Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0325-2006
for
Océ Digital Access Controller (DAC)
R 8.1.10
from
Océ Technologies B.V.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0, Fax +49 228 9582-455, Infoline +49 228 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0325-2006
Océ Digital Access Controller (DAC)
R 8.1.10
from
Océ Technologies B.V.
Common Criteria Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for compliance
with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.1 (Basic Flaw Remediation)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the
evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, January 27th, 2006
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no
warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0325-2006
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
BSI-DSZ-CC-0325-2006 Certification Report
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
VI
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0325-2006
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
• Part 1, Version 0.6
• Part 2, Version 1.0
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22 September 2000 in the Bundes-
anzeiger p. 19445
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0325-2006 Certification Report
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
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3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Océ Digital Access Controller (DAC), R8.1.10 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-
0268-2005. For this evaluation specific results from the evaluation process
based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0268-2005 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Océ Digital Access Controller (DAC), R8.1.10 was
conducted by TNO-ITSEF BV. The TNO-ITSEF BV is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is:
Océ Technologies B.V.
P.O. Box 101
5900 MA Venlo
The Netherlands
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on January 27th
, 2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0325-2006 Certification Report
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-26.
The product Océ Digital Access Controller (DAC), R8.1.10 has been included in
the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from
BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
Océ Technologies B.V.
P.O. Box 101
5900 MA Venlo
The Netherlands
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0325-2006
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0325-2006 Certification Report
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 9
3 Security Policy 12
4 Assumptions 12
5 Architectural Information 14
6 Documentation 15
7 IT Product Testing 16
8 Evaluated Configuration 19
9 Results of the Evaluation 20
10 Comments/Recommendations 22
11 Annexes 22
12 Security Target 22
13 Definitions 23
14 Bibliography 25
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0325-2006
1 Executive Summary
Océ produces a wide range of Multifunctional Devices (MFDs) for copying,
printing and scanning. MFDs consist of two main parts: a Digital Access
Controller (DAC) and a Digital Copier (DC). The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
the Océ Digital Access Controller (DAC), R8.1.10. The TOE is used with the
following Océ products:
• Océ VarioPrint 2050, 2060 and 2070
• Océ VarioPrint 2045, 2055 and 2065
• Océ 3145E, 3155E and 3165E.
The DAC is a PC-based MFD-controller that provides a wide range of printing
and scanning functionality to the DC of the MFD to which the DAC is connected.
The DAC provides security functionality to the DC. It does not provide copy
functionality.
The DAC can operate in three different security modes: ‘high’, ‘normal’ and
‘low’. The TOE covers the DAC operating in the security mode ‘high (factory
default)’ as delivered by Océ to the customer. This mode is the initial version of
the security mode ‘high‘ and provides a restricted set of functionality that is
configured to meet the Security Target claim. Once changed, it is not possible
to get the DAC back into the certified configuration (‘high (factory default)’) by
changing the security mode back to 'high'. Changing the operational mode
invalidates the claim made in the Security Target.
Two physical configurations exist of the MFDs: one where the DAC is external
to the MFD, and one where it is internal to the MFD. All logical access points
(CD-Rom, floppy drives, network ports, USB/serial/parallel ports etc.) are fully
physically accessible in the internal configuration. For the purpose of this
evaluation, the two configurations are therefore identical.
The DAC consists of two parts, the underlying hardware platform which is not
part of the TOE and the software which forms the TOE.
The IT product Océ Digital Access Controller (DAC), R8.1.10 was evaluated by
TNO-ITSEF BV. The evaluation was completed on December 19th
, 2005. The
TNO-ITSEF BV is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is
Océ Technologies B.V.
P.O. Box 101
5900 MA Venlo
The Netherlands
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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1.1 Assurance package
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements are based entirely on the
assurance components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C
or [1], part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of
assurance level EAL2+ (Evaluation Assurance Level 2 augmented). The
assurance requirements are augmented by the component ALC_FLR.1.
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 conformant as shown in the following table.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FMT Security Management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Table 1: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
Note: Only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details please refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 5.1.
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These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF.FILTERING The TOE uses a built-in firewall to block ports and ICMP
commands that are not needed for the operation of the TOE.
In addition all network protocols that are not supported in the
security mode ‘high’ are disabled.
By default no traffic is permitted to enter or leave to TOE
except for the TCP/IP packets and the restricted ICMP
command set via the ports defined in the rule table described
in [7], Appendix D.
SF.JOB_RELEASE The TOE verifies the identity and associated PIN code that
was send with the print job when submitted by
S.REMOTE_USER with Username/PIN received from
S.LOCAL_USER via the DC interface. If verification is
successful, the secure print job is released for printing.
SF.SHREDDING Once a print or scan job has been deleted, the data is
overwritten. It is possible to perform multiple write cycles, with
various patterns being applied. At least three write cycles will
always take place. S.REMOTE_SYSADMIN or
S.SERVICE_ENGINEER can choose the moment when the
shredding cycle commences. The first write cycle can occur
immediately after the print job has completed or to improve job
throughput performance, once the TOE enters an idle state.
The remaining cycles may also take place immediately after
the print job has been completed or also at the time when the
TOE enters an idle state. The shredding mechanism supports
US DOD 5220-22m and Gutmann algorithms (for more
information see [17] and [18]).
SF.MANAGEMENT The TOE can be managed in relation to SF.JOB_RELEASE
and SF.SHREDDING. In order to gain access, the
S.REMOTE_SYSADMIN or S.SERVICE_ENGINEER must
authenticate themselves to the TOE. S.SERVICE_ENGINEER
does this by entering a password. S.REMOTE_SYSADMIN
authenticates himself by entering a password. The TOE is
delivered by Océ with pre-configured in the security mode
‘high’. This provides the most restrictive set of operational
settings.
SF.SELFTEST During start-up the TOE will check the hard disk files system
and the integrity of the software the forms the TOE. If defects
in the hard disk files system are detected, the corrupted file
system will be automatically repaired. The software includes
all executables (operating system executables, Océ authored
DAC executables, Third party software executables and DAC
system settings). If defects are detected, the corrupted data
will be replaced by correct shadow data.
Table 2: TOE Security Functions
For a complete list and definition of the used subjects and objects please refer
to the Security Target [7], chapter 3.1.
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1.3 Strength of Function
The Strength of Function claim for all the probabilistic functions and
mechanisms provided by the TOE is SOF-basic.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The following threats and Organisational Security Policies are defined for the
TOE:
Threat Description
T.RESIDUAL_DATA S.THIEF steals the TOE or parts thereof and retrieves stored
or deleted D.SECURE_PRINT_JOB. The motivation for
S.THIEF to attack the TOE is low because it requires
sophisticated data recovery equipment that can recover data
even after the shredding mechanism has executed to recover
data that has little value to the attacker.
T.NOSY_USER S.LOCAL_USER accesses a D.SECURE_PRINT_JOB that
does not belong to him/her that is stored in the DAC. The
motivation to carry out this attack is low.
T.MALWARE A S.NETWORK_DEVICE is used by malware that may have
entered the TOE’s operational environment to launch an
attack on the integrity of the TOE. Alternatively
S.DIGITAL_COPIER is used by malware to launch an attack
on the integrity of S.NETWORK_DEVICE. The motivation to
carry out this attack is low.
Table 3: Threats
Organisational Security
Policy
Description
P.JOB_DELETE When D.SECURE_PRINT_JOB, D.PRINTJOB and
D.SCANJOB objects are no longer needed by the TOE,
they will be deleted by the TOE at the earliest available
opportunity in a manner that meets a recognised
standard.
P.TOE_ADMINISTRATION The modification of TOE security settings shall be
restricted to S.SERVICE_ENGINEER and
S.REMOTE_SYSADMIN.
Table 4: Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
For a complete list and definition of the used subjects and objects please refer
to the Security Target [7], chapter 3.1.
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1.5 Special configuration requirements
1.5.1 Security mode
By default, Océ delivers the DAC in the highest security mode: indicated by
'Security level: high (factory default)'. This provides the most restrictive set of
operational settings.
The remote system administrator must not change the security mode. If the
security mode is changed, the DAC is no longer in the certified configuration
and is no longer able to assure the security of its objects and itself. Once
changed, it is not possible to get the DAC back into the certified configuration
(‘high (factory default)’) by changing the security mode back to 'high'.
1.5.2 Authentication
1.5.2.1 Remote system administrator
The Océ system configuration application is password protected.
For the purpose of configuring the DAC prior to deployment, the DAC is
delivered with a factory-default password. The remote system administrator
must change the password before the DAC is deployed.
The remote system administrator must not use a short or easy-to-guess
password. He must use a non-predictable sequence of at least five characters.
Additionally to this minimum requirements, the remote system administrator is
advised to:
• use a long password - up to 49 characters can be used.
• use a mixture of upper and lower case letters, numbers and punctuation.
• change the password every month.
Log-on to Océ system configuration is blocked for a while after an incorrect
password is entered. The blocking interval is increased after successive
incorrect entries.
1.5.2.2 Service engineer
The service engineer is a local administrator, and is typically employed by Océ.
He has access through RS-232 connections to a wide range of settings on the
TOE and the DC. The service engineer has elevated privileges above those of
the user and the system administrator.
The TOE connection is protected with a default password. The service engineer
must authenticate himself to the TOE before he is allowed to modify the TOE
security settings.
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At the first log on the service engineer must change the SDS password to a
different value than the default value to keep the DAC Common Criteria
Centified. The password must follow the following rules:
• The passwords must have alpha-numeric characters, a combination of
numbers and letters.
• The password must have uppercase letters, lowercase letters, and numbers.
• The length of the password must be between 5 and 50 characters.
1.5.3 E-shredding
By default, E-shredding is enabled for all data objects.
The following E-shredding settings can be configured within security mode
'high':
• number of overwrite passes (Default:'3'),
• moment of overwriting (Default: 'Perform first pass at once, the rest in the
background').
The remote system administrator must not change the 'Jobs to overwrite'
settings. If E-shredding is disabled for 'scan jobs' or 'print jobs without security
code', the DAC is no longer in the certified configuration and is no longer able to
assure the security of 'scan jobs' and 'print jobs without security code'.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The TOE is intended to be used within a Digital Copier. The following
assumptions for the environment of the TOE are made:
Name Definition
A.DIGITAL_COPIER Attachment of the TOE to a Digital Copier
A.ENVIRONMENT Regular office environment
A.SECURITY_POLICY Existing security policy governing the use of IT products in the
customer organisation
A.SHREDDING Shredding for print jobs and scan jobs will not be disabled
A.SLA Any security flaws discovered in the TOE will be repaired
Table 5: Assumptions for the TOE
Note: Only the titles of the assumptions are provided. For more details please
refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 3.2.
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
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this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Océ Digital Access Controller (DAC), R8.1.10
The TOE is a series of software that runs on a generic off-the-shelf PC
(underlying platform). Together this is called the DAC (Digital Access
Controller). The DAC is a PC-based MFD-controller (Multi Functional Device)
that provides a wide range of printing and scanning functionality to the Digital
Copier (DC) of the MFD to which the DAC is connected. The DAC provides
security functionality to the DC. It does not provide copy functionality.
2.1 Physical scope of the TOE
The TOE consists of the software parts of the DAC, i.e. the operating system
(OS/2 operating system version 4.5.2), the DAC-specific software (Océ DAC-
specific software release 8.1.10) and the third-party software (Adobe PS3-PDF
Interpreter, Version 3016.103 build #1, Apache HTTP server with SSL support,
Apache 1.3.33, OpenSSL 0.9.7e (used for remote system administration) and
OpenSSL 0.9.7d (used for job forwarding), mod_ssl 2.8.22.). The underlying PC
infrastructure is not part of the TOE (see also figure 1).
OS/2 operating system
Underlying PC Infrastructure
Océ
DAC – specific
software
Third – party
software
TOE
Non - TOE
Figure 1: Physical scope of the TOE
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2.2 TOE deliverables
The following TOE deliverables are provided for a customer who purchases the
Océ Digital Access Controller (DAC), R8.1.10:
Underlying platform:
1. A generic off-the-shelf PC comprising at a minimum a 900Mhz Celeron
processor, 128MB internal RAM, 15GB hard drive, one serial port, internal
floppy and CDROM drive
2. Generic graphics card and network card supporting either 10/100Mbs
Ethernet UTP or 4/16Mbs Token Ring
3. Drivers for the PC, graphics card and network card
Océ Digital Access Controller (DAC), R8.1.10:
1. The OS/2 operating system version 4.5.2
2. Océ DAC-specific software R 8.1.10
3. Third-party developed software: Adobe PS3-PDF Interpreter, Version
3016.103 build #1, Apache HTTP server with SSL support, Apache 1.3.33,
OpenSSL 0.9.7e (used for remote system administration) and OpenSSL
0.9.7d (used for job forwarding), mod_ssl 2.8.22.
Accompanying manuals – administrator guidance:
1. Administrator guidance for the system administrator:
- Océ VarioPrint 2045-70, Common Criteria Certified configuration of the
DAC R8.1.10. Edition 2005-10.
2. The DAC administration guidance for the customer system administrator
takes the form of HTML pages. These are part of the Océ DAC-specific
software, R8.1.10 release and is identified in the ‘About this help’ section as:
‘Océ System Configuration, version 3.1, On-line help, revision 2005’, March
2005.
3. The DAC administration guidance for the Océ service engineer takes the
form of a Lotus Notes application that is installed on the service engineer’s
laptop. The guidance contains an appendix that is identified as ‘Production
and Installation of DAC controller, Codenumber: 1000063294, 19 May 2005’
and is a frozen version of the Océ service engineer Lotus Notes application
made at the time of product release.
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Accompanying manuals – user guidance:
1. Job manuals
- Océ VarioPrint 2045, 2055, 2065:
Job manual, Code number 1060028223 - Edition 02-2005
- Océ VarioPrint 2050, 2060, 2070
Job manual, Code number 1060028188 - Edition 02-2005
- Océ 3145E, 3155E, 3165E
Job manual, Code number 1060028155 - Edition 02-2005
2. Configuration manuals
- Océ VarioPrint 2045, 2055, 2065:
Configuration manual, Code number 1060028232 - Edition 02-2005
- Océ VarioPrint 2050, 2060, 2070
Configuration manual - Code number 1060028210 - Edition 02-2005
- Océ 3145E, 3155E, 3165E
Configuration manual, Code number 1060028167 - Edition 02-2005
For the delivery the DAC and the DC are packed to one package and are
labelled. When they arrive at the customer the package is checked by the Océ
service engineer and then installed according the installation guidance. During
the DAC startup, an integrity check is performed. If integrity errors are detected,
a complete re-install will be performed.
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3 Security Policy
The TOE, the software part of a Digital Access Controller (DAC) is part of a
multifunctional device (MFD) for copying, printing and scanning. MFDs consist
of two main parts: a controller and a Digital Copier (DC). The DAC is connected
between a network and the DC.
The security policy of the TOE is to provide:
• protection against unauthorised access to data which is stored temporarily in
the DAC
• protection against malware in the TOE’s operational environment which
might launch an attack on the integrity of the TOE.
4 Assumptions
4.1 Usage assumptions
4.1.1 Remote system administrator
It is assumed that the DAC is used in the security mode 'high (factory default)'.
The security mode will not be changed.
The remote system administrator will read the available system administrator
documentation and must be aware of the security policy of the organisation.
The remote system administrator has to work in a security aware manner with
the DAC.
4.1.2 Local and remote users
When secure print jobs are sent to the DAC, the user will specify a PIN of at
least four digits and a maximum of six digits and, whether the job is printed or
not, will delete the job on the same working day. Employees are aware of this
requirement.
The user will read the available user documentation and must be aware of the
security policy of the organisation. The user has to work in a security aware
manner with the DAC.
4.1.3 E-shredding
It is assumed that the E-shredding operation for print jobs and scan job data
objects will not be disabled.
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4.1.4 Authentication
4.1.4.1 Remote system administrator
The Océ System Configuration application is password protected.
For the purpose of configuring the DAC prior to deployment, the DAC is
delivered with a factory-default password. The remote system administrator will
change the password before the DAC is deployed.
The remote system administrator will not use a short or easy-to-guess
password. It is assumed that a non-predictable sequence of at least five
characters will be used. Additionally to these minimum requirements, the
remote system administrator is advised to:
• use a long password - up to 49 characters can be used.
• use a mixture of upper and lower case letters, numbers and punctuation.
• change the password every month.
Log-on to Océ system configuration is blocked for a while after an incorrect
password is entered. The blocking interval is increased after successive
incorrect entries.
4.1.4.2 Service engineer
The service engineer is a local administrator, and is typically employed by Océ.
He has access through RS-232 connections to a wide range of settings on the
TOE and the DC. The service engineer has elevated privileges above those of
the user and the system administrator.
The TOE connection is protected with a default password. The service engineer
must authenticate himself to the TOE before he is allowed to modify the TOE
security settings. At the first log on the service engineer must change the SDS
password to a different value than the default value to keep the DAC Common
Criteria Centified. The password must follow the following rules:
• The passwords must have alpha-numeric characters, a combination of
numbers and letters.
• The password must have uppercase letters, lowercase letters, and numbers.
• The length of the password must be between 5 and 50 characters.
4.2 Environmental assumptions
4.2.1 Security policy
It is assumed that the customer organisation will have a security policy
governing the use of IT products by employees in the organisation.
The security policy describes and requires a low to medium level of assurance
(Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Level 2) for the DAC.
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It is assumed that the network, which the DAC is attached to, is protected by
security measures that are intended to prevent malicious programs, viruses and
network traffic, not related to the working of the operational environment,
entering the network to which it is attached. Although the virus database files
and various patches are kept up to date, the policy recognises that new threats
emerge over time and that occasionally they may enter the environment from
outside and provides measures to help limit the damage. The policy will define
how IT products are protected against threats originating from outside the
organisation.
The employees of the organisation are aware of, are trained in and operate
according to the terms and conditions of the policy. The policy also covers
physical security and the need for employees to work in a security aware
manner including the usage of the DAC.
4.2.2 Environment
It is assumed that the operational environment of the DAC is a regular office
environment. Physical access to the operational environment is restricted. The
environment contains non-threatening office personnel (local users, remote
users, remote system administrator, Océ service engineer). A “thief” (cleaning
staff, burglar, visitor, in rare cases a user who will have no moral issues in
stealing the TOE or parts of it and attempts to retrieve earlier printer and
scanner jobs from the TOE) is only rarely present in this environment and not
on a recurring base.
5 Architectural Information
The following diagram indicates the subsystems of the TOE that implement the
security functionality.
Network
Digital
Copier
Firewall
Job
manager
DAC
Settings
manager
E-shred
service
Start-up control/Integrity checker
RS-232
Communication Layer
Figure 2: Overview of the TOE subsystems
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Communication Layer: This subsystem provides the communication
functionality between the TOE subsystems and the internal interfaces between
the subsystems. In addition, this subsystem provides the communication
functionality to the Digital Copier interface.
Firewall: This subsystem provides state-full inspection of the network packets
that pass through the network card (both inbound and outbound). It ensures that
there is no direct path between the Digital Copier and the network to which the
DAC is attached.
Job Manager: This subsystem manages the print and scan jobs that are
handled by the DAC. There are four types of job:
1. Standard Print Job (D.PRINT_JOB in ST)
2. User associated Print Job (D.PRINT_JOB in ST)
3. User associated print job with unique PIN(D.SECURE_PRINT_JOB in ST)
4. Scan job (D.SCAN_JOB in ST)
DAC Settings manager: This subsystem manages security related settings of
the DAC.
Start-up control/Integrity checker: This subsystem performs an integrity check
as part of the start-up process when power is applied to the DAC. The DAC file
system is checked for inconstancies.
E-shred service: subsystem provides the shredding of the job data objects that
are handled by the Job Manager subsystem (Standard Print Job, User
associated Print Job, User associated print job with unique PIN and Scan job).
6 Documentation
The documentation [9] – [16] is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security
Target.
The documentation is intended for administrators and users:
1. For the system administrator, there is provided the system administrator
guidance [9] which can be found on the home page of Océ.
2. The DAC administration guidance [16] which takes the form of HTML pages
and is part of the DAC is intended for the system administrator.
3. For the user of the MFD, the job manuals [10] – [12] and the configuration
manuals [13] – [15] are provided.
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7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Independant Testing
7.1.1 Testing approach
The tests are built upon the security functions as defined in the Security Target
[7]. All security functions have associated tests. The security functions are
SF.FILTERING, SF.JOB_RELEASE, SF.MANAGEMENT, SF.SHREDDING and
SF.SELFTEST.
The objectives for the tests are derived from the security functions and are:
1. Check of filtering if it performs conform to the functional specification. With
all network functionality enabled in security level high, the firewall should be
properly configured.
2. Check of the external Ethernet connector if the firewall only allows certain
defined ports.
3. Check of security printing if it performs conform to the functional
specification.
4. Check of shredding if it performs conform to the functional specification.
5. Check of Web SAS authentication and SDS authentication if they perform
conform to the functional specification.
6. Check of integrity test function if it performs conform to the functional
specification.
7.1.2 Test configuration
Tests are performed with the DAC, R 8.1.10 connected to a Océ VarioPrint
2070. The security mode is ‘high (factory default)'.
The following software components are used:
1. OS/2 version 4.5.2
2. Apache HTTP server with SSL support, Apache 1.3.33, OpenSSL 0.9.7e
(used for remote system administration) and OpenSSL 0.9.7d (used for job
forwarding), mod_ssl 2.8.22.
3. Adobe PS3-PDF Interpreter, Version 3016.103 v.3.1 build #1
4. DAC, R 8.1.10
7.1.3 Coverage
All testing commensurate with the functional specification and covers all
security functions.
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The developer has performed all necessary functional tests for the security
functions. In addition the developer has performed extensive vulnerability tests
that exceeds the attack potential required by EAL2.
7.1.4 Results
The results of the developer testing showed that the security functions perform
as expected.
This means that the developer has shown that
1. The TOE protects it’s own integrity against threats from the network to which
it is attached and the Digital Copier to which it is attached through use of a
firewall and integrity checks on system files upon system reboot.
2. The TOE protects the confidentiality of secure print jobs once they have
been received by the DAC by storing them until the user authenticates
himself to the DAC via a user interface on the DC. The DAC shreds the data
after printing is completed.
3. The TOE does not form a threat to its environment.
7.2 Penetration Testing
Following the developer Vulnerability Analysis, the following penetration testing
effort was made.
7.2.1 Testing Approach
The functional specification was the starting point for the identification of which
interfaces and which functions need to be tested. Based on the more detailed
knowledge of the high-level design some tests are included additionally.
A number of publicly available scanners for obvious vulnerabilities were applied.
7.2.2 Test Configuration
Tests are performed with the DAC, R 8.1.10 connected to a Océ VarioPrint
2070. The security mode is ‘high (factory default)'.
The following software components are used:
1. OS/2 version 4.5.2
2. Apache HTTP server with SSL support, Apache 1.3.33, OpenSSL 0.9.7e
(used for remote system administration) and OpenSSL 0.9.7d (used for job
forwarding), mod_ssl 2.8.22.
3. Adobe PS3-PDF Interpreter, Version 3016.103 v.3.1 build #1
4. DAC, R 8.1.10
5. The test laptop ran Suse 9.3, Nessus 2.2.5 and the Auditor Security
Collection (auditor-200605-02) live CD
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7.2.3 Coverage
The penetration testing was commensurate to the functional specification and
covered the search for obvious vulnerabilities.
7.2.4 Penetration testing summary
The evaluators have had a meeting in which the (possible) vulnerabilities are
identified. Each evaluator contributed his perspective on the TOE and the
evaluation based on the assurance classes he had executed. The outcome of
this meeting is input for the vulnerability analysis.
The following tests are performed:
• Openssl (auditor-200605-02) Open source ssl implementation
• Nessus 2.2.5 Open Source vulnerability scanner
• Amap (auditor-200605-02) Open source port scanner.
• Xprobe2 (auditor-200605-02) Open source OS fingerprint, sends ICMP
• Ethereal (auditor-200605-02) Open Source network sniffer.
7.2.5 Results
The TOE behaved as expected:
1. The security functionality works as expected.
2. The vulnerability test showed that the TOE is resistant against all tested
public known vulnerabilities based on recent internet scans.
3. The vulnerability scans did not revealed vulnerabilities that could be
exploited on the level of EAL2.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is identified by the release Océ Digital Access Controller (DAC),
R8.1.10.
For setting up and running the TOE according to the evaluated configuration all
guidance documents (refer to chapter 6) and the implications given by the
Security Target have to be followed. These implications can also be found in
chapter 1.5, 1.6 and 4 of this report.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL2+.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL2
augmented by ALC_FLR.1 and the class ASE for the Security Target
evaluation) are summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Configuration Items ACM_CAP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Delivery Procedures ADO_DEL.1 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Informal functional specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
Descriptive high-level design ADV_HLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Evidence of coverage ATE_COV.1 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Developer vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.1 PASS
Table 6: Verdicts for the assurance components
The focus of this re-evaluation was laid on the examination of the strengthened
login mechanisms for the system administrator and the service engineer as well
as on the search for new obvious vulnerabilities and on the correctness of
overall functionality of the TOE after the addition of some new not security-
relevant features.
The evaluation has shown that:
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 conformant
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL2
augmented by ALC_FLR.1
• the SFRs FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.2 and FIA_UAU.2 require the
TOE to provide security functions that provide identification/authentication
functionality that meets a SOF claim of ‘SOF basic’.
A strength of function claim of ‘SOF basic’ is made for the security functions
SF.JOB_RELEASE and SF.MANAGEMENT. These are the security
functions that implement FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.2 and
FIA_UAU.2.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the Océ Digital Access
Controller (DAC), R8.1.10
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
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10 Comments/Recommendations
• The DAC is intended to provide scan and print functionality to users
requiring a low to moderate level of security assurance (Common Criteria
Evaluation Assurance Level 2+).
• The remote system administrator must not change the security mode. If the
security mode is changed, the DAC is no longer in the certified configuration
and is no longer able to assure the security of its objects and itself. Once
changed, it is not possible to get the DAC back into the certified
configuration (‘high (factory default)’) by changing the security mode back to
'high'.
• The remote system administrator must not change the 'Jobs to overwrite'
settings. If E-shredding is disabled for 'scan jobs' or 'print jobs without
security code', the DAC is no longer in the certified configuration and is no
longer able to assure the security of 'scan jobs' and 'print jobs without
security code'.
• The employees of the organisation are aware of, are trained in and operate
according to the terms and conditions of the policy. The policy also covers
physical security and the need for employees to work in a security aware
manner including the usage of the DAC. The employees will read the
available guidance documentation.
The guidance documentation (refer to chapter 6 of this report) contains
necessary information about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for
secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the
environment in the Security Target [7] and the Security Target as a whole has to
be taken into account. Therefore a user/administrator has to follow the guidance
in these documents.
11 Annexes
None.
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
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13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
DAC Digital Access Controler
DC Digital Copier
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
MFD Multifunctional Device
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
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Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme AIS33, Version 2 –
“Methodologie zur Fehlerbehebung – Flaw Remediation”, 26.07.2002
[7] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0325-2006, Version 1.9, September 02nd
, 2005;
The Océ Digital Access Controller (DAC) R8.1.10, as used in the Océ
VarioPrint 2045, 2050, 2055, 2060, 2065, 2070, 3145, 3155, 3165
printer/copier/scanner products, Océ Technologies B.V.
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2.0, December 16th
, 2005, The Océ
Digital Access Controller (DAC) R8.1.10, as used in the Océ VarioPrint
2045-65, the Océ VarioPrint 2050-70, the Océ 31x5 ranges of Océ
printer/copier/scanner products – EAL2+ (confidential document)
Guidance Documentation
[9] Océ VarioPrint 2045-65, Océ VarioPrint 2050-70, Océ 31x5: Common
Criteria certified configuration of the DAC R8.10.1 - Edition 2005-10
[10] Océ VarioPrint 2045-65 Job manual, Code number 1060028223 - Edition
02-2005
[11] Océ VarioPrint 2050-70 Job manual, Code number 1060028188 - Edition
02-2005
[12] Océ 31x5E Job manual, Code number 1060028155 - Edition 02-2005
[13] Océ VarioPrint 2045-65 Configuration manual, Code number
1060028232 - Edition 02-2005
[14] Océ VarioPrint 2050-70 Configuration manual, Code number
1060028210 -Edition 02-2005
[15] Océ 31x5E Configuration manual, Code number 1060028167 - Edition
02-2005
[16] Océ-Technologies B.V., Océ System Configuration version 3.1 On-line
help, Revision 2005, March 2005
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[17] Secure Deletion of Data from Magnetic and Solid State Memory, Peter
Guttman 1996
(http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/secure_del.html)
[18] US Department of Defence Military Standard DOD 5220-22m
(http://www.dss.mil/isecnispom_0195.htm)
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance
requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL,
Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part
of the conformance result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
"The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 2.1."
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM: Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery and
operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV: Development Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle support Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and map
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
"The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility."
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component“
is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the
obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with
explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 2: Evaluation assurance level summary
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
"Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
"Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
"Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.“
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
"Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
"Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
"Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.“
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
"Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0325-2006 Certification Report
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
"Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.“
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
"Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4)
attack potential.
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