basic attack potential of EAL2 and always fulfilling the usage
assumptions and the proper security policies satisfaction.
For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product security
properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
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OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some of the
objectives of the defined security problem.
The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are detailed in [ST], chapter
4.2 (Security objectives for the operational environment).
The details of the product operational environment (assumptions, threats and organisational
security policies) and the TOE security requirements are included in the associated security target.
ARCHITECTURE
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE
The TOE is separated into various subsystems that provide the TOE Security Functions. A diagram
illustrating the different subsystems and TOE Security Functionality Interfaces (TSFIs) that compose
the TOE (see Figure 1).
The TOE boundary does not include the hardware on which the software-only TOE is installed or any of the other
operational environment components shown in
Figure 1. The TOE boundary includes the TOE’s two software components BCF 4.7.0 and Switch
Light OS 4.7.0, and the subsystems and TSFIs in the following table:
TOE Component Subsystem TSFI
BCF 4.7.0
Controller Subsystem
GUI
CLI
REST API
Controller OpenSSL Crypto Subsystem None
BC-FJA Crypto Subsystem None
Switch Light OS
4.7.0
Spine Switch Subsystem None
Spine Crypto Subsystem None
Switch Light OS
4.7.0
Leaf Switch Subsystem Data
Leaf Crypto Subsystem None
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Figure 1. TOE diagram.
TLSv1.2 – Transport Layer Security version 1.2
BC-FJA – Bouncy Castle FIPS7 Java API
GNU – GNU’s Not Unix
HTTPS8 – HyperText Transport Protocol Service
NTP – Network Time Protocol
OpenSSL – Open Secure Sockets Layer
OS – Operating System
RADIUS - Remote Dial-in Access Service
SSH – Secure Shell
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PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE
The leaf-spine architecture, which can be seen in Figure 2, optimizes bandwidth between switch
ports within the data center by creating a high-capacity fabric using multiple spine switches that
interconnect the edge ports on each leaf switch. This design provides consistent latency and
minimizes the hops between servers in different racks. The fabric design is modular and scalable;
leaf switches can be added to increase the number of switch edge ports, whereas fabric bandwidth
can be increased by adding more spine switches.
Figure 2. Evaluated Configuration of the TOE.
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DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made available
together to the users of the evaluated version.
 Big Switch Networks Big Cloud Fabric 4.7 CLI Reference Guide; RELEASE DATE: May 24, 2018;
Document Version 1.0, May 24, 2018
 Big Switch Networks Big Cloud Fabric 4.7 Deployment Guide; RELEASE DATE: May 24, 2018;
Document Version 1.0, May 24, 2018
 Big Switch Networks Big Cloud Fabric 4.7 GUI Guide; RELEASE DATE: May 24, 2018; Document
Version 1.0, May 24, 2018
 Big Switch Networks Big Cloud Fabric 4.7 Hardware Compatibility List; RELEASE DATE: May 24,
2018; Document Version 1.0, May 24, 2018
 Big Switch Networks Big Cloud Fabric 4.7 Hardware Guide; RELEASE DATE: May 24, 2018;
Document Version 1.0, May 24, 2018
 Big Switch Networks Big Cloud Fabric 4.7.0 Release Notes; RELEASE DATE: May 24, 2018;
Document Version 1.3, July 11, 2018
 Big Switch Networks Big Cloud Fabric 4.7 REST API Guide; RELEASE DATE: May 24, 2018;
Document Version 1.0, May 24, 2018
 Big Switch Networks Big Cloud Fabric 4.7 System Messages Guide; RELEASE DATE: May 24, 2018;
Document Version 1.0, May 24, 2018
 Big Switch Networks Big Cloud Fabric 4.7 User Guide; RELEASE DATE: May 24, 2018; Document
Version 1.0, May 24, 2018
 Freeradius Installation and Setup (Ubuntu) 2017-Dec-20
 Big Switch Networks Big Cloud Fabric 4.7.0 Guidance Documentation Supplement v0.7
PRODUCT TESTING
The developer has executed test for all the security functions. All the tests have been performed by
the developer in its premises, with a satisfactory result.
During the evaluation process it has been verified each unit test checking that the security
functionality that covers is been identified and also that the kind of test is appropriate to the
function that is intended to test.
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All the tests have been developed using the testing scenario appropriate to the established
architecture in the security target. It has also been checked that the obtained results during the
tests fit or correspond to the previously estimated results.
The evaluator has devised and executed a test plan where a subset of test which covers the main
number of test from the vendor has been repeated. Also the evaluator has devised and executed an
independent testing plan to complement the evaluator’s tests and give more assurance to the
functionality coverage.
It has been checked that the obtained results conform to the expected results and in the cases
where a deviation in respect to the expected results was present, the evaluator has confirmed that
this variation neither represents any security problem nor a decrease in the functional capacity of
the product.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The software and hardware requirements, as well as the referenced options are indicated below.
Therefore, for the operation of the product Big Switch Networks Big Cloud Fabric 4.7.0 it is
necessary the disposition of the following software components:
 TOE software BCF v4.7.0 installed in BCF controllers (BCF Controller 1 and BCF Controller 2, see
Figure 2)
 Switch Light OS v4.7.0 installed in the BCF leaf and spine switches (see Figure 2).
Regarding the hardware components, the only requirement is that they shall support the software
elements previously detailed.
Among all the possibilities offered by these software and hardware requirements, the configuration
selected for the evaluation is the following:
 For the BCF v4.7.0 software:
 BCF Controller appliances (2 units) - BCF-CTLR-HWB-PRP / Intel Xeon E5-2620 v3 2.40GHz
 For the Switch Light OS v4.7.0:
 Spine switches - Dell S6010-ON / Intel Xeon 12/24
 Leaf switches - Dell S4048-ON / Intel Xeon 12/24
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EVALUATION RESULTS
The product Big Switch Networks Big Cloud Fabric 4.7.0 has been evaluated against the Security
Target [ST].
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL2 have been assigned a “PASS”
verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Epoche & Espri S.L.U. assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the
whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the evaluation level EAL2, as defined
by Common Criteria v3.1 R5 and the CEM v3.1 R5.
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM
Next, recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided. These have been
collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be considered when using the product.
The laboratory gives the following security recommendation for the TOE environment:
The fulfilment of the assumptions indicated in the security target is a key point as it implies TOE
environment configurations that leave some potential vulnerabilities out of the scope.
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product Epoche & Espri S.L.U., a positive resolution is proposed.
GLOSSARY
BCF Big Cloud Fabric
Brite-Box Vendor branded switches that are shipped without an embedded network operating
system
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
OC Organismo de Certificación
SDN Software-Defined Network (SDN)
TOE Target of Evaluation
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the product:
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Version 3.1,
R5 Final, April 2017.
[ST] Big Switch Networks Big Cloud Fabric 4.7.0 Security Target, v 0.8, October 5 2018
SECURITY TARGET / SECURITY TARGET LITE (IF APPLICABLE)
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is available in the
Certification Body:
 Big Switch Networks Big Cloud Fabric 4.7.0 Security Target, v 0.8, October 5 2018.
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RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under
certain conditions was agreed.
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It
defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at
higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL
4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For "Smartcards and similar devices" a
SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical
Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common
Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The current list of
signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the
agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogis.org.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this
agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common
Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers
CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on
assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation
(ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
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The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates based on CCRA-
2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of CCRA-
2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification procedures and for Assurance Continuity
(maintenance and re-certification)of old certificates a transition period on the recognition of
certificates according to the rules of CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL
4 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government representatives from
the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the
United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the
website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this
certification is recognized under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.