Australian Information Security
Evaluation Program
Certification Report
Juniper SSR Software v7.0.1 on Juniper
SSR120, SSR130, SSR1200, SSR1300,
SSR1400, SSR1500, and HPE ProLiant
DL345 Gen 11
Version 1.0, 30 March 2026
Document reference: AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T048-CR-V1.0
(Certification expires five years from certification report date)
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T048-CR-v1.0 ii
Table of contents
Executive Summary 1
Introduction 2
Overview 2
Purpose 2
Identification 2
Target of Evaluation 4
Overview 4
Description of the TOE 4
TOE Functionality 4
TOE Physical Boundary 4
Clarification of Scope 6
Security 7
Secure Delivery 7
Version Verification 8
Documentation and Guidance 8
Secure Usage 9
Evaluation 10
Overview 10
Evaluation Procedures 10
Functional Testing 10
Entropy Testing 10
Penetration Testing 10
Certification 12
Overview 12
Assurance 12
Certification Result 12
Recommendations 12
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T048-CR-v1.0 iii
Annex – References and Abbreviations 14
References 14
Abbreviations 15
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T048-CR-v1.0 1
Executive Summary
This report describes the findings of the IT security evaluation of Juniper Networks, Juniper SSR Software v7.0.1 on
Juniper SSR120, SSR130, SSR1200, SSR1300, SSR1400, SSR1500, and HPE ProLiant DL345 Gen 11 appliances against
Common Criteria approved Protection Profiles (PPs).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Juniper SSR Software v7.0.1 on Juniper SSR120, SSR130, SSR1200, SSR1300,
SSR1400, SSR1500, and HPE ProLiant DL345 Gen 11, which are Session Smart Routing (SSR) appliances, allowing the
development of agile, secure, and resilient applications and solutions with Wide Area Network (WAN) connections.
This report concludes that the TOE has complied with the following PPs [4]:
 collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version: 2.2e, 23 March 2020 (CPP_ND_V2.2E).
 PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.4 + Errata 20200625, 25 June 2020
(MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E).
Additionally, the above PPs are grouped together using certified PP-Configuration. This evaluation used the following
PP-Configuration [4]:
 PP-Configuration for Network Device and Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.4 +Errata20200625, 25 June
2020 (CFG_NDcPP-FW_V1.4E).
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria and the requirements of the Australian
Information Security Evaluation Program (AISEP). The evaluation was performed by Teron Labs with the final
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) submitted on 12 March 2026.
With regard to the secure operation of the TOE, the Australian Certification Authority recommends that
administrators:
 Review the intended operational environment and ensure that they are comfortable that the stated security
objectives for the operational environment can be suitably addressed.
 ensure that the TOE is operated in the evaluated configuration and that assumptions concerning the TOE
security environment are fulfilled
 configure and operate the TOE according to the vendor’s product administrator guidance and pay attention to
all security warnings
 maintain the underlying environment in a secure manner so that the integrity of the TOE Security Function is
preserved
 verify the hash of any downloaded software, as present on the https://www.juniper.net website
 the system auditor should review the audit trail generated and exported by the TOE periodically
 The ProLiant DL345 Gen11 platform was tested running on an AMD EPYC 9575F. If using other ProLiant DL345
Gen11 configurations, the algorithm assurance only covers CPUs from the same CPU family.
Potential purchasers of the TOE should review the intended operational environment and ensure that they are
comfortable that the stated security objectives for the operational environment can be suitably addressed.
This report includes information about the underlying security policies and architecture of the TOE, and information
regarding the conduct of the evaluation.
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T048-CR-v1.0 2
It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that the TOE meets their requirements. For this reason, it is recommended
that a prospective user of the TOE refer to the Security Target [8] and read this Certification Report prior to deciding
whether to purchase the product.
Introduction
Overview
This chapter contains information about the purpose of this document and how to identify the TOE.
Purpose
The purpose of this Certification Report is to:
 report the certification of results of the IT security evaluation of the TOE against the requirements of the
Common Criteria [1,2,3] and Protection Profiles [4]
 Provide a source of detailed security information about the TOE for any interested parties.
This report should be read in conjunction with the TOE’s Security Target [8] which provides a full description of the
security requirements and specifications that were used as the basis of the evaluation.
Identification
The TOE is Juniper SSR Software v7.0.1 on Juniper SSR120, SSR130, SSR1200, SSR1300, SSR1400, SSR1500, and HPE
ProLiant DL345 Gen 11.
Description Version
Evaluation scheme Australian Information Security Evaluation Program
TOE Juniper SSR Software v7.0.1 on Juniper SSR120, SSR130, SSR1200,
SSR1300, SSR1400, SSR1500, and HPE ProLiant DL345 Gen 11
Software version 7.0.1
Hardware platforms SSR120, SSR130, SSR1200, SSR1300, SSR1400, SSR1500 and HPE
ProLiant DL345 Gen 11
Security Target Security Target Juniper SSR Software v7.0.1 on Juniper SSR120, SSR130,
SSR1200, SSR1300, SSR1400, SSR1500, and HPE ProLiant DL345 Gen 11,
Version 1.0, 04 March 2026
Evaluation Technical Report Evaluation Technical Report 1.0, dated 12 March 2026
Document reference EFT-T048-ETR 1.0
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T048-CR-v1.0 3
Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2
Extended and Part 3 Conformant, April 2017, Version 3.1 Rev 5
Methodology Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, April 2017
Version 3.1 Rev 5
Conformance  collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version: 2.2e,
23 March 2020 (CPP_ND_V2.2E).
 PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.4 + Errata
20200625, 25 June 2020 (MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E).
 PP-Configuration for Network Device and Stateful Traffic Filter
Firewalls, Version 1.4 +Errata20200625, 25 June 2020 (CFG_NDcPP-
FW_V1.4E).
Developer Juniper Networks, Inc.
Evaluation facility Teron Labs
Level 2, 14 Moore St,
Canberra ACT 2601
Australia
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T048-CR-v1.0 4
Target of Evaluation
Overview
This chapter contains information about the Target of Evaluation (TOE), including a description of functionality
provided, its architectural components, the scope of evaluation, its security policies and its secure usage.
Description of the TOE
The TOE is the Juniper SSR Software v7.0.1 on Juniper SSR120, SSR130, SSR1200, SSR1300, SSR1400, SSR1500, and HPE
ProLiant DL345 Gen 11, which are Session Smart Routing (SSR) appliances, allowing the development of agile, secure,
and resilient applications and solutions with Wide Area Network (WAN) connections.
Each TOE variant includes the same software and may be provisioned and configured by the user to be a Session
Smart Router (in short: Router) or a Session Smart Conductor (in short: Conductor). The TOE configured as a Router
implements the data plane and control plane functions of the TOE and performs most functions. The TOE configured
as a Conductor implements a centralized management and policy engine allowing provisioning and management of
several Routers. A Conductor also acts as an information aggregation repository.
The TOE implements all security functions of a network device. It also implements a stateful traffic filtering firewall to
guard access to the protected network. Instances of the TOE configured as Routers are deployed in various data
centres, branches, and other facilities to protect the network connection. The Routers are associated to one or more
instances of TOE configured as Conductors for information aggregation, life-cycle management, and configuration
management. The Conductor may additionally be connected to other services to utilize the collected information.
TOE Functionality
The TOE functionality that was evaluated is described in section 1.4 of the Security Target [8].
TOE Physical Boundary
The physical boundary of the TOE includes all hardware and software parts and the security guidance of the TOE. The
parts of the TOE included in the physical boundary are detailed in Table 1.
Part of the TOE Identification Description
TOE Hardware SSR120, SSR130, SSR1200, SSR1300,
SSR1400, SSR1500 and HPE ProLiant
DL345 Gen 11
The hardware platform and the casing of the
TOE. Includes the processor, the memories,
and the persistent storage.
TOE Software Juniper SSR Software v7.0.1 The SSR-OS included in the TOE is Juniper SSR
Software v7.0.1. TOE software is distributed as
the following installation package:
 SSR-7.0.1-1.r1.el9.x86_64.ibu-v1.iso
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T048-CR-v1.0 5
Security Guidance SSR v7.0.1 Common Criteria Install
and Configuration v1.0
The Common Criteria Guidance supplement for
the TOE. The security guidance is distributed as
a document in PDF format.
Table 1 -Parts Included in the physical boundary of the TOE
TOE Hardware is the platform on which the TOE Software is executed. Only the platforms identified in Table 1 are
included in the evaluation. The technical characteristics of the hardware platforms are summarized in Table 2.
Platform CPU Microprocessor Networking
Juniper SSR120 4-Core Intel Atom C3558 Denverton 1 x RJ45 Console Port
4 x 1 GbE Ethernet Ports
2 x 1 GbE RJ-45/SFP Combo Ports
Juniper SSR130 8-Core Intel Atom C3758 Denverton 1 x RJ45 Console Port
6 x 1 GbE Ethernet Ports
2 x 1 GbE RJ-45/SFP Combo Ports
Juniper
SSR1200
8-Core AMD EPYC 3251 Snowy Owl 1 x RJ45 Console Port
1 x 1 GbE Management port
4 x 1/10 GbE SFP+ ports
7 x 1 GbE Ethernet ports
Juniper
SSR1300
16-Core Intel Xeon Gold
6208U
Cascade Lake 1 x RJ45 Console Port
1 x 1 GbE Management port
4 x 10 GbE SFP+ ports
4 x 1/10 GbE SFP+ ports
4 x 1 GbE Ethernet ports
Juniper
SSR1400
24-Core Intel Xeon Gold
6212U
Cascade Lake 1 x RJ45 Console Port
1 x 1 GbE Management port
4 x 10 GbE SFP+ ports
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T048-CR-v1.0 6
4 x 1/10/25 GbE SFP28 ports
4 x 1 GbE Ethernet ports
Juniper
SSR1500
64-Core AMD EPYC 7713P Milan 1 x RJ45 Console Port
1 x 1 GbE Management port
12 x 1/10/25 GbE SFP28 ports
4 x 1 GbE Ethernet ports
HPE ProLiant
DL345 Gen11
AMD EPYC 9575F EPYC None. Choice of OCP or stand-up card,
supporting NIC adapters BTO models pre-
selected with a primary networking card.
Table 2 - TOE Hardware Variants
Clarification of Scope
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria and associated methodologies.
The scope of the evaluation was limited to those claims made in the Security Target [8].
Evaluated Functionality
Functional tests performed during the evaluation were taken from the Protection Profiles [4] and Supporting
Documents [12] and sufficiently demonstrate the security functionality of the TOE. Some of the tests were combined
for ease of execution.
Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware
The TOE relies on the following external components to operate securely and as evaluated. These items are outside
the TOE boundary and must be present and correctly configured in the operational environment.
 Syslog server supporting SSHv2 connections to send audit logs
 SSHv2 client for remote administration
 Local administration or the remote management workstation is required but not part of the TOE
 NTP Server is not part of the TOE
 Audit server is mandatory but not part of TOE
 Hardware platforms not explicitly included in the physical scope of the TOE, even if Juniper or HPE branded
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T048-CR-v1.0 7
Non-evaluated Functionality and Services
Potential users of the TOE are advised that some functions and services have not been evaluated as part of the
evaluation. Potential users of the TOE should carefully consider their requirements for using functions and services
outside of the evaluated configuration.
Australian Government users should refer to the Australian Government Information Security Manual [5] for policy
relating to using an evaluated product in an unevaluated configuration.
The following components are considered outside of the scope of the TOE:
 use of Simple Network Management Protocol, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set
 REST API must only be used over HTTPS, not over HTTP
 VPN Gateway and IPsec are not included in the TOE
 Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) functions are not included
 TLS uses X.509 certificates which are verified and validated by the TOE but is not part of the TOE
 The Juniper MIST for the management of the TOE is not included.
Security Policy
The TOE Security Policy is a set of rules that defines the required security behaviour of the TOE; how information
within the TOE is managed and protected. The Security Target [8] contains a summary of the functionality that is
evaluated.
Secure Delivery
There are several mechanisms provided in the delivery process to ensure that a customer receives a product that has
not been tampered with. The customer should perform the following checks upon receipt of a device to verify the
integrity of the platform:
 shipping label - Ensure that the shipping label correctly identifies the correct customer name and address as well
as the device
 outside packaging - Inspect the outside shipping box and tape. Ensure that the shipping tape has not been cut or
otherwise compromised. Ensure that the box has not been cut or damaged to allow access to the device
 inside packaging - Inspect the plastic bag and seal. Ensure that the bag is not cut or removed. Ensure that the
seal remains intact.
If the customer identifies a problem during the inspection, they should immediately contact the supplier providing the
order number, tracking number and a description of the identified problem to the supplier.
Additionally, there are several checks that can be performed to ensure that the customer has received a box sent by
Juniper Networks and not a different company masquerading as Juniper Networks. The customer should perform the
following checks upon receipt of a device to verify the authenticity of the device:
 Verify that the device was ordered using a purchase order. Juniper Networks devices are never shipped without
a purchase order
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T048-CR-v1.0 8
 When a device is shipped, a shipment notification is sent to the e-mail address provided by the customer when
the order is taken. Verify that this e-mail notification was received and contains the following information:
 purchase order number
 Juniper Networks order number used to track the shipment
 carrier tracking number used to track the shipment
 list of items shipped including serial numbers
 address and contacts of both the supplier and the customer
 verify that the shipment was initiated by Juniper Network, performing the following tasks:
 compare the carrier tracking number of the Juniper Networks order number listed in the Juniper Networks
shipping notification with the tracking number on the package received
 log on to the Juniper Networks online customer support portal at
https://www.juniper.net/customers/csc/management to view the order status
 Compare the carrier tracking number or the Juniper Networks order number listed in the Juniper Networks
shipment notification with the tracking number on the package received.
Installation of the TOE
The Configuration Guides [6] contains all relevant information for the secure configuration of the TOE.
Version Verification
The verification of the TOE is largely automatic, including the verification using hashes. The TOE cannot load a
modified image. Valid software images can be downloaded from
https://www.juniper.net/documentation/us/en/software/session-smart-router/docs/intro_downloading_iso/. In
addition to the automated verification, the site includes individual hashes for each image. The administrator should
verify the hash of the software before installing it into the hardware platform.
Security Administrators are able to query the current version of the TOE firmware using the CLI command ‘show
version’.
Documentation and Guidance
It is important that the TOE is used in accordance with guidance documentation in order to ensure secure usage. The
following documentation is available to the consumer when the TOE is purchased. The evaluated configuration guide
(System Admin Guide) document for the Juniper SSR Software v7.0.1 on Juniper SSR120, SSR130, SSR1200, SSR1300,
SSR1400, SSR1500, and HPE ProLiant DL345 Gen 11is available for download at
https://www.juniper.net/documentation. The title is:
 SSR v7.0.1 Common Criteria Install and Configuration, Version 1.0, 03 March 2026 [6].
All Common Criteria guidance material is available at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org [1, 2, 3, 9, and 13].
The Australian Government Information Security Manual is available at https://www.cyber.gov.au/ism [5].
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T048-CR-v1.0 9
Secure Usage
The evaluation of the TOE took into account certain assumptions about its operational environment. These
assumptions must hold in order to ensure the security objectives of the TOE are met.
The network device is assumed to be physically secured within its operational environment, protected from physical
attacks that could compromise its security or interfere with its physical connections and correct operation. This level
of protection is expected to be sufficient to safeguard the device and the sensitive data it handles.
The TOE is expected to provide networking functionality as its primary purpose and should not offer any general-
purpose computing capabilities, such as running compilers or user applications unrelated to its networking functions.
This ensures that the device remains focused solely on its intended security and networking roles.
The network device's administrator(s) are assumed to be trustworthy, acting in the best interests of the organization’s
security. This includes being well-trained, adhering to established policies, and following all guidance documentation.
Administrators are responsible for ensuring that passwords and credentials used within the TOE are strong and
secure. The TOE is not expected to protect against a malicious administrator who deliberately seeks to bypass or
compromise its security features.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are expected to fully
validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into the
TOE’s trust store (aka 'root store', ' trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline
verification).
The TOE’s firmware and software are assumed to be regularly updated by an administrator, particularly in response to
newly discovered vulnerabilities. This ensures that the TOE remains protected against emerging threats.
The credentials (such as private keys) used by administrators to access the TOE must be securely protected on any
platform where they are stored. Administrators must also ensure that sensitive residual information, including
cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, and passwords, is not accessible to unauthorized individuals when
networking equipment is discarded or removed from service.
The TOE is assumed to be connected to distinct networks in a way that ensures its security policies are enforced on all
relevant network traffic flowing between these networks.
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T048-CR-v1.0 10
Evaluation
Overview
This chapter contains information about the procedures used in conducting the evaluation, the testing conducted as
part of the evaluation and the certification result.
Evaluation Procedures
The criteria against which the TOE has been evaluated are contained in the relevant Protection Profiles [4] and
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Revision 5, Parts 2 and 3 [1, 2].
Testing methodology was drawn from Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, April 2017 Version
3.1 Revision 5 [3] and relevant Supporting Documents [12].
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the operational procedures of the Australian Information Security
Evaluation Program [10].
In addition, the conditions outlined in the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field
of Information Technology Security [9] and the document CC and CEM addenda, Exact Conformance, Selection-Based
SFRs, Optional SFRs [13] were also upheld.
Functional Testing
All functional tests performed by the evaluators were taken from the Protection Profiles [4] and Supporting
Documents [12]. The tests were designed to provide the required testing coverage for the security functions claimed
by the TOE.
Entropy Testing
The entropy design description, justification, operation and health tests are assessed and documented in a separate
report [11].
Penetration Testing
The evaluators performed the evaluation activities for vulnerability assessment specified by the NDcPP Supporting
Document [12] that follow a flaw hypothesis methodology. Accordingly, four types of flaw hypotheses have been
considered:
 Type 1 - public vulnerabilities
 Type 2 - ND-iTC (Network international Technical Community) sourced
 Type 3 - evaluation team generated
 Type 4 - tool generated.
The evaluators conducted a review of public vulnerability databases and technical community sources to determine
potential flaw hypotheses using searches that include TOE device name and components, protocols supported by the
TOE and terms relating to the device type of the TOE. These searches were conducted up to the 09 December 2025
coinciding with the conclusion of the evaluation. There was no identifiable Type 2 hypotheses for this evaluation.
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T048-CR-v1.0 11
The evaluation team devised one test to check a potential vulnerability within the TOE’s boot process. The evaluation
team also conducted tool-generated vulnerability testing of the TOE as per the Supporting Document [12]
Based on the results of this testing, the evaluators determined that the TOE is resistant to an attacker possessing a
basic attack potential.
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T048-CR-v1.0 12
Certification
Overview
This chapter contains information about the result of the certification, an overview of the assurance provided and
recommendations made by the certifiers.
Assurance
This certification is focused on the evaluation of product compliance with Protection Profiles that cover the
technology area of network devices with added security functionality including stateful traffic filter firewall functions.
Organisations can have confidence that the scope of an evaluation against an ASD-approved Protection Profile covers
the necessary security functionality expected of the evaluated product and known threats will have been addressed.
The analysis is supported by testing as outlined in the PP Supporting Documents and Protection Profile Module
activities, and a vulnerability survey demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with a basic attack potential.
Compliance also provides assurance through evidence of secure delivery procedures. Certification is not a guarantee
of freedom from security vulnerabilities.
The effectiveness and integrity of cryptographic functions are also within the scope of product evaluations performed
in line with the Protection Profiles (PPs) [4]. PPs provide assurance by providing a full Security Target, and an analysis
of the Security Functional Requirements in that Security Target, guidance documentation, and a basic description of
the architecture of the TOE.
Certification Result
Teron Labs has determined that the TOE upholds the claims made in the Security Target [8] and has met the
requirements of the Protection Profiles CPP_ND_V2.2E [4.a], MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E [4.b] and PP configuration for
Network Device and Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls [4.c].
After due consideration of the conduct of the evaluation as reported to the certifiers, and of the Evaluation Technical
Report [7], the Australian Certification Authority certifies the evaluation of the Juniper SSR Software v7.0.1 on Juniper
SSR120, SSR130, SSR1200, SSR1300, SSR1400, SSR1500, and HPE ProLiant DL345 Gen 11 performed by the Australian
Information Security Evaluation Facility, Teron Labs.
The Australian Certification Authority certifies that the Security Target [8] have met the requirements of the Network
Device Protection Profiles [4].
Certification is not a guarantee of freedom from security vulnerabilities.
Recommendations
Not all of the evaluated functionality present in the TOE may be suitable for Australian Government users. For further
guidance, Australian Government users should refer to the Australian Government Information Security Manual [5].
In addition to ensuring that the assumptions concerning the operational environment are fulfilled, and the guidance
document is followed, the Australian Certification Authority also recommends that users and administrators:
 Review the intended operational environment and ensure that they are comfortable that the stated security
objectives for the operational environment can be suitably addressed.
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T048-CR-v1.0 13
 ensure that the TOE is operated in the evaluated configuration and that assumptions concerning the TOE
security environment are fulfilled
 configure and operate the TOE according to the vendor’s product administrator guidance and pay attention to
all security warnings
 maintain the underlying environment in a secure manner so that the integrity of the TOE Security Function is
preserved
 verify the hash of any downloaded software, as present on the https://www.juniper.net website
 the system auditor should review the audit trail generated and exported by the TOE periodically
 The ProLiant DL345 Gen11 platform was tested running on an AMD EPYC 9575F. If using other ProLiant DL345
Gen11 configurations, the algorithm assurance only covers CPUs from the same CPU family.
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T048-CR-v1.0 14
Annex – References and Abbreviations
References
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components April
2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components April
2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5
3. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, April 2017,
Version 3.1 Revision 5
4. Protection Profiles:
a) collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version: 2.2e, 23 March 2020 (CPP_ND_V2.2E).
b) PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.4 + Errata 20200625, 25 June 2020
(MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E).
c) PP-Configuration for Network Device and Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.4
+Errata20200625, 25 June 2020 (CFG_NDcPP-FW_V1.4E).
5. Australian Government Information Security Manual: https://www.cyber.gov.au/ism
6. SSR v7.0.1 Common Criteria Install and Configuration, Version 1.0, 03 March 2026.
7. Evaluation Technical Report Juniper SSR Software v7.0.1 on Juniper SSR120, SSR130, SSR1200, SSR1300,
SSR1400, SSR1500, and HPE ProLiant DL345 Gen 11 (Document reference EFT-T048-ETR 1.0)
8. Security Target for Juniper SSR Software v7.0.1 on Juniper SSR120, SSR130, SSR1200, SSR1300, SSR1400,
SSR1500, and HPE ProLiant DL345 Gen 11, Version 1.0, 04 March 2026.
9. Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of Information Technology
Security, 2 July 2014
10. AISEP Policy Manual (APM): ): https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-
03/2022_AUG_REL_AISEP_Policy_Manual_6.3.pdf
11. Entropy Documentation:
a) Entropy Assessment Report, Juniper SSR Software v7.0.1 on SSR120, SSR130, SSR1200, SSR1300,
SSR1400, SSR1500, and HPE ProLiant DL345 Gen11, Version 1.0, dated 02 December 2025.
12. Protection Profile Supporting Documents
a) Supporting Document, Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, December 2019, version 2.2
(CPP_ND_V2.2E_SD)
b) Supporting Document, Evaluation Activities for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls PP-Module, Version 1.4
+ Errata 20200625, June 2020 (MOD_CPP_FW _v1.4e_SD)
13. CC and CEM addenda, Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, Optional SFRs 30 September 2021, Version 2.0,
CCDB-013-v2.0
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T048-CR-v1.0 15
Abbreviations
AISEP Australian Information Security Evaluation Program
API Application programming interface
ASD Australian Signals Directorate
ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit
CA Certificate Authority
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CLI Command Line Interface
GbE Gigabit Ethernet
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
HPE Hewlett Packard Enterprise
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
NDcPP CCRA-approved collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices
NTP Network Time Protocol
PIN Personal Identification Number
PP Protection Profile
RJ-45 8-pin copper connection
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SSH Secure Shell
SSR Session Smart Router
SFP Small Form factor Pluggable
SFP+ enhanced Small Form factor Pluggable
TOE Target of Evaluation
VPN Virtual Private Network
Disclaimer
The material in this guide is of a general nature and should not be regarded as legal advice or relied on for assistance
in any particular circumstance or emergency situation. In any important matter, you should seek appropriate
independent professional advice in relation to your own circumstances.
The Commonwealth accepts no responsibility or liability for any damage, loss or expense incurred as a result of the
reliance on information contained in this guide.
Copyright
© Commonwealth of Australia 2026.
With the exception of the Coat of Arms, the Australian Signals Directorate logo and where otherwise stated, all
material presented in this publication is provided under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence
(www.creativecommons.org/licenses).
For the avoidance of doubt, this means this licence only applies to material as set out in this document.
The details of the relevant licence conditions are available on the Creative Commons website as is the full legal code
for the CC BY 4.0 licence (www.creativecommons.org/licenses).
Use of the Coat of Arms
The terms under which the Coat of Arms can be used are detailed on the Department of the Prime Minister and
Cabinet website (www.pmc.gov.au/government/commonwealth-coat-arms).
For more information, or to report a cyber security incident, contact us:
cyber.gov.au | 1300 CYBER1 (1300 292 371)