National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Citrix ADC Platinum Edition Version 11.1
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10974-2019
Dated: 10/18/19
Version: 0.1
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Meredith Hennan
Jerome Myers
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Danielle F Canoles
Thibaut Marconnet
Kenji Yoshino
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 8
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................. 10
4 Security Policy...................................................................................................................... 11
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ............................................................... 14
5.1 Assumptions..................................................................................................................................................14
5.2 Threats...........................................................................................................................................................15
5.3 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................16
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 18
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 19
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................19
7.1.1 Physical Boundaries.................................................................................................................................20
7.2 Excluded Functionality ................................................................................................................................20
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 23
8.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................23
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................23
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 24
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................24
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................24
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................24
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................25
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................25
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................25
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................26
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 27
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 28
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 29
13 Glossary ................................................................................................................................ 30
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 31
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information
Technology (IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target
(ST), which is where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which
describes how those security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the
evaluated configuration. Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and
Clarification of Scope in Section 5 and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any
restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of
the evaluation of the Citrix ADC Platinum Edition Version 11.1 Target of Evaluation (TOE). It
presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not
an endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE
is either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of
the product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in September 2019. The information in this
report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report,
all written by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common
Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant and meets the assurance requirements defined
in collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP) + Errata 20180314 version 2.0e
(NDcPPv2.0e).
The following table identifies the Technical Decisions associated with the collaborative
Protection Profile for Network Devices at time of evaluation, whether they are applicable to the
TOE in the evaluated configuration, and rationale for exclusion, if warranted:
Table 1 Technical Decisions
Identifier Applicable Exclusion Rationale (if applicable)
0425 – NIT Technical Decision for Cut-and-
paste Error for Guidance AA
Yes
0423 – NIT Technical Decision for
Clarification about application of
RfI#201726rev2
Yes
0412 – NIT Technical Decision for
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5 SFR and AA discrepancy
Yes
0411 – NIT Technical Decision for
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.5, Test 1 - Server and client
side seem to be confused
No This TD addresses SSH Client
functionality. The TOE does not
support SSH Client functionality.
0410 – NIT technical decision for Redundant
assurance activities associated with
FAU_GEN.1
Yes
0409 – NIT decision for Applicability of
FIA_AFL.1 to key-based SSH authentication
Yes
5
0408 – NIT Technical Decision for local vs.
remote administrator accounts
Yes
0407 – NIT Technical Decision for handling
Certification of Cloud Deployments
Yes
0402 – NIT Technical Decision for RSA-based
FCS_CKM.2 Selection
Yes
0401 – NIT Technical Decision for Reliance
on external servers to meet SFRs
Yes
0400 – NIT Technical Decision for
FCS_CKM.2 and elliptic curve-based key
establishment
Yes
0399 – NIT Technical Decision for Manual
installation of CRL (FIA_X509_EXT.2)
Yes
0398 – NIT Technical Decision for
FCS_SSH*EXT.1.1 RFCs for AES-CTR
Yes
0397 – NIT Technical Decision for Fixing AES-
CTR Mode Tests
Yes
0396 – NIT Technical Decision for
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1, Test 2
Yes
0395 – NIT Technical Decision for Different
Handling of TLS1.1 and TLS1.2
No This TD addresses TLS Server
functionality. The TOE does not
support TLS Server functionality.
0394 – NIT Technical Decision for Audit of
Management Activities related to
Cryptographic Keys
Yes
0343 – NIT Technical Decision for Updating
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14 Tests
No This TD addresses IPsec functionality.
The TOE does not support IPsec.
0342 – NIT Technical Decision for TLS and
DTLS Server Tests
No This TD addresses (D)TLS Server
functionality. The TOE does not
support (D)TLS Server functionality.
0341 – NIT Technical Decision for TLS
wildcard checking
Yes
0340 – NIT Technical Decision for Handling
of the basicConstraints extension in CA and
leaf certificates
Yes
0339 – NIT Technical Decision for Making
password-based authentication optional in
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2
Yes
0338 – NIT Technical Decision for Access
Banner Verification
Yes
0337 – NIT Technical Decision for Selections
in FCS_SSH*_EXT.1.6
Yes
0336 – NIT Technical Decision for Audit
requirements for FCS_SSH*_EXT.1.8
Yes
0335 – NIT Technical Decision for FCS_DTLS
Mandatory Cipher Suites
No This TD addresses DTLS functionality.
The TOE does not support DTLS.
0334 – NIT Technical Decision for Testing
SSH when password-based authentication is
not supported
No This TD addresses SSH client
functionality. The TOE does not claim
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.
0333 – NIT Technical Decision for
Applicability of FIA_X509_EXT.3
Yes
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0324 – NIT Technical Decision for Correction
of section numbers in SD Table 1
Yes
0323 – NIT Technical Decision for DTLS
server testing - Empty Certificate Authorities
list
No This TD addresses DTLS functionality.
The TOE does not support DTLS.
0322 – NIT Technical Decision for TLS server
testing - Empty Certificate Authorities list
No This TD is associated with
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2. The TOE does not
include FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 functionality.
0321 – Protection of NTP communications No The TOE does not support an NTP
server for automatic time updates.
0291 – NIT technical decision for DH14 and
FCS_CKM.1
Yes
0290 – NIT technical decision for physical
interruption of trusted path/channel.
Yes
0289 – NIT technical decision for
FCS_TLSC_EXT.x.1 Test 5e
Yes
0281 – NIT Technical Decision for Testing
both thresholds for SSH rekey
Yes
0262 – NIT Technical Decision for TLS server
testing - Empty Certificate Authorities list
No This TD has been archived
0260 – NIT Technical Decision for Typo in
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4
No This TD has been archived.
0259 – NIT Technical Decision for Support
for X509 ssh rsa authentication IAW RFC
6187
Yes
0257 – NIT Technical Decision for Updating
FCS_DTLSC_EXT.x.2/FCS_TLSC_EXT.x.2 Tests
1-4
Yes
0256 – NIT Technical Decision for Handling
of TLS connections with and without mutual
authentication
No This TD is associated with
FCS_DTLSC_EXT.2/FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.
The TOE does not include this
functionality.
0228 – NIT Technical Decision for CA
certificates - basicConstraints validation
Yes
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP
approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 4), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in the
NDcPP. This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The
evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria
Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of
7
the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST).
Based on these findings, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are
accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of
the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
produced.
8
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this
program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products against Protection
Profile containing Assurance Activities, which are interpretation of CEM work units specific
to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Product Compliance
List.
Table 2 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 2 Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation
Scheme
United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Citrix ADC Platinum Edition Version 11.1
Protection Profile collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP) + Errata
20180314 version 2.0e (NDcPPv2.0e)
Security Target Citrix ADC Platinum Edition Version 11.1 Security Target v1.2
Evaluation
Technical Report
Citrix ADC Platinum Edition Version 11.1 ETR v1.3
Common Criteria NDcPP Assurance Activity Report for Citrix ADC
Platinum Edition Version 11.1 Version 1.2
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 4
Conformance
Result
CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor Citrix Systems, Inc.
Developer Citrix Systems, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
2400 Research Blvd
Rockville, MD 20850
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CCEVS Validators Meredith Hennan
Jerome Myers
10
3 Architectural Information
The Citrix ADC (formerly NetScaler) is an Application Delivery Controller that accelerates
application performance, enhances application availability with advanced Layer 4 – Layer 7 load
balancing, secures applications from attacks, and lowers server expenses by offloading
computationally intensive tasks. The TOE comprises Citrix ADC running on the following hardware
appliances.
 MPX 14030 FIPS
 MPX 14060 FIPS
 MPX 14080 FIPS
Citrix MPX 14XXX FIPS appliances are network devices that combine Layer 4 - Layer 7 load
balancing and content switching with application acceleration, data compression, static and
dynamic content caching, SSL acceleration, network optimization, application performance
monitoring, application visibility, and robust application security via an application firewall. The
ADC appliance supports NIST-approved FIPS 140-2 algorithms.
11
4 Security Policy
Security Audit
The TOE keeps local and remote audit records of security relevant events.
Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides cryptographic support for the SSH and TLS protocols. The related FIPS 140-2
validation details are provided in Table 3.
Table 3 CAVP Algorithm Testing References
Algorithm
CAVP
Cert
#
Standard Operation SFR
NITROXIII CNN3560-NFBE-G Algorithms (CMVP Cert. #2850)
RSA 1634 FIPS 186-4 Signature Verification FCS_COP.1/S
igGen
DRBG 680 SP 800-90A Random Bit Generation FCS_RBG_EX
T.1
AES 2034
3205
AES specified in ISO
18033-3
CBC specified in ISO
10116
TLS Encryption/Decryption
DRBG Primitive
FCS_COP.1/D
ataEncryptio
n
SHA 1780 ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 Hashing FCS_COP.1/H
ash
HMAC 1233 ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011 Keyed-Hashing FCS_COP.1/K
eyedHash
Citrix FIPS Cryptographic Module Algorithms (CMVP Cert. #2988)
RSA 2379 FIPS 186-4 Key Generation
Signature
Generation/Verification
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1/S
igGen
ECDSA 1056 FIPS 186-4 Key Generation FCS_CKM.1
DRBG 1417 SP 800-90A Random Bit Generation FCS_RBG_EX
T.1
SHA 3626 ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 Hashing FCS_COP.1/H
ash
12
Algorithm
CAVP
Cert
#
Standard Operation SFR
HMAC 2923 ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011 Keyed-Hashing FCS_COP.1/K
eyedHash
AES 4397 AES specified in ISO
18033-3
CBC specified in ISO
10116
CTR specified in ISO
10116
SSH Encryption/ Decryption
DRBG Primitive
FCS_COP.1/D
ataEncryptio
n
CVL (SP800-
56A)
1106 SP 800-56A Key Establishment FCS_CKM.2
Identification and Authentication
The TOE provides two types of authentication to provide a trusted means for Security
Administrators and remote endpoints to interact: X.509v3 certificate-based authentication for
remote devices and password-based or public-key authentication for Security Administrators.
Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure communication channel with a
remote endpoint.
Security Administrators can set a minimum length for passwords (between 4 and 127
characters). Additionally, the TOE detects and tracks consecutive unsuccessful remote
authentication attempts and will prevent the offending attempts from authenticating when a
Security Administrator defined threshold is reached.
Security management
The TOE enables secure local and remote management of its security functions, including:
o Local console CLI administration
o Remote CLI administration via SSHv2
o Administrator authentication using a local database
o Timed user lockout after multiple failed authentication attempts
o Password complexity enforcement
o Role Based Access Control - the TOE supports several types of administrative user roles.
Collectively these sub-roles comprise the “Security Administrator”
o Configurable banners to be displayed at login
o Timeouts to terminate administrative sessions after a set period of inactivity
o Protection of secret keys and passwords
13
Protection of the TSF
The TOE ensures the authenticity and integrity of software updates through hash comparison
and requires administrative intervention prior to the software updates being installed.
TOE Access
Prior to login, the TOE displays a banner with a message configurable by the Security
Administrator. The TOE terminates user connections after an Authorized Administrator
configurable amount of time.
Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE uses TLS to provide a trusted channel between itself and remote syslog and LDAP
servers.
The TOE uses SSH to provide a trusted path between itself and remote administrators.
14
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE
security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION
The network device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not
subject to physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere with the device’s
physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to
protect the device and the data it contains. As a result, the [NDcPPv2.0e] will not include any
requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical attack mitigations. The
[NDcPPv2.0e] will not expect the product to defend against physical access to the device that
allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the
device.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY
The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not provide
functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For example, the
device should not provide a computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to
networking functionality).
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION
A standard/generic network device does not provide any assurance regarding the protection of
traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the network device to protect data that originates on or
is destined to the device itself, to include administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is
traversing the network device, destined for another network entity, is not covered by the
NDcPPv2.0e. It is assumed that this protection will be covered by cPPs for particular types of
network devices (e.g., firewall).
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR
The Security Administrator(s) for the network device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the
best interest of security for the organization. This includes being appropriately trained, following
policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure
passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy and to lack malicious intent when
administering the device. The network device is not expected to be capable of defending against
a malicious Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.
A.REGULAR_UPDATES
The network device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an Administrator on a
regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE
The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the network device are protected by
the platform on which they reside.
15
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive
residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on
networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational
environment.
5.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The
assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS
Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to the network device by nefarious
means such as masquerading as an Administrator to the device, masquerading as the device to
an Administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its entirety, or selected portions), or
performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which would provide access to the administrative session,
or sessions between network devices. Successfully gaining Administrator access allows malicious
actions that compromise the security functionality of the device and the network on which it
resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY
Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a cryptographic exhaust
against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow
attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key space and give them
unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate and/or control the traffic with minimal
effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS
Threat agents may attempt to target network devices that do not use standardized secure
tunnelling protocols to protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take advantage of
poorly designed protocols or poor key management to successfully perform man-in-the-middle
attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in loss of confidentiality and integrity of
the critical network traffic, and potentially could lead to a compromise of the network device
itself.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS
Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use weak methods to authenticate
the endpoints – e.g. a shared password that is guessable or transported as plaintext. The
consequences are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the attacker could masquerade as the
Administrator or another device, and the attacker could insert themselves into the network
stream and perform a man-in-the-middle attack. The result is the critical network traffic is
exposed and there could be a loss of confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the network
device itself could be compromised.
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T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of the software or firmware which
undermines the security functionality of the device. Non-validated updates or updates validated
using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the update firmware vulnerable to surreptitious
alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY
Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the security functionality of the
network device without Administrator awareness. This could result in the attacker finding an
avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to compromise the device and the
Administrator would have no knowledge that the device has been compromised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data enabling continued access to the
network device and its critical data. The compromise of credentials includes replacing existing
credentials with an attacker’s credentials, modifying existing credentials, or obtaining the
Administrator or device credentials for use by the attacker.
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING
Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak administrative passwords to gain privileged
access to the device. Having privileged access to the device provides the attacker unfettered
access to the network traffic, and may allow them to take advantage of any trust relationships
with other network devices.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE
An external, unauthorized entity could make use of failed or compromised security functionality
and might therefore subsequently use or abuse security functions without prior authentication
to access, change or modify device data, critical network traffic or security functionality of the
device.
5.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance
for this evaluation is defined within the NDcPP.
 Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not
specifically search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an
“obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
17
 The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities
included in the product were not covered by this evaluation. Please see Section 7.2 of
this report for further information on the specific functionality and features that are
excluded from the scope of this evaluation.
18
6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
 Citrix ADC Platinum Edition Version 11.1 Security Target v1.2 [ST]
 Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for ADC 11.1 Platinum Edition v1.1
[CCECG]
 Citrix ADC MPX, September 16, 2019
 NetScaler 11.1, September 13, 2019
The [CCECG] includes all required information for configuring the TOE into the evaluated
configuration. The Citrix ADC MPX and NetScaler 11.1 guides are general user guides which may
be used to configure any excluded functionality with the exception of (see Section 7.2 for
additional details):
 IPv6
 NTP based updates to the time
 Use of superuser privileges except as described in [CCECG]
 ADC GUI (HTTP/HTTPS), ADC Nitro API and ADM
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that may be available online was
not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied upon when configuring
or operating the device as evaluated. Consumers are encouraged to download the configuration
documentation from the NIAP website to ensure that the TOE platforms are configured as evaluated.
19
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE evaluated configuration consists of one of the MPX series appliances listed in Section 3
above when configured in accordance with the documentation identified in Section 6. The TOE
also supports (sometimes optionally) secure connectivity with several other IT environment
devices as described in Table 4 below,
Table 4 IT Environment Components
Component Required Usage/Purpose Description for TOE performance
Management
Workstation with
SSH Client
Yes This includes any IT Environment Management
workstation with an SSH client installed that is used by the
TOE administrator to support TOE administration through
SSH protected channels. Any SSH client that supports
SSHv2 may be used.
Syslog server Yes The syslog audit server is used for remote storage of audit
records that have been generated by and transmitted
from the TOE. The syslog server must support
communications using TLS 1.1 or TLS 1.2.
LDAP Server Yes The LDAP server is used for authentication of
administrator credentials The LDAP server must support
communications using TLS 1.1 or TLS 1.2.
The following figure provides a visual depiction of an example of a typical TOE deployment. The
TOE boundary is surrounded with hashed red lines.
20
Figure 1 Deployment Configuration of TOE
7.1.1 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is a hardware and software solution that is comprised of the security appliance models
described above in section 1.3. The TOE guidance documentation can be found at
http://docs.citrix.com/en-us/netscaler/11-1.html# but the product needs to be administered in
accordance with the [CCESG] as described in Section 6 of this document to ensure proper
operation within the evaluated configuration.
7.2 Excluded Functionality
Hardware and software located in the TOE environment are not included in the scope of the
evaluation.
Only security functionality specified in the SFRs and TSS is covered by the scope of evaluation.
The following other product features or functionality are considered unevaluated, because they
are not included in the scope of the Security Target:
21
 Web Logging
 Application Firewall
 Global Server Load Balancing (GSLB)
 AAA-TM Authentication
 External authentication methods: Kerberos, TACACS+, SAML, RADIUS
 Responder
 Rewrite (URL Transformation)
 Layer 3 Routing
 Vpath
 RISE
 High Availability
 CloudBridge
 CallHome
 Integrated Disk Caching
 General TLS VPN functionality
 Clientless VPN functionality
 SSL acceleration – SSL termination for application servers1
 AppFlow
 AppQoE
 BGP
 Cache Redirection
 Compression Control
 Content Accelerator
 Content Filtering
 Content Switching
 FEO
 OSPF
 LSN
 RDP Proxy
 RIP
 HTM Injection
 Http DoS Protection
 Integrated Caching
 Surge Protection
 ISIS
 Priority Queuing
 Reputation
 Sure Connect
 NetScaler Push
1
TLS used by the TSF is in scope and evaluated by FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.
22
Additionally, the following features may not be used when the TOE is operated in a manner
compliant with this Security Target:
 IPv6
 NTP based updates to the time
 Use of superuser privileges except as described in [CCECG]
 ADC GUI (HTTP/HTTPS), ADC Nitro API and ADM
23
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in the proprietary Evaluation Test Report for Citrix ADC Platinum
Edition Version 11.1, which is not publicly available. The Assurance Activities Report posted on
the NIAP PCL provides a non-proprietary overview of testing and the prescribed assurance
activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the vendor-provided guidance
documentation and ran the tests specified in the NDcPPv2.0e. The Independent Testing activity
is documented in Sections 4 and 5 of the Assurance Activities Report, which is publicly available,
and is not duplicated here. The configuration of the TOE, configuration of the test environment,
and test tools utilized are documented in Section 3 of the Assurance Activities Report.
24
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR). The reader of this document can assume that activities and
work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Citrix ADC Platinum
Edition Version 11.1 to be Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP.
Additionally the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPPv2.0e.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Citrix ADC Platinum Edition Version 11.1 that
are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that
support the requirements. Additionally, the evaluator performed an assessment of the
Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPPv2.0e.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in
the Security Target's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPPv2.0e related to the examination of the information
contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
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evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of
the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP related to the examination of the information
contained in the operational guidance documents.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the Assurance Activities in the NDcPPv2.0e and recorded the results in a Test
Report, summarized in the Evaluation Technical Report and Assurance Activities Report.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test
activities in the NDcPP, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed a
public search for vulnerabilities on October 10, 2019. The details of the vulnerability search can
be found in Section 5.15.1 of the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the NDcPPv2.0e, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
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9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the NDcPPv2.0e,
and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The validators have no supplemental comments. All validator comments are adequately
covered in other sections of this document.
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11 Annexes
Not applicable.
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12 Security Target
Citrix ADC Platinum Edition Version 11.1 Security Target v1.2
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13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility accredited
by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by
the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria
using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete,
consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements
for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT
product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of
a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
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14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 4.
5. collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP) + Errata 20180314 version
2.0e (NDcPPv2.0e)
6. Citrix ADC (formerly NetScaler) Platinum Edition Version 11.1 Common Criteria Security
Target, Version 1.2, September 2019
7. Common Criteria NDcPP Assurance Activity Report for Citrix ADC Platinum Edition
Version 11.1, Version 1.3, October 2019
8. Citrix ADC Platinum Edition Version 11.1 Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.3,
September 2019