Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0389-2007
for
SM4148 LSI module for Smart Card
from
Sharp Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V3.5
BSI-DSZ-CC-0389-2007
SM4148 LSI module for Smart Card
from
Sharp Corporation
Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4
and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation, version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001
Functionality: BSI-PP-0002-2001 conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 augmented by
ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the TSF),
ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficieny of security measures),
AVA_MSU.3 (Analysis and testing for insecure states) and
AVA_VLA.4 (Highly resistant)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 3. July 2007
The Vice President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Hange L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0389-2007 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0389-2007
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0389-2007 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.35
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0389-2007
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective in March 1998. This agreement has been signed by
the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates
was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels
(EAL 1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
recognizes certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and
the United Kingdom within the terms of this Agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition
of Protection Profiles based on the CC. As of February 2007 the arrangement
has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America.
The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http:\\www.commoncriteriaportal.org
This evaluation contains the components ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2,
AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 that are not mutually recognised in accordance
with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4-components
of these assurance families are relevant.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0389-2007 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SM4148 LSI module for Smart Card has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-
0245-2005.
The evaluation of the product SM4148 LSI module for Smart Card was
conducted by Brightsight. Brightsight is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is:
Sharp Corporation
System-Flash Division IC Group
2613-1, Ichinomoto-cho
Tenri, Nara 632-8567
Japan
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 3. July 2007.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0389-2007
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-18 and D1 to D-4.
The product SM4148 LSI module for Smart Card, has been included in the BSI
list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
http://www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
Sharp Corporation
System-Flash Division IC Group
2613-1, Ichinomoto-cho
Tenri, Nara 632-8567
Japan
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0389-2007 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0389-2007
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 9
3 Security Policy 10
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 10
5 Architectural Information 11
6 Documentation 11
7 IT Product Testing 11
8 Evaluated Configuration 12
9 Results of the Evaluation 12
10 Comments/Recommendations 15
11 Annexes 15
12 Security Target 15
13 Definitions 15
14 Bibliography 17
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0389-2007 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the SM4148 LSI module for Smart Card (a
packaged IC) produced in the 4th
factory of Sharp Corporation at Fukuyama,
hereafter called SM4148.
The SM4148 is a dual interface type module providing a hardware platform to a
smard card operating system and smard card application software with
interfaces for contact and contactless communications, physical and logical
protection mechanisms, DES and modular multiplication coprocessors.
The SM4148 is intended for use in high security applications, for example
national ID cards and electronic passports.
The TOE physically consists of a packaged module containing the following:
• The circuitry of an IC (hardware including physical memories RAM, ROM
and Flash ROM (FROM) providing a secure execution environment for
programs and the physical interaction with the reader/writer
• TSF data stored in the IC
• The following IC dedicated software:
• BootROM, IC dedicated software for starting the OS (OS itself is
outside of the TOE and a DRNG function
• TestROM (test functionality is disabled before TOE delivery)
The SM4148 was evaluated by Brightsight. The evaluation was completed on
27. April 2007. Brightsight is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is
Sharp Corporation
System-Flash Division IC Group
2613-1, Ichinomoto-cho
Tenri, Nara 632-8567
Japan
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL4+ (Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented). The following table shows
the augmented assurance components.
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0389-2007
Requirement Identifier
EAL4 TOE evaluation: methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
+ ADV_IMP.2 Development – Implementation of the TSF
+ ALC_DVS.2 Life cycle support – Sufficiency of security measures
+ AVA_MSU.3 Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure
states
+ AVA_VLA.4 Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1 [DES] Cryptographic operation
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1 Subset access control
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
FMT Security management
FMT_MSA.1 [On] Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1 [Off] Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FPT Protection of the TSF
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
FRU Fault tolerance
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0389-2007 Certification Report
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FAU Security audit
FAU_SAS.1 Audit review
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1 Audit review
FMT Security management
FMT_LIM.1 Security management
FMT_LIM.2 Security management
Table 3: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF.Passivation The complete top layer of the IC, except for the bond pads, is
covered with a passivation layer making physical attack
difficult.
SF.Module The IC is covered with resin making physical attack difficult.
SF.Flat_Layout The TOE’s wiring rule for the logic circuits, which is called
“Flat-layout”, does not have hierarchies. This makes it difficult
for an attacker to find the signals between the logical circuits.
SF.Narrow_Wiring The wiring space of the IC is very narrow, making it difficult to
change the IC or read data from it.
SF.Bus_Scrambling The bus between the CPU and memories is scrambled,
making it difficult to read data from it.
SF.Shielding_Layer The two top layers of the IC are shielding layers, one passive
and one active.If the active shield is broken, the TOE does not
operate, making physical attacks difficult.
SF.Watchdog_Timer The TOE has a watchdog timer, which resets the TOE when it
times out.
SF.Odd_Address The TOE resets when it detects an odd address violation.
SF.Illegal_Instruction The TOE resets when it detects an illegal instruction.
SF.Abnormal_Internal_Clock The TOE resets when it detects that the period of the high
level or low level of the internal clock is outside of the allowed
range.
SF.Abnormal_RF_Clock The TOE resets when, in contactless mode, it detects that the
period of the high level or low level of the RF clock outside of
the allowed range.
SF.Abnormal_Temperature The TOE resets when it detects a temperature outside of the
allowed range.
SF.Abnormal_Voltage_Flash Flash memory uses 2 power-sources. One is the internal
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0389-2007
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
voltage. The other is the internal program voltage.
The TOE resets when it detects the internal voltage for the
flash component is outside of the allowed range.
SF.Abnormal_Voltage_Logic The TOE resets when it detects an internal voltage for the
logic components is outside of the allowed range.
SF.Over-Voltage_Protector Should the voltage of the internal supply power (VCC)
become too high, then the TOE will absorb excess power up
to a limit. If the absorbed power is too high, the TOE will
disable itself permanently.
SF.Power_Regulator The TOE regulates the internal power voltages VAA, VDD,
VFF and VPPO from the internal supply power VCC.
SF.PLL The TOE regulates the internal clock in contact operation.
SF.Blocked_Test_Pins The test pins of the TOE are irreversibly blocked before the
TOE is shipped to the customer
SF.Memory_Protect The TOE enforces the following memory protection:
If the Memory Protect is On:
read/write access to the RAM is allowed except for:
• Read/write access to the OS stack area
• Read/write access to the OS working area
• Read/write access to the co-processor shared RAM area
unless explicitly enabled
read/write access to all other memory areas is denied, except
for:
• Read access to the application area
• Read/write access the General Purpose Registers except
the SYS register.
SF.Memory_Protect_On The TOE ensures that only Software running with the Memory
Protect Off can turn the Memory Protect On.
SF.Memory_Protect_Off The TOE ensures that Software running with the Memory
Protect
On can turn the Memory protect Off only by:
• returning control to the Software in the SCALL relief area
with the SCALL instruction, or
• returning control to the Software in the SRET relief area with
the SRET instruction, or
• to the interrupt handling Software by generating an interrupt.
SF.DES The TOE has a coprocessor capable of providing DES
encryption and decryption. This coprocessor is difficult to
analyse with SPA/DPA and difficult to influence with DFA.
SF.FLASH The TOE has flash memory capable of storing initialisation
data and/or pre-personalisation data and/or supplements of
the Smartcard Embedded Software.
SF.RNG The TOE has Deterministic Random Number Generator that
meets the AIS20 K3 requirements.
Table 4: Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 6.1.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0389-2007 Certification Report
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed ‘high’ (SOF-high) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [7, chapter 6.2].
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
For details see chapter 9 of this report.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats which were assumed for the evaluation and averted by the TOE
and the organisational security policies defined for the TOE are specified in the
Security Target [7] and can be summarised as follows.
It is assumed that the attacker is a human being or a process acting on behalf
of him.
So called standard high-level security concerns defined in the Protection Profile
[8] were derived from considering the end-usage phase (phase 7 of the life
cycle as described in the Security Target) as follows:
• manipulation of user data and of the smart card Embedded Software (while
being executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE’s memories),
• disclosure of user data and of the smart card Embedded Software (while
being processed and while being stored in the TOE’s memories) and
• deficiency of random numbers.
These high-level security concerns are refined in the Protection Profile [8] and
used by the Security Target [7] by defining threats on a more technical level for
• Inherent Information Leakage,
• Physical Probing,
• Physical Manipulation,
• Malfunction due to Environmental Stress,
• Forced Information Leakage,
• Abuse of Functionality and
• Deficiency of Random Numbers.
In addition, a threat concerning Memory Access Violation is specified.
Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 are
covered by assumptions (see below).
The development and production environment starting with phase 2 up to TOE
Delivery are covered by an organisational security policy outlining that the IC
developer / manufacturer must apply the policy “Protection during TOE
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0389-2007
Development and Production (P.Process-TOE)” so that no information is
unintentionally made available for the operational phase of the TOE. The Policy
ensures confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its related design
information and data. Access to samples, tools and material must be restricted.
A specific additional security functionality for DES encryption and decryption
must be provided by the TOE according to an additional security policy defined
in the Security Target.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The TOE has two different operating modes, user mode and test mode. The
application software being executed on the TOE cannot use the test mode. The
TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the IC packaging process
(Phase 4). At this point in time the operating system software is already stored
in the non-volatile memories of the chip and the test mode is disabled. Thus
there are no special procedures for generation or installation that are important
for a secure use of the TOE. The further production and delivery processes, like
the Smartcard finishing process, personalisation and the delivery of the
smartcard to an end user, have to be organized in a way that excludes all
possibilities of physical manipulation of the TOE. There are no special security
measures for the startup of the TOE besides the requirement that the controller
has to be used under the well-defined operating conditions and that the
requirements on the software have to be applied as described in the user
documentation.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
With respect to the life cycle defined in the Security Target, Phase 1 and the
Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 are covered by these
assumptions:
The developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software (Phase 1) must ensure:
• the appropriate “Usage of Hardware Platform (A.Plat-Appl)” while developing
this software in Phase 1. Therefore, it has to be ensured, that the software
fulfils the assumptions for a secure use of the TOE. In particular the
assumptions imply that developers are trusted to develop software that fulfils
the assumptions.
• the appropriate “Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-Appl)” while developing
this software in Phase 1. The smart card operating system and the smart
card application software have to use security relevant user data (especially
keys and plain text data) in a secure way. It is assumed that the Security
Policy as defined for the specific application context of the environment does
not contradict the Security Objectives of the TOE. Only appropriate secret
keys as input for the cryptographic function of the TOE have to be used to
ensure the strength of cryptographic operation.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0389-2007 Certification Report
Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation (A.Process-Card) is
assumed after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6, as well as during the
delivery to Phase 7.
Following additional assumptions are assumed in the Security Target:
• Key-dependent functions (if any) shall be implemented in the Smartcard
Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to leakage
attacks (A.Key-Function).
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
SM4148 LSI module for Smart Card,
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW SM4148 module packaged module
2 SW Hermes Bootstrap Program
(including DRNG function)
1.2.0 included in BootROM
3 SW IC dedicated test software 1.0.0 included in TestROM
4 DOC Programmers Manual of
SM4148
1.3.0 paper
5 DOC Combination Type Smart
Card LSI HERMES
Bootstrap program
Functional Specification
1.0.0 paper
6 DOC Secure Programming
Guidance for SM4148
1.0 paper
7 DOC Handling Guidance for
SM4148
1.0 paper
Table 5: Deliverables of the TOE
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0389-2007
The TOE can be identified by examining the module:
41xxxxx
4148 S
YYWWDFV
4148 identifies the SM4148 while the „F“ identifies the production line (factory)
and must be „1“ (identifying the 4th
factory at Fukuyama).
3 Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functions to be used
by the smart card operating system and the smart card application thus provi-
ding an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a
symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithm to ensure the confidentiality of
plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and
it will provide a random number generation of appropriate quality.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is
also to provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the
confidentiality of cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions performed
by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall:
• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory
of the TOE and
• maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of
security functions (security mechanisms and associated functions)
provided by the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The smart card operating system and the application software stored in the
FROM are not part of the TOE. The code in the Test ROM of the TOE (IC
dedicated software) is used by the TOE manufacturer to check the chip function
before TOE delivery. This was considered as part of the evaluation under the
CC assurance aspects ALC for relevant procedures and under ATE for testing.
The TOE is delivered as a module at the end of the IC packaging into modules
(phase 4 of the life cycle defined). At these specific points in time the operating
system software is already stored in the non-volatile memories of the chip and
the test mode is completely disabled.
The smart card applications need the security functions of the smart card
operating system based on the security features of the TOE. With respect to
security the composition of this TOE, the operating system, and the smart card
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0389-2007 Certification Report
application is important. Within this composition the security functionality is only
partly provided by the TOE and causes dependencies between the TOE
security functions and the functions provided by the operating system or the
smart card application on top. These dependencies are expressed by environ-
mental and secure usage assumptions as outlined in the user documentation.
Within this evaluation of the TOE several aspects were specifically considered
to support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with an embedded smart
card application software (i.e. smart card operating system and application).
This was necessary as Sharp Corp. is the TOE developer and manufacturer
and responsible for specific aspects of handling the embedded smart card
application software in its development and production environment.
5 Architectural Information
The top level block diagram and a list of subsystems can be found within the
TOE description of the Security Target [7]. The Programmers Manual [10]
contains the description of the complete instruction set and the hardware
description (but only the part relevant for smartcard application software
developers).
For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the components
Sharp original 16 bit CPU, DES coprocessor, Deterministic Random Number
Generator, Flash Memory, RAM, ROM, Memory Protect Circuit, I/O and filters
are used.
Security measures for physical protection are realised within the layout of the
whole circuitry.
The TOE IC Dedicated Software, stored on the chip, is used for testing
purposes during production only and is completed separated from the use of the
embedded software by disabling before TOE delivery.
6 Documentation
The documentation [10] to [13] is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security
Target [7].
Note that the customer who buys the TOE is normally the developer of the
operating system and/or application software which will use the TOE as
hardware computing platform to implement the software (operating system /
application software) which will use the TOE.
7 IT Product Testing
The developer tests cover all Security Functions and all security mechanisms
as identified in the functional specification and the high level design.
The functional testing of SM4148 can be divided in
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0389-2007
• tests which are performed in a simulation environment for analogue and
digital simulations,
• layout tests by testing the implementation by optical control, in order to
verify statements concerning the layout design.
• functional tests
The evaluators conducted the independent testing and penetration testing in
conjunction.
• Independent testing: The evaluators designed a series of tests to test
special security functions. All test results were as expected.
• The penetration testing effort can be summarised as follows:
• The evaluators assessed all possible vulnerabilities found during
evaluation of the classes. This resulted in a shortlist with a number of
possible vulnerabilities to be tested.
• The evaluators made an analysis of the TOE in its intended
environment to check whether the developer vulnerability analysis has
assessed all information. The attack tree technique was used for this
assessment.
• The evaluators tested the claims made by the developer, which the
evaluators deemed worth further investigation, based on the
vulnerability analysis.
All test results were as expected.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is identified by SM4148 LSI module for Smart Card (a packaged IC)
produced in the 4th
factory at Fukuyama. There is only one evaluated
configuration of the TOE. All information of how to use the TOE and its security
functions by the software is provided within the user documentation.
The TOE has two different operating modes: User mode and test mode. The
test mode is irreversibly disabled before the TOE leaves the factory. Its was
tested whether it was possible to re-enable this test mode but that proved to be
not possible. Thus, the evaluation was mainly performed in the user mode. For
all evaluation activities performed in test mode, there was a rationale why the
results are valid for the user mode, too.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
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The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
ordination with the Certification Body [4, AIS 34]). For smart card IC specific
methodology the CC supporting documents
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and
(see [4, AIS 25, AIS 26])
and [4, AIS 20 (Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for
deterministic random number generators) were used.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are
summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Sufficiency of security measures ALC_DVS.2 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states AVA_MSU.3 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Highly resistant AVA_VLA.4 PASS
Table 6: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
• the TOE is conform to the Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, BSI-PP-
0002-2001 [9]
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function:
• SF.DES (Coutermeasures of the DES coprocessor against side channel
attacks),
• SF.RNG (Deterministic Random Number Generator)
The scheme interpretations AIS 26 and AIS 20 (see [4]) were used.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for the TOE Security Function SF.DES (DES coprocessor).
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex A in part D of this report.
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The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE SM4148 LSI
module for Smart Card (a packaged IC) produced in the 4th
factory at Fukuyama
as identified in chapter 2. The evaluation results cannot be extended to further
versions/derivates of the TOE and/or another production sites without any extra
investigations.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The operational documents [10] to [13] contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
11 Annexes
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment (see part D of this report).
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [7] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is a sanitized version of the
complete security target [7] used for the evaluation performed.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CPU Central Processing Unit
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
DPA Differential Power Analysis
DRNG Deterministic Random Number Generator
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
FROM Flash ROM
IC Integrated Circuit
I/O Input/Output
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IT Information Technology
OS Operating System
PLL Phase Locked Loop
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
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Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version
2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0389, version 1.5, 11 April 2007, SM4148
LSI for IC cards Security Target, Sharp Corporation (confidential
document)
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[7] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0389, version 1.5, 11 April 2007, SM4148
LSI for IC cards Security Target, Sharp Corporation (sanitized public
document)
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, version 2.0, April 20th
, 2007, Evaluation
Technical Report SHARP SM4148 Module –EAL4+ (confidential
document)
[9] Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI
registration ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001, developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs,
Hitachi Ltd., Infineon Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors
[10] Programmers Manual of SM4148, Ver. 1.3.0, April 18, 2007
[11] Combination Type Smard Card LSI HERMES Bootstrap program
Functional Specification, Ver. 1.0.0, December 20, 2005
[12] Secure Programming Guidance for SM4148, Ver. 1.0, September 15,
2006
[13] Handling Guidance for SM4148, Ver. 1.0, September 15, 2006
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment D-3
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Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0389-2007
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product SM4148 LSI module for Smart Card, (Target of Evaluation,
TOE) has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005), extended by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance, for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, version 2.3 (ISO/IEC15408:
2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 3. July 2007, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common
Criteria assurance requirements
• ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4,
ACM_SCP.2),
• ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
• ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
(a) Sharp Makuhari, 1-9-2, NAKASE, MIHAMA-KU, CHIBA-SHI, CHIBA 261-8520,
Japan
(b) Sharp Tenri, 2631-1, ICHINOMOTO-CHO, TENRI-SHI, NARA 632-8567, Japan
(c) Toppan Printing Co. Ltd., 1101-20, MYOHOJI-CHO, YOHKAICHI-SHI, SHIGA
527-8566, Japan
(d) Sharp Fukuyama, 1, ASAHI, DAIMON-CHO, FUKUYAMA-SHI, HIROSHIMA
721-8522, Japan (production site)
(e) Sharp Takaya Electronic Industry Co. Ltd., 3121-1, SATOMI, SATOSHO-CHO,
ASAKUCHI-GUN, OKAYAMA 719-0301, Japan
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in
accordance with the Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0389, version 1.5, 11 April
2007, SM4148 LSI for IC cards Security Target, Sharp Corporation.
The evaluators verified, that the threats and the security objectives for the life
cycle phases 2, 3 and 4 up to delivery at the end of phase 4 as stated in the
Security Target [7] are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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