National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update
with Surface Book
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10715-2016
Dated: June 23, 2016
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
VALIDATION REPORT
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Herb Ellis
Stelios Melachrinoudis
Ken Stutterheim
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Leidos
Columbia, MD
VALIDATION REPORT
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
iii
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary...................................................................................................................1
2 Identification..............................................................................................................................3
2.1 Threats...............................................................................................................................3
2.2 Organizational Security Policies.......................................................................................4
3 Architectural Information ..........................................................................................................5
4 Assumptions...............................................................................................................................6
4.1 Clarification of Scope .......................................................................................................6
5 Security Policy...........................................................................................................................8
5.1 Security Audit...................................................................................................................8
5.2 Cryptographic Support......................................................................................................8
5.3 User Data Protection.........................................................................................................8
5.4 Identification and Authentication .....................................................................................8
5.5 Security Management .......................................................................................................8
5.6 Protection of the TSF........................................................................................................8
5.7 Session Locking................................................................................................................9
5.8 Trusted Path/Channels ......................................................................................................9
6 Documentation.........................................................................................................................10
7 Independent Testing.................................................................................................................11
8 Evaluated Configuration ..........................................................................................................12
9 Results of the Evaluation .........................................................................................................13
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................................14
11 Annexes....................................................................................................................................15
12 Security Target.........................................................................................................................16
13 Abbreviations and Acronyms ..................................................................................................17
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................21
VALIDATION REPORT
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
1
List of Tables
Table 1: Evaluation Details............................................................................................................. 1
Table 2: ST and TOE Identification................................................................................................ 3
Table 3: TOE Security Assurance Requirements ......................................................................... 13
VALIDATION REPORT
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
1
1 Executive Summary
This report is intended to assist the end-user of this product and any security certification agent for that
end-user to determine the suitability of this Information Technology (IT) product in their environment.
End-users should review the Security Target (ST), (which is where specific security claims are made) as
well as this Validation Report (VR) (which describes how those security claims were evaluated, tested,
and any restrictions that may be imposed upon the evaluated configuration) to help in that determination.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 4 and the
Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book. It presents the
evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an endorsement of the
Target of Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is either
expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of the product as
evaluated and as documented in the ST.
The evaluation of Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book was performed by
Leidos Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, Maryland, in the United States and
was completed in June 2016. The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the
Common Criteria and Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 3.1, revision 4
and the assurance activities specified in the Protection Profile for Mobility Device Fundamentals, version
2.0. The evaluation was consistent with NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
(CCEVS) policies and practices as described on their web site (www.niap-ccevs.org).
The Leidos evaluation team determined that Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface
Book is conformant to the claimed Protection Profile (PP) and, when installed, configured and operated as
specified in the evaluated guidance documentation, satisfied all of the security functional requirements
stated in the ST. The information in this VR is largely derived from the publically available Assurance
Activities Report (AAR) and the associated proprietary test report produced by the Leidos evaluation
team.
The TOE is a hardware and software solution that consists of Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015
Update Operating System editions running on the following devices:
 Microsoft Surface Book, Windows 10 November 2015 Update Pro, 64-bit
 Microsoft Surface Book, Windows 10 November 2015 Update Enterprise, 64-bit
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, examined evaluation evidence,
provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the evaluation results
produced by the evaluation team. The validation team found that the evaluation results showed that all
assurance activities specified in the claimed PP had been completed successfully and that the product
satisfied all of the security functional and assurance requirements as stated in the ST. Therefore the
validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and
the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical
report are consistent with the evidence produced.
Table 1: Evaluation Details
Item Identifier
VALIDATION REPORT
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
2
Item Identifier
Evaluated Product Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update Enterprise and
Windows 10 November 2015 Update Pro, 64-bit, with Surface Book
Sponsor & Developer Michael Grimm
Microsoft Corporation
CCTL Leidos
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive
Columbia, MD 21046
Completion Date June 2016
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
Interpretations There were no applicable interpretations used for this evaluation.
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation: Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
PP Protection Profile for Mobility Device Fundamentals, Version 2.0
Evaluation Class None
Disclaimer The information contained in this Validation Report is not an
endorsement of the Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update
mobile device by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty
of the Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update mobile device is
either expressed or implied.
Evaluation Personnel Gregory Beaver
Gary Grainger
Kevin Steiner
Validation Personnel Herb Ellis, Validator Trainee
Stelios Melachrinoudis, Lead Validator
Ken Stutterheim, Senior Validator
VALIDATION REPORT
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
3
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under
this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called Common
Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment
Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency
across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security evaluation contract
with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation,
the product is added to NIAP’s Product Compliant List (PCL).
The following table identifies the evaluated Security Target and TOE.
Table 2: ST and TOE Identification
Name Description
ST Title Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update Security Target
ST Version 1.0
Publication Date June 10, 2016
Vendor and ST Author Microsoft
TOE Reference Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
TOE Hardware Models Microsoft Surface Book (Windows 10 November 2015 Update Pro 64-bit)
Microsoft Surface Book (Windows 10 November 2015 Update Enterprise 64-bit)
TOE Software Version Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update 64-bit Pro edition
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update 64-bit Enterprise edition
Keywords Mobility Device
2.1 Threats
The ST identifies the following threats that the TOE and its operational environment are intended to
counter:
 An attacker is positioned on a wireless communications channel or elsewhere on the network
infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access to data exchanged between the Mobile
Device and other endpoints.
 An attacker is positioned on a wireless communications channel or elsewhere on the network
infrastructure. Attackers may initiate communications with the Mobile Device or alter
communications between the Mobile Device and other endpoints in order to compromise the
Mobile Device. These attacks include malicious software update of any applications or system
software on the device. These attacks also include malicious web pages or email attachments
which are usually delivered to devices over the network.
 The loss or theft of the Mobile Device may give rise to loss of confidentiality of user data
including credentials. These physical access threats may involve attacks which attempt to access
the device through external hardware ports, through its user interface, and also through direct and
VALIDATION REPORT
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
4
possibly destructive access to its storage media. The goal of such attacks is to access data from a
lost or stolen device which is not expected to return to its user.
 Applications loaded onto the Mobile Device may include malicious or exploitable code. This
code could be included intentionally by its developer or unknowingly by the developer, perhaps
as part of a software library. Malicious apps may attempt to exfiltrate data to which they have
access. They may also conduct attacks against the platform‘s system software which will provide
them with additional privileges and the ability to conduct further malicious activities. Malicious
applications may be able to control the device's sensors (GPS, camera, microphone) to gather
intelligence about the user's surroundings even when those activities do not involve data resident
or transmitted from the device. Flawed applications may give an attacker access to perform
network-based or physical attacks that otherwise would have been prevented.
 Persistent access to a device by an attacker implies that the device has lost integrity and cannot
regain it. The device has likely lost this integrity due to some other threat vector, yet the
continued access by an attacker constitutes an on-going threat in itself. In this case the device and
its data may be controlled by an adversary at least as well as by its legitimate owner.
2.2 Organizational Security Policies
There are no Organizational Security Policies for the Mobile Device protection profile.
VALIDATION REPORT
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
5
3 Architectural Information
The TOE is a hardware and software solution that consists of Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015
Update Operating System editions running on the following devices:
 Microsoft Surface Book, Windows 10 November 2015 Update Pro, 64-bit, Intel Core i7,
Marvell 8897 Wi-Fi a/b/g/n adapter, Bluetooth 4.0, Bluetooth LE, Intel TPM 2.0
 Microsoft Surface Book, Windows 10 November 2015 Update Enterprise, 64-bit, Intel Core i7,
Marvell 8897 Wi-Fi a/b/g/n adapter, Bluetooth 4.0, Bluetooth LE, Intel TPM 2.0
The Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update editions are preemptive multitasking, multiprocessor,
and multi-user operating systems. In general, operating systems provide users with a convenient interface
to manage underlying hardware. They control the allocation and manage computing resources such as
processors, memory, and Input/Output (I/O) devices. Windows 10 November 2015 Update also referred
to as “Windows”, expands these basic operating system capabilities to controlling the allocation and
managing higher level IT resources such as security principals (user or machine accounts), files, printing
objects, services, window station, desktops, cryptographic keys, network ports traffic, directory objects,
and web content. Multi-user operating systems such as Windows keep track of which user is using which
resource, grant resource requests, account for resource usage, and mediate conflicting requests from
different programs and users.
The TOE includes the following variants of Windows:
 Windows 10 November 2015 Update 64-bit Pro
 Windows 10 November 2015 Update 64-bit Enterprise
The TOE includes both physical and logical boundaries. Its operational environment is that of a
networked environment with IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi) and Bluetooth networks.
VALIDATION REPORT
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
6
4 Assumptions
The ST identifies the following assumptions about the use of the product:
 It is assumed that the TOE‘s security functions are configured correctly in a manner to ensure that
the TOE security policies will be enforced on all applicable network traffic flowing among the
attached networks.
 It is assumed that the mobile user will immediately notify the administrator if the Mobile Device
is lost or stolen.
 It is assumed that the mobile user exercises precautions to reduce the risk of loss or theft of the
Mobile Device.
4.1 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation.
Note that:
1. As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the
security claims made, with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities specified in the
claimed PPs and performed by the evaluation team).
2. This evaluation covers only the specific device models, operating system editions, and software
versions identified in this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
For example, functionality that is offered in Windows 10 Home edition was not evaluated.
3. The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality specified
in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the product were not
covered by this evaluation. Any additional non-security related functional capabilities of the
product, even those described in the ST, were not covered by this evaluation.
4. Accordingly, the functionality offered by applications other than Universal Windows
Applications running in Application Containers was not tested. The MDFPP has requirements it
places on TOE system services that applications can leverage and this evaluation used only
Universal Windows Applications, which may be obtained from the Windows Store. In particular,
users and administrators should install only Universal Windows Applications, otherwise the
device will be outside the evaluated configuration.
5. Biometric, PIN-based, and other secondary authentication mechanisms, such as picture password,
PIN, and Windows Hello, were not tested, and are therefore out of scope.
6. At the time of this evaluation, the native IPsec functionality provided by Windows 10 November
2015 Update had not been evaluated against the VPN Client Protection Profile. This evaluation
makes no statements about the future success or failure of such an evaluation. The native IPsec
client is included in the TOE as distributed and is utilized to meet IPsec requirements mandated
by the MDFPP, but the TOE has not been evaluated as a VPN Client. Sponsors and customers
needing an evaluated VPN Client should look for a separate evaluation of that functionality.
7. Device manufacturers, OS developers, and mobile carriers provide many applications that
provide capabilities outside of what is required in the MDF PP. AVA_VAN.1 in Section 6.6 of
MDFPP V2.0 limits the scope of vulnerability search activities. Hence, identifying and inspecting
data collected and transmitted by applications is beyond the scope of MDFPP V2.0.
VALIDATION REPORT
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
7
8. This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious”
vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE,
technical sophistication and resources.
9. Per the Operational Guidance, many configurations described for the IT Administrator role are
applied to the device through a Mobile Device Management (MDM) solution. The specific steps
to perform a configuration through the MDM are solution-specific and are not described. As such,
examples of possible configuration option text are provided but not guaranteed to match any
specific MDM solution.
VALIDATION REPORT
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
8
5 Security Policy
The TOE enforces the following security policies as described in the ST.
5.1 Security Audit
Windows has the ability to collect audit data, review audit logs, protect audit logs from overflow, and
restrict access to audit logs. Audit information generated by the system includes the date and time of the
event, the user identity that caused the event to be generated, and other event specific data. Authorized
administrators can review audit logs and have the ability to search and sort audit records. Authorized
Administrators can also configure the audit system to include or exclude potentially auditable events to be
audited based on a wide range of characteristics. In the context of this evaluation, the protection profile
requirements cover generating audit events, selecting which events should be audited, and providing
secure storage for audit event entries.
5.2 Cryptographic Support
Windows provides CAVP validated cryptographic functions that support encryption/decryption,
cryptographic signatures, cryptographic hashing, cryptographic key agreement, and random number
generation. The TOE additionally provides support for public keys, credential management and certificate
validation functions and provides support for the National Security Agency’s Suite B cryptographic
algorithms. Windows also provides extensive auditing support of cryptographic operations, and a key
isolation service designed to limit the potential exposure of secret and private keys. In addition to using
cryptography for its own security functions, Windows offers access to the cryptographic support functions
for user-mode and kernel-mode programs. Public key certificates generated and used by Windows to
authenticate users and machines as well as protect both user and system data in transit.
 Software-based disk encryption: Windows implements BitLocker to provide encrypted data
storage for fixed and removable volumes and protects the disk volume’s encryption key with one
or more intermediate keys and authorization factor.
 IPsec: Windows implements IPsec to provide protected, authenticated, confidential, and tamper-
proof networking between two peer computers.
5.3 User Data Protection
In the context of this evaluation, Windows protects user data at rest and provides secure storage of
X.509v3 certificates.
5.4 Identification and Authentication
In the context of this evaluation, Windows provides the ability to use, store, and protect X.509 certificates
that are used for TLS and authenticates the user to their mobile device.
5.5 Security Management
Windows includes several functions to manage security policies. Policy management is controlled
through a combination of access control, membership in administrator groups, and privileges.
5.6 Protection of the TSF
Windows provides a number of features to ensure the protection of TOE security functions. For
applications and processes within the scope of this evaluation, Windows protects against unauthorized
VALIDATION REPORT
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
9
data disclosure and modification by using a suite of Internet standards. Windows ensures process
isolation security for all processes through private virtual address spaces, execution context, and security
context. The Windows data structures defining process address space, execution context, memory
protection, and security context are stored in protected kernel-mode memory. Windows includes self-
testing features that ensure the integrity of executable program images and its cryptographic functions.
Finally, Windows provides a trusted update mechanism to update Windows binaries itself.
Like TSF processes, user processes also are provided a private address space and process context, and
therefore are protected from each other. Additionally, the TSF has the ability to protect memory pages
using Data Execution Prevention (DEP) which marks memory pages in a process as non-executable
unless the location explicitly contains executable code. When the processor is asked to execute
instructions from a page marked as data, the processor will raise an exception for the OS to handle.
The Windows kernel, user-mode applications, and all Windows Store Applications implement Address
Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) in order to load executable code at unpredictable base addresses.
The base address is generated using a pseudo-random number generator that is seeded by high quality
entropy sources when available which provides at least 8 random bits for memory mapping.
5.7 Session Locking
Windows provides the ability for a user to lock their session either immediately or after a defined interval.
Windows constantly monitors the mouse, keyboard, and touch display for activity and locks the computer
after a set period of inactivity. Windows allows an authorized administrator to configure the system to
display a logon banner before the logon dialog.
5.8 Trusted Path/Channels
Windows uses a suite of protocols to provide a Virtual Private Network Connection (VPN) between itself,
acting as a VPN client, and a VPN gateway in addition to providing protected communications for
HTTPS and TLS.
VALIDATION REPORT
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
10
6 Documentation
Microsoft offers a number of guidance documents along with a CC-specific supplemental document
describing the installation process for the TOE as well as guidance for subsequent use and administration
of the applicable security features.
The guidance documentation examined during the course of the evaluation and delivered with the TOE is
as follows:
 Microsoft Windows 10 Mobile Device Operational Guidance, Version 1.0, May 13, 2016.
The above document is considered to be part of the evaluated TOE. Any additional customer
documentation delivered with the TOE or made available through electronic downloads should not be
relied upon for using the TOE in its evaluated configuration.
The Security Target used is:
 Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update Security Target, Version 1.0, June 10, 2016
VALIDATION REPORT
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
11
7 Independent Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the evaluation team. It is derived from information contained
in the following proprietary documents:
 Surface Book with Windows 10 November 2015 Update Common Criteria Test Report and
Procedures for Mobility Device Fundamentals PP, Version 1.0, June 13, 2016
A non-proprietary version of the tests performed and samples of the evidence that was generated is
summarized in the following document:
 Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book Common Criteria Assurance
Activities Report, Version 1.0, June 13, 2016
The purpose of the testing activity was to confirm the TOE behaves in accordance with the TOE security
functional requirements as specified in the ST for a product claiming conformance to PP MDF v2.0.
The evaluation team devised a Test Plan based on the Testing Assurance Activities specified in PP MDF.
The Test Plan described how each test activity was to be instantiated within the TOE test environment.
The evaluation team executed the tests specified in the Test Plan and documented the results in the team
test report listed above.
Independent testing took place primarily at the Leidos CCTL location in Columbia, Maryland. The
evaluation team performed limited testing at Microsoft facilities in Redmond, Washington.
The evaluators received the TOE in the form that normal customers would receive it, installed and
configured the TOE in accordance with the provided guidance, and exercised the Team Test Plan on
equipment configured in the testing laboratory.
Given the complete set of test results from the test procedures exercised by the evaluators, the testing
requirements for PP MDF v2.0 were fulfilled.
VALIDATION REPORT
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
12
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated version of the TOE consists of the following software and hardware device combinations.
TOE Software Identification: The following Windows Operating System editions are included in the
evaluation:
 Microsoft Windows 10 Pro November 2015 Update edition (64-bit version) on Microsoft Surface
Book
 Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update Enterprise edition (64-bit version) on Microsoft
Surface Book
The following security updates must be applied to the above Windows 10 products:
 All critical updates as of May 31, 2016
TOE Hardware Identification: The following hardware devices and components are included in the
evaluation:
 Microsoft Surface Book, Windows 10 Pro November 2015 Update, 64-bit, Intel Core i7,
Marvell 8897 Wi-Fi a/b/g/n adapter, Bluetooth 4.0, Bluetooth LE, Intel TPM 2.0
 Microsoft Surface Book, Windows 10 Enterprise November 2015 Update, 64-bit, Intel Core i7,
Marvell 8897 Wi-Fi a/b/g/n adapter, Bluetooth 4.0, Bluetooth LE, Intel TPM 2.0
The TOE must be deployed as described in section 4 Assumptions of this document and be configured in
accordance with the Microsoft Windows 10 Mobile Device Operational Guidance, Version 1.0, May 13,
2016.
Per Policy Letter #22, user installation of vendor-delivered bug fixes and security patches is encouraged
between completion of the evaluation and the Assurance Maintenance Date; with such updates properly
installed, the product is still considered by NIAP to be in its evaluated configuration.
VALIDATION REPORT
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
13
9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation was conducted based upon the assurance activities specified in Protection Profile for
Mobility Device Fundamentals Version 2.0, in conjunction with version 3.1, revision 4 of the CC and the
CEM. A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it demonstrates
that the evaluation team performed the assurance activities in the claimed PPs, and correctly verified that
the product meets the claims in the ST.
The details of the evaluation are recorded in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), which is controlled
by the Leidos CCTL. The security assurance requirements are listed in the following table.
Table 3: TOE Security Assurance Requirements
Assurance Component ID Assurance Component Name
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem Definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
VALIDATION REPORT
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
14
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the
Security Target, and only the functionality implemented by the SFR’s within the Security Target was
evaluated. All other functionality provided by Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with
Surface Book, to include software that was not part of the evaluated configuration, needs to be assessed
separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
For Surface Book, evaluators discovered that Windows displays the following warning when the user is
about to surpass the policy for failed authentication attempts:
“If you keep entering the wrong password, you’ll be locked out to help protect your data. To unlock,
you’ll need a BitLocker recovery key.”
It is important for users, customers, and sponsors to understand that until an update is issued to modify
this warning to one that better reflects the evaluated configuration, the warning must be disregarded as of
the completion of this evaluation. There is no BitLocker recovery key created, utilized, or transmitted
anywhere when Windows 10 is in its evaluated configuration, including as a recovery mechanism.
Consequently, when the maximum number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been surpassed,
the user is not “locked out” but instead the user and organizational data on the device is wiped.
According to the Operational Guidance, the cipher suite selection and priority may be configured on the
server side of a connection. Cipher suite selection is made according to the default order for Windows 10.
Additionally, Windows 10 devices may be configured to trust a Certificate Authority by using policy
pushed to the device by an MDM. The TOE comes preloaded with root certificates for various Certificate
Authorities. Additional Certificate Authorities may be managed on the Windows 10 device using
workplace enrollment and an MDM.
While there is traditionally an option to disable or enable location services on an MDM system or by a
local Windows 10 administrator on a Windows 10 device, Surface Book does not have a GPS radio.
Instead, it determines the location from available network information. In addition, the Surface Book does
not have the ability to initiate or receive phone calls and so the device does not contain a dialer or any
USSD or MMI codes. As such, GPS and telephony capabilities are out of scope.
VALIDATION REPORT
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
15
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
VALIDATION REPORT
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
16
12 Security Target
Name Description
ST Title Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update Security Target
ST Version 1.0
Publication Date June 10, 2016
VALIDATION REPORT
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
17
13 Abbreviations and Acronyms
ACE Access Control Entry
ACL Access Control List
ACP Access Control Policy
AD Active Directory
ADAM Active Directory Application Mode
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AGD Administrator Guidance Document
AH Authentication Header
ALPC Advanced Local Process Communication
ANSI American National Standards Institute
API Application Programming Interface
APIC Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller
BTG BitLocker To Go
CA Certificate Authority
CBAC Claims Basic Access Control, see DYN
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria
CD-ROM Compact Disk Read Only Memory
CIFS Common Internet File System
CIMCPP Certificate Issuing and Management Components For Basic Robustness
Environments Protection Profile, Version 1.0, April 27, 2009
CM Configuration Management; Control Management
COM Component Object Model
CP Content Provider
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRL Certificate Revocation List
CryptoAPI Cryptographic API
CSP Cryptographic Service Provider
DAC Discretionary Access Control
DACL Discretionary Access Control List
DC Domain Controller
DEP Data Execution Prevention
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DFS Distributed File System
DMA Direct Memory Access
DNS Domain Name System
DS Directory Service
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
DYN Dynamic Access Control
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB Electronic Code Book
EFS Encrypting File System
ESP Encapsulating Security Protocol
VALIDATION REPORT
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
18
FEK File Encryption Key
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FRS File Replication Service
FSMO Flexible Single Master Operation
FTP File Transfer Protocol
FVE Full Volume Encryption
GB Gigabyte
GC Global Catalog
GHz Gigahertz
GPC Group Policy Container
GPO Group Policy Object
GPOSPP US Government Protection Profile for General-Purpose Operating
System in a Networked Environment
GPT Group Policy Template
GPT GUID Partition Table
GUI Graphical User Interface
GUID Globally Unique Identifiers
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Secure HTTP
I/O Input / Output
I&A Identification and Authentication
IA Information Assurance
ICF Internet Connection Firewall
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
ICS Internet Connection Sharing
ID Identification
IDE Integrated Drive Electronics
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
IFS Installable File System
IIS Internet Information Services
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IP Internet Protocol
IPv4 IP Version 4
IPv6 IP Version 6
IPC Inter-process Communication
IPI Inter-process Interrupt
IPsec IP Security
ISAPI Internet Server API
IT Information Technology
KDC Key Distribution Center
LAN Local Area Network
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LPC Local Procedure Call
LSA Local Security Authority
LSASS LSA Subsystem Service
LUA Least-privilege User Account
MAC Message Authentication Code
MB Megabyte
MMC Microsoft Management Console
VALIDATION REPORT
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
19
MSR Model Specific Register
NAC (Cisco) Network Admission Control
NAP Network Access Protection
NAT Network Address Translation
NIC Network Interface Card
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NLB Network Load Balancing
NMI Non-maskable Interrupt
NTFS New Technology File System
NTLM New Technology LAN Manager
OS Operating System
PAE Physical Address Extension
PC/SC Personal Computer/Smart Card
PIN Personal Identification Number
PKCS Public Key Certificate Standard
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In Service
RAID Redundant Array of Independent Disks
RAM Random Access Memory
RAS Remote Access Service
RC4 Rivest’s Cipher 4
RID Relative Identifier
RNG Random Number Generator
RPC Remote Procedure Call
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
RSASSA RSA Signature Scheme with Appendix
SA Security Association
SACL System Access Control List
SAM Security Assurance Measure
SAML Security Assertion Markup Language
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SAS Secure Attention Sequence
SD Security Descriptor
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SID Security Identifier
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SIPI Startup IPI
SF Security Functions
SFP Security Functional Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SMB Server Message Block
SMI System Management Interrupt
SMTP Simple Mail Transport Protocol
SP Service Pack
SPI Security Parameters Index
SPI Stateful Packet Inspection
SRM Security Reference Monitor
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
VALIDATION REPORT
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
20
SSP Security Support Providers
SSPI Security Support Provider Interface
ST Security Target
SYSVOL System Volume
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TDI Transport Driver Interface
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TPM Trusted Platform Module
TSC TOE Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSS TOE Summary Specification
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver / Transmitter
UI User Interface
UID User Identifier
UNC Universal Naming Convention
US United States
UPN User Principal Name
URL Uniform Resource Locator
USB Universal Serial Bus
USN Update Sequence Number
v5 Version 5
VDS Virtual Disk Service
VPN Virtual Private Network
VSS Volume Shadow Copy Service
WAN Wide Area Network
WCF Windows Communications Framework
WebDAV Web Document Authoring and Versioning
WebSSO Web Single Sign On
WDM Windows Driver Model
WIF Windows Identity Framework
WMI Windows Management Instrumentation
WSC Windows Security Center
WU Windows Update
WSDL Web Service Description Language
WWW World-Wide Web
X64 A 64-bit instruction set architecture
VALIDATION REPORT
Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update with Surface Book
21
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction,
Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security Functional
Requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security Assurance
Components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
[4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[5] Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update Security Target, Version 1.0, June 10, 2016
[6] Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme - Guidance to CCEVS Approved Common
Criteria Testing Laboratories, Version 3.0, 29 Aug 2014.
[7] Evaluation Technical Report for Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update, Version 1.0,
June 13, 2016
[8] Microsoft Windows 10 Version 1511 Operational Guidance, Version 1.0, May 13, 2016