Ärendetyp 5.3 Diarienummer: 24FMV5978-24
Dokument ID CSEC2024016
Enligt säkerhetsskyddslagen (2018:585)
SEKRETESS
Enligt offentlighets- och
Sekretesslagen (2009:400)
2026-01-22
Försvarets materielverk
Swedish Defence Material Administration
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report MontaVista VPN Client v2.0
Issue: 1.0, 2026-jan-22
Authorisation: Jerry Johansson, Lead certifier , CSEC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification 5
3 Security Policy 6
3.1 Cryptographic protocols 6
3.2 Cryptographic key negotiation and handling 6
3.3 Establish mutually authenticated trusted channel 6
3.4 Confidentiality and Integrity of red data-in-transit 6
3.5 Generation of audit records 6
3.6 Self-test of the cryptographic functions 7
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
4.1 Assumptions 8
4.2 Clarification of Scope 9
5 Architectural Information 10
6 Documentation 11
7 IT Product Testing 12
7.1 Developer Testing 12
7.2 Evaluator Testing 12
7.3 Penetration Testing 13
8 Evaluated Configuration 14
9 Results of the Evaluation 15
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 16
11 Acronyms 17
12 Bibliography 18
Appendix A Scheme Versions 19
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System 19
A.2 Scheme Notes 19
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1 Executive Summary
The TOE is part of the MontaVista VPN Client (MVC), which is a software product.
The MVC is intended to be used with the MontaVista Linux Carrier Grade eXpress
(CGX) operating system using the ARM processor architecture.
The MVC is employed by an end-user as a client on an operating environment to es-
tablish a mutually-authenticated trusted channel with a server on a remote system run-
ning a compatible implementation of the standard protocols implemented by TOE.
The MVC consists of a collection of software modules that include components from
the opensource software project strongSwan and Linux kernel networking compo-
nents. The TOE is provided as binary executables along with the whole MVC source
code, including all of the non-TOE components and tools necessary to build the exe-
cutable images. However, only the binary executables are considered the TOE and not
the source code version.
The MVC utilizes features of the non-TOE hardware/firmware/software platform pro-
vided by its environment, including cryptographic operations, key management and
key storage.
The TOE type is a VPN Client.
The ST does not claim conformance to any Protection Profiles (PPs).
There are ten assumptions made in the ST regarding the secure usage and environment
of the MontaVista VPN Client. The TOE relies on these being met to counter one
threat and three organisational security policies (OSPs) in the ST. The assumptions,
the OSPs and the threats are described in chapter 4 Assumptions and Clarifications of
Scope.
The evaluation has been performed by atsec information security AB in their premises
in Stockholm, Sweden. Site-visit and testing oversight was performed by the evaluator
at the developer's site in San Jose, two certifiers participated virtually via Teams.
The evaluation was completed in 2025-12-02. The evaluation was conducted in ac-
cordance with the requirements of Common Criteria (CC), version 2022 and the
Common Methodology (CEM) version 2022. The evaluation was performed at the
evaluation assurance level EAL 4, augmented by ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.4.
atsec information security AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria
under the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. Combitech
AB are also accredited by the Swedish accreditation body SWEDAC according to
ISO/IEC 17025 for Common Criteria.
The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
sions of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results
confirm the security claims in the Security Target (ST), and have been achieved in
agreement with the requirements of the Common Criteria and the Common Methodol-
ogy for evaluation assurance level EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 and
AVA_VAN.4.
The technical information in this report is based on the Security Target [ST] and the
Final Evaluation Report produced by atsec information security AB.
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The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
certificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are
met. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the
IT product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate is either expressed or implied.
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2 Identification
Certification Identification
Certification ID CSEC2024016
Name and version of the
certified IT product
MontaVista VPN Client v.2.0
buildtag: agib-6.6-5.0-250613145912
Security Target Identification MontaVista VPN Client (MVC)
Common Criteria Security Target
EAL EAL 4 + ALC_FLR.2 + AVA_VAN.4
Sponsor MontaVista Software, LLC
Developer MontaVista Software, LLC
ITSEF atsec AB
Common Criteria version CC:2022
CEM version CEM:2022
QMS version 2.6.1
Scheme Notes Release 22.0
Recognition Scope CCRA, SOGIS, EA/MLA
Certification date 2026–01–22
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3 Security Policy
The TOE provides the following security services:
- Cryptographic protocols
- Cryptographic key negotiation and handling
- Establish mutually authenticated trusted channel
- Confidentiality and Integrity of red data-in-transit
- Generation of audit records
- Self-test of the cryptographic functions
3.1 Cryptographic protocols
Cryptographic protocols capable of successful runs despite passive eavesdropping or
active manipulations of coordination and data communication messages in transit by
an adversary with powers such as those defined by the Dolev-Yao symbolic model.
The MVC implements ESP protocol to provide confidentiality, data origin authentica-
tion, connectionless integrity, and anti-replay service to connections between local and
remote red networks for both ipv4 and ipv6. The MVC performs encrypting and sign-
ing, to mitigate against eavesdropping and manipulation of messages while in transit
over the black network.
3.2 Cryptographic key negotiation and handling
IKEv2 protocol is implemented by the MVC for IPsec keying functionality. At phase
1 the MVC performs mutual authentication of the peers using X.509 certificates, nego-
tiates cryptographic parameters, and creates session keys for the rest of IKEv2 com-
munication (Phase 2).
3.3 Establish mutually authenticated trusted channel
Establish a mutually authenticated trusted channel “VPN tunnel” over a public “black”
network.
IPsec ESP functionality of the MVC implements IPsec tunnel mode, which encapsu-
lates the whole IP packet by encrypting and authenticating the original IP packet. En-
cryption and authentication is performed by utilizing keys and algorithm selections
from an Security Association (SA) entry in SA Database. The SA entry is created for
the connection by IKEv2 functionality in Phase 2 negotiation
3.4 Confidentiality and Integrity of red data-in-transit
Confidentiality and integrity of red data-in-transit through VPN tunnel.
The red data in-transit is protected by encapsulating it into IPsec VPN ESP tunnel, ne-
gotiated between local and remote peer as described above. For network packets, IP-
sec Security Policy Database is searched to determine whether a packet is subject to
IPsec transformation.
3.5 Generation of audit records
StrongSwan generates audit records of IPsec IKEv2 security-relevant events via the
systemd logging interface provided by the platform. The log entries are stored into a
file and accessible locally to the security administrator.
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3.6 Self-test of the cryptographic functions
During start-up, the TOE will perform test of the strongSwan and test of the crypto-
graphic functions that are provided by the platform (both the kernel and the user space
part). The TOE will also test the integrity of the strongSwan configuration. If these
tests are failing the TOE will not be operational and will enter a secure state. In that
case the TOE will generate an audit event.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Assumptions
The Security Target [ST] makes ten assumptions on the usage and the operational en-
vironment of the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL_SECURITY
The non-IT environment provides the TOE and the platform upon which it operates
with appropriate physical security to prevent tampering commensurate with the value
of the IT assets protected by the TOE..
A.PERSONNEL
Personnel that use or administer the TOE or the platform are assumed to be trusted,
trained and follow all applicable guidance documentation.
A.IT_ADMIN
The operational environment of the TOE provides procedures and tools for the secure
configuration and administration of the TOE.
A.IT_STORAGE
The IT environment provides protected persistent storage for programs and data of the
TOE.
A.IT_ACCESS_CONTROL
The IT environment for the operation of the TOE provides appropriate and adequate
access control for assets upon which the TOE depends, including: TOE executable
files, configuration files, ports, or other interfaces.
A.IT_CRYPTO_EXP
The cryptographic primitives, RNG and memory management for kernel key erasure
required by the TOE are provided by the underlying platform.
A.IT_CRYPTO_GEN
The IT environment provides mechanisms for the storage, distribution and manage-
ment of cryptographic private keys and certificates.
A.IT_INITIALIZATION
The IT environment has hardware and software features to ensure correct establish-
ment of initial secure state.
A.IT_TIME
The IT environment has hardware and software features to provide the current time.
A.IT_MEDIATION
All access to data assets (including red data and external network connections) that ex-
ist in the IT environment is mediated by and subject to the controls provided by the
platform upon which the TOE executes.
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4.2 Clarification of Scope
The Security Target contains one threat, which has been considered during the evalua-
tion.
T.NETWORK_ATTACK
The actions of an adversary on the black network (including message inspection, dis-
assembly, replay, deletion, modification, and creation potentially across multiple ses-
sions) enable the adversary to defeat the objectives of the security protocols imple-
mented by the TOE resulting in violation of a security policy, such as the confidential-
ity or integrity of red DIT.
The Security Target contains three Organisational Security Policies (OSPs).
P.LOGGING
Information regarding the occurrence of security-relevant events within the TSF shall
be logged for later forensic examination, including the identity of associated individu-
al user or subject, along with other relevant particulars.
P.RED_DATA_PROT
The TOE shall ensure that red data is protected when it is under control of the TOE
and that it is only transmitted over the designated communication channel to or from a
peer over a black network.
P.SELF_TEST
The TOE must verify the integrity of the configuration and verify that the crypto-
graphic operations are performed correctly before any outside connection is estab-
lished. If the test fails the TOE must come to a halt.
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5 Architectural Information
The MVC is used to establish a cryptographically secure data communication channel
between a local user and a remote trusted user or to establish a trusted network over a
potentially unsafe network.
The client is physically realized in the MVC as a software product. The core function-
ality is to transmit red data with confidentiality, integrity and authenticity achieved by
establishing a suitably configured VPN tunnel between the VPN client and a compati-
ble VPN gateway. Supporting functions needed to protect the VPN client and to con-
figure and establish the secure channel, perform encryption/decryption and signing of
data, key and certificate management, key storage, etc. are provided by the platform
running the MVC product. The MVC utilizes features of the non-TOE hard-
ware/firmware/software platform provided by its environment, including cryptograph-
ic operations, key management and key storage.
MVC implements security functionality that integrates with the CGX kernel to pro-
vide IPSec ESP packet path functionality, maintaining Security Association & Securi-
ty Policy databases (SAD and SPD) and enforcing IPsec ESP protocol transformation
of network packets. In CGX user space, MVC implements security functionality for
managing IPsec configuration, running IPsec IKEv2 keying protocol and controlling
ESP transformation in the kernel by applying SA and SP information.
During start-up, the TOE will perform test of the strongSwan and test of the crypto-
graphic functions that are provided by the platform (both the kernel and the user space
part). The TOE will also test the integrity of the strongSwan configuration. If these
tests are failing the TOE will not be operational and will enter a secure state. In that
case the TOE will generate an audit event.
StrongSwan generates audit records of IPsec IKEv2 security-relevant events via the
systemd logging interface provided by the platform. The log entries are stored into a
file and accessible locally to the security administrator.
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6 Documentation
The TOE includes the following guidance documentation:
RFG Reference Guide MVC 2.0 VPN
CGX MVSecure CGX 5.0 Getting Started Guide MVC 2.0 AGIB
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7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Testing
Testing Approach
The developer has performed testing against all TSFIs and subsystems of the TOE.
The testing covers the cryptographic protocols and algorithms claimed in the [ST]. In
total, it consists of 31 test cases. This testing is performed as a part of the development
process, and to an extent the test execution and reporting of results is automated.
However, the tests may also be executed manually with relative ease.
For each test case, the developer provided an overall test objective, test steps, and the
expected results in the developer's test plan. The tests include both positive and nega-
tive test cases.
Test Configuration
The testing was performed using the same platform as specified in the [ST]. As most
tests are simply executed on said trusted platform (part of the TOE operational envi-
ronment), the testing can be completed without proprietary tools. The developer's test-
ing has been completed between two identical TOE's, but the tests may also be exe-
cuted with other compatible systems used as end-points for the VPN.
Test Results
The developer provided the test output and results separately from the test plan. The
developer provided both a verdict of the test case and also the complete test output.
The evaluator examined these to verify the results. All tests were successful.
7.2 Evaluator Testing
Testing Effort
The evaluator first executed a sample of the developer's testing for each TSFI via the
following test cases:
● TPS-CGX26-RFC_3602_ESP
● TPS-CGX26-RFC_4945_IKEv2
● TPS-CGX26-Strongswan_strongswanconf
● TPS-CGX26-Strongswan_Host_Host
● TPS-CGX26-Strongswan_Systemd_verification
● TPS-CGX26-Strongswan_systemdlogging
● TPS-CGX26-Crypto_Tests_Interface
● TPS-CGX26-Update_SA
● TPS-CGX26-IPv6
The evaluator did not identify any gaps in the coverage of the developer's testing to
TSF, Subsystems, or TSFIs. The evaluator added a test case to verify the cryptograph-
ic functionality by using a trusted reference implementation:
● ETC#1: Independent (Cryptographic) Implementation
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Testing Approach
The evaluator based the testing effort on the results of the ATE_COV and ATE_DPT
work units. Here, the evaluator determined that the developer testing had covered all
TSFIs, Subsystems
and TSF of the TOE. The evaluator repeated a sample of the developer's testing, cov-
ering one test for each TSFI.
The evaluator found room for improvement the area of one cryptographic test, but
opted to verify the expected behaviour of the functionality via analysis of the imple-
mentation representation, and therefore did not add any further test case related to this.
The evaluator identified that the developer did not test against a fully independent
cryptographic implementation. The evaluator set up a test to verify the cryptographic
functionality against a Libreswan reference implementation.
Test Configuration
The evaluator had prepared and installed the testing environment, including the
TOE(s) at atsec's premises in Stockholm, Sweden. The developer provided the hard-
ware and software platform as specified in the [ST], and also the TOE. The developer
also provided information about additional test systems, such as remote VPN end-
points, which assisted the evaluator in setting up an equivalent testing environment.
Test Results
All evaluator test cases and sample developer tests were completed successfully.
7.3 Penetration Testing
Testing approach
No potential vulnerabilities were identified. Penetration testing was conducted against
exposed areas within the TOE, as identified during the search of vulnerabilities
through the developer's evidence. As such, the evaluator created a negative test against
the TOE's trusted channel as a penetration test.
Testing configuration
The TOE and the TOE environment were configured according to the [ST], [RFG] and
[CGX] guidance documents.
Testing depth
Since the developers performs both positive and negative testing, it was unlikely that
vulnerabilities caused by programming errors or bugs would be found and identified
by the evaluator. As such, the evaluator attempted to expand the scope of the testing
from the perspective of an attacker by verifying the claimed integrity and confidential-
ity functionality.
Testing results
None of the performed penetration tests revealed any vulnerability in the TOE.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE components below shall be installed and configured in accordance with the
TOE guidance listed in this document.
The MVC is intended to be used with the MontaVista Linux Carrier Grade eXpress
(CGX) operating system using the ARM processor architecture. So the CGX operating
system must be provided as part of the operational environment.
The following platform software components are required for operation of the TOE:
- identification and authentication components
- Linux Kernel Crypto API which provides cryptographic algorithm implementations
for the kernel space ESP implementation
- OpenSSL library and PKCS#11 module (SoftHSM by default) which provide
cryptographic algorithm implementations for the user space charon-systemd IKEv2
implementation
- Netlink Socket API for maintaining Security Policy Database (SPD) / Security
Association Database (SAD) in the kernel space and for communicating from the
kernel space IPsec stack to the charon-systemd daemon
- systemd daemon that starts charon-systemd and collects and stores log information
- configuration agent (using libest) that provides user interface for configuration and
interfaces to other parts of the user's system
Besides, a hardware/firmware platform compatible with the CGX operating system is
required, which has at least one network interface and provides persistent storage for
software components, configuration and log data. The evaluated platform hardware is
an AGIB A101 board, secure SoC environment (ARM ISA).
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within
the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives
stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Moderate.
The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].
The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS.
The verdicts for the assurance classes and components are summarised in the follow-
ing table:
Assurance Class/Family Short name Verdict
Development ADV PASS
Security Architecture ADV_ARC.1 PASS
Functional Specification ADV_FSP.4 PASS
TOE Design ADV_TDS.3 PASS
Guidance Documents AGD PASS
Operational User Guidance AGD_OPE.1 PASS
Preparative Procedures AGD_PRE.1 PASS
Life-cycle Support ALC PASS
CM Capabilities ALC_CMC.4 PASS
CM Scope ALC_CMS.4 PASS
Delivery ALC_DEL.1 PASS
Development Security ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Flaw Remediation ALC_FLR.2 PASS
Life-cycle Definition ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Tools and Techniques ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Security Target Evaluation ASE PASS
ST Introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Conformance Claims ASE_CCL.1 PASS
Security Problem Definition ASE_SPD.1 PASS
Security Objectives ASE_OBJ.2 PASS
Extended Components Definition ASE_ECD.1 PASS
Security Requirements ASE_REQ.2 PASS
TOE Summary Specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Tests ATE PASS
Coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Depth ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional Tests ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent Testing ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability Assessment AVA PASS
Vulnerability Analysis AVA_VAN.4 PASS
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10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
None.
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11 Acronyms
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
CEM
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security,
document describing the methodology used in Common Cri-
teria evaluations
CLI Command Line Interface
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility, test laboratory licensed to
operate within a evaluation and certification scheme
OSP Organisational Security Policy
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target, document containing security requirements
and specifications, used as the basis of a TOE evaluation
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VPN Virtual Private Network
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12 Bibliography
ST MontaVista VPN Client (MVC) Common Criteria Security Target,
MontaVista Software LLC, 2025-12-01, document version 2.8,
FMV_ID 24FMV5978-38
RFG Reference Guide MVC 2.0 VPN, MontaVista Software LLC,
June 2025, document revision 1, FMV_ID 24FMV5978-30
CGX Getting Started Guide MVC 2.0 AGIB, MontaVista Software LLC,
June 2025, document revision 2, FMV_ID 24FMV5978-30
CC/CEM Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
and Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, CCMB-2022-11-001 through 006, document versions
CC:2022/CEM:2022 rev 1
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Appendix A Scheme Versions
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System
During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval-
uation and Certification scheme have been applicable since the certification applica-
tion was registered 2024-11-04:
Version Introduced Impact of changes
2.6.1 2025-10-16 No impact
2.6 2025-04-23 No impact
2.5.2 2024-06-14 Application
A.2 Scheme Notes
Scheme Notes applicable to the certification:
Scheme
Note
Version Title Applicability
SN-15 5.0 Testing Compliant
SN-18 4.0 Highlighted Requirements on the Security
Target
Compliant
SN-22 4.0 Vulnerability Assessment Compliant
SN-27 1.0 ST Requirements at the Time of Application
for Certification
Compliant
SN-28 2.0 Updated Procedures for Application, Evalua-
tion and Certification
Compliant