SERTIT, Postboks 814, 1306 Sandvika, NORWAY
Phone: +47 67 86 40 00 Fax: +47 67 86 40 09 E-mail: post@sertit.no Internet: www.sertit.no
Sertifiseringsmyndigheten for IT-sikkerhet Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security
SERTIT-090 CR Certification Report
Issue 1.0 25 November 2016
HED Secure Smart Card Chip CIU9872B_01 C11 with IC Dedicated Software
CERTIFICATION REPORT - SERTIT STANDARD REPORT TEMPLATE SD 009 VERSION 2.1 11.11.2011
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ARRANGEMENT ON THE RECOGNITION OF COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATES IN
THE FIELD OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
SERTIT, the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security, is a member of the
above Arrangement and as such this confirms that the Common Criteria certificate
has been issued by or under the authority of a Party to this Arrangement and is the
Party’s claim that the certificate has been issued in accordance with the terms of
this Arrangement
The judgements contained in the certificate and Certification Report are those of
SERTIT which issued it and the Dutch evaluation facility (EVIT) which carried out
the evaluation. There is no implication of acceptance by other Members of the
Agreement Group of liability in respect of those judgements or for loss sustained as
a result of reliance placed upon those judgements by a third party.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate
indicates that this certification is recognized under the terms of the CCRA July 2nd 2014.
The recognition under CCRA is limited to cPP related assurance
packages or EAL 2 and ALC_FLR CC part 3 components.
MUTUAL RECOGNITION AGREEMENT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
EVALUATION CERTIFICATES (SOGIS MRA)
SERTIT, the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security, is a member of the
above Agreement and as such this confirms that the Common Criteria certificate
has been issued by or under the authority of a Party to this Agreement and is the
Party’s claim that the certificate has been issued in accordance with the terms of
this Agreement
The judgements contained in the certificate and Certification Report are those of
SERTIT which issued it and the Dutch evaluation facility (EVIT) which carried out
the evaluation. There is no implication of acceptance by other Members of the
Agreement Group of liability in respect of those judgement s or for loss sustained as
a result of reliance placed upon those judgements by a third party.
Mutual recognition under SOGIS MRA applies to components up to EAL 4.
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Contents
1 Certification Statement .................................................................................................4
2 Abbreviations .................................................................................................................5
3 References ......................................................................................................................7
4 Executive Summary ........................................................................................................8
4.1 Introduction 8
4.2 Evaluated Product 8
4.3 TOE scope 8
4.4 Protection Profile Conformance 8
4.5 Assurance Level 8
4.6 Security Policy 9
4.7 Security Claims 9
4.8 Threats Countered 9
4.9 Threats Countered by the TOE’s environment 9
4.10 Threats and Attacks not Countered 9
4.11 Environmental Assumptions and Dependencies 9
4.12 IT Security Objectives 9
4.13 Non-IT Security Objectives 9
4.14 Security Functional Requirements 9
4.15 Security Function Policy 10
4.16 Evaluation Conduct 11
4.17 General Points 11
5 Evaluation Findings ......................................................................................................13
5.1 Introduction 14
5.2 Delivery 14
5.3 Installation and Guidance Documentation 14
5.4 Misuse 14
5.5 Vulnerability Analysis 14
5.6 Developer’s Tests 15
5.7 Evaluators’ Tests 15
6 Evaluation Outcome .....................................................................................................17
6.1 Certification Result 17
6.2 Recommendations 17
Annex A: Evaluated Configuration .........................................................................................18
TOE Identification 18
TOE Documentation 18
TOE Configuration 18
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2 Abbreviations
API Application Programming Interface
CC Common Criteria for Information Security Evaluation (ISO/IEC 15408)
CCRA Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the
Field of Information Technology Security
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CMS Chip Management System
DEMA Differential Electro Magnetic Analysis
DES Data Encryption Standard
DPA Differential Fault Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
EMFI Electro-Magnetic Fault Injection
EOR Evaluation Observation Report
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
EVIT Evaluation Facility under the Norwegian Certification Scheme for IT
Security
FBBI Forward-Body Bias Injection
IC Integrated Circuit
OSP Organizational Security Policy
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman Public Key Encryption
SERTIT Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security
SEMA Simple Electro Magnetic Analysis
SFR Security Functional Requirements
SPA Simple Power Analysis
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
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VM Voltage Manipulation
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3 References
[1] Security Target Lite of CIU9872B_01 C11 Secure Smart Card Chip, CEC
Huada Electronic Design Co, Ltd, Version 1.1, 2 November 2016.
[2] Common Criteria Part 1, CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1 R4, September
2012.
[3] Common Criteria Part 2, CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1 R4, September
2012.
[4] Common Criteria Part 3, CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1 R4, September
2012.
[5] The Norwegian Certification Scheme, SD001E, Version 8.0, 20 August 2010 .
[6] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1 R4, September
2012.
[7] JIL Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.2,
January 2013.
[8] JIL Application of Application Attack Potential to Smart Cards, Version 2.9,
May 2013.
[9] AIS20/31 A proposal for Functionality classes for random number
generators, Version 2.0, 18 September 2011.
[10] Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) Common Criteria EAL5+ Evaluation of
the HED Secure Smart Card Chip CIU9872B_01 C11 with IC Dedicated
Software, 16-RPT-444 Version 2.0, 2 Nov, 2016 (Brightsight).
[11] CIU9872B_01 C11 Operational User Guidance, Version 1.0, 20 Oct 2016.
[12] CIU9872B_01 C11 Preparative Procedures, Version 1.0, 20 Oct 2016
[13] CIU9872B_01 C11 Crypto Library User Guide, Version 1.0, 20 Oct 2016
[14] CIU9872B_01 C11 Product Datasheet, Version 1.0, 20 Oct 2016
[15] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, BSI-
CC-PP-0084-2014, Version 1.0, January 2014.
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4 Executive Summary
4.1 Introduction
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security
evaluation of HED Secure Smart Card Chip CIU9872B_01 C11 with IC Dedicated
Software to the Sponsor, CEC Huada Electronic Design Co, Ltd, and is intended to
assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security of the
product for their requirements.
Prospective consumers are advised to read this report in conjunction with the
Security Target [1] which specifies the functional, environmental and assurance
evaluation requirements.
4.2 Evaluated Product
The version of the product evaluated was HED Secure Smart Card Chip CIU9872B_01
C11 with IC Dedicated Software.
This product is also described in this report as the Target of Evaluation (TOE). The
developer was CEC Huada Electronic Design Co, Ltd.
The TOE is a secure smart card integrated circuit with dedicated software mainly for
banking and finance market, electronic commerce or governmental applications.
The scope of the TOE includes a dual-interface IC hardware and IC dedicated software
for DES and RSA. The IC has a DES coprocessor, a RSA coprocessor, a True Random
Number Generator (AIS20/31 [9] PTG.2 class) and a Deterministic Random Number
Generator (AIS 20/31 [9] DRG.3 class).
Details of the evaluated configuration, including the TOE’s supporting guidance
documentation, are given in Annex A.
4.3 TOE scope
The TOE scope is described in the Security Target [1], chapter 1.3.
4.4 Protection Profile Conformance
The Security Target [1] claimed conformance to the following protection profile:
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4.5 Assurance Level
The Security Target [1] specified the assurance requirements for the evaluation. The
assurance incorporated predefined evaluation assurance level EAL 5+, augmented by
AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2. Common Criteria Part 3 [4] describes the scale of
assurance given by predefined assurance levels EAL1 to EAL7. An overview of CC is
given in CC Part 1 [2].
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4.6 Security Policy
The TOE security policies are detailed in Security Target [1], chapter 3.3.
4.7 Security Claims
The Security Target [1] fully specifies the TOE’s security objectives, the threats and
OSP’s which these objectives counter or meet and security functional requirements
and security functions to meet the objectives. Most of the SFR’s are taken from CC
Part 2 [3]. Others come from extended component definitions copied from the
claimed PP [15]. Use of the standard and the standardized PP [15] facilitates
comparison with other evaluated products
The following SFR’s are defined in the Protection Profile [15]: FCS_RNG.1,
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FAU_SAS.1, FDP_SDC.1.
4.8 Threats Countered
All threats that are countered are described in the Security Target [1], chapter 3.2.
4.9 Threats Countered by the TOE’s environment
There are no threats countered by the TOE’s environment.
4.10 Threats and Attacks not Countered
No threats or attacks are described that are not countered.
4.11 Environmental Assumptions and Dependencies
The assumptions that apply to this TOE are described in the Security Target [1],
chapter 3.4.
4.12 IT Security Objectives
The security objectives that apply to this TOE are described in the Security Target [1],
chapter 4.1.
4.13 Non-IT Security Objectives
The security objectives for the environment are described in the Security Target [1],
chapter 4.2.
4.14 Security Functional Requirements
The following Security Functional Requirements are directly taken from the
Protection Profile [15].
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Security Functional
Requirement
Title
FRU_FLT.2 “Limited fault tolerance“
FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state”
FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”
FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”
FAU_SAS.1 “Audit storage”
FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”
FDP_ITT.1 “Basic internal transfer protection”
FDP_IFC.1 “Subset information flow control”
FPT_ITT.1 “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection”
FDP_SDC.1 “Stored data confidentiality”
FDP_SDI.2 “Stored data integrity monitoring and action”
FCS_RNG.1[PTG.2] “Random Number Generation (Class PTG.2) ”
FCS_RNG.1[DRG.2] “Random number generation (Class DRG.3)”
FCS_COP.1[TDES] “Cryptographic operation”
FCS_COP.1[RSA] “Cryptographic operation”
Except for FAU_SAS.1, FDP_SDC.1, FDP_SDI.2, FCS_RNG.1 and FCS_COP.1 all
assignments and selections are completely defined in the Protection Profile [15].
The following additional Security Functional Requirements are claimed in the
Security Target [1]:
Security Functional
Requirement
Title
FDP_ACC.1 “Subset access control”
FDP_ACF.1 “Security attribute based access control”
4.15 Security Function Policy
The TOE is a secure microcontroller with with IC dedicated support software intended
for use as a smart card IC.
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The TOE consists of hardware and IC dedicated software. The hardware is based on a
32-bit CPU with ROM (Non-Volatile Read-Only Memory), EEPROM (Non-volatile
Programmable Memory) and RAM (Volatile Memory). The hardware of the TOE also
incorporates communication peripherals and cryptographic coprocessors for
execution and acceleration of symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms.
The IC dedicated software consists of boot code and a library of cryptographic
services.
The TOE supports the following communication interfaces:
ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface
ISO/IEC 14443 contactless interface.
The TOE is delivered to a composite product manufacturer. The security IC embedded
software is developed by the composite product manufacturer. The security IC
embedded software is sent to Huada Company to be implemented in ROM and
delivered back to the composite product manufacturer together with the TOE. The
security IC embedded software is not part of the TOE.
4.16 Evaluation Conduct
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the
Norwegian Certification Scheme for IT Security as described in SERTIT Document
SD001E [5]. The Scheme is managed by the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT
Security (SERTIT). As stated on page 2 of this Certificat ion Report, SERTIT is a
member of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in
the Field of Information Technology Security (CCRA), and the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the terms of this Arrangement.
The purpose of the evaluation was to provide assurance about the effectiveness of
the TOE in meeting its Security Target [1], which prospective consumers are advised
to read. To ensure that the Security Target [1] gave an appropriate baseline for a CC
evaluation, it was first itself evaluated. The TOE was then evaluated against this
baseline. Both parts of the evaluation were performed in accordance with CC Part 3
[4] and the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) [6]. Interpretations [7], [8], [9]
are used.
SERTIT monitored the evaluation, which was carried out by Brightsight B.V. as
Commercial Evaluation Facility (EVIT). The evaluation was completed when the EVIT
submitted the final Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [10] to SERTIT on 2 Nobember
2016. As a result SERTIT then produced this Certification Report.
4.17 General Points
The evaluation addressed the security functionality claimed in the Security Target [1]
with reference to the assumed operating environment specified by the Security
Target [1]. The evaluated configuration was that specified in Annex A. Prospective
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consumers are advised to check that this matches their identified requirements and
give due consideration to the recommendations and caveats of this report.
Certification does not guarantee that the IT product is free from security
vulnerabilities. This Certification Report and the belonging Certificate only reflect
the view of SERTIT at the time of certification. It is furthermore the responsibility of
users (both existing and prospective) to check whether any security vulnerabilities
have been discovered since the date shown in this report. This Certification Report is
not an endorsement of the IT product by SERTIT or any other organization that
recognizes or gives effect to this Certification Report, and no warranty of the IT
product by SERTIT or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this
Certification Report is either expressed or implied.
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5 Evaluation Findings
The evaluators examined the following assurance classes and components taken from
CC Part 3 [4]. These classes comprise the EAL5 assurance package augmented with
AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2.
Assurance class Assurance components
Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.5 Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_INT.2 TSF Internals
ADV_TDS.4 Basic modular design
Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures
and automation
ALC_CMS.5 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.2 Well-defined life-cycle model
Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: basic design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
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All assurance classes were found to be satisfactory and were awarded an overall
“pass” verdict.
5.1 Introduction
The evaluation addressed the requirements specified in the Security Target [1]. The
results of this work were reported in the ETR [10] under the CC Part 3 [4] headings.
The following sections note considerations that are of relevance to either consumers
or those involved with subsequent assurance maintenance and re -evaluation of the
TOE.
5.2 Delivery
On receipt of the TOE, the consumer is recommended to check that the evaluated
versions of its constituent components have been supplied, and to check that the
security of the TOE has not been compromised in delivery.
The delivery procedure is described in the supporting document [12].
5.3 Installation and Guidance Documentation
Installation procedures are described in detail in the supporting document [12].
5.4 Misuse
There is always a risk of intentional and unintentional misconfigurations that could
possibly compromise confidential information. Security IC Embedded Software shall
follow the guidance documentation [11], [12], [13], [14] for the TOE in order to
ensure that the TOE is operated in a secure manner.
The guidance documents adequately describe the mode of operation of the TOE, all
assumptions about the intended environment and all requirements for external
security. Sufficient guidance is provided for the consumer to effectively use the TOE’s
security functions.
5.5 Vulnerability Analysis
The Evaluators’ vulnerability analysis was based on both public domain sources and
the visibility of the TOE given by the evaluation process.
An independent vulnerability analysis was done, consisting of the following steps:
A design and implementation review on the TOE was done to identify
weaknesses in the TOE that could potentially be exploited by attackers. A code
review of the crypto library and boot code was also executed.
Validation tests of security features performed in the ATE class are taken into
account for the following vulnerability analysis.
A vulnerability analysis based on the design and implementation review results
and the validation test results of security features, was performed considering
the well-known attacks from the “JIL Attack Methods for Smartcards an d
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Similar Devices” [7]. User guidance is also taken into consideration while
analysing potential vulnerabilities.
A penetration test plan is established based on the results of the vulnerability
analysis.
Practical penetration tests are performed according the penetration test plan.
5.6 Developer’s Tests
The developer tests consist of four parts; 1) testing on engineering samples, 2)
testing on wafers, 3) testing on simulation tools and 4) testing on an emulation
board (FPGA).
Testing on engineering samples:
Developer tests performed on engineering samples (cards or Dual -In-Line-
Package ICs)
Testing on wafers:
Developer tests performed on wafers
Testing on simulation tools:
Developer tests were done on simulation tools in the chip development
environment, which were used to verify the logical functions.
Testing on the emulation board:
Developer tests were done on an emulation board (FPGA), mainly for the Crypto
library.
5.7 Evaluators’ Tests
The evaluator’s responsibility for independent testing is required by the ATE_IND
class. Since developer’s testing procedures were found to be extensive and thorough,
and developer’s hardware testing tools are not generally available to allow
reproduction of developer test cases in the evaluator’s test lab, the choice was made
to perform the evaluator independent testing by witnessin g of the developer’s test
cases, using the developer’s tools, at the premises of the developer. The evaluator
used a sampling strategy to select developer tests to validate the developer’s test
results. The sampling strategy is as follows:
At least one test is chosen for each SFR-enforcing subsystem
If there are several tests mapped to a subsystem, the test(s) that verify
security functions/mechanism will be preferred.
In addition to this, the evaluator has defined additional test cases, prompted by
study of the developer’s documentation. The test strategy is as shown below:
Augmentation of developer testing for interfaces by varying parameters in
order to more rigorously test the interface
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Performing positive and negative tests on selected Security Functio ns or
Security Mechanisms.
These tests are also performed using the developer’s tools at the premises of the
developer. The evaluator witnessed the whole process of the tests.
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6 Evaluation Outcome
6.1 Certification Result
After due consideration of the ETR [10], produced by the Evaluators, and the conduct
of the evaluation, as witnessed by the Certifier, SERTIT has determined that the HED
Secure Smart Card Chip CIU9872B_01 C11 with IC Dedicated Software meets the
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant requirements of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL
5+ augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 for the specified Common Criteria
Part 2 extended functionality and Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 V1.0, in
the specified environment.
6.2 Recommendations
Prospective consumers of HED Secure Smart Card Chip CIU9872B_01 C11 with IC
Dedicated Software should understand the specific scope of the certification by
reading this report in conjunction with the Security Target [1]. The TOE should be
used in accordance with a number of environmental considerations as specified in
the Security Target.
Only the evaluated TOE configuration should be installed. This is specified in Annex A
with further relevant information given above under Section 4.3 “TOE Scope” and
Section 5 “Evaluation Findings”.
The TOE should be used in accordance with the supporting guidance documentation
[11], [12], [13], [14] included in the evaluated configuration.
The above “Evaluation Findings” include a number of recommendations relating to the
secure receipt, installation, configuration and operation of the TOE.
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Annex A: Evaluated Configuration
TOE Identification
The TOE consists of:
Type Name Version Package
Hardware CIU9872B_01 C11 module
Software CMS 1.3 boot code in ROM
Cryptographic library 1.2 Cryptographic library in
ROM
API library 1.1 API library binary file
Manuals CIU9872B_01 C11 Operational
User Guidance [11]
1.0 document
CIU9872B_01 C11 Preparative
Procedures [12]
1.0 document
CIU9872B_01 C11 Crypto Library
User Guide [13]
1.0 document
CIU9872B_01 C11 Product
Datasheet [14]
1.0 document
TOE Documentation
The supporting guidance documents evaluated were:
[a] CIU9872B_01 C11 Operational User Guidance, Version 1.0, 20 Oct 2016
[11]
[b] CIU9872B_01 C11 Preparative Procedures, Version 1.0, 20 Oct 2016 [12]
[c] CIU9872B_01 C11 Crypto Library User Guide, Version 1.0, 20 Oct 2016 [13]
[d] CIU9872B_01 C11 Product Datasheet, Version 1.0, 20 Oct 2016 [14]
Further discussion of the supporting guidance material is given in Section 5.3
“Installation and Guidance Documentation”.
TOE Configuration
The TOE configuration used for testing was the same used for developer tests. This is
described in chapter 5.6 of this report.