High Sec Labs FV11H-M,
FV11D-M, FV11PH-M,
FV11HH-MM, FV11PP-MM,
FV11HP-MM, FV11PH-MM
Video Isolators
Firmware Version 44000-E7E7
Security Target
Doc No: 2149-001-D102A7
Version: 1.1
14 January 2026
High Sec Labs Ltd.
29 HaEshel St
Caesarea,
Israel 3079510
Prepared by:
EWA-Canada, An Intertek Company
1223 Michael Street North, Suite 200
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
K1J 7T2
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CONTENTS
1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION............................................1
1.1 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION........................................................... 1
1.2 SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE....................................................... 2
1.3 TOE REFERENCE........................................................................... 2
1.4 TOE OVERVIEW............................................................................ 2
TOE Environment...........................................................................3
1.5 TOE DESCRIPTION........................................................................ 4
Evaluated Configuration..................................................................4
Physical Scope...............................................................................5
Logical Scope ................................................................................5
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS.............................................................7
2.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE CLAIM....................................... 7
2.2 PP-CONFIGURATION CONFORMANCE CLAIM ..................................... 7
2.3 TECHNICAL DECISIONS................................................................. 7
2.4 PACKAGE CLAIM........................................................................... 8
2.5 CONFORMANCE RATIONALE ........................................................... 8
3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ..............................................9
3.1 THREATS .................................................................................... 9
3.2 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ......................................... 10
3.3 ASSUMPTIONS........................................................................... 10
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES............................................................ 12
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE ............................................ 12
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ......... 16
4.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE............................................... 17
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION..................................... 21
6 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.................................. 22
6.1 CONVENTIONS........................................................................... 22
6.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS........................................ 22
User Data Protection (FDP) ...........................................................24
Protection of the TSF (FPT) ...........................................................28
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7 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ................................... 30
8 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE.................................... 31
8.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ....................... 31
8.2 DEPENDENCY RATIONALE ............................................................ 31
8.3 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ........................ 32
9 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION ............................................... 33
9.1 USER DATA PROTECTION............................................................. 33
PSD Switching .............................................................................33
Video Functionality.......................................................................33
9.2 PROTECTION OF THE TSF ............................................................ 36
No Access to TOE.........................................................................36
Passive Anti-tampering Functionality ..............................................36
TSF Testing.................................................................................37
10 TERMINOLOGY AND ACRONYMS............................................... 38
10.1 TERMINOLOGY........................................................................... 38
10.2 ACRONYMS................................................................................ 38
11 REFERENCES ........................................................................... 40
ANNEX A – LETTER OF VOLATILITY..................................................... 41
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 – Non-TOE Hardware and Software................................................. 3
Table 2 – TOE Peripheral Sharing Devices and Features ................................ 5
Table 3 – Logical Scope of the TOE ............................................................ 6
Table 4 – Applicable Technical Decisions..................................................... 8
Table 5 – Threats.................................................................................. 10
Table 6 – Assumptions........................................................................... 11
Table 7 – Security Objectives for the TOE ................................................. 15
Table 8 – Security Objectives for the Operational Environment..................... 16
Table 9 – Security Objectives Rationale .................................................... 20
Table 10 – Functional Families of Extended Components ............................. 21
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Table 11 – Summary of Security Functional Requirements........................... 24
Table 12 – Security Assurance Requirements............................................. 30
Table 13 – Functional Requirement Dependencies ...................................... 32
Table 14 – Terminology ......................................................................... 38
Table 15 – Acronyms............................................................................. 39
Table 16 – References ........................................................................... 40
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 – Isolator Evaluated Configuration................................................. 4
Figure 2 – Mini Isolator Evaluated Configuration........................................... 4
Figure 3 – Display EDID Read Function..................................................... 34
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1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION
This Security Target (ST) defines the scope of the evaluation in terms of the
assumptions made, the intended environment for the Target of Evaluation
(TOE), the Information Technology (IT) security functional and assurance
requirements to be met, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level)
to which it is asserted that the TOE satisfies its IT security requirements. This
document forms the baseline for the Common Criteria (CC) evaluation.
1.1 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION
Section 1, ST Introduction, provides the Security Target reference, the Target
of Evaluation reference, the TOE overview and the TOE description.
Section 2, Conformance Claims, describes how the ST conforms to the
Common Criteria, Protection Profile (PP) and PP Modules.
Section 3, Security Problem Definition, describes the expected environment
in which the TOE is to be used. This section defines the set of threats that are
relevant to the secure operation of the TOE, organizational security policies with
which the TOE must comply, and secure usage assumptions applicable to this
analysis.
Section 4, Security Objectives, defines the set of security objectives to be
satisfied by the TOE and by the TOE operating environment in response to the
problem defined by the security problem definition.
Section 5, Extended Components Definition, defines the extended
components which are then detailed in Section 6.
Section 6, Security Functional Requirements, specifies the security
functional requirements that must be satisfied by the TOE and the IT
environment.
Section 7, Security Assurance Requirements, specifies the security
assurance requirements that must be satisfied by the TOE and the IT
environment.
Section 8, Security Requirements Rationale, provides a rationale for the
selection of functional and assurance requirements.
Section 9, TOE Summary Specification, describes the security functions that
are included in the TOE to enable it to meet the IT security functional
requirements.
Section 10, Terminology and Acronyms, defines the acronyms and
terminology used in this ST.
Section 11, References, provides a list of documents referenced in this ST.
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1.2 SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE
ST Title: High Sec Labs FV11H-M, FV11D-M, FV11PH-M,
FV11HH-MM, FV11PP-MM, FV11HP-MM, FV11PH-MM
Video Isolators Firmware Version 44000-E7E7
Security Target
ST Version: 1.1
ST Date: 14 January 2026
1.3 TOE REFERENCE
TOE Identification: High Sec Labs FV11H-M, FV11D-M, FV11PH-M,
FV11HH-MM, FV11PP-MM, FV11HP-MM, FV11PH-MM
Video Isolators Firmware Version 44000-E7E7
TOE Developer: High Sec Labs Ltd.
TOE Type: Peripheral Sharing Device (Other Devices and
Systems)
1.4 TOE OVERVIEW
The High Sec Labs (HSL) Video Isolators ensure unidirectional video between a
connected computer and a display.
The following security features are provided by the HSL Peripheral Sharing
Devices:
• Video Security
• Computer video input interfaces are isolated through the use of
separate electronic components, power and ground domains
• The display is isolated by dedicated, read-only, Extended Display
Identification Data (EDID) emulation for each computer
• Access to the monitor’s EDID is blocked
• Access to the Monitor Control Command Set (MCCS commands) is
blocked
• DisplayPort, High-Definition Multimedia Interface (HDMI), and
Digital Visual Interface (DVI)-D video peripherals are supported as
follows:
▪ The FV11D-M device supports a DVI-D video display
▪ The FV11H-M, FV11PH-M, FV11HH-MM and FV11PH-MM
devices support an HDMI video display
▪ The FV11PH-M, FV11PP-MM and FV11HP-MM devices support
a DisplayPort video display
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• DisplayPort, High-Definition Multimedia Interface (HDMI), and
Digital Visual Interface (DVI)-D video input is supported as follows:
▪ The FV11D-M device supports DVI-D video input
▪ The FV11H-M, FV11PH-M, FV11HH-MM and FV11HP-MM
devices support HDMI video input
▪ The FV11PH-M, FV11PH-MM and FV11PP-MM devices support
DisplayPort video input
• Anti-Tampering
• Special holographic tampering evident labels on the product’s
enclosure provide a clear visual indication if the product has been
opened or compromised
High Sec Labs secure peripheral sharing devices use isolated microcontrollers to
emulate connected peripherals in order to prevent display signaling and power
signaling attacks.
The TOE is a combined software and hardware TOE. A mapping showing the
applicable Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) for each device is included
in Annex B.
TOE Environment
The following components are required for operation of the TOE in the evaluated
configuration.
Component Description
Connected Computer 1 general purpose computer
User display Standard computer display (HDMI 2.0, DVI-D, DisplayPort
1.1, 1.2 or 1.3)
HSL KVM Cables Video cable (DisplayPort, DVI-D, HDMI)
Table 1 – Non-TOE Hardware and Software
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1.5 TOE DESCRIPTION
Evaluated Configuration
Figure 1 – Isolator Evaluated Configuration
Figure 2 – Mini Isolator Evaluated Configuration
In the evaluated configuration, the isolator is connected to the computer and to
the video display device to ensure unidirectional communications. The video
input may be DisplayPort, HDMI or DVI-D.
For this evaluation, the TOE was tested according to the PP requirements using
devices supporting DP 1.1a, DP 1.2 (for some tests), HDMI 1.4, USB 2.0, and
CCID Revision 1.1 (for UA). The TOE supports DP 1.3 and HDMI 2.0 subject to
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the limitations stated in the TSS. These limitations are due to the PP mandated
blocking of specific parts of the protocols.
Physical Scope
The TOE consists of the devices shown in Table 2.
Family
Description
Part
Number
Model Tamper
Evident labels
Video in Video out
Single Port
video isolator
devices
CGA14746 FV11H-M Yes HDMI HDMI
CGA14744 FV11D-M Yes DVI-D DVI-D
CGA19442 FV11PH-M Yes DP/HDMI DP/HDMI
CGA26978 FV11HH-MM Yes HDMI HDMI
CGA26979 FV11HP-MM Yes HDMI DP
CGA26980 FV11PH-MM Yes DP HDMI
CGA26981 FV11PP-MM Yes DP DP
Table 2 – TOE Peripheral Sharing Devices and Features
1.5.2.1 TOE Delivery
The TOE, together with its corresponding cables are delivered to the customer
via trusted carrier, such as Fed-Ex, that provide a tracking service for all
shipments.
1.5.2.2 TOE Guidance
The TOE includes the following guidance documentation:
• HSL QUICK SETUP GUIDE Secure KVM Isolators, HLT34088 Rev. 2.0
Guidance may be downloaded from the High Sec Labs website
(https://highseclabs.com/quick-start-guides/) in .pdf format.
The following guidance is available upon request by emailing
support@highseclabs.com:
• High Sec Labs FV11H-M, FV11D-M, FV11PH-M, FV11HH-MM, FV11PP-MM,
FV11HP-MM, FV11PH-MM Firmware Version 44000-E7E7 Peripheral
Sharing Devices Common Criteria Guidance Supplement, Version 1.0
Logical Scope
The logical boundary of the TOE includes all interfaces and functions within the
physical boundary. The logical boundary of the TOE may be broken down by the
security function classes described in Section 6. Table 3 summarizes the logical
scope of the TOE.
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Functional Classes Description
User Data Protection The TOE enforces unidirectional data flow for video. The
TOE ensures that only authorized peripheral devices may
be used.
Protection of the TSF1
The TOE ensures a secure state in the case of failure,
provides only restricted access, and performs self-testing.
The TOE provides passive detection of physical attack.
Table 3 – Logical Scope of the TOE
1
TOE Security Functionality
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2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
2.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE CLAIM
This Security Target claims to be conformant to Version 3.1 of Common Criteria
for Information Technology Security Evaluation according to:
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model; CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security Functional Components; CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security Assurance Components CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017
As follows:
• CC Part 2 extended
• CC Part 3 conformant
The Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017 has been taken into account.
2.2 PP-CONFIGURATION CONFORMANCE CLAIM
This ST claims exact conformance with the National Information Assurance
Partnership (NIAP) PP‐Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device and
Video/Display Devices, 19 July 2019 [CFG_PSD‐VI_V1.0]
This PP-Configuration includes the following components:
• Base-PP: Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, Version 4.0
[PP_PSD_V4.0]
• PP-Module: PP-Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0
[MOD_VI_V1.0]
2.3 TECHNICAL DECISIONS
The Technical Decisions in Table 4 apply to the PP and the modules and have
been accounted for in the ST and in the evaluation.
TD Name PP affected Relevant Y/N
TD0506 Missing Steps to disconnect
and reconnect display
[MOD_VI_V1.0] Y
TD0514 Correction to MOD VI
FDP_APC_EXT.1 Test 3 Step 6
[MOD_VI_V1.0] Y
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TD Name PP affected Relevant Y/N
TD0518 Typographical errors in
dependency Table
[PP_PSD_V4.0] N
FPT_STM.1 is not
claimed in the ST
TD0539 Incorrect selection trigger in
FTA_CIN_EXT.1 in
MOD_VI_V1.0
[MOD_VI_V1.0] Y
TD0583 FPT_PHP.3 modified for remote
controllers
[PP_PSD_V4.0] Y
TD0584 Update to FDP_APC_EXT.1
Video Tests
[MOD_VI_V.10] Y
TD0593 Equivalency Arguments for
PSD
[MOD_VI_V1.0] Y
TD0681 PSD purging of EDID data
upon disconnect
[MOD_VI_V1.0] Y
TD0686 DisplayPort CEC Testing [MOD_VI_V1.0] Y
TD0804 Clarification regarding
Extenders in PSD Evaluations
[PP_PSD_V4.0] Y
TD0842 Alternate Conversion Option
for FDP_IPC_EXT.1
[MOD_VI_V1.0] Y
TD0844 Addition of Assurance Package
for Flaw Remediation V1.0
Conformance Claim
[PP_PSD_V4.0] N
No ALC_FLR
SARs are claimed
in the ST
TD0942 Updated EDID Read
Requirements
[MOD_VI_V1.0] Y
Table 4 – Applicable Technical Decisions
2.4 PACKAGE CLAIM
This Security Target does not claim conformance to any package.
2.5 CONFORMANCE RATIONALE
The TOE Video Isolator devices are inherently consistent with the Compliant
Targets of Evaluation described in the [PP_PSD_V4.0] and in the PP‐Module for
Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0 [MOD_VI_1.0], and with the PP‐Configuration
for Peripheral Sharing Device and Video/Display Devices [CFG_PSD‐VI_V1.0].
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The security problem definition, statement of security objectives and statement
of security requirements in this ST conform exactly to the security problem
definition, statement of security objectives and statement of security
requirements contained in [PP_PSD_V4.0] and the PP‐Module for Video/Display
Devices, Version 1.0 [MOD_VI_1.0].
3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
3.1 THREATS
Table 5 lists the threats described in Section 3.1 of the [PP_PSD_V4.0].
Mitigation to the threats is through the objectives identified in Section 4.1,
Security Objectives for the TOE.
Threat Description
T.DATA_LEAK A connection via the PSD2
between one or more
computers may allow unauthorized data flow through
the PSD or its connected peripherals.
T.SIGNAL_LEAK A connection via the PSD between one or more
computers may allow unauthorized data flow through
bit‐by‐bit signaling.
T.RESIDUAL_LEAK A PSD may leak (partial, residual, or echo) user data
between the intended connected computer and another
unintended connected computer.
T.UNINTENDED_USE A PSD may connect the user to a computer other than
the one to which the user intended to connect.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_DEVICES The use of an unauthorized peripheral device with a
specific PSD peripheral port may allow unauthorized
data flows between connected devices or enable an
attack on the PSD or its connected computers.
T.LOGICAL_TAMPER An attached device (computer or peripheral) with
malware, or otherwise under the control of a
malicious user, could modify or overwrite code or
data stored in the PSD’s volatile or non‐volatile
memory to allow unauthorized information flows.
T.PHYSICAL_TAMPER A malicious user or human agent could physically
modify the PSD to allow unauthorized information
flows.
2
Peripheral Sharing Device
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Threat Description
T.REPLACEMENT A malicious human agent could replace the PSD
during shipping, storage, or use with an alternate
device that does not enforce the PSD security
policies.
T.FAILED Detectable failure of a PSD may cause an
unauthorized information flow or weakening of PSD
security functions.
Table 5 – Threats
3.2 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES
There are no Organizational Security Policies applicable to this TOE.
3.3 ASSUMPTIONS
The assumptions required to ensure the security of the TOE are listed in Table 6.
Assumptions Description
A.NO_TEMPEST Computers and peripheral devices connected to the
PSD are not TEMPEST approved.
The TSF may or may not isolate the ground of the
keyboard and mouse computer interfaces (the USB
ground). The Operational Environment is assumed not
to support TEMPEST red‐black ground isolation.
A.PHYSICAL The environment provides physical security
commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data
it processes and contains.
A.NO_WIRELESS_DEVICES The environment includes no wireless peripheral
devices.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN PSD Administrators and users are trusted to follow and
apply all guidance in a trusted manner.
A.TRUSTED_CONFIG Personnel configuring the PSD and its operational
environment follow the applicable security
configuration guidance.
A.USER_ALLOWED_ACCESS All PSD users are allowed to interact with all
connected computers. It is not the role of the PSD to
prevent or otherwise control user access to connected
computers. Computers or their connected network
shall have the required means to authenticate the user
and to control access to their various resources.
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Assumptions Description
A.NO_SPECIAL_ANALOG
_CAPABILITIES
The computers connected to the TOE are not equipped
with special analog data collection cards or peripherals
such as analog to digital interface, high performance
audio interface, digital signal processing function, or
analog video capture function.
Table 6 – Assumptions
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4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES
The purpose of the security objectives is to address the security concerns and to
show which security concerns are addressed by the TOE, and which are
addressed by the environment. Threats may be addressed by the TOE or the
security environment or both. Therefore, the CC identifies two categories of
security objectives:
• Security objectives for the TOE
• Security objectives for the environment
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE
This section identifies and describes the security objectives that are to be
addressed by the TOE, and traces each Security Functional Requirement (SFR)
back to a security objective of the TOE.
Security Objective Description
O.COMPUTER
_INTERFACE
_ISOLATION
The PSD shall prevent unauthorized data flow to ensure that
the PSD and its connected peripheral devices cannot be
exploited in an attempt to leak data. The TOE‐Computer
interface shall be isolated from all other PSD‐Computer
interfaces while TOE is powered.
Addressed by:
MOD_VI FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.1
O.COMPUTER
_INTERFACE
_ISOLATION
_TOE_UNPOWERED
The PSD shall not allow data to transit a PSD‐Computer
interface while the PSD is unpowered.
Addressed by:
MOD_VI FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.1
O.USER_DATA
_ISOLATION
The PSD shall route user data, such as keyboard entries, only
to the computer selected by the user. The PSD shall provide
isolation between the data flowing from the peripheral device
to the selected computer and any non‐selected computer.
Addressed by:
MOD_VI FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.1
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Security Objective Description
O.NO_USER
_DATA_RETENTION
The PSD shall not retain user data in non‐volatile memory
after power up or, if supported, factory reset.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FDP_RIP_EXT.1
O.NO_OTHER
_EXTERNAL
_INTERFACES
The PSD shall not have any external interfaces other than
those implemented by the TSF.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FDP_PDC_EXT.1
O.LEAK
_PREVENTION
_SWITCHING
The PSD shall ensure that there are no switching mechanisms
that allow signal data leakage between connected computers.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FDP_SWI_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.2
O.AUTHORIZED
_USAGE
The TOE shall explicitly prohibit or ignore unauthorized
switching mechanisms, either because it supports only one
connected computer or because it allows only authorized
mechanisms to switch between connected computers.
Authorized switching mechanisms shall require express user
action restricted to console buttons, console switches, console
touch screen, wired remote control, and peripheral devices
using a guard. Unauthorized switching mechanisms include
keyboard shortcuts, also known as “hotkeys,” automatic port
scanning, control through a connected computer, and control
through keyboard shortcuts. Where applicable, the results of
the switching activity shall be indicated by the TSF so that it
is clear to the user that the switching mechanism was
engaged as intended.
A conformant TOE may also provide a management function
to configure some aspects of the TSF. If the TOE provides this
functionality, it shall ensure that whatever management
functions it provides can only be performed by authorized
administrators and that an audit trail of management
activities is generated.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FDP_SWI_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.2
MOD_VI FDP_CDS_EXT.1
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Security Objective Description
O.PERIPHERAL
_PORTS_ISOLATION
The PSD shall ensure that data does not flow between
peripheral devices connected to different PSD interfaces.
Addressed by:
MOD_VI FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.1
O.REJECT
_UNAUTHORIZED
_PERIPHERAL
The PSD shall reject unauthorized peripheral device types and
protocols.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FDP_PDC_EXT.1
MOD_VI FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI,
FDP_IPC_EXT.1, FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP,
SPR_EXT.1/DVI-D, FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI,
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/USB
O.REJECT
_UNAUTHORIZED
_ENDPOINTS
The PSD shall reject unauthorized peripheral devices
connected via a Universal Serial Bus (USB) hub.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FDP_PDC_EXT.1
O.NO_TOE_ACCESS The PSD firmware, software, and memory shall not be
accessible via its external ports.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FPT_NTA_EXT.1
O.TAMPER
_EVIDENT
_LABEL
The PSD shall be identifiable as authentic by the user and the
user must be made aware of any procedures or other such
information to accomplish authentication. This feature must
be available upon receipt of the PSD and continue to be
available during the PSD deployment. The PSD shall be
labeled with at least one visible unique identifying tamper‐
evident marking that can be used to authenticate the device.
The PSD manufacturer must maintain a complete list of
manufactured PSD articles and their respective identification
markings’ unique identifiers.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FPT_PHP.1
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Security Objective Description
O.ANTI_TAMPERING The PSD shall be physically enclosed so that any attempts to
open or otherwise access the internals or modify the
connections of the PSD would be evident, and optionally
thwarted through disablement of the TOE. Note: This applies
to a wired remote control as well as the main chassis of the
PSD.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FPT_PHP.1
O.SELF_TEST The PSD shall perform self‐tests following power up or
powered reset.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FPT_TST.1
O.SELF_TEST
_FAIL_TOE
_DISABLE
The PSD shall enter a secure state upon detection of a critical
failure.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FPT_FLS_EXT.1, FPT_TST_EXT.1
O.SELF_TEST
_FAIL_INDICATION
The PSD shall provide clear and visible user indications in the
case of a self‐test failure.
Addressed by:
PP_PSD FPT_TST_EXT.1
O.PROTECTED
_EDID
The TOE shall read the connected display Extended Display
Identification Data (EDID) once during the TOE power up or
reboot sequence and prevent any EDID channel write
transactions that connected computers initiate.
Addressed by:
MOD_VI FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI, FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP,
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DVI-D, FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI,
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/USB
O.UNIDIRECTIONAL
_VIDEO
The TOE shall enforce unidirectional video data flow from the
connected computer video interface to the display interface
only.
Addressed by:
MOD_VI FDP_UDF_EXT.1/VI
Table 7 – Security Objectives for the TOE
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4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
This section identifies and describes the security objectives that are to be
addressed by the IT environment or by non-technical or procedural means.
Security Objective Description
OE.NO_TEMPEST The operational environment will not use TEMPEST
approved equipment.
OE.PHYSICAL The operational environment will provide physical
security, commensurate with the value of the PSD
and the data that transits it.
OE.NO_WIRELESS_DEVICES The operational environment will not include
wireless keyboards, mice, audio, user
authentication, or video devices.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN The operational environment will ensure that trusted
PSD Administrators and users are appropriately
trained.
OE.TRUSTED_CONFIG The operational environment will ensure that
administrators configuring the PSD and its
operational environment follow the applicable
security configuration guidance.
OE.NO_SPECIAL_ANALOG
_CAPABILITIES
The operational environment will not have special
analog data collection cards or peripherals such as
analog to digital interface, high performance audio
interface, or a component with digital signal
processing or analog video capture functions.
Table 8 – Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
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4.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE
The security objectives rationale describes how the assumptions and threats
map to the security objectives.
Threat or
Assumption
Security
Objective(s)
Rationale
T.DATA_LEAK O.COMPUTER
_INTERFACE
_ISOLATION
Isolation of computer interfaces
prevents data from leaking between
them without authorization.
O.COMPUTER
_INTERFACE
_ISOLATION
_TOE_UNPOWERED
Maintaining interface isolation while
the TOE is in an unpowered state
ensures that data cannot leak
between computer interfaces.
O.USER_DATA
_ISOLATION
The TOE’s routing of data only to the
selected computer ensures that it will
not leak to any others.
O.NO_OTHER
_EXTERNAL
_INTERFACES
The absence of additional external
interfaces ensures that there is no
unexpected method by which data
can be leaked.
O.PERIPHERAL_PORTS
_ISOLATION
Isolation of peripheral ports prevents
data from leaking between them
without authorization.
O.PROTECTED_EDID The TOE’s protection of the EDID
interface prevents its use as a vector
for unauthorized data leakage via this
channel.
O.UNIDIRECTIONAL
_VIDEO
The TOE’s enforcement of
unidirectional output for video data
protects against data leakage via
connected computers by ensuring
that no video data can be input to a
connected computer through this
interface.
T.SIGNAL_LEAK O.COMPUTER
_INTERFACE
_ISOLATION
Isolation of computer interfaces
prevents data leakage through bit‐
wise signaling because there is no
mechanism by which the signal data
can be communicated.
O.NO_OTHER
_EXTERNAL
_INTERFACES
The absence of additional external
interfaces ensures that there is no
unexpected method by which data
can be leaked through bitwise
signaling.
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Threat or
Assumption
Security
Objective(s)
Rationale
O.LEAK_PREVENTION
_SWITCHING
The TOE’s use of switching methods
that are not susceptible to signal
leakage helps mitigate the signal leak
threat.
O.PROTECTED_EDID The TOE’s protection of the EDID
interface prevents its use as a vector
for bit‐by‐bit signal leakage via this
channel.
O.UNIDIRECTIONAL
_VIDEO
The TOE’s enforcement of
unidirectional output for video data
protects against signaling leakage via
connected computers by ensuring
that no video data can be input to a
connected computer through this
interface.
T.RESIDUAL
_LEAK
O.NO_USER_DATA
_RETENTION
The TOE’s lack of data retention
ensures that a residual data leak is
not possible.
O.PROTECTED_EDID The TOE’s protection of the EDID
interface prevents the leakage of
residual data by ensuring that no
such data can be written to EDID
memory.
T.UNINTENDED
_USE
O.AUTHORIZED
_USAGE
The TOE’s support for only switching
mechanisms that require explicit user
action to engage ensures that a user
has sufficient information to avoid
interacting with an unintended
computer.
T.UNAUTHORIZED
_DEVICES
O.REJECT
_UNAUTHORIZED
_ENDPOINTS
The TOE’s ability to reject
unauthorized endpoints mitigates the
threat of unauthorized devices being
used to communicate with connected
computers.
O.REJECT
_UNAUTHORIZED
_PERIPHERAL
The TOE’s ability to reject
unauthorized peripherals mitigates
the threat of unauthorized devices
being used to communicate with
connected computers.
O.UNIDIRECTIONAL
_VIDEO
The TOE’s limitation of supported
video protocol interfaces prevents the
connection of unauthorized devices.
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Threat or
Assumption
Security
Objective(s)
Rationale
T.LOGICAL
_TAMPER
O.NO_TOE_ACCESS The TOE’s prevention of logical
access to its firmware, software, and
memory mitigates the threat of
logical tampering.
T.PHYSICAL
_TAMPER
O.ANTI_TAMPERING The TOE mitigates the threat of
physical tampering through use of an
enclosure that provides tamper
detection functionality.
O.TAMPER_EVIDENT
_LABEL
The TOE mitigates the threat of
physical tampering through use of
tamper evident labels that reveal
physical tampering attempts.
T.REPLACEMENT O.TAMPER_EVIDENT
_LABEL
The TOE’s use of a tamper evident
label that provides authenticity of the
device mitigates the threat that it is
substituted for a replacement device
during the acquisition process.
T.FAILED O.SELF_TEST The TOE mitigates the threat of
failures leading to compromise of
security functions through self‐tests
of its own functionality.
O.SELF_TEST_FAIL
_TOE_DISABLE
The TOE mitigates the threat of
failures leading to compromise of
security functions by disabling all
data flows in the event a failure is
detected.
O.SELF_TEST_FAIL
_INDICATION
The TOE mitigates the threat of
failures leading to compromise of
security functions by providing users
with a clear indication when it is in a
failure state and should not be
trusted.
A.NO_TEMPEST OE.NO_TEMPEST If the TOE’s operational environment
does not include TEMPEST approved
equipment, then the assumption is
satisfied.
A.NO_PHYSICAL OE.PHYSICAL If the TOE’s operational environment
provides physical security, then the
assumption is satisfied.
A.NO_WIRELESS
_DEVICES
OE.NO_WIRELESS
_DEVICES
If the TOE’s operational environment
does not include wireless peripherals,
then the assumption is satisfied.
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Threat or
Assumption
Security
Objective(s)
Rationale
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN OE.TRUSTED
_ADMIN
If the TOE’s operational environment
ensures that only trusted
administrators will manage the TSF,
then the assumption is satisfied.
A.TRUSTED
_CONFIG
OE.TRUSTED
_CONFIG
If TOE administrators follow the
provided security configuration
guidance, then the assumption is
satisfied.
A.USER_ALLOWED
_ACCESS
OE.PHYSICAL If the TOE’s operational environment
provides physical access to connected
computers, then the assumption is
satisfied.
A.NO_SPECIAL
_ANALOG
_CAPABILITIES
OE.NO_SPECIAL
_ANALOG
_CAPABILITIES
If administrators in the TOE’s
operational environment take care to
ensure that computers with special
analog data collection interfaces are
not connected to the TOE, then the
assumption that such components
are not present is satisfied.
Table 9 – Security Objectives Rationale
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5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION
The extended components definition is presented in Appendix C of the Protection
Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device [PP_PSD_V4.0] and in the module for
display devices [MOD_VI_V1.0].
The families to which these components belong are identified in the following
table:
Functional
Class
Functional Families Protection
Profile Module
User Data
Protection (FDP)
FDP_APC_EXT Active PSD Connections [PP_PSD_V4.0]
FDP_CDS_EXT Connected Displays Supported [MOD_VI_V1.0]
FDP_IPC_EXT Internal Protocol Conversion [MOD_VI_V1.0]
FDP_PDC_EXT Peripheral Device Connection [PP_PSD_V4.0]
[MOD_VI_V1.0]
FDP_RIP_EXT Residual Information Protection [PP_PSD_V4.0]
FDP_SPR_EXT Sub-Protocol Rules [MOD_VI_V1.0]
FDP_SWI_EXT PSD Switching [PP_PSD_V4.0]
FDP_UDF_EXT Unidirectional Data Flow [MOD_VI_V1.0]
Protection of the
TSF (FPT)
FPT_FLS_EXT Failure with Preservation of Secure
State
[PP_PSD_V4.0]
FPT_NTA_EXT No Access to TOE [PP_PSD_V4.0]
FPT_TST_EXT TSF Testing [PP_PSD_V4.0]
Table 10 – Functional Families of Extended Components
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6 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS
Section 6 provides security functional and assurance requirements that must be
satisfied by a compliant TOE.
6.1 CONVENTIONS
The CC permits four types of operations to be performed on functional
requirements: selection, assignment, refinement, and iteration. This is defined
in the PP as:
• Assignment: Indicated by surrounding brackets and underline, e.g.,
[assigned item].
• Selection: Indicated by surrounding brackets and italics, e.g., [selected
item].
• Refinement: Refined components are identified by using [bold
surrounded by brackets] for additional information, or [strikeout
surrounded by brackets] for deleted text.
• Iteration: Iteration operations for iterations within the Protection Profile
and associated modules are identified with a slash (‘/’) and an identifier
(e.g. “/VI”).
Extended SFRs are identified by the inclusion of “EXT” in the SFR name.
The CC operations already performed in the PP and PP modules are reproduced
in plain text and not denoted in this ST. The requirements have been copied
from the PP and PP modules and any remaining operations have been completed
herein. Refer to the PP and PP modules to identify those operations.
6.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
Section 6.2 details the security functional requirements that apply to all TOE
devices.
Class Identifier Name Source Applicable
Devices
User Data
Protection
(FDP)
FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI Active PSD Connections [MOD_VI_V1.0] All
FDP_CDS_EXT.1 Connected Displays
Supported
[MOD_VI_V1.0] All
FDP_IPC_EXT.1 Internal Protocol
Conversion
[MOD_VI_V1.0] FV11PH-M,
FV11PH-MM
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Class Identifier Name Source Applicable
Devices
FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Peripheral Device
Connection
[PP_PSD_V4.0]
[MOD_VI_V1.0]3
All
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI Authorized Devices
(Video Output)
[MOD_VI_V1.0] All
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(1) Authorized Connection
Protocols (Video
Output) (1)
[MOD_VI_V1.0] FV11D-M
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(2) Authorized Connection
Protocols (Video
Output) (2)
[MOD_VI_V1.0] FV11H-M,
FV11HH-MM
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(3) Authorized Connection
Protocols (Video
Output) (3)
[MOD_VI_V1.0] FV11PH-M,
FV11PH-MM,
FV11HP-MM
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(4) Authorized Connection
Protocols (Video
Output) (4)
[MOD_VI_V1.0] FV11PP-MM
FDP_RIP_EXT.1 Residual Information
Protection
[PP_PSD_V4.0] All
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DVI-D Sub-Protocol Rules
(DVI-D Protocol)
[MOD_VI_V1.0] FV11D-M
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI Sub-Protocol Rules
(HDMI Protocol)
[MOD_VI_V1.0] FV11H-M,
FV11PH-M,
FV11HH-MM,
FV11PH-MM,
FV11HP-MM
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP Sub-Protocol Rules (DP
Protocol)
[MOD_VI_V1.0] FV11PH-M,
FV11PP-MM,
FV11PH-MM,
FV11HP-MM
FDP_SWI_EXT.1 PSD Switching [PP_PSD_V4.0] All
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/VI Unidirectional Data
Flow (Video Output)
[MOD_VI_V1.0] All
3
There is no modification to this SFR in the [MOD_VI_V1.0]. However, there are
additions to the Peripheral Device Connections associated with this SFR and additional
evaluation activities.
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Class Identifier Name Source Applicable
Devices
Protection
of the TSF
(FPT)
FPT_FLS_EXT.1 Failure with
Preservation of Secure
State
[PP_PSD_V4.0] All
FPT_NTA_EXT.1 No Access to TOE [PP_PSD_V4.0] All
FPT_PHP.1 Passive Detection of
Physical Attack
[PP_PSD_V4.0] All
FPT_TST.1 TSF Testing [PP_PSD_V4.0] All
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing [PP_PSD_V4.0] All
Table 11 – Summary of Security Functional Requirements
User Data Protection (FDP)
6.2.1.1 FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI Active PSD Connections
FDP_APC_EXT.1.1/VI The TSF shall route user data only from the interfaces selected
by the user.
FDP_APC_EXT.1.2/VI The TSF shall ensure that no data or electrical signals flow
between connected computers whether the TOE is powered on
or powered off.
FDP_APC_EXT.1.3/VI The TSF shall ensure that no data transits the TOE when the
TOE is powered off.
FDP_APC_EXT.1.4/VI The TSF shall ensure that no data transits the TOE when the
TOE is in a failure state.
6.2.1.2 FDP_CDS_EXT.1 Connected Displays Supported
FDP_CDS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall support [one connected display] at a time.
6.2.1.3 FDP_IPC_EXT.1 Internal Protocol Conversion
FDP_IPC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall convert the DisplayPort protocol at the [DisplayPort
peripheral display interface(s), DisplayPort computer video
interface] into the HDMI protocol within the TOE.
FDP_IPC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall output the [HDMI] protocol from inside the TOE to
[computer video interface, peripheral display interface(s)] as
[DisplayPort protocol, HDMI protocol].
Application Note: TD0842 applies to this SFR definition. FDP_IPC_EXT.1 applies to
models FV11PH-M, FV11HP-MM, FV11PH-MM, and FV11PP-MM.
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6.2.1.4 FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Peripheral Device Connection
FDP_PDC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall reject connections with unauthorized devices upon
TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a
powered‐on TOE.
FDP_PDC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall reject connections with devices presenting
unauthorized interface protocols upon TOE power up and upon
connection of a peripheral device to a powered‐on TOE.
FDP_PDC_EXT.1.3 The TOE shall have no external interfaces other than those
claimed by the TSF.
FDP_PDC_EXT.1.4 The TOE shall not have wireless interfaces.
FDP_PDC_EXT.1.5 The TOE shall provide a visual or auditory indication to the User
when a peripheral is rejected.
6.2.1.5 FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI Peripheral Device Connection (Video
Output)
FDP_PDC_EXT.2.1/VI The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices as
defined in Appendix E [of [MOD_VI_V1.0]] and [
• no other devices
] upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral
device to a powered-on TOE.
FDP_PDC_EXT.2.2/VI The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices
presenting authorized interface protocols as defined in
Appendix E [of [MOD_VI_V1.0]] and [
• no other devices
] upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral
device to a powered-on TOE.
6.2.1.6 FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(1) Authorized Connection Protocols
(Video Output) (1)
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.1/VI(1) The TSF shall have interfaces for the [DVI-D] protocols.
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.2/VI(1) The TSF shall apply the following rules to the supported
protocols: [the TSF shall use a fixed EDID file stored within
the TSF to send to each of the host computers, the TSF shall
read the connected display EDID information once during
power‐on or reboot [when prompted by user intervention][.
Application Note: TD0942 applies to this SFR definition. FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(1) applies
to model FV11D-M.
6.2.1.7 FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(2) Authorized Connection Protocols
(Video Output) (2)
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.1/VI(2) The TSF shall have interfaces for the [HDMI] protocols.
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FDP_PDC_EXT.3.2/VI(2) The TSF shall apply the following rules to the supported
protocols: [the TSF shall use a fixed EDID file stored within
the TSF to send to each of the host computers, the TSF shall
read the connected display EDID information once during
power‐on or reboot [when prompted by user intervention]].
Application Note: TD0942 applies to this SFR definition. FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(2) applies
to models FV11H-M and FV11HH-MM. Only the FV11H-M has the
ability to read the connected display EDID information.
6.2.1.8 FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(3) Authorized Connection Protocols
(Video Output) (3)
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.1/VI(3) The TSF shall have interfaces for the [HDMI, DisplayPort]
protocols.
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.2/VI(3) The TSF shall apply the following rules to the supported
protocols: [the TSF shall use a fixed EDID file stored within
the TSF to send to each of the host computers, the TSF
shall read the connected display EDID information once
during power‐on or reboot [when prompted by user
intervention]].
Application Note: TD0942 applies to this SFR definition. FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(3) applies
to models FV11PH-M, FV11HP-MM and FV11PH-MM. Only the FV11PH-
M has the ability to read the connected display EDID information.
6.2.1.9 FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(4) Authorized Connection Protocols
(Video Output) (4)
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.1/VI(4) The TSF shall have interfaces for the [DisplayPort]
protocols.
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.2/VI(4) The TSF shall apply the following rules to the supported
protocols: [the TSF shall use a fixed EDID file stored within
the TSF to send to each of the host computers].
Application Note: TD0942 applies to this SFR definition. FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(4) applies
to model FV11PP-MM.
6.2.1.10 FDP_RIP_EXT.1 Residual Information Protection
FDP_RIP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that no user data is written to TOE non‐volatile
memory or storage.
6.2.1.11 FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DVI-D Sub-Protocol Rules (DVI-D
Protocol)
FDP_SPR_EXT.1.1/DVI-D The TSF shall apply the following rules for the DVI-D
protocol:
• block the following video/display sub‐protocols:
o ARC,
o CEC,
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o EDID from computer to display,
o HDCP,
o HEAC,
o HEC,
o MCCS
• allow the following video/display sub‐protocols:
o EDID from display to computer,
o HPD from display to computer.
Application Note: FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DVI-D applies to model FV11D-M.
6.2.1.12 FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI Sub-Protocol Rules (HDMI
Protocol)
FDP_SPR_EXT.1.1/HDMI The TSF shall apply the following rules for the HDMI
protocol:
• block the following video/display sub‐protocols:
o ARC
o CEC,
o EDID from computer to display,
o HDCP,
o HEAC,
o HEC,
o MCCS
• allow the following video/display sub‐protocols:
o EDID from display to computer,
o HPD from display to computer.
Application Note: FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI applies to the following models: FV11H-M,
FV11PH-M, FV11HH-MM, FV11HP-MM and FV11PH-MM.
6.2.1.13 FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP Sub-Protocol Rules (DisplayPort
Protocol)
FDP_SPR_EXT.1.1/DP The TSF shall apply the following rules for the DisplayPort
protocol:
• block the following video/display sub‐protocols:
o CEC,
o EDID from computer to display,
o HDCP,
o MCCS
• allow the following video/display sub‐protocols:
o EDID from display to computer,
o HPD from display to computer,
o Link Training.
Application Note: FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP applies to the following models: FV11PH-M,
FV11PP-MM, FV11HP-MM and FV11PH-MM.
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6.2.1.14 FDP_SWI_EXT.1 PSD Switching
FDP_SWI_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that [the TOE supports only one connected
computer].
6.2.1.15 FDP_UDF_EXT.1/VI Unidirectional Data Flow (Video
Output)
FDP_UDF_EXT.1.1/VI The TSF shall ensure video data transits the TOE
unidirectionally from the TOE computer video interface to the
TOE peripheral device display interface.
Protection of the TSF (FPT)
6.2.2.1 FPT_FLS_EXT.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State
FPT_FLS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur: failure of the power‐on self‐test and [no other
failures].
6.2.2.2 FPT_NTA_EXT.1 No Access to TOE
FPT_NTA_EXT.1.1 TOE firmware, software, and memory shall not be accessible via the
TOE’s external ports, with the following exceptions: [the Extended
Display Identification Data (EDID) memory of Video TOEs may
be accessible from connected computers; the configuration data,
settings, and logging data that may be accessible by authorized
administrators].
6.2.2.3 FPT_PHP.1 Passive Detection of Physical Attack
FPT_PHP.1.1 The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering
that might compromise the TSF.
FPT_PHP.1.2 The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical
tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.
6.2.2.4 FPT_TST.1 TSF Testing
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up and at the
conditions [no other conditions] to demonstrate the correct operation of
user control functions and [no other functions].
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the
integrity of [TSF data].
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the
integrity of [TSF].
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6.2.2.5 FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall respond to a self‐test failure by providing users with a
[visual] indication of failure and by shutdown of normal TSF
functions.
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7 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The assurance requirements are summarized in Table 12.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
Identifier Name
Development (ADV) ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification
Guidance Documents
(AGD)
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Life-Cycle Support
(ALC)
ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM Coverage
Security Target
Evaluation (ASE)
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended Components Definition
ASE_INT.1 ST Introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security Objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived Security Requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem Definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE Summary Specification
Tests (ATE)
ATE_IND.1
Independent Testing -
Conformance
Vulnerability
Assessment (AVA)
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability Survey
Table 12 – Security Assurance Requirements
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8 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE
8.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
RATIONALE
Table 7 provides a mapping between the SFRs and Security Objectives.
8.2 DEPENDENCY RATIONALE
Table 13 identifies the Security Functional Requirements and their associated
dependencies. It also indicates whether the ST explicitly addresses each
dependency.
SFR Dependencies Rationale Statement
FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI None N/A
FDP_CDS_EXT.1 None N/A
FDP_IPC_EXT.1 FDP_PDC_EXT.2 Included
FDP_PDC_EXT.1 None N/A
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Included
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(1) FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Included
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(2) FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Included
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(3) FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Included
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(4) FDP_PDC_EXT.1 Included
FDP_RIP_EXT.1 None N/A
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP FDP_PDC_EXT.3 Included
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DVI-D FDP_PDC_EXT.3 Included
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI FDP_PDC_EXT.3 Included
FDP_SWI_EXT.1 None N/A
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/VI FDP_APC_EXT.1 Included
FPT_FLS_EXT.1 FPT_TST.1
FPT_PHP.3
Included
Included only if anti‐tamper is selected
in FPT_FLS_EXT.1.1
FPT_NTA_EXT.1 None N/A
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SFR Dependencies Rationale Statement
FPT_PHP.1 None N/A
FPT_TST.1 None N/A
FPT_TST_EXT.1 FPT_TST.1 Included
Table 13 – Functional Requirement Dependencies
8.3 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
RATIONALE
The TOE assurance requirements for this ST consist of the requirements
indicated in the [PP_PSD_V4.0].
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9 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
This section provides a description of the security functions and assurance
measures of the TOE that meet the TOE security requirements. Unless otherwise
stated, the description applies to all devices.
9.1 USER DATA PROTECTION
PSD Switching
The TOE supports only one connected computer.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_SWI_EXT.1.
9.1.1.1 Active PSD Connections
The TOE ensures that data flows only between the connected computer and the
display peripheral. No data transits the TOE when the TOE is powered off, or
when the TOE is in a failure state. A failure state occurs when the TOE fails a
self-test when powering on.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI.
9.1.1.2 Connected Computer Interfaces
The TOE is connected to the computer video port using a video cable supporting
DisplayPort, HDMI or DVI-D.
There are no wireless interfaces or additional external interfaces
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_PDC_EXT.1.
9.1.1.3 Residual Information Protection
The Letter of Volatility is included as Annex A.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_RIP_EXT.1.
Video Functionality
Video data flow is comprised of unidirectional Extended Display Identification
Data (EDID) and video data flow path and goes from the TOE computer video
interface to the TOE peripheral device display interface. Figure 3 shows a data
flow during the display EDID read function.
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Figure 3 – Display EDID Read Function
An EDID read event only occurs when the user clicks the EDID LOCK button. The
video controller reads the EDID content from the display device to verify that it
is valid and usable. For this, Switch 1 is closed, and Switch 2 and Switch 3 are
open. If data is not valid, TOE operation will cease and wait for the display
peripheral to be changed.
In the next step, Switch 1 and Switch 3 are open, and Switch 2 is closed. The
video controller writes the EDID content into the emulated EDID Electrically
Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM) chip.
The video controller uses the Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2
C) lines to write to the
emulated EDID EEPROM chip. Once the write operation is complete, the video
controller switches to normal operating mode. In this mode, Switch 1 and Switch
2 are closed, and Switch 3 is open.
In the normal operation mode, the Emulated EDID EEPROM chip is switched to
the computer to enable reading of the EDID information. The write protect
switch (Switch 2) is switched to protected mode (i.e. it is closed) to prevent any
attempt to write to the EEPROM or to transmit MCCS commands.
In normal mode, the power to the emulated EDID EEPROM is received from the
computer through the video cable.
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During TOE normal operation, any attempt by the connected computer to affect
the EDID channel is blocked by the architecture.
The EDID function is emulated by an independent emulation EEPROM chip. This
chip reads content from the connected display once during TOE power up. Any
subsequent change to the display peripheral will be ignored.
The TOE will reject any display device that does not present valid EDID content.
A Light Emitting Diode (LED) on the rear panel of the TOE will indicate a rejected
display device.
The TOE supports DisplayPort versions 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, DVI-D and HDMI 2.0:
• For DisplayPort connections, the TOE video function filters the AUX
channel by converting it to I2
C EDID only. DisplayPort video is converted
into an HDMI video stream, and the I2
C EDID lines connected to the
emulated EDID EEPROM functions as shown in the figures above. This
allows EDID to be passed from the display to the computer (as described
above), and allows Hot-Plug Detection (HPD) and Link Training
information to pass through the TOE. AUX channel threats are mitigated
through the conversion from DisplayPort to HDMI protocols. Traffic types
including USB, Ethernet, MCCS, and EDID write from the computer to the
display are blocked by the TOE. High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection
(HDCP) and Consumer Electronics Control (CEC) functions are not
connected.
o DisplayPort is supported for video input and video output on the
FV11PH-M and FV11PP-MM device.
o DisplayPort is supported for video input on the FV11PH-MM device.
o DisplayPort is supported for video output on the FV11HP-MM
device.
• For DVI-D connections, EDID information is allowed to pass from the
display to the computer, as described above. HPD information is also
allowed to pass. Other protocols, including Audio Return Channel (ARC),
EDID from the computer to the display, HDMI Ethernet and Audio Return
Channel (HEAC), HDMI Ethernet Channel (HEC) and MCCS are blocked.
HDCP and Consumer Electronics Control (CEC) functions are not
connected.
o DVI-D is supported for video input and video output on the FV11D-
M device.
• For HDMI connections, EDID information is allowed to pass from the
display to the computer, as described above. HPD information is also
allowed to pass. Other protocols, including Audio Return Channel (ARC),
EDID from the computer to the display, HDMI Ethernet and Audio Return
Channel (HEAC), and HDMI Ethernet Channel (HEC) are blocked. HDCP
and Consumer Electronics Control (CEC) functions are not connected.
o HDMI is supported for video input and video output on the FV11H-
M, FV11PH-M, and FV11HH-MM devices.
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o HDMI is supported for video input on the FV11HP-MM device.
o HDMI is supported for video output on the FV11PH-MM device.
The TOE video function blocks MCCS write transactions through the emulated
EDID EEPROM. The emulated EEPROM supports only EDID read transactions.
Following a failed self-test, or when the TOE is powered off, all video input
signals are isolated from the video output interface by the active video re-driver.
The Emulated EDID EEPROM may still operate since it is powered by the
computer.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_IPC_EXT.1,
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP, FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DVI-D, FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI.
9.1.2.1 Video Compatible Device Types
The TOE accepts any DisplayPort, DVI-D or HDMI display device at the video
peripheral ports as shown in Table 2. The TOE does not support a wireless
connection to a video display.
The TOE utilizes a fixed EDID file installed on the device during production and
stored within non-volatile memory in the TOE. The TOE does not provide an
interface to modify the fixed EDID file stored on the device. On the FV11H-M,
FV11D-M, FV11PH-M Isolator models, the user can click the EDID LOCK button
on the device to run an EDID capture from the display.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FDP_PDC_EXT.1,
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI, FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(1), FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(2),
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(3), FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(4).
9.2 PROTECTION OF THE TSF
No Access to TOE
Connected computers do not have access to TOE firmware or memory, with the
following exceptions:
• EDID data is accessible to connected computers from the TOE.
All of the TOE microcontrollers run from internal protected flash memory.
Firmware cannot be updated from an external source. Firmware cannot be read
or rewritten through the use of Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) tools. Firmware is
executed on Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) with the appropriate
protections to prevent external access and tampering of code or stacks.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FPT_NTA_EXT.1.
Passive Anti-tampering Functionality
The Isolator enclosure was designed specifically to prevent physical tampering.
It features a stainless-steel welded chassis and panels that prevent external
access through bending or brute force.
The Mini Isolator features a plastic welded chassis.
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Additionally, each device is fitted with one or more holographic Tampering
Evident Labels placed at critical locations on the TOE enclosure. If the label is
removed, the word ‘VOID’ appears on both the label and the product surface.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FPT_PHP.1.
TSF Testing
The TOE performs a self-test at initial start-up. The self-test runs independently
at each microcontroller and performs a verification check of the integrity of the
microcontroller firmware.
If the self-test fails, the LED on the front panel blinks to indicate the failure. The
TOE remains in a disabled state until the self-test is rerun and passes.
TOE Security Functional Requirements addressed: FPT_FLS_EXT.1, FPT_TST.1,
FPT_TST_EXT.1.
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10TERMINOLOGY AND ACRONYMS
10.1 TERMINOLOGY
The following terminology is used in this ST:
Term Description
AUX AUX refers to the auxiliary channel, particularly as it applies to
the DisplayPort protocol.
VI VI refers to the requirements for Video/Display Devices.
Table 14 – Terminology
10.2 ACRONYMS
The following acronyms are used in this ST:
Acronym Definition
ARC Audio Return Channel
CC Common Criteria
CEC Consumer Electronics Control
DVI Digital Visual Interface
EDID Extended Display Identification Data
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
HDCP High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection
HDMI High-Definition Multimedia Interface
HEAC HDMI Ethernet and Audio Return Channel
HEC HDMI Ethernet Channel
HPD Hot-Plug Detection
HSL High Sec Labs
I2
C Inter-Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
JTAG Joint Test Action Group
LED Light Emitting Diode
MCCS Monitor Control Command Set
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Acronym Definition
PP Protection Profile
PSD Peripheral Sharing Device
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SRAM Static Random Access Memory
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
USB Universal Serial Bus
Table 15 – Acronyms
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11REFERENCES
Identifier Title
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation –
• Part 1: Introduction and General Model, CCMB‐2017‐
04‐001, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
• Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB‐2017‐
04‐002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
• Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB‐2017‐
04‐003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, CCMB‐2017‐04‐004,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[PP_PSD_V4.0] Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, Version: 4.0,
2019‐07‐19
[MOD_VI_1.0] PP‐Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July
2019
[CFG_PSD‐VI_V1.0] PP‐Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device and
Video/Display Devices, 19 July 2019
Table 16 – References
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ANNEX A – LETTER OF VOLATILITY
The table below provides volatility information and memory types for the High Sec Labs Peripheral Sharing Devices. User data is
not retained in any TOE device when the power is turned off.
Product
Model
Number
in each
product
Function,
Manufacturer
and Part
Number
Storage Type Size Power Source (if
not the TOE)
Volatility Contains User
Data
Isolators:
FV11H-M
FV11D-M
FV11PH-M
FV11HH-MM
FV11HP-MM
FV11PH-MM
FV11PP-MM
1 Video Controller:
ST Microelectronics
STM32F070C6T6
Embedded SRAM1
6KB Connected computer Volatile No user data
Embedded Flash2
32KB Non-
Volatile
No user data
Embedded EEPROM 4KB Non-
Volatile
No user data
1 EDID Emulators:
ST Microelectronics
M24C02-WMN6TP
EEPROM3
2KB Non-
Volatile
No user data
Notes:
1
SRAM stores USB Host stack parameters and up to the last 4 key-codes. Data is erased during power off of the device. Device emulators
receive power from the individual connected computers and therefore devices are powered on as long as the associated computer is powered on
and connected.
2
Flash storage is used to store firmware code. It contains no user data. Flash storage is permanently locked by fuses after initial programming
to prevent rewriting. It is an integral part of the ST Microcontroller together with SRAM and EEPROM.
3
EEPROM is used to store operational parameters, such as display Plug & Play, and contains no user data.