PREMIER MINISTRE
Secretariat General for National Defence
Central Directorate for Information Systems Security
Certification Report DCSSI-2007/23
ST19NR66-A Secure Microcontroller
Paris, 13th
of December 2007
Courtesy Translation
Certification report DCSSI-2007/23 ST19NR66-A Secure Microcontroller
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Warning
This report is designed to provide sponsors with a document enabling them to assess the
security level of a product under the conditions of use and operation defined in this report for
the evaluated version. It is also designed to provide the potential purchaser of the product with
the conditions under which he may operate or use the product so as to meet the conditions of
use for which the product has been evaluated and certified; that is why this certification report
must be read alongside the evaluated user and administration guidance, as well as with the
product security target, which presents threats, environmental assumptions and the supposed
conditions of use so that the user can judge for himself whether the product meets his needs in
terms of security objectives.
Certification does not, however, constitute a recommendation product from DCSSI (Central
Directorate for Information Systems Security), and does not guarantee that the certified
product is totally free of all exploitable vulnerabilities.
Any correspondence about this report has to be addressed to:
Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale
Direction Centrale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information
Centre de certification
51, boulevard de la Tour Maubourg
75700 PARIS cedex 07 SP
France
certification.dcssi@sgdn.pm.gouv.fr
Reproduction of this document without any change or cut is authorised.
ST19NR66-A Secure Microcontroller Certification report DCSSI-2007/23
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Certification report reference
DCSSI-2007/23
Product name
ST19NR66-A Secure Microcontroller
Product reference
ST19NR66-A revision C
(dedicated software ZXC, maskset K7H0A)
Protection profile conformity
PP/9806 – PP BSI-PP-002-2001
Evaluation criteria and version
Common Criteria version 2.3
compliant with ISO 15408:2005
Evaluation level
EAL 5 augmented
ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3, AVA_VLA.4
Developer
STMicroelectronics
Smartcard IC division, ZI de Rousset, BP2, 13106 Rousset Cedex, France
Sponsor
STMicroelectronics
Smartcard IC division, ZI de Rousset, BP2, 13106 Rousset Cedex, France
Evaluation facility
Serma Technologies
30 avenue Gustave Eiffel, 33608 Pessac, France
Phone: +33 (0)5 57 26 08 75, email : e.francois@serma.com
Recognition arrangements
CCRA
The product is recognised at EAL4 level.
SOG-IS
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Introduction
The Certification
Security certification for information technology products and systems is governed by decree
number 2002-535 dated April, 18th 2002, and published in the "Journal Officiel de la
République Française". This decree stipulates that:
• The central information system security department draws up certification reports.
These reports indicate the features of the proposed security targets. They may include
any warnings that the authors feel the need to mention for security reasons. They may
or may not be transmitted to third parties or made public, as the principals desire
(article 7).
• The certificates issued by the Prime Minister certify that the copies of the products or
systems submitted for evaluation fulfil the specified security features. They also
certify that the evaluations have been carried out in compliance with applicable rules
and standards, with the required degrees of skill and impartiality (article 8).
The procedures are available on the Internet site www.ssi.gouv.fr.
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Content
1. THE PRODUCT........................................................................................................................... 6
1.1. PRESENTATION OF THE PRODUCT........................................................................................... 6
1.2. EVALUATED PRODUCT DESCRIPTION ..................................................................................... 6
1.2.1. Product identification.................................................................................................... 6
1.2.2. Security services............................................................................................................ 6
1.2.3. Architecture................................................................................................................... 7
1.2.4. Life cycle ....................................................................................................................... 8
1.2.5. Evaluated configuration................................................................................................ 9
2. THE EVALUATION.................................................................................................................. 10
2.1. EVALUATION REFERENTIAL ................................................................................................. 10
2.2. EVALUATION WORK ............................................................................................................. 10
2.3. CRYPTOGRAPHIC MECHANISMS ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS..................................................... 10
2.4. RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR ANALYSIS .......................................................................... 10
3. CERTIFICATION...................................................................................................................... 11
3.1. CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................ 11
3.2. RESTRICTIONS...................................................................................................................... 11
3.3. RECOGNITION OF THE CERTIFICATE..................................................................................... 11
3.3.1. European recognition (SOG-IS).................................................................................. 11
3.3.2. International common criteria recognition (CCRA)................................................... 12
ANNEX 1. EVALUATION LEVEL OF THE PRODUCT.......................................................... 13
ANNEX 2. EVALUATED PRODUCT REFERENCES .............................................................. 14
ANNEX 3. CERTIFICATION REFERENCES ........................................................................... 16
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1. The product
1.1. Presentation of the product
The evaluated product is the ST19NR66-A (revision C) microcontroller (dedicated software
ZXC, maskset K7H0A) developed by STMicroelectronics. This product includes a software
test (“Autotest”) and a software library (system management, crypto library), stored in ROM
memory.
The microcontroller aims to host one or several software applications and can be embedded in
a plastic support to create a Smartcard with multiple possible usages (secure identity
documents, banking, health card, pay-TV or transport applications…) depending on the
Embedded Software applications. However, only the microcontroller is evaluated. The
software applications are not in the scope of this evaluation.
1.2. Evaluated product description
The security target [ST] defines the evaluated product, its evaluated security functionalities
and its operation environment.
This security target is compliant to both [PP9806] and [PP0002] protection profiles.
1.2.1. Product identification
The configuration list [CONF] identifies the product’s constituent elements.
The certified version of the product can be identified by the following elements that can be
checked with a microscope:
- Die identification (maskset): K7H0A;
- Dedicated software identification: ZXC;
- Embedded software identification: this reference depends on the application embedded
in ROM memory;
- Manufacturing site identification: STMicroelectronics_4 (Rousset).
1.2.2. Security services
The product provides mainly the following security services:
- Hardware initialisation & TOE attribute initialisation;
- TOE configuration switching and control;
- TOE logical integrity;
- Test of the TOE;
- Administrators authentication;
- Storage and Function Access Firewall;
- Physical tampering security function;
- Security violation administrator;
- Unobservability;
- Symmetric Key Cryptography Support;
- Asymmetric Key Cryptography Support (RSA and elliptic curves);
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- Unpredictable Number Generation Support.
1.2.3. Architecture
The ST19NR66-A microcontroller is made up of:
- A Hardware part:
- An 8-bit processing unit;
- Memories: EEPROM (high density 66KB with integrity control, for program
and data storage), ROM (224KB for user, 32KB for dedicated software :
autotest and cryptographic libraries) and SRAM (6KB) ;
- Security Modules: Memory Access Control Logic, clock generator, security
administrator, power management, memories integrity control ;
- Functional Modules: timers, I/O management in contact mode (IART ISO
7816-3) and contactless mode (RFUART ISO 14443-B), True Random
Number Generators, DES and RSA co-processing units.
- A dedicated software is embedded in ROM which comprises:
- Microcontroller test capabilities («Autotest »);
- System and Hardware/Software interface management capabilities
- ISO 14443-B interface management capabilities;
- Cryptographic libraries: DES (E-DES implementation), RSA and ECC (elliptic
curves) which are included in the product security target.
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1.2.4. Life cycle
The product’s life cycle is organised as follow:
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 3
Phase 4
Phase 5
Phase 6
Phase 7
Smartcard embedded
software development
Product
construction
IC design with its dedicated
software
Smartcard IC database
construction
IC photomask fabrication
IC testing and prepersonalisation
IC manufacturing
Testing
IC packaging
Testing
Smartcard product finishing process
Testing
Personalisation
Smartcard product end-
usage
Product
usage
End of life process
Legend
Trusted delivery and
verification procedures
Delivery done within
secure environment
Phases
supposed
to
be
secured
STM Rousset
STM Singapore
STM Rousset
DNP Tokyo
DNP Agrate
STM Rousset
STM Rousset
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 3
Phase 4
Phase 5
Phase 6
Phase 7
Smartcard embedded
software development
Product
construction
IC design with its dedicated
software
Smartcard IC database
construction
IC photomask fabrication
IC testing and prepersonalisation
IC manufacturing
Testing
IC packaging
Testing
Smartcard product finishing process
Testing
Personalisation
Smartcard product end-
usage
Product
usage
End of life process
Legend
Trusted delivery and
verification procedures
Delivery done within
secure environment
Legend
Trusted delivery and
verification procedures
Delivery done within
secure environment
Phases
supposed
to
be
secured
STM Rousset
STM Singapore
STM Rousset
DNP Tokyo
DNP Agrate
STM Rousset
STM Rousset
Figure 1 – Life cycle
The product is designed, prepared and tested by:
STMicroelectronics SAS
Smartcard IC division
ZI de Rousset, BP2
13106 Rousset Cedex
France
A part of the design is realised by:
STMicroelectronics Pte Ltd
5A Serangoon North Avenue 5
554574 Singapore
Singapore.
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The photo masks of the product are manufactured by:
DAI NIPPON PRINTING CO., LTD
2-2-1, Fukuoka, kamifukuoka-shi,
Saitama-Ken, 356-8507
Japan
and by:
DAI NIPPON PRINTING EUROPE
Via C. Olivetti, 2/A,
I-20041 Agrate Brianza,
Italy
The product can be in one of its three possible configurations:
- “Test” configuration: product configuration at the end of developer IC manufacturing.
The product is tested with a part of the Dedicated Software (called “Autotest”) within
the secure developer premises. Pre-personalization data can be loaded in the
EEPROM. The product configuration is changed to “Issuer” before delivery to the
next user, and the part cannot be reversed to the “test” configuration.
- “Issuer” configuration: product configuration when delivered to users involved in IC
packaging and personalization. Limited tests are still possible with the Dedicated
Software (System Rom operating system). Personalization data can be loaded in the
EEPROM.
The product configuration is changed to its final “User” configuration when delivered
to the end user (the part cannot be reversed to the “Issuer” configuration).
- “User” configuration: Final product configuration. The developer test functionalities
are unavailable. The Dedicated Software only provides the power-on reset sequence
and routine libraries (mainly cryptographic services). After the power-on reset
sequence, the product functionalities are driven exclusively by the Embedded
Software.
1.2.5. Evaluated configuration
This certification report presents the evaluation work related to the product and the dedicated
software library identified in §1.2.1. Any other embedded application, such as embedded
applications intended specifically for the sake of the evaluation is not part of the evaluation
perimeter.
Referring to the life-cycle, the evaluated product is the product that comes out the
manufacturing, test and pre-personalization phase (phase 3).
For the evaluation needs, the product ST19NR66-A was provided to the ITSEF with a
dedicated test software (Card Manager reference: TZV ) in a mode known as “open1
”.
1
mode that enables to load and execute a native code in EEPROM and also to disable the configurable security
mechanisms (see [CC AP], chapter 3.8).
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2. The evaluation
2.1. Evaluation referential
The evaluation has been performed in compliance with Common Criteria version 2.3 [CC]
and with the Common Evaluation Methodology [CEM.
For assurance components above EAL4 level, the evaluation facility own evaluation methods
consistent with [AIS 34], validated by DCSSI have been used.
In order to meet the specificities of smart cards, the [CC IC] and [CC AP] guides have been
applied.
2.2. Evaluation work
The evaluation relies on the evaluation results of the ST19NR66B and ST19NA18C
microcontrollers certified in 2006 and 2007 under the references [2006/27] and [2007/07].
The evaluation technical report [ETR], delivered to DCSSI the 4th
of December 2007,
provides details on the work performed by the evaluation facility and assesses that all
evaluation tasks are “pass”.
2.3. Cryptographic mechanisms robustness analysis
The robustness of cryptographic mechanisms has not been analysed by DCSSI.
2.4. Random number generator analysis
The evaluated product provides a hardware random number generator that can be used by the
embedded software.
The evaluation facility has evaluated the random number generator with the [AIS31] and
[FIPS 140] methodology.
The generator reaches the class “P2 – SOF-high” according to [AIS31] and Level 31
according to [FIPS 140].
1
Only the [FIPS 140-2] subset related to random number generators has been evaluated and only regarding the
statistical tests specified in the standard.
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3. Certification
3.1. Conclusion
The evaluation was carried out according to the current rules and standards, with the required
competency and impartiality by a licensed evaluation facility. All the work performed permits
the release of a certificate in conformance with the decree 2002-535.
This certificate testifies that the secure microcontroller ST19NR66-A submitted for evaluation
fulfils the security features specified in its security target [ST] for the evaluation level EAL 5
augmented.
3.2. Restrictions
This certificate only applies on the product specified in chapter 1.2 of this certification report.
This certificate provides a resistance assessment of the ST19NR66-A secure microcontroller
to a set of attacks which remains generic due to the missing of any specific embedded
application. Therefore, the security of a final product based on the evaluated microcontroller
would only be assessed through the final product evaluation, which could be performed on the
basis of the current evaluation results.
The user of the certified product shall respect the operational environmental security
objectives summarized specified in the security target [ST] and shall respect the
recommendations in the guidance [GUIDES], in particular:
- Security procedures must be applied during the product delivery to the users in order
to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the product and the related
manufacturing and test data (prevent any copy, modification, theft, unauthorized
manipulation or usage);
- The communication between a product developed based on the secured
microcontroller and other products must be secured (in terms of protocols and
procedures);
- The system (work station, terminal, communication…) must guaranty the
confidentiality and the integrity of the sensitive data, which are stored or processed.
3.3. Recognition of the certificate
3.3.1. European recognition (SOG-IS)
This certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the SOG-IS agreement [SOG-
IS].
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The European Recognition Agreement made by SOG-IS in 1999 allows recognition from
Signatory States of the agreement1
, of ITSEC and Common Criteria certificates. The
European recognition is applicable up to ITSEC E6 and CC EAL7 levels. The certificates that
are recognized in the agreement scope are released with the following marking:
3.3.2. International common criteria recognition (CCRA)
This certificate is released in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA [CC RA].
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement allows the recognition, by signatory
countries2
, of the Common Criteria certificates. The mutual recognition is applicable up to the
assurance components of CC EAL4 level and also to ALC_FLR family. The certificates that
are recognized in the agreement scope are released with the following marking:
1 The signatory countries of the SOG-IS agreement are: Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
2 The signatory countries of the CCRA arrangement are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the
Netherlands, New-Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United
States.
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Annex 1. Evaluation level of the product
Components by assurance level Assurance level of the product
Class Family
EAL
1
EAL
2
EAL
3
EAL
4
EAL
5
EAL
6
EAL
7
EAL
5+
Name of the component
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2 1 Partial CM automation
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5 4
Configuration support and
acceptance procedures
ACM
Configuration
management
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3 3
Development tools CM
coverage
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 Detection of modification
ADO
Delivery and
operation ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Installation, generation and
start-up procedures
ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4 3
Semiformal functional
specification
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5 3 Semiformal high-level design
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3 2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT 1 2 3 1 Modularity
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2 1 Descriptive low-level design
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2
Semiformal correspondence
demonstration
ADV
Development
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3 3
Formal TOE security policy
model
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Administrator guidance
AGD
Guidance AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 User guidance
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2 2
Sufficiency of security
measures
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3 2 Standardised life-cycle model
ALC
Life-cycle
support
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3 2
Compliance with
implementation standards
ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3 2 Testing: low-level design
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 Functional testing
ATE
Tests
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 Independent testing – sample
AVA_CCA 1 2 2 1 Covert channel analysis
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3 3
Analysis and testing of
insecure states
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Strength of TOE security
function evaluation
AVA
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4 4 Highly resistant
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Annex 2. Evaluated product references
[2006/27] Certification report 2006/27 - ST19NR66B secure microcontroller, 8th
of December 2006, SGDN/DCSSI
[2007/07] Certification report 2007/07 - ST19NA18C secure microcontroller, 28th
of March 2007, SGDN/DCSSI
[ST] Reference security target for the evaluation:
- ST19N Generic Security Target,
Reference: SMD_ST19N_ST_06_001_V02.00
STMicroelectronics
For the needs of publication, the following security target has been
provided and validated in the evaluation:
- ST19NR66-A Security Target,
Reference: SMD_ST19NR66_ST_07_001 V01.00
STMicroelectronics
[ETR] Evaluation technical report :
- Evaluation Technical Report - YQUEM project,
Reference: YQUEM_ST19NR66-A_ETR_v1.0
STMicroelectronics
For the needs of composite evaluation with this microcontroller a
technical report for composition has been validated:
- Evaluation Technical Report for composition – ST19NR66-A,
Reference: YQUEM_ST19NR66-A_ETRLiteComp_v1.0
STMicroelectronics
[CONF] Product configuration list:
- Configuration List ST19NR66-A PRODUCT - K7H0A MASK
SET,
Reference: MKT_K7H0_CFGL_07_001_V1.0
STMicroelectronics
List of the delivered materials by STMicroelectronics:
- ST19NR66-A Documentation report,
Reference: SMD_ST19NR66-A_DR_07_001 v1.1
STMicroelectronics
[GUIDES] The product user guidance documentation is the following:
- ST19NR66-A Dual contactless MCU with 66 Kbytes EEPROM,
elliptic curves, enhanced RF,
Reference: DS_19NR66A/0711 Rev 2
STMicroelectronics
- Manuals of security recommendations v2.0,
Reference: APM_19W-19N_SECU/0612V2.0
STMicroelectronics
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- ST19NR66 - System ROM - Issuer Configuration – User
Manual,
Reference: UM_19NR66_SR_I/0611 Rev 3,
STMicroelectronics
- ST19N System Library V2 User Manual,
Reference: Um_19N_SysLibV2/0610 Rev 3,
STMicroelectronics
- ST19X, ST19W and 19N EDES Library User Manual,
Reference: UM_19X_EDESLIB/0605 Rev 2,
STMicroelectronics
- ST19N - Fast Cryptographic Library FastLIB4 – User Manual,
Reference: UM_19N_FASTLIB4/0605 Rev 3,
STMicroelectronics
- Information note (MAP library),
Reference: SE_IN_06_004 V1.01
STMicroelectronics
- ST19 Elliptic curves library - user manual,
Reference: UM_19_ECCLIB/0711 Rev. 4
STMicroelectronics
- ST19N RF UART Communication Library User Manual,
Reference: Um19N_RFUART_CommLib/0610 Rev 2,
STMicroelectronics
- AIS31 Compliant Random Numbers on ST19N Products - User
Manual,
Reference: UM_19N_AIS31_CRN/0702 V1
STMicroelectronics
- ST19X-ST19W - Programming Manual,
Reference: PM_19X-19W/0210V2
STMicroelectronics
[PP/9806] Protection Profile Smart Card Integrated Circuit Version 2.0, September
1998. Certified by DCSSI under the reference PP/9806.
[PP0002] Protection Profile, Smart card IC Platform Protection Profile Version
1.0 July 2001. Certified by BSI under the reference BSI-PP-0002-2001.
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Annex 3. Certification references
Decree number 2002-535 dated 18th
April 2002 related to the security evaluations and
certifications for information technology products and systems.
[CER/P/01] Procedure CER/P/01 - Certification of the security provided by IT
products and systems, DCSSI.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Part 1: Introduction and general model,
August 2005, version 2.3, ref CCMB-2005-08-001;
Part 2: Security functional requirements,
August 2005, version 2.3, ref CCMB-2005-08-002;
Part 3: Security assurance requirements,
August 2005, version 2.3, ref CCMB-2005-08-003.
The content of Common Criteria version 2.3 is identical to the
international ISO/IEC 15408:2005.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation: Evaluation Methodology,
August 2005, version 2.3, ref CCMB-2005-08-004.
The content of CEM version 2.3 is identical to the international ISO/IEC
18045:2005.
[CC IC] Common Criteria Supporting Document - Mandatory Technical
Document - The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, reference
CCDB-2006-04-003 version 2.0, revision 1, April 2006.
[CC AP] Common Criteria Supporting Document - Mandatory Technical
Document - Application of attack potential to smart-cards, reference
CCDB-2007-04-001 version 2.3, revision 1, April 2007.
[COMP] Common Criteria Supporting Document - Mandatory Technical
Document - Composite product evaluation for smart cards and similar
devices, reference CCDB-2007-09-001 version 1.0, revision 1,
September 2007.
[CC RA] Arrangement on the Recognition of Common criteria certificates in the
field of information Technology Security, May 2000.
[SOG-IS] «Mutual Recognition Agreement of Information Technology Security
Evaluation Certificates», version 2.0, April 1999, Management
Committee of Agreement Group.
[REF-CRY] Cryptographic mechanisms - Rules and recommendations about the
choice and parameters sizes of cryptographic mechanisms with standard
robustness level version 1.10, 14th
of September 2007, No.
1904/SGDN/DCSSI/SDS/LCR.
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[AIS 34] Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme - Evaluation
Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+, AIS34, Version
1.00, 01 June 2004,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[AIS31] Functionnality classes and evaluation methodology for physical random
number generator, AIS31 version 1, 25/09/2001,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[FIPS 140] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
Reference: FIPS PUB-140-2:1999,
NIST