TrustCB B.V.
Registered address:
Van den Berghlaan 48, 2132 AT
Hoofddorp, The Netherlands
nscib@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/nscib/
https://nscib.nl
TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK),
under number 858360275.
Certification Report
ID-One CNS V2 on COSMO V9.1
Sponsor and developer: IN Smart Identity France
2 place Samuel de Champlain
92400 Courbevoie
France
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2500021-01-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2500021-01
Author(s): Kjartan Jæger Kvassnes
Date: 12 February 2026
Number of pages: 13
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 9
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Evaluation Results 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 11
4 Definitions 11
5 Bibliography 12
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
Page: 5/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2500021-01-CR, dated 12 February 2026
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the ID-One
CNS V2 on COSMO V9.1. The developer of the ID-One CNS V2 on COSMO V9.1 is IN Smart Identity
France located in Courbevoie, France and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and
certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the
suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is the Smart Card Integrated Circuit with Embedded Software serving as a QSCD (Qualified
Signature Creation Device) in accordance to its functional specification. The Smart Card chip module
can be embedded in a plastic card providing a physical interface between the terminal and the chip.
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The
evaluation was completed on 12 February 2026 with the approval of the ETR. The certification
procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for
Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the ID-One CNS V2 on COSMO V9.1, the security
requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the ID-One CNS V2 on COSMO V9.1 are
advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due
consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the ID-One CNS V2 on COSMO V9.1 from IN
Smart Identity France located in Courbevoie, France.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware
SLC32GDL400G3
SLC32GDA400G3
IFX_CCI_000005
Software Library - HSL V01.22.4346-SLCx2_C65.lib
Java Card Platform - ID-ONE COSMO V9.1
BIOMETRY
SAAAAR 092914
Software ID-One CNS V2 Code version “20 33 81”
Internal version “00 00 01 09”
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the ID-One CNS V2
on COSMO V9.1. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST] or [ST-lite], Chapter 4.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE is a composite TOE, consisting of a CNS applet, a Java Card smart card operating system
and an underlying IC. The TOE is a Smart Card Integrated Circuit with Embedded Software serving as
CNS application, which provides QSCD functionality.
The TOE provides the following security features:
• generation of the SCD and the correspondent SVD,
• import of the SCD and, optionally, the correspondent signature verification data (SVD)
• export the SVD for certification through a trusted channel to the CGA,
• prove the identity as QSCD to external entities
• optionally, receive and store certificate info
• switch the TOE from a non-operational state to an operational state, and
• if in an operational state, create digital signatures for data with the following steps:
o select an SCD if multiple are present in the QSCD,
o receive DTBS or a unique representation thereof DTBS/R through a trusted channel
with SCA.
o authenticate the signatory and determine its intent to sign,
o apply an appropriate cryptographic signature creation function using the selected SCD
to the DTBS/R
• identification and authentication of trusted users and applications,
• data storage and protection from modification or disclosures, as needed,
• secure exchange of sensitive data between the TOE and a trusted application,
• secure exchange of sensitive data between the TOE and a trusted human interface device.
Even though Netlink Authentication is supported, it is not in scope of the certification and only usable
for files out of the QSCD configuration as it does not provide any of the keys needed for this type of
authentication.
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2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 11.3 of the [ST] or [ST-
lite].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE architecture can be depicted as follows:
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
FQR 220 1516 – ID-One CNS V2 Java Applet on Cosmo V9.1
– AGD_PRE, dated 05 November 2020
Issue 1
FQR 220 1517 – ID-One CNS V2 Java Applet on Cosmo V9.1
– AGD_OPE, dated 05 November 2020
Issue 1
FQR 220 1401 – ID-One CNS V2 Java Applet – User Guide, dated 30
October 2020
Issue 7
FQR 110 9208 – ID-One Cosmo v9.1 Biometry Pre-Perso Ed 9 01/12/2021
Guide, dated 01 December 2021
Ed 9
FQR 110 9200 – ID-One Cosmo v9.1 Biometry Reference Ed 8
16/03/2022 Guide, dated 16 March 2022
Ed 8
FQR 110 9237 – ID-One Cosmo v9.1 Biometry Applet Security
Recommendations, dated 10 January 2022
Ed 3
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FQR 110 9238 – ID-One Cosmo V9.1 Biometry Application Loading
Protection Guidance, dated 09 October 2019
Ed 1
FQR 110 8921 – Secure acceptance and delivery of sensitive elements,
dated 24 September 2018
Ed 1
FQR 110 9242 – Java Card API on ID-One Cosmo V9.1 platform Ed 1
FQR 110 9402 – ID-One Cosmo v9.1 Biometry Cosmo Flash Image
Generation, dated 27 November 2019
Ed 1
FQR 110 8805 – JCVM_PATCH, dated 23 August 2019 Ed 2
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and SFR-enforcing
module level. All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were
tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The
testing was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were
used extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and a test environment.
The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases
designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
• When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD no potential vulnerabilities
were identified from generating questions to the type of TOE and the specified behaviour.
• For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review was performed on the TOE.
During this attack-oriented analysis, the protection against the attack scenarios was analysed
using the knowledge gained from all previous evaluation classes. This resulted in the
identification of additional potential vulnerabilities. This analysis was performed according to
the attack list in [JIL-AP]. An important source for assurance against attacks in this step is the
[91_ETRfC] of the underlying platform; no additional potential vulnerabilities were concluded
from this.
• After the first implementation representation review, the Developer decided to update the
product in order to improve the security of the TOE and address some of the identified
potential vulnerabilities. A second implementation representation review was performed to
analyse the code modifications, following the same approach as for the first review.
• All potential vulnerabilities were analysed using the knowledge gained from the two
implementation representation reviews, all the evaluation classes and the public domain. A
judgment was made on how to assure that these potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable.
All potential vulnerabilities were found to be not exploitable due to the security mechanisms of
the certified Java Card platform, which rendered all the potential attack paths impractical. No
penetration tests were defined.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 1 week. During that test campaign, 100% of the
total time was spent on Perturbation attacks, 0% on side-channel testing, and 0% on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The TOE used for testing was: ID-One CNS V2 on SLC32GDA400G3.
Page: 9/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2500021-01-CR, dated 12 February 2026
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2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been
reused, but vulnerability analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the software component
of the TOE. Sites involved in the development and production of the hardware platform were reused
by composition.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number ID-One CNS V2 on COSMO V9.1.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the ID-One CNS V2 on COSMO
V9.1, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 4
augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. This implies that the product satisfies the security
requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [EN419211-2], [EN419211-3],
[EN419211-4], [EN419211-5] and [EN419211-6].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: <none>.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
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cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
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3 Security Target
The IN Groupe CNS V2 on Cosmo V9.1 Security Target, Version 5, Dated 16 January 2026 [ST] is
included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP Protection Profile
QSCD Qualified Signature Creation Device
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II
and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards
and similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[EN419211-2] EN 419 211-2:2013, Protection profiles for secure signature creation device -
Part 2: Device with key generation, V2.0.1, registered under the reference
BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02
[EN419211-3] EN 419 211-3:2013, Protection profiles for secure signature creation device -
Part 3: Device with key import, V1.0.2, registered under the reference BSI-
CC-PP-0075-2012-MA-01
[EN419211-4] EN 419 211-4:2013, Protection profiles for Secure signature creation device
— Part 4: Device with key generation and trusted communication with
certificate generation application, V1.0.1, registered under the reference BSI-
CC-PP-0071-2012-MA-01
[EN419211-5] EN 419211-5:2013, Protection profiles for secure signature creation device -
Part 5: Extension for device with key generation and trusted communication
with signature creation application, V1.0.1, registered under the reference
BSI-CC-PP-0072-2012-MA-01
[EN419211-6] EN 419211-6:2014 Protection profiles for secure signature creation device –
Part6: Extension for device with key import and trusted communication with
signature creation application, Version 1.0.4, registered under the reference
BSI-CC-PP-0076-2013-MA-01
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “ID-One CNS V2 on Cosmo V9.1” – EAL4+, 26-
RPT-081, Version 2.0, Dated 27 January 2026
[HW-CERT] BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V7-2024 for Infineon Security Controller
IFX_CCI_000003h, 000005h, 000008h, 00000Ch, 000013h, 000014h,
000015h, 00001Ch, 00001Dh, 000021h, 000022h in the design step H13
from Infineon Technologies AG, Version 1.0, 30 September 2024.
[HW-ETRfC] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product BSI-DSZ-
CC1110-V7-2024, Version 3, 2023-12-01, ETR for composite evaluation
(EFC), TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[PLAT_CERT] Rapport de certification ANSSI-CC-2020/07-R01 Plateforme ID-One Cosmo
V9.1 masquée sur le composant IFX SLC32 (Identification du matériel
092915), Paris, le 09 Mai 2025
[PLAT_ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report: ETR for composition - PYRRHA-R01, v1.5,
24/04/2025
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2.1, February
2024
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[JIL-AMS] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.5, May 2022
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
02 August 2022
[ST] IN Groupe CNS V2 on Cosmo V9.1 Security Target, Version 5, Dated 16
January 2026
[ST-lite] IN Groupe CNS V2 on Cosmo V9.1 Public Security Target, Version 2, Dated
16 January 2026
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)