UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ
539-EWA
COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT
Adder AVS-4112, AVS-2112, AVS-4114, AVS-4214,
AVS-2114, AVS-2214, AVS-4128, AVS-4124, AVS-
1124, AVS-4224 Firmware Version 44404-E7E7
Peripheral Sharing Devices
20 April 2022
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FOREWORD
This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security
Establishment (CSE).
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (a branch of CSE).
This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common
Criteria Program, and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or
any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT
product by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report,
and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.
If your organization has identified a requirement for this certification report based on business needs and would like more
detailed information, please contact:
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
Contact Centre and Information Services
contact@cyber.gc.ca | 1-833-CYBER-88 (1-833-292-3788)
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OVERVIEW
The Canadian Common Criteria Program provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of
Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory (CCTL) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Canadian Centre for Cyber
Security.
A CCTL is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a
significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, the General Requirements
for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security
requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in
addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCTL.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted to the Common Criteria portal (the
official website of the International Common Criteria Program).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 6
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation ........................................................................................................... 7
1.1 Common Criteria Conformance.......................................................................................................................... 7
1.2 TOE Description................................................................................................................................................. 7
1.3 TOE Architecture ............................................................................................................................................... 8
2 Security Policy......................................................................................................................................... 9
3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ......................................................................................................10
3.1 Usage and Environmental Assumptions.............................................................................................................10
3.2 Clarification of Scope .......................................................................................................................................10
4 Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................................................11
4.1 Documentation.................................................................................................................................................11
5 Evaluation Analysis Activities....................................................................................................................12
5.1 Development....................................................................................................................................................12
5.2 Guidance Documents........................................................................................................................................12
5.3 Life-Cycle Support ............................................................................................................................................12
6 Testing Activities ....................................................................................................................................13
6.1 Assessment of Developer tests.........................................................................................................................13
6.2 Conduct of Testing...........................................................................................................................................13
6.3 Independent Testing.........................................................................................................................................13
6.3.1 Independent Testing Results .........................................................................................................................13
6.4 Vulnerability Analysis .......................................................................................................................................14
6.4.1 Vulnerability Analysis Results........................................................................................................................14
7 Results of the Evaluation ..........................................................................................................................15
7.1 Recommendations/Comments..........................................................................................................................15
8 Supporting Content..................................................................................................................................16
8.1 List of Abbreviations.........................................................................................................................................16
8.2 References.......................................................................................................................................................17
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LIST OF FIGURES
– Evaluated Configuration for KVM and Matrix Switches..............................................................8
– Evaluated Configuration for Combiner Switches..........................................................................8
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: TOE Identification ................................................................................................................................................7
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Adder AVS-4112, AVS-2112, AVS-4114, AVS-4214, AVS-2114, AVS-2214, AVS-4128, AVS-4124, AVS-1124, AVS-4224
Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from
Adder Technology , was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. A description of the TOE can be found in Section
1.2. The results of this evaluation demonstrate that the TOE meets the requirements of the conformance claim listed in
Section 1.1 for the evaluated security functionality.
EWA-Canada is the CCTL that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 20 April 2022 and was carried
out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Program.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the
intended environment for the TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify
that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the
comments, observations, and recommendations in this Certification Report.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as the Certification Body, declares that this evaluation meets all the conditions of
the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product is listed on the Certified Products
list (CPL) for the Canadian Common Criteria Program and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the
International Common Criteria Program).
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1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:
Table 1: TOE Identification
TOE Name and Version Adder AVS-4112, AVS-2112, AVS-4114, AVS-4214, AVS-2114, AVS-2214, AVS-4128,
AVS-4124, AVS-1124, AVS-4224 Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing
Devices
Developer Adder Technology
1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
The TOE claims the following conformance:
Exact conformance to the NIAP PP‐Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device, Analog Audio Output Devices,
Keyboard/Mouse Devices, and Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0, which comprises the following:
• Base-PP: Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, Version 4.0;
• PP-Module: PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0;
• PP-Module: PP-Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0; and
• PP-Module: PP-Module for Analog Audio Output Devices, Version 1.
1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION
The Adder Technology Secure Keyboard, Video, Mouse (KVM), Matrix and Combiner Switches allow users to share keyboard,
video, mouse, and audio device peripherals between a number of connected computers. Security features ensure isolation
between computers and peripherals to prevent data leakage between connected systems. The TOE includes KVM, Matrix
and Combiner Switches.
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1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE
Diagrams of the TOE architectures is as follows:
– Evaluated Configuration for KVM and Matrix Switches.
– Evaluated Configuration for Combiner Switches.
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2 SECURITY POLICY
The TOE implements and enforces policies pertaining to the following security functionality:
 User Data Protection
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE Access
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST) referenced in
section 8.2.
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3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the
product’s installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.
3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:
 No TEMPEST: Computers and peripheral devices connected to the PSD are not TEMPEST approved.
 Physical: The environment provides physical security commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it
processes and contains.
 No wireless devices: The environment includes no wireless peripheral devices.
 Trusted admin and configuration: PSD Administrators and users are trusted to follow and apply all guidance in a
trusted manner. Personnel configuring the PSD and its operational environment follow the applicable security
configuration guidance.
 User allowed access: All PSD users are allowed to interact with all connected computers. It is not the role of the PSD
to prevent or otherwise control user access to connected computers. Computers or their connected network shall
have the required means to authenticate the user and to control access to their various resources.
 No special analog capabilities: The computers connected to the TOE are not equipped with special analog data
collection cards or peripherals such as analog to digital interface, high performance audio interface, digital signal
processing function, or analog video capture function.
 No Microphones: Users are trained not to connect a microphone to the TOE audio output interface.
3.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
All security features of these products were evaluated.
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4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:
TOE Software/Firmware  Firmware Version 44404-E7E7
TOE Hardware  AVS-4112, AVS-2112, AVS-4114, AVS-4214, AVS-2114, AVS-2214, AVS-4128, AVS-4124,
AVS-1124, AVS-4224
Environmental Support 2-8 General purpose computers
General purpose USB keyboard
General purpose USB mouse
Analog audio output device (speakers or headphones)
Standard computer display (HDMI 2.0, DVI-D, or DisplayPort 1.1, 1.2 or 1.3)
Adder KVM Cables
4.1 DOCUMENTATION
The following documents are provided to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:
a) ADDERView™ Secure 2, 4 & 16 Port High Security Single and Dual Head KVM Switches Quick Start, MAN-QS-
000037_V0-1 RC4
b) ADDERView™ Secure 4 & 8 Port High Security Flexi-Switch Quick Start, MAN-QS-000038_V0-1 RC4
c) ADDERView™ Secure 4-Port High Security Multi-Viewer Switch, Quick Start, MAN-QS-000039_V0-1 RC2
d) ADDERView™ Secure 4, 8 and 16-Port High Security 4K Multi-Viewer Switches, Quick Start, MAN-QS-000040_V0-1
RC2
Guidance may be downloaded from the Adder Technology website(www.adder.com/en/avs-qs) in
.pdf format.
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5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process dealing with
Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.
5.1 DEVELOPMENT
The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design completely and
accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF implements the security functional
requirements. The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected
against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.
5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it
sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use
and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance and determined
that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.
Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.
5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT
An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators
found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all the procedures required to
maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.
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6 TESTING ACTIVITIES
Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent tests, and performing a
vulnerability analysis.
6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and
reviewing their test results, as documented in the Evaluation Test Report (ETR). The correspondence between the tests
identified in the developer’s test documentation and the functional specification was complete.
6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING
The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The
detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are
documented in a separate Test Results document.
6.3 INDEPENDENT TESTING
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional & penetration tests by examining design and
guidance documentation.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and
results. The following testing activities were performed:
a. PP Assurance Activities: The evaluator performed the assurance activities listed in the claimed PP
6.3.1 INDEPENDENT TESTING RESULTS
The developer’s tests and the independent tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance that the TOE behaves as
specified in its ST and functional specification.
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6.4 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
The vulnerability analysis focused on 4 flaw hypotheses.
 Public Vulnerability based (Type 1)
 Technical community sources (Type 2)
 Evaluation team generated (Type 3)
 Tool Generated (Type 4)
The evaluators conducted an independent review of all evaluation evidence, public domain vulnerability databases and
technical community sources (Type 1 & 2). Additionally, the evaluators used automated vulnerability scanning tools to
discover potential network, platform, and application layer vulnerabilities (Type 4). Based upon this review, the evaluators
formulated flaw hypotheses (Type 3), which they used in their vulnerability analysis.
Type 1 & 2 searches were conducted on 31 March 2022 and included the following search terms:
Adder Adder KVM Adder Firmware
Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Adder Peripheral Sharing AVS-1124
AVS-4128 AVS-4214 AVS-4112
AVS-2112 AVS-4114 AVS-2114
AVS-2214 AVS-4124 AVS-4224
AS-SPLRCU AS-4RCU AS-8RCU
STMicroelectronics 32-Bit
Vulnerability searches were conducted using the following sources:
Check National Vulnerability Database:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search.
Check Adder support:
https://adder.com/en.
Check Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures:
https://google.ca.
Port, Protocol and Vulnerability Scans:
Software: Nmap, Wireshark and Nessus.
6.4.1 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS RESULTS
The vulnerability analysis did not uncover any security relevant residual exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating
environment.
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7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS). This
certification report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration.
This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Table 1. The overall verdict for this
evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS
It is recommended that all guidance outlined in Section 4.1 be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
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8 SUPPORTING CONTENT
8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Term Definition
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCTL Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
CM Configuration Management
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE Communications Security Establishment
CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GC Government of Canada
IT Information Technology
ITS
KVM
Information Technology Security
Keyboard, Video, Mouse
PP
PSD
Protection Profile
Peripheral Sharing Device
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
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8.2 REFERENCES
Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Adder AVS-4112, AVS-2112, AVS-4114, AVS-4214, AVS-2114, AVS-2214, AVS-4128, AVS-4124, AVS-
1124, AVS-4224 Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices Security Target, Version 1.5, 23
November 2021.
Evaluation Technical Report for the Common Criteria Evaluation of Adder AVS-4112, AVS-2112, AVS-4114, AVS-
4214, AVS-2114, AVS-2214, AVS-4128, AVS-4124, AVS-1124, AVS-4224 Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral
Sharing Devices, Version 1.7, 20 April 2022.
Assurance Activity Report Adder AVS-4112, AVS-2112, AVS-4114, AVS-4214, AVS-2114, AVS-2214, AVS-4128,
AVS-4124, AVS-1124, AVS-4224 Firmware Version 44404-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices, Version 1.7, 07 April
2022.