National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
JUNOS 24.4R2 FOR MX240/480/960 ROUTERS AND
EX9204/9208/9214 SWITCHES
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11700 -2026
Dated: June 25, 2026
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, SUITE: 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jaemond Reyes
Jenn Dotson
Lisa Mitchell
Lori Sarem
Randy Heimann
Sheldon Durrant
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Pratheek Menon
Manohar Negi
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 5
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 7
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 9
3.1 TOE Description.............................................................................................................................................9
3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms..............................................................................................................................9
3.3 TOE Architecture...........................................................................................................................................9
3.4 Physical Boundaries .....................................................................................................................................11
4 Security Policy...................................................................................................................... 13
4.1 Security Audit ...............................................................................................................................................13
4.2 Cryptographic Support................................................................................................................................13
4.3 Identification and Authentication ...............................................................................................................13
4.4 Security Management ..................................................................................................................................13
4.5 Protection of the TSF ...................................................................................................................................14
4.6 TOE Access ...................................................................................................................................................14
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels ................................................................................................................................14
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ............................................................... 16
5.1 Assumptions and Threats ............................................................................................................................16
5.2 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................16
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 17
7 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 18
7.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................18
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................18
8 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 19
8.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................19
8.2 Excluded Functionality ................................................................................................................................19
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 21
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................21
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................21
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................21
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................22
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................22
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................22
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................23
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 24
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 25
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 26
13 Glossary................................................................................................................................ 27
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14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 28
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is
where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those
security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5
and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration
are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the Junos 24.4R2 for MX240/480/960 Routers and EX9204/9208/9214 Switches
Series Target of Evaluation (TOE). It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the
conformance results. This VR is not an endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S.
Government, and no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This VR applies only
to the specific version and configuration of the product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in June 2026. The information in this report
is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report, all
written by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common
Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the
• PP-Configuration for Network Devices and MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 2.0
(CFG_NDcPP-MACsec_V2.0) which includes the following components:
o collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 6 December
2023 [CPP_ND_V3.0E]
o PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 02 March 2023
[MOD_MACSEC_V1.0]
• Functional Package for SSH, Version 1.0, 13 May 2021, [PKG_SSH_V1.0]
The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5), as
interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in the Protection Profile (PP). This VR applies
only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence
provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the ST. Based on these findings,
the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions
6
justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the
ETR are consistent with the evidence produced.
7
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories
called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products against
PPs containing Assurance Activities, which are interpretations of Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM) work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security evaluation contract
with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the
evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Product Compliant List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Junos 24.4R2 for MX240/480/960 Routers and EX9204/9208/9214 Switches
Protection Profile • PP-Configuration for Network Devices and MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 2.0
(CFG_NDcPP-MACsec_V2.0) which includes the following components:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 6
December 2023 [CPP_ND_V3.0E]
• PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 02 March 2023
[MOD_MACSEC_V1.0]
Functional Package for SSH, Version 1.0, 13 May 2021, [PKG_SSH_V1.0]
Security Target Junos 24.4R2 for MX240/480/960 Routers and EX9204/9208/9214 Switches Security
Target, Version 0.6, June 18, 2026
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for MX240/480/960 and EX9204/9208/9214 Switches on
JUNOS 24.4R2, Version 0.4, June 3, 2026
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor HPE Juniper Networking
Developer HPE Juniper Networking
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
Rockville, MD
8
Item Identifier
CCEVS Validators The MITRE Corporation
9
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the ST. See
the ST for a complete description of the TOE and capabilities.
The TOE is the HPE Juniper Networking Junos 24.4R2 for MX240/480/960 Routers and
EX9204/9208/9214 Switches with MACsec on the MPC10E/EX9200/MPC3E Series Line Cards.
3.1 TOE Description
The TOE is a secure network device that protects itself largely by offering only a minimal logical
interface to the network and attached nodes. It includes the Junos OS firmware, JUNOS OS
24.4R2, which is a special purpose OS offering no general-purpose computing capabilities. Junos
OS implements both management and control functions as well as all IP routing.
3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration and any excluded functionality is provided in Section
8.
3.3 TOE Architecture
The architecture components of the MX240, MX480, and MX960 are:
• Modular Control Plane: The platforms utilize a redundant Routing Engine (RE) for the
control plane, with available models including the RE-S-X6-64G and RE-S-X6-128G,
both featuring a 6-core 2.0 GHz CPU with 64 GB and 128 GB of memory, respectively.
• Unified Operating System: The architecture runs on the modular Junos OS, which
provides routing, switching, security, and service features, as well as supporting
automation tools and telemetry.
• Programmable Forwarding: At the core of the hardware is the programmable Trio
chipset, which enables wire-rate forwarding, service agility, and allows for the
implementation of inline services and telemetry.
• Inline MACsec Technology: The platforms support robust data plane security through
features like integrated Layer 2 MACsec, with line cards such as the MPC-10E providing
inline AES-256 MACsec line-side encryption.
The architecture components of the EX9204, EX9208, EX9214 are:
• Modular Chassis Design: The EX9204 (4-slot), EX9208 (8-slot), and EX9214 (14-slot)
are modular chassis that share a common set of line cards, Routing Engines, and Switch
Fabric modules.
10
• Centralized Control Plane: The architecture is built for high availability with support
for redundant EX9200-RE2 Routing Engines. The RE2 features a six-core, 2 GHz Intel
processor with 64 GB of DRAM to run the Junos OS and manage all control plane
functions.
• Programmable Forwarding ASIC: The platforms are based on "Juniper One," a
custom-designed ASIC that provides a programmable Packet Forwarding Engine (PFE),
allowing new networking protocols and features to be added via software updates.
• High-Density Cryptographic-Capable Line Cards: The chassis support various line
cards, including the EX9200-15C, which provides 15 ports of 100GbE/40GbE with
Media Access Control Security (MACsec) capability, each of which can house 10-gigabit
small form-factor pluggable plus (SFP+) transceivers and includes hardware support for
cryptographic functions.
• Integrated MACsec Technology: These cryptographic capabilities are exposed via
MACsec technology (IEEE 802.1ae) with AES-256-bit encryption, supported online
cards like the EX9200-15C to provide link-layer data confidentiality, integrity, and
authentication.
• Secure OS and Logging: The EX9200-RE2 runs the carrier-class Junos OS, which
stores its images and system logs on dual 64 GB SSDs. For secure management, the OS
provides secure access protocols, including SSHv2.
• Separated Management and Control: The EX9200-RE2 modules communicate with
the line cards over a dedicated internal out-of-band Gigabit Ethernet control interface,
separating management traffic from the data plane.
Network management is secured using the SSH protocol. All management, whether from a user
connecting to a terminal or from the network, requires successful authentication. In the evaluated
deployment the TOE is managed and configured via Command Line Interface, either via a
directly connected console or over the network secured using the SSH protocol.
The TOE implements MACsec between adjacent devices. All traffic communicated between the
devices including frames for LLDP (Link Layer Discovery Protocol), DHCP (Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol), ARP (Address Resolution Protocol), STP (Spanning Tree Protocol),
Ethernet Control frames, etc. (the exceptions to this protection are Destination MAC and Source
MAC addresses in MACsec and MKA frames).
MACsec can be deployed in point-to-point mode or shared mode with multiple stations. In the
evaluated configuration MACsec must be configured individually on each point-to-point
Ethernet link, such that a pair of MACsec devices (connected by a physical medium) protect
Ethernet frames switched or routed from one device to the other. The two MACsec devices are
provided with a Connectivity Association Key (CAK) and utilize the MACsec Key Agreement
11
(MKA) protocol to create a secure tunnel. MKA is used by the two MACsec devices to agree
upon MACsec keys. MACsec must be configured to protect all traffic between the devices, with
the exception of the MKA or Ethernet control traffic such as EAP over LAN (EAPOL) frames.
The devices will first exchange MKA frames, which serve to determine if the peer is an
authorized peer and agree upon a shared key and MACsec cipher suite used to set up a transmit
(Tx) Security Association (SA) and a receive (Rx) SA. Once the SAs are set up, MACsec-
protected frames traverse the unprotected link.
The following appliance models constitute the variations of the TOE:
Model
Routing Engine
(RE)
RE-CPU
MACsec Line
card
MIC-3D-10GE-SFP-E
within MPC3E-3D-NG
MX240
RE-S-X6-128G
RE-S-X6-64G
HASWELL-
EP, Intel Xeon
E5-2608L V3
MPC10E-10C
and MPC10E-
15C, with JNPR
Penta Silicon
MACsec ASIC
BCM82756 MACsec
ASIC with CAVP num
AES4550
MX480
MX960
EX9204 EX9200-RE2 HASWELL-
EP, Intel Xeon
E5-2608L V3
EX9200-15C
with JNPR Penta
Silicon MACsec
ASIC
Not supported
EX9208
EX9214
Note that the RE-S-X6 and EX9200-RE2 routing engines have identical hardware and are simply
marketed with different names.
3.4 Physical Boundaries
The following figure provides a visual depiction of an example TOE deployment. The TOE
boundary is surrounded by a red line.
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13
4 Security Policy
The TOE provides the security functions required by the CPP_ND_V3.0E,
MOD_MACSEC_V1.0, and PKG_SSH_V1.0. These security functionalities are listed in more
detail in the sections below.
4.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates audit events for all start-up and shutdown functions as well as all auditable
events specified in Tables 12 and 13 of the ST. Auditable events are stored in the syslog files on
the appliance and can be sent to an external log server (via Netconf over SSH). Auditable events
include start-up and shutdown of the audit functions, authentication events, and all SFR-specific
events required by the applicable Protection Profiles, Packages and Modules. Audit records
include the date and time, event category, event type, username, and the outcome of the event
(success or failure). Local syslog storage limits are configurable and are monitored. If the storage
limit is reached the oldest logs will be overwritten.
4.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE implements an SSH server to support protected communications for administrators to
establish secure sessions and to connect to external syslog servers. The TOE requires that
applications exchanging information with it are successfully authenticated prior to any exchange
(i.e. applications connecting over SSH). Layer 2 communication over point-to-point Ethernet
links between the TOE and compliant peers can be secured using MACsec. The TOE includes
cryptographic modules that implement the underlying cryptographic services, including key
management and protection of stored keys, algorithms, random bit generation and crypto
administration. The cryptographic modules provide confidentiality and integrity services for
authentication and for protecting communications with connecting applications. Details on
cryptographic implementations by the TOE are available in the ST.
4.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE supports Role Based Access Control. All users must be authenticated to the TOE prior
to being granted access to any management actions. The TOE supports password-based
authentication and public key based authentication. Based on the assigned role, a user is granted
a set of privileges to access the system. Administrative users must provide unique identification
and authentication data before any administrative access to the system is granted. Authentication
data entered and stored on the TOE is protected.
4.4 Security Management
The TOE provides a Security Administrator role that is responsible for:
• Ability to administer the TOE remotely
• Ability to configure the access banner
• Ability to configure the remote session inactivity time before session termination
14
• Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using digital signature capability
prior to installing those updates
• Ability to start and stop services
• Ability to configure local audit behaviour
• Ability to modify the behaviour of the transmission of audit data to an external IT entity
• Ability to manage the cryptographic keys
• Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality
• Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying
• Ability to re-enable an Administrator account
• Ability to configure the local session inactivity time before session termination or locking
• Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1
• Ability to set the time which is used for timestamps
• Ability to configure NTP
• Ability to administer the TOE locally
• Ability to manage the trusted public keys database
• Ability to manage a PSK-based CAK and install it in the device
• Ability to manage the Key Server to create, delete, and activate MKA participants using
the CLI commands
• Ability to specify the lifetime of a CAK
• Ability to enable, disable, or delete a PSK-based CAK using CLI commands
The devices are managed through a Command Line Interface (CLI). The CLI is accessible
through local (serial) console connection or remote administrative (SSH) session.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects all passwords, pre-shared keys, symmetric keys and private keys from
unauthorized disclosure. Passwords are stored using sha256 or sha512. The TOE executes self-
tests during initial start-up to ensure correct operation and enforcement of its security functions.
An administrator can install software updates to the TOE. The TOE allows manual setting of
time by the administrator and is also capable of syncing time to an NTP server.
4.6 TOE Access
The TOE displays a customizable banner before any administrative session can be established
with it. The TOE will terminate local or remote interactive sessions after a specified period of
session inactivity configured by an administrator. An administrator can terminate their own
interactive local or remote sessions.
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE supports SSHv2 for secure communications with authorized IT entities such as syslog
servers. The TOE supports SSHv2 (remote CLI) for secure remote administration. The TOE also
15
supports MACsec for securing data at Layer 2 between TOE and MACsec supporting peer
device.
16
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 6 December 2023
(NDcPP30e)
• PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 02 March 2023
• Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 13 May 2021
That information has not been reproduced here and the CPP_ND_V3.0E, MOD_MACSEC_V1.0,
and PKG_SSH_V1.0 should be consulted if there is interest in that material.
5.2 Clarification of Scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in
CPP_ND_V3.0E, MOD_MACSEC_V1.0, and PKG_SSH_V1.0 as described for this TOE in the
ST. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All
other functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this
evaluation is defined within the claimed PP/PP-Modules/Package listed below.
o collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 6 December
2023 [CPP_ND_V3.0E]
o PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 02 March 2023
[MOD_MACSEC_V1.0]
o Functional Package for SSH, Version 1.0, 13 May 2021, [PKG_SSH_V1.0].
• Consistent with the expectations of the PP, this evaluation did not specifically search for,
nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities
to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one
that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical
sophistication and resources.
• The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities
included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
17
6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for this evaluation:
• Junos 24.4R2 for MX240/480/960 Routers and EX9204/9208/9214 Switches Security
Target, Version 0.6, June 18, 2026
• Junos® OS Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for MX240, MX480,
MX960, EX9204, EX9208 and EX9214 Devices, Release 24.4R2, June 18, 2026.
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online
was not included in the scope of the evaluation and should not be relied upon when configuring
or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in
the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to download the
configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as evaluated.
18
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in the Evaluation Technical Report for MX240/480/960 and
EX9204/9208/9214 Switches on JUNOS 24.4R2, Version 0.4, 03 June 2026 [ETR], which is not
publicly available. The AAR provides an overview of testing and the prescribed assurance
activities.
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to the vendor-provided guidance
documentation and ran the tests specified in the claimed PP/PP-Modules/Package listed below:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 6 December 2023
[CPP_ND_V3.0E]
• PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 02 March 2023
[MOD_MACSEC_V1.0]
• Functional Package for SSH, Version 1.0, 13 May 2021, [PKG_SSH_V1.0].
The Independent Testing activity is documented in the AAR, which is publicly available, and is
not duplicated here.
19
8 TOE Evaluated Configuration
8.1 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the following models:
Model
Routing Engine
(RE)
RE-CPU
MACsec Line
card
MIC-3D-10GE-SFP-E
within MPC3E-3D-NG
MX240 RE-S-X6-128G
RE-S-X6-64G
HASWELL-
EP, Intel Xeon
E5-2608L V3
MPC10E-10C
and MPC10E-
15C, with JNPR
Penta Silicon
MACsec ASIC
BCM82756 MACsec
ASIC with CAVP num
AES4550
MX480
MX960
EX9204 EX9200-RE2 HASWELL-
EP, Intel Xeon
E5-2608L V3
EX9200-15C
with JNPR Penta
Silicon MACsec
ASIC
Not supported
EX9208
EX9214
The following environmental components are required to operate the TOE in the evaluated
configuration:
Components Description
Local Management Console Any management workstation (computer) that is directly
(serially) connected to the TOE’s console port may be used by
the TOE administrator for local administration of the TOE.
Remote Management
Workstation
Any management workstation (computer) with a SSHv2 client
installed that may be used by the TOE administrator for remote
administration of the TOE through SSH protected channel.
Syslog Server A syslog server, used for remote storage of audit records that
have been generated by and transmitted from the TOE securely
using SSH tunnel (SSHv2).
NTP Server A NTPv4 server, used to provide reliable timestamps to the
TOE.
MACsec Peer A MACsec Peer, used for establishing MACsec
communication for securing Layer 2 data using MACsec
functionality.
8.2 Excluded Functionality
The following product functionality is not included in the CC evaluation:
20
• Use of telnet, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set.
• Use of FTP, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set.
• Use of SNMP, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set.
• Use of SSL, including management via J-Web, JUNOScript and JUNOScope, since it
violates the Trusted Path requirement set.
• Use of CLI account super-user and Linux root account.
21
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the ETR.
The reader of this document can assume that all activities and work units received a passing
verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 Rev. 5 and CEM version 3.1 Rev. 5. The evaluation determined the TOE to be Part 2
extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the claimed PP, PP-module, and Functional Package.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the JUNOS 24.4R2 for MX240/480/960 Routers
and EX9204/9208/9214 Switches that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product
security function descriptions that support the requirements. Additionally, the evaluator
performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities specified in the claimed PP/PP-
Modules/Package.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in
the ST's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance
Activities specified in the claimed PP/PP-Modules/Package related to the examination of the
information contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
22
securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of
the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the claimed PP/PP-Modules/Package related to the examination
of the information contained in the operational guidance documents.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the TOE
was identified.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the Assurance Activities in the claimed PP/PP-Modules/Package and recorded the
results in a Test Report, summarized in the ETR and AAR.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
was provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test
activities in the claimed PP/PP-Modules/Package, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed a public
search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any issues with
the TOE.
The evaluation team performed a public search against the following sources to ensure there
were no publicly known and exploitable vulnerabilities in the TOE:
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search#/nvd/home?resultType=records
• https://www.cve.org/
• https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
• https://supportportal.juniper.net/s/global-search/%40uri#f-
sf_primarysourcename=Knowledge&f-sf_articletype=Security%20Advisories&f-
sflevel3=MX-Series,EX-Series&f-
sflevel4=MX960,MX240,MX480,EX9204,EX9208,EX9214
23
The vulnerability searches were performed on Sep 26, 2025, Nov 24, 2025, April 30, 2026 and
June 18, 2026. The search was conducted with the following terms:
• Juniper MX240 (cpe:2.3:h:juniper:mx240:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*)
• Juniper MX480 (cpe:2.3:h:juniper:mx480:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*)
• Juniper MX960 (cpe:2.3:h:juniper:mx960:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*)
• Juniper EX9204 (cpe:2.3:h:juniper:ex9204-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*)
• Juniper EX9208 (cpe:2.3:h:juniper:ex9208:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*)
• Juniper EX9214 (cpe:2.3:h:juniper:ex9214:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*)
• JUNOS OS 24.4R2
• Intel Xeon E5-2608L V3 (cpe:2.3:h:intel:xeon_e5-2608l_v3:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*)
• Juniper Penta Silicon
• Broadcom BCM82756
• OpenSSL 1.1.1zb
• OpenSSH 9.7p1 (cpe:2.3:a:openbsd:openssh:9.7:p1:*:*:*:*:*:*)
• Junos libMD
• Junos libquicksec 7.0
No open vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE were identified.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed
the vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the claimed PP/PP-Modules/Package, and that
the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the
ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the accuracy of
the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the claimed PP/PP-
Modules/Package, and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
24
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Junos® OS Common Criteria
Evaluated Configuration Guide for MX240, MX480, MX960, EX9204, EX9208 and EX9214
Devices, Release 24.4R2. As stated in the Clarification of Scope, the evaluated functionality is
scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the ST, and the only
evaluated functionality was that which was described by the SFRs claimed in the ST. All other
functionality provided by the TOE needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can
be drawn about its effectiveness.
Consumers employing the TOE must follow the configuration instructions provided in the
Configuration Guidance documentation listed in Section 6 to ensure the evaluated configuration is
established and maintained. It is important to note the excluded functionality listed in Section 8.2
and follow the configuration instructions to ensure that this functionality is disabled.
Evaluation activities are strictly bound by the assurance activities described in the claimed PP/PP-
Module/Package listed in Section 2 and their accompanying Supporting Documents. Consumers
and integrators of this TOE are advised to understand the inherent limitations of these activities
and take additional measures as needed to ensure proper TOE behavior when integrated into an
operational environment.
25
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
26
12 Security Target
Junos 24.4R2 for MX240/480/960 Routers and EX9204/9208/9214 Switches Security Target,
Version 0.6, June 18, 2026.
27
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
28
14 Bibliography
The validation team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5.
5. Evaluation Technical Report for MX240/480/960 AND EX9204/9208/9214 Switches on
JUNOS 24.4R2, Version 0.4, 03 June 2026.
6. Junos® OS Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for MX240, MX480,
MX960, EX9204, EX9208 and EX9214 Devices Release 24.4R2, June 18, 2026.
7. collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 6 December 2023
[CPP_ND_V3.0E].
8. PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 02 March 2023
[MOD_MACSEC_V1.0].
9. Functional Package for SSH Version 1.0, 13 May 2021, [PKG_SSH_V1.0]
10. Junos 24.4R2 for MX240/480/960 Routers and EX9204/9208/9214 Switches Security
Target, Version 0.6, June 18, 2026.
11. Assurance Activity Report for JUNOS 24.4R2 for MX240/480/960 and
EX9204/9208/9214 Switches, Version 0.5.
12. Vulnerability Assessment for Junos 24.4R2 for MX240/480/960 Routers and
EX9204/9208/9214 Switches, Version 0.5, June 18, 2026.
13. HPE Juniper Networking Flaw Remediation Procedures, Version 0.1, 10 March 2026.