Australian Information Security Evaluation
Program
Certification Report
Juniper Networks Junos OS 22.3R1 for
QFX5200-32C, QFX5110-48S, QFX5110-
32Q, QFX5120-48T, QFX5120-48Y,
QFX5120-32C, QFX5210-64C, QFX5200-48Y
and EX4650-48Y
Version 1.0, 17 October 2024
Document reference: AISEP-CC-CR-2024-EFT-T033-CR-V1.0
(Certification expires five years from certification report date)
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Table of contents
Executive summary 1
Introduction 2
Overview 2
Purpose 2
Identification 2
Target of Evaluation 4
Overview 4
Description of the TOE 4
TOE Functionality 4
TOE physical boundary 4
Architecture 5
Clarification of scope 6
Evaluated functionality 6
Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware 6
Non-evaluated functionality and services 6
Security 6
Secure delivery 7
Installation of the TOE 7
Version verification 8
Documentation and guidance 8
Secure usage 8
Evaluation 9
Overview 9
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Evaluation procedures 9
Functional testing 9
Entropy testing 9
Penetration testing 9
Certification 9
Overview 10
Assurance 10
Certification result 10
Recommendations 10
Annex A – References and abbreviations 10
References 12
Abbreviations 12
1
Executive summary
This report describes the findings of the IT security evaluation of Juniper Networks Junos OS 22.3R1 for QFX5200-32C,
QFX5110-48S, QFX5110-32Q, QFX5120-48T, QFX5120-48Y, QFX5120-32C, QFX5210-64C, QFX5200-48Y and EX4650-48Y
appliances against Common Criteria approved Protection Profile (PP).
The variants of the TOE are secure network devices which protect themselves largely by offering only a minimal logical
interface to the network and the attached nodes. It is a purpose built platform that does not provide any general-
purpose computing capabilities. The TOE implements both management and control functions as well as all IP routing.
This report concludes that the Target of Evaluation (TOE) has complied with the following PP [4]:
 collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2E, 23 March 2020 (NDcPP)
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria and the requirements of the Australian
Information Security Evaluation Program (AISEP). The evaluation was performed by Teron Labs with the final Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR) submitted on 04 October 2024.
With regard to the secure operation of the TOE, the Australian Certification Authority recommends that administrators:
 ensure that the TOE is operated in the evaluated configuration and that assumptions concerning the TOE security
environment are fulfilled
 configure and operate the TOE according to the vendor’s product administrator guidance and pay attention to all
security warnings
 maintain the underlying environment in a secure manner so that the integrity of the TOE Security Function is
preserved
 verify the hash of any downloaded software, as present on the https://www.juniper.net website
 the system auditor should review the audit trail generated and exported by the TOE periodically
Potential purchasers of the TOE should review the intended operational environment and ensure that they are
comfortable that the stated security objectives for the operational environment can be suitably addressed.
This report includes information about the underlying security policies and architecture of the TOE, and information
regarding the conduct of the evaluation.
It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that the TOE meets their requirements. For this reason, it is recommended
that a prospective user of the TOE refer to the Security Target [7] and read this Certification Report prior to deciding
whether to purchase the product.
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Introduction
Overview
This chapter contains information about the purpose of this document and how to identify the Target of Evaluation
(TOE).
Purpose
The purpose of this Certification Report is to:
 report the certification of results of the IT security evaluation of the TOE against the requirements of the Common
Criteria [1,2,3] and Protection Profile [4]
 provide a source of detailed security information about the TOE for any interested parties.
This report should be read in conjunction with the TOE’s Security Target [7], which provides a full description of the
security requirements, and specifications that were used as the basis of the evaluation.
Identification
The TOE is Junos OS 22.3R1 for QFX5200-32C, QFX5110-48S, QFX5110-32Q, QFX5120-48T, QFX5120-48Y, QFX5120-32C,
QFX5210-64C, QFX5200-48Y and EX4650-48Y.
Description Version
Evaluation scheme Australian Information Security Evaluation Program
TOE Junos OS 22.3R1 for QFX5200-32C, QFX5110-48S, QFX5110-32Q,
QFX5120-48T, QFX5120-48Y, QFX5120-32C, QFX5210-64C, QFX5200-
48Y and EX4650-48Y
Software version v22.3R1
Hardware platforms QFX5200-32C, QFX5110-48S, QFX5110-32Q, QFX5120-48T, QFX5120-
48Y, QFX5120-32C, QFX5210-64C, QFX5200-48Y and EX4650-48Y
Security Target Security Target Junos OS 22.3R1 for QFX5200-32C, QFX5110-48S,
QFX5110-32Q, QFX5120-48T, QFX5120-48Y, QFX5120-32C, QFX5210-
64C, QFX5200-48Y and EX4650-48Y , Version 1.0, 05 August 2024
Evaluation Technical Report Evaluation Technical Report 1.1, dated 4 October 2024
Document reference EFT-T033-ETR 1.1
Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2
Extended and Part 3 Conformant, April 2017, Version 3.1 Rev 5
3
Methodology Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, April 2017
Version 3.1 Rev 5
Conformance Network Device collaborative Protection Profile version 2.2e, 23 March
2020 (NDcPP)
Developer Juniper Networks, Inc. 1133 Innovation Way, Sunnyvale California
94089 United States of America
Evaluation facility Teron Labs
Unit 3, 10 Geils Court
Deakin ACT 2600
Australia
4
Target of Evaluation
Overview
This chapter contains information about the Target of Evaluation (TOE), including a description of functionality
provided, its architectural components, the scope of evaluation, its security policies and its secure usage.
Description of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) are the Juniper Networks, Inc. QFX5200-32C, QFX5110-48S, QFX5110-32Q, QFX5120-
48T, QFX5120-48Y, QFX5120-32C, QFX5210-64C, QFX5200-48Y and EX4650-48Y Ethernet Switches executing the Junos
OS 22.3R1 software as a complete appliance of hardware and software.
The variants of the TOE are grouped by equivalency, share a common architecture and feature set. They implement a
variety of high-speed interfaces (only Ethernet is in the scope of the evaluation) for enterprise branch, campus, and
data center networks. They also share common Junos firmware, features, and technology for compatibility across
platforms.
The appliance variations constituting the TOE are secure network devices that protect themselves largely by offering
only a minimal logical interface to the network and attached nodes. They include the Junos OS firmware Junos OS
22.3R1, which is a special purpose OS offering no general-purpose computing capabilities. Junos OS implements both
management and control functions as well as all IP routing.
The TOE allows multiple interconnected switches to operate as a single, logical unit, enabling users to manage all
platforms as one virtual device. The functions of the appliances are managed through the Junos firmware, either from a
connected terminal console or via a network connection. Network management is secured using the SSH protocol. All
management, whether from a user connecting to a terminal or from the network, requires successful authentication. In
the evaluated deployment the TOE is managed and configured via Command Line Interface, either via a directly
connected console or over the network secured using the SSH protocol.
The TOE supports the definition and enforcement of information flow policies among network nodes. Each information
flow from one network node to another passes through an instance of the TOE. Information flows are controlled based
on network node addresses and protocols. The TOE also ensures that security-relevant activity is audited and provides
the necessary tools to manage all the security functions.
The variants of the TOE are appliances that are physically self-contained, housing the software and hardware necessary
to perform all routing and switching functions. The architecture components of the TOE are the Routing Engine
implementing routing and switching services while also providing a network management interface for the
configuration and operation of the TOE. The Packet Forwarding Engine implement transit packet forwarding operations.
The power supply connects to the midplane of the TOE, distributing different voltage outputs to the appliance
components, depending on the voltage requirements needed. The switch fabric boards provide a scalable, non-blocking
central matrix for all network data passing through the TOE.
TOE Functionality
The TOE functionality that was evaluated is described in section 1.5 of the Security Target [7].
TOE physical boundary
The TOE is the Junos OS 22.3R1 firmware running on the appliance chassis listed in the table below. The TOE is
contained within the physical boundary of the specified appliance chassis.
5
The physical boundary of the TOE is the entire chassis of the appliance platform, and includes both the hardware and
software of the network device. The TOE is the Junos OS 22.3R1 software running on the appliance chassis listed in the
table above. This includes the firmware implementing the Routing Engine and the ASICs implementing the Packet
Forwarding Engine. Hence the TOE is contained within the physical boundary of the specified appliance chassis. The
install package for the QFX models is jinstall-host-qfx-5e-x86-64-22.3R1.11.tgz. The install package for the EX4650-48Y
is jinstall-host-ex-4e-x86-64-22.3R1.11.tgz.
The physical boundary for QFX5200-32C, QFX5110-48S, QFX5110-32Q, QFX5120-48T, QFX5120-48Y, QFX5120-32C,
QFX5210-64C, QFX5200-48Y and EX4650-48Y is shown in the figure below.
The TOE interfaces comprise the following:
 network interfaces which pass traffic on connected network nodes
 management interface which handles administrative actions.
Architecture
Each instance of the TOE consists of the following major architectural components:
 Switch fabric – the switch fabric boards provide a highly scalable, non-blocking, centralized switch fabric matrix
through which all network data passes.
 Routing Engine (Control Board) – the Routine Engine (RE) runs the Junos firmware and implements Layer 3 routing
services and Layer 2 switching services. The RE also implements the management functions for configuration and
operation of the TOE and controls the flow of information through the TOE, including support for appliance
interface control and control plane functions such as chassis component, system management and user access to
the appliance.
 Layer 2 switching services, Layer 3 switching/routing services and network management for all operations
necessary for the configuration and operation of the TOE and controls the flow of information through the TOE.
 Packet Forwarding Engine (PFE) – The PFE implements all operations necessary for transit packet forwarding. The
line cards implement an extensive set of Layer 2 and Layer 3 services that can be deployed in any combination of
L2- L3 applications.
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 Power –The power supplies connect to the midplane, which distributes the different output voltages produced by
the power supplies to the appliance components, depending on their voltage requirements.
The Routing Engine and the Packet Forwarding Engine perform their primary tasks independently, while constantly
communicating through a high-speed internal link. This enables streamlined forwarding and routing control and the
capability to run Internet-scale networks at high speeds
The functions of the TOE can be managed using a Command Line Interface (CLI) implemented by the Junos OS. The CLI
may be accessed from a connected terminal console or via a network connection secured by the SSH Protocol. All
management accesses require successful authentication. The TOE implements measures to prevent access by the
parties not successfully authenticated and to make it difficult for unauthorized parties to gain access to the CLI.
Clarification of scope
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria and associated methodologies.
The scope of the evaluation was limited to those claims made in the Security Target [7].
Evaluated functionality
Functional tests performed during the evaluation were taken from the Protection Profile [4] and Supporting Document
[13] and sufficiently demonstrate the security functionality of the TOE. Some of the tests were combined for ease of
execution.
Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
The TOE relies on the provision of the following items in the network environment:
 Syslog server supporting SSHv2 connections to send audit logs
 SSHv2 client for remote administration
 serial connection client for local administration
Non-evaluated functionality and services
Potential users of the TOE are advised that some functions and services have not been evaluated as part of the
evaluation. Potential users of the TOE should carefully consider their requirements for using functions and services
outside of the evaluated configuration.
Australian Government users should refer to the Australian Government Information Security Manual [5] for policy
relating to using an evaluated product in an unevaluated configuration.
The following components are considered outside of the scope of the TOE:
 use of telnet, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set
 use of File Transfer Protocol, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set
 use of Simple Network Management Protocol, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set
 use of Secure Sockets Layer, including management via J-Web, JUNOScript and JUNOScope, since it violates the
Trusted Path requirement set
 use of Command Line Interface account super-user and Linux root account.
7
 MACsec is not included in the scope of the evaluation.
Security
The TOE Security Policy is a set of rules that defines the required security behaviour of the TOE; how information within
the TOE is managed and protected. The Security Target [7] contains the functionality that is to be evaluated.
Secure delivery
There are several mechanisms provided in the delivery process to ensure that a customer receives a product that has
not been tampered with. The customer should perform the following checks upon receipt of a device to verify the
integrity of the platform:
 shipping label - Ensure that the shipping label correctly identifies the correct customer name and address as well
as the device
 outside packaging - Inspect the outside shipping box and tape. Ensure that the shipping tape has not been cut or
otherwise compromised. Ensure that the box has not been cut or damaged to allow access to the device
 inside packaging - Inspect the plastic bag and seal. Ensure that the bag is not cut or removed. Ensure that the seal
remains intact.
If the customer identifies a problem during the inspection, they should immediately contact the supplier providing the
order number, tracking number and a description of the identified problem to the supplier.
Additionally, there are several checks that can be performed to ensure that the customer has received a box sent by
Juniper Networks and not a different company masquerading as Juniper Networks. The customer should perform the
following checks upon receipt of a device to verify the authenticity of the device:
 verify that the device was ordered using a purchase order. Juniper Networks devices are never shipped without a
purchase order
 when a device is shipped, a shipment notification is sent to the e-mail address provided by the customer when the
order is taken. Verify that this e-mail notification was received and contains the following information:
 purchase order number
 Juniper Networks order number used to track the shipment
 carrier tracking number used to track the shipment
 list of items shipped including serial numbers
 address and contacts of both the supplier and the customer
 verify that the shipment was initiated by Juniper Network, performing the following tasks:
 compare the carrier tracking number of the Juniper Networks order number listed in the Juniper Networks
shipping notification with the tracking number on the package received
 log on to the Juniper Networks online customer support portal at
https://www.juniper.net/customers/csc/management to view the order status
 compare the carrier tracking number or the Juniper Networks order number listed in the Juniper Networks
shipment notification with the tracking number on the package received.
Installation of the TOE
The Configuration Guides [6] contains all relevant information for the secure configuration of the TOE.
8
Version verification
The verification of the TOE is largely automatic, including the verification using hashes. The TOE cannot load a modified
image. Valid software images can be downloaded from https://www.juniper.net. In addition to the automated
verification, the site includes individual hashes for each image. The administrator should verify the hash of the software
before installing it into the hardware platform.
Security Administrators are able to query the current version of the TOE firmware using the CLI command ‘show
version’.
Documentation and guidance
It is important that the TOE is used in accordance with guidance documentation in order to ensure secure usage. The
following documentation is available to the consumer when the TOE is purchased. The evaluated configuration guide
(System Admin Guide) document for the QFX model devices and EX4650-48Y running Junos OS 22.3R1 are available for
download at https://www.juniper.net/documentation. The title is:
 Junos® OS Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for EX4650-48Y, QFX5110-32Q, QFX5110-48S,
QFX5120-32C, QFX5120-48T, QFX5120-48Y, QFX5120-48YM, QFX5200-32C, QFX5200-48Y, and QFX5210-64C
Devices, Release 22.3R1, Date 2024-09-10 [6].
All Common Criteria guidance material is available at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Australian Government Information Security Manual is available at https://www.cyber.gov.au/ism [5].
Secure usage
The evaluation of the TOE took into account certain assumptions about its operational environment. These
assumptions must hold in order to ensure the security objectives of the TOE are met.
The network device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not subject to physical
attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere with the device’s physical interconnections and correct
operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains.
The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not provide functionality/services
that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For example, the device should not provide a computing platform
for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking functionality).
The administrator(s) for the network device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the
organisation. This includes being appropriately trained, following policy and adhering to guidance documentation.
Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy. The network device is
not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise
the security of the device.
The network device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an administrator on a regular basis in response
to the release of product updates due to known security vulnerabilities.
The administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the network device are protected by the platform on which
they reside.
The administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorised access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g.
cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded
or removed from its operational environment.
It is assumed that the TOE is connected to distinct networks in a manner that ensures that the TOE security policies will
be enforced on all applicable network traffic flowing among the attached networks.
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Evaluation
Overview
This chapter contains information about the procedures used in conducting the evaluation, the testing conducted as
part of the evaluation and the certification result.
Evaluation procedures
The criteria against which the Target of Evaluation (TOE) has been evaluated are contained in the relevant Protection
Profile [4] and Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Revision 5, Parts 2 and 3 [1,
2].
Testing methodology was drawn from Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, April 2017 Version
3.1 Revision 5 [3] and the relevant Supporting Document [12].
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the operational procedures of the Australian Information Security
Evaluation Program [10].
In addition, the conditions outlined in the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field
of Information Technology Security [9] and the document CC and CEM addenda, Exact Conformance, Selection-Based
SFRs, Optional SFRs [13] were also upheld.
Functional testing
All functional tests performed by the evaluators were taken from the Protection Profile [4] and Supporting Document
[12]. The tests were designed to provide the required testing coverage for the security functions claimed by the TOE.
Entropy testing
The entropy design description, justification, operation and health tests are assessed and documented in a separate
report [11].
Penetration testing
The evaluators performed the evaluation activities for vulnerability assessment specified by the NDcPP Supporting
Document [12] which follow a flaw hypothesis methodology. Accordingly, four types of flaw hypotheses have been
considered:
 Type 1 - public vulnerabilities
 Type 2 - ND-iTC (Network international Technical Community) sourced
 Type 3 - evaluation team generated
 Type 4 - tool generated.
The evaluators conducted a review of public vulnerability databases and technical community sources to determine
potential flaw hypotheses using searches that include TOE device name and components, protocols supported by the
TOE and terms relating to the device type of the TOE. These searches were conducted up to the 16 April 2024
coinciding with the conclusion of the evaluation. There was no identifiable Type 2 hypotheses for this evaluation.
The evaluation team devised one test to check a potential vulnerability within the TOE’s boot process. The evaluation
team also conducted tool-generated vulnerability testing of the TOE as per the Supporting Document [12]
10
Based on the results of this testing, the evaluators determined that the TOE is resistant to an attacker possessing a
basic attack potential.
Certification
Overview
This chapter contains information about the result of the certification, an overview of the assurance provided and
recommendations made by the certifiers.
Assurance
This certification is focused on the evaluation of product compliance with Protection Profile that cover the technology
area of network devices. Organisations can have confidence that the scope of an evaluation against an ASD-approved
Protection Profile covers the necessary security functionality expected of the evaluated product and known threats will
have been addressed.
The analysis is supported by testing as outlined in the PP Supporting Document and a vulnerability survey
demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with a basic attack potential. Compliance also provides assurance
through evidence of secure delivery procedures. Certification is not a guarantee of freedom from security
vulnerabilities.
The effectiveness and integrity of cryptographic functions are also within the scope of product evaluations performed
in line with the Protection Profile (PP). PP provides assurance by providing a full Security Target, and an analysis of the
Security Functional Requirements in that Security Target, guidance documentation, and a basic description of the
architecture of the TOE.
Certification result
Teron Labs has determined that the TOE upholds the claims made in the Security Target [7] and has met the
requirements of the Protection Profiles NDcPP V2.2E [4].
After due consideration of the conduct of the evaluation as reported to the certifiers, and of the Evaluation Technical
Report [8], the Australian Certification Authority certifies the evaluation of the Juniper Junos OS 22.3R1 for QFX5200-
32C, QFX5110-48S, QFX5110-32Q, QFX5120-48T, QFX5120-48Y, QFX5120-32C, QFX5210-64C, QFX5200-48Y and
EX4650-48Y performed by the Australian Information Security Evaluation Facility, Teron Labs.
The Australian Certification Authority certifies that the Security Target [7] have met the requirements of the Network
Device Protection Profile.
Recommendations
Not all of the evaluated functionality present in the TOE may be suitable for Australian Government users. For further
guidance, Australian Government users should refer to the Australian Government Information Security Manual [5].
In addition to ensuring that the assumptions concerning the operational environment are fulfilled, and the guidance
document is followed, the Australian Certification Authority also recommends that users and administrators:
 ensure that the TOE is operated in the evaluated configuration and that assumptions concerning the TOE security
environment are fulfilled
 configure and operate the TOE according to the vendor’s product administrator guidance and pay attention to all
security warnings
11
 maintain the underlying environment in a secure manner so that the integrity of the TOE Security Function is
preserved
 verify the hash of any downloaded software, as present on the https://www.juniper.net website
 the system auditor should review the audit trail generated and exported by the TOE periodically.
12
Annex A – References and abbreviations
References
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components April
2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components April
2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5
3. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, April 2017,
Version 3.1 Revision 5
4. Protection Profile:
a) collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP), Version 2.2E, 23 March 2020
5. Australian Government Information Security Manual: https://www.cyber.gov.au/ism
6. Guidance documentation: Junos® OS Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for EX4650-48Y,
QFX5110-32Q, QFX5110-48S, QFX5120-32C, QFX5120-48T, QFX5120-48Y, QFX5120-48YM, QFX5200-32C,
QFX5200-48Y, and QFX5210-64C Devices, Release 22.3R1, 10 September 2024
7. Security Target for Junos OS 22.3R1 for QFX5200-32C, QFX5110-48S, QFX5110-32Q, QFX5120-48T, QFX5120-
48Y, QFX5120-32C, QFX5210-64C, QFX5200-48Y and EX4650-48Y, Version 1.0, 05 August 2024
8. Evaluation Technical Report - Junos OS 22.3R1 for EX4650-48Y, QFX5110-32Q, QFX5110-48S, QFX5120-32C,
QFX5120-48T, QFX5120-48Y, QFX5200-32C, QFX5200-48Y, and QFX5210-64C, dated 4 October 2024
(Document reference EFT-T033-ETR 1.1)
9. Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of Information Technology
Security, 2 July 2014
10. AISEP Policy Manual (APM): https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-
03/2022_AUG_REL_AISEP_Policy_Manual_6.3.pdf
11. Entropy Documentation:
a) Junos OS Entropy Source version 22.3, Entropy Assessment and SP 800-90B Compliance Report, Junos
OS 22.3R1, Version 1.5, 30 August 2023
12. Protection Profile Supporting Document:
a) Supporting Document, Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, December 2019, version 2.2
(NDcPP-SD)
13. CC and CEM addenda, Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, Optional SFRs 30 September 2021, Version
2.0, CCDB-013-v2.0
13
Abbreviations
ACA Australian Certification Authority
AISEP Australian Information Security Evaluation Program
ASD Australian Signals Directorate
ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
MACsec Media Access Control security
NDcPP CCRA-approved collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices
ND-iTC Network International Technical Community
OS Operating System
PFE Packet Forwarding Engine
PP Protection Profile
RE Routing Engine
SSH Secure Shell
TOE Target of Evaluation