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Reference: 2023-9-INF-4307- v1
Target: Limitada al expediente
Date: 04.06.2024
Createdby:CERT10
Revisedby:CALIDAD
Approvedby:TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
Dossier # 2023-9
TOE Strong Customer Authentication for Apple Pay, on MacBook Air 2022 with M2
running macOS Ventura 13.3.1
Applicant 94-2404110 - Apple Inc.
References
[EXT-8404] Certification request
[EXT-8927] Evaluation technical report
Certification report of the product Strong Customer Authentication for Apple Pay, on MacBook Air
2022 with M2 running macOS Ventura 13.3.1, as requested in [EXT-8404] dated 27/02/2023, and
evaluated by Applus Laboratories, as detailed in the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-8927]
received on 26/01/2024.
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...........................................................................................................................3
TOE SUMMARY...................................................................................................................................3
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................4
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS...........................................................................................4
IDENTIFICATION.....................................................................................................................................6
SECURITY POLICIES.................................................................................................................................6
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .........................................................................7
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS..................................................................................7
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY ...............................................................................7
ARCHITECTURE.......................................................................................................................................7
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE....................................................................................................................8
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE...................................................................................................................8
Subsystems of the TOE...................................................................................................................9
DOCUMENTS........................................................................................................................................10
PRODUCT TESTING...............................................................................................................................11
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION.............................................................................................................12
EVALUATION RESULTS .........................................................................................................................13
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM...............................................14
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................................................14
GLOSSARY.............................................................................................................................................14
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....................................................................................................................................14
SECURITY TARGET ................................................................................................................................15
RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS...............................................................................................................16
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)......................................................16
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA).....................................................................16
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the product Strong
Customer Authentication for Apple Pay, on MacBook Air 2022 with M2 running macOS Ventura
13.3.1.
The TOE is a combination of Hardware and Software components that implement Strong Customer
Authentication and Dynamic Linking for Apple Pay on mobile devices.
Developer/manufacturer: Apple Inc.
Sponsor: Apple Inc.
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI).
ITSEF: Applus Laboratories.
Protection Profile: None.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria 3.1 R5, EAL2 + ADV_FSP.3 and ALC_FLR.3.
Evaluation end date: 09/04/2024
Expiration Date1: 15/05/2029
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL2 (augmented with ADV_FSP.3 +
ALC_FLR.3) have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Applus Laboratories
assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for
the EAL2 + ADV_FSP.3 + ALC_FLR.3, as defined by the Common Criteria 3.1 R5 and the CEM 3.1 R5.
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product Strong Customer Authentication for Apple Pay, on MacBook Air 2022 with M2 running
macOS Ventura 13.3.1, a positive resolution is proposed.
TOE SUMMARY
The TOE platform includes the components implementing Strong Customer Authentication (SCA)
and Dynamic Linking for Apple Pay.
User authentication is managed by the Secure Enclave. The Secure Enclave is a dedicated secure
subsystem integrated into Apple systems on chip (SoCs). The Secure Enclave is isolated from the
1 This date refers to the expiration date of the certificate recognition within the scope of the mutual recognition
arrangements signed by this Certification Body.
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main processor to provide an extra layer of security and is designed to keep sensitive user data
secure even when the Application Processor kernel becomes compromised.
macOS also allows the Apple Pay services and other security functions of the TOE to operate.
The Secure Element (outside of the TOE) is the secure component holding the Apple Pay secrets
and processes the Apple Pay transactions.
SECURITY ASSURANCEREQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level EAL2 and the
evidences required by the additional component ADV_FSP.3 + ALC_FLR.3 to the table, according to
Common Criteria v3.1 R5.
ASSURANCE CLASS ASSURANCE COMPONENT
ASE ASE_CCL.1
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_INT.1
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_SPD.1
ASE_TSS.1
ADV ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.3
ADV_TDS.1
AGD AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ALC ALC_CMC.2
ALC_CMS.2
ALC_DEL.1
ALC_FLR.3
ATE ATE_COV.1
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2
AVA AVA_VAN.2
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements, according to the
Common Criteria v3.1 R5:
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT
FIA_UID.2
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FIA_UAU.2
FIA_UAU.5
FIA_AFL.1/Biometric
FIA_AFL.1/Recovery
FIA_AFL.1/Delay
FIA_UAU.6
FDP_DAU.1
FIA_ATD.1
FIA_SOS.2
FDP_ACC.2/Authentication_SFP
FDP_ACF.1/Authentication_SFP
FDP_ITT.1
FDP_ETC.2/Transaction
FDP_ACC.2/Payment_SFP
FDP_ACF.1/Payment_SFP
FDP_ACC.2/Card_Perso_SFP
FDP_ACF.1/Card_Perso_SFP
FDP_ETC.2/Card_Perso_SFP
FPT_ITC.1
FDP_ITC.1
FTP_ITC.1/SE
FDP_UCT.1/SE
FDP_UIT.1/SE
FPT_RPL.1/SE
FTP_ITC.1/Watch
FDP_UCT.1/Watch
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FDP_UIT.1/Watch
FPT_RPL.1/Watch
FPR_UNO.1
FDP_RIP.1
FDP_SDI.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MTD.1
FMT_MTD.3
IDENTIFICATION
Product: Strong Customer Authentication for Apple Pay, on MacBook Air 2022 with M2 running
macOS Ventura 13.3.1
Security Target: Strong Customer Authentication for Apple Pay, on MacBook Air 2022 with M2
running macOS Ventura 13.3.1, Security Target (version: 1.11, November 16, 2023).
Protection Profile: None.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria 3.1 R5, EAL2 + ADV_FSP.3 and ALC_FLR.3.
SECURITY POLICIES
The use of the product Strong Customer Authentication for Apple Pay, on MacBook Air 2022 with
M2 running macOS Ventura 13.3.1 shall implement a set of security policies assuring the fulfilment
of different standards and security demands.
The detail of these policies is documented in the Security Target, section 4.6 (“Organizational
Security Policies”).
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ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the security properties
and functionalities compiled by the security target. These assumptions have been applied during
the evaluation in order to determine if the identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these assumptions for its
operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them could not be assumed, it would not
be possible to assure the secure operation of the TOE.
The detail of these assumptions is documented in the Security Target, section 4.3 (“Assumptions”).
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS
The following threats do not suppose a risk for the product Strong Customer Authentication for
Apple Pay, on MacBook Air 2022 with M2 running macOS Ventura 13.3.1, although the agents
implementing attacks have the attack potential according to the Basic attack potential level of EAL2
+ ADV_FSP.3 + ALC_FLR.3 and always fulfilling the usage assumptions and the proper security
policies satisfaction.
For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product security
properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
The threats covered by the security properties of the TOE are those defined in the Security Target,
section 4.5 (“Threats”).
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTFUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some of the
objectives of the defined security problem.
The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are those defined in the
Protection Profile and they are documented in the Security Target, section 5.2 (“Security Objectives
for the environment”).
ARCHITECTURE
The TOE platform includes the components implementing Strong Customer Authentication (SCA)
and Dynamic Linking for Apple Pay.
User authentication is managed by the Secure Enclave. The Secure Enclave is a dedicated secure
subsystem integrated into Apple systems on chip (SoCs). The Secure Enclave is isolated from the
main processor to provide an extra layer of security and is designed to keep sensitive user data
secure even when the Application Processor kernel becomes compromised.
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LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE
TOE security features contains a summary of the logical security features provided by the TOE. The
main security features of the TOE are:
• User authentication and management
• Secure channel between the Secure Enclave and the Biometric sensor
• Secure channel between the Secure Enclave and the Secure Element
• Secure channel between the Secure Enclave and the Apple Watch
• Card Data management
• Apple Pay payment transaction processing and management
• Operating System update
• iCloud logout and disk erasure”
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE
The physical architecture is depicted in the following figure
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Subsystems of the TOE
The subsystems of the TOE consist of:
• Secure Enclave: The software components of the TOE residing in the Secure Enclave. This
subsystem includes several applications executing on the Secure Enclave operating system.
o BioApp is an application which provides functionality for processing biometric data
and generating biometric templates.
o The SKS (Secure Key Store) is a hardware cryptographic module. The module is
embedded in-side the Secure Enclave and packaged within the Application
Processor.
o The SSE (Secure Enclave-Secure Element) manages the pairing between the Secure
Enclave and the Secure Element, allowing the Secure Element to process only
genuine and authorized Apple Pay transactions. The SSE application maintains
sensitive pairing material, allowing Secure Element and Secure Enclave to perform a
mutual authentication before exchanging data.
• Apple Wallet: The Apple Wallet subsystem is an application executing as part of macOS that
handles the enrollment of applications and governs the payment operation.
• macOS components executing on Application Processor (AP):
o logind: The component of macOS that provides the user interface to handle user
password authentication
o Launchpad: The component of macOS that handles I/O with the Console, and
thereby provides the functionality for the macOS user interface
o NFCd: This daemon facilitates the communication between Apple Wallet and the
Secure Element
o Safari browser: Web browser included with the OS. Provides the user interface to
conduct payment transactions
o Security Framework: This is an API provided by the OS to provide cryptographic
support that can be used to protect information, establish trust, and control access
to software.
o System Preferences application: This application allows the user to modify various
system set-tings.
• Device components:
o Touch ID sensor: This is the hardware component and associated drivers that allow
fingerprints data to be captured and passed to BioApp for enrollment and matching
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o Boot-loader: This subsystem consists of code that is executed during the boot
sequence of the device. The boot-loader is responsible for ensuring that the device
boots using software with assured integrity
o Console: Hardware and associated drivers that handles user input via the keyboard,
and displays output via the screen. The keyboard and screen hardware are also part
of the TOE.
All other macOS components are outside of the TOE, including the Secure Element together with
the NFCC hardware, and the XNU macOS kernel. The macOS subsystem components are individual
applications.
DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made available
together to the users of the evaluated version.
• Strong Customer Authentication for Apple Pay on MacBook Air 2022 with M2 running
macOS Ventura 13.3.1: Security Target, version 1.11
• Strong Customer Authentication for Apple Pay on MacBook Air 2022 with M2 running
macOS Ventura 13.3.1: Guidance, version 1.6
• Apple Pay Support, https://support.apple.com/apple-pay, version 1.0
• Apple Platform Security, https://support.apple.com/guide/security/welcome/web, version
1.15
• Check Your Service and Support Coverage (review your Apple warranty status),
https://checkcoverage.apple.com, version 1.0
• Set up your MacBook Air for new Mac users, https://support.apple.com/en-
us/guide/macbook-air/apd3a3bbed27/2023/mac/13.4, version 1.0
• Set up your MacBook Air, https://support.apple.com/guide/macbook-air/set-up-your-mac-
apd831707cb3/mac, version 1.0
• Use Disk Utility to erase a Mac with Apple silicon, https://support.apple.com/HT212030,
version 1.0
• Identify your MacBook Air model, https://support.apple.com/HT201862, version 1.0
• Find out which macOS your Mac is using, https://support.apple.com/HT201260, version 1.0
• Apple macOS Software License Agreement for macOS Monterey B. Apple Pay Supplemental
Terms and Conditions, https://www.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/macOSVentura.pdf, version
1.0
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• How to update the software on your Mac, https://support.apple.com/HT201541, version
1.0
• Erase all content and settings on Mac, https://support.apple.com/HT212749, version 1.0
• Change or reset the password of a macOS user account,
https://support.apple.com/HT202860, version 1.0
• If you can't reset your Mac login password, https://support.apple.com/HT212190, version
1.0
• Reset your Mac login password, https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/mh35902/mac,
version 1.0
• Personal Safety User Guide for Apple devices Set a unique passcode or password on devices,
https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/personal-safety/ipsd0a253dd5/1.0/web/1.0,
version 1.0
• Registration form for Apple security-announce mailing list,
https://lists.apple.com/mailman/listinfo/security-announce/, version 1.0
• Get help with security issues, https://support.apple.com/HT201221, version 1.0
• Report a security or privacy vulnerability, https://support.apple.com/HT201220, version 1.0
• Apple Security Update, https://support.apple.com/HT201222, version 1.0
• Find the model and serial number of your Mac, https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201581,
version 1.0
• About System Integrity Protection on your Mac – Apple Support,
https://support.apple.com/HT204899, version 1.0
• Use Touch ID on your Mac, https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/touch-id-
mchl16fbf90a/mac, version 1.0
• About Touch ID advanced technology, https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204587, version
1.0
• If Touch ID isn't working on your Mac, https://support.apple.com/HT212225, version 1.0
• Unlock your Mac with your Apple Watch, https://support.Apple.com/HT206995, version 1.0
PRODUCT TESTING
The developer has executed test for all the security functions. All the tests have been performed by
the developer in its premises, with a satisfactory result. During the evaluation process it has been
verified each unit test checking that the security functionality that covers is been identified and also
that the kind of test is appropriate to the function that is intended to test. All the tests have been
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executed using the testing scenario appropriate to the established architecture in the security
target. It has also been checked that the obtained results during the tests fit or correspond to the
previously estimated results. To verify the results of the developer tests, the evaluator has repeated
the 78.5% of the developer functional tests.
In addition, the lab has devised a test for each of the security function of the product verifying that
the obtained results are consistent with the results obtained by the developer. It has been checked
that the obtained results conform to the expected results and in the cases where a deviation in
respect to the expected results was present, the evaluator has confirmed that this variation neither
represents any security problem nor a decrease in the functional capacity of the product. Through
the tests performed by the Laboratory it is concluded that 65.78% of the SFRs and all the TSFIs
defined in the Functional Specification has been tested.
PENETRATION TESTING
Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational environment,
the evaluation team has devised attack scenarios for penetration tests. Within these activities all
aspects of the security architecture which were not covered by functional testing have been
considered. The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential Basic has been successful in the
TOE’s operational environment as defined in the security target when all security measures
required by the developer in the security guidance defined in DOCUMENTS section are applied.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The TOE consists of a range of hardware and software components as listed below, which are all
developed by Apple.
TOE component Version Description
Apple Pay App
(Wallet)
App part of macOS
Ventura 13.3.1
Authentication policy on data and services
In-app transaction data management
Application Processor2
(AP)
M2 Authentication policy on data and services
Transaction data management
Biometric Sensor
(Touch ID)
Touch ID sensor
within the keyboard of
the MacBook Air 2022
with M2
Sensor for fingerprint capture
Boot Loader macOS Ventura 13.3.1 Allows the device to start and boot the operating system
2 Only the parts of the AP related to the TSF are included within the TOE scope. The GPU of the AP is not relevant to the
TSF and is therefore not part of the TOE.
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TOE component Version Description
Secure Enclave
sepOS part of macOS
Ventura 13.3.1
Authentication Setup:
• Enrollment of the authentication material
• User authentication verification
Authentication Prover:
• Password verification
• Biometrics matching
• Authentication policy on data
• SSE Manages the pairing between the Secure Enclave and the
Secure Element
• SKS Hardware Cryptographic module
• BioApp Provides functionality for processingbiometric data and
generating biometric templates.
macOS Platform Device operating system platform (macOS Ventura 13.3.1) executing on Application
Processor (AP) with the following Apple Pay services that are included in the TOE:
• Security Framework macOS Ventura 13.3.1 Provides functionality to protect information, establish
trust, and control access to software.
• Logind macOS Ventura 13.3.1 Provides functionality for managing user logins and
sessions
• NFCd macOS Ventura 13.3.1 Provides communication layer between the TOE and the
Secure Element
• Safari Version 16.4
(18615.1.26.11.23)
Browser
• System Preferences macOS Ventura 13.3.1 Allows the user to indicate their preferred system
preferences for the device, operating system and
applications.
• Launchpad macOS Ventura 13.3.1 Provides the functionality for the macOS user interface
Console Keyboard and display
of the MacBook Air
2022 with M2
Device drivers part of
macOS Ventura 13.3.1
Provides the functionality for input/output (I/O)
EVALUATION RESULTS
The product Strong Customer Authentication for Apple Pay, on MacBook Air 2022 with M2 running
macOS Ventura 13.3.1 has been evaluated against the Security Target Strong Customer
Authentication for Apple Pay, on MacBook Air 2022 with M2 running macOS Ventura 13.3.1,
Security Target (version: 1.11, November 16, 2023).
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL2 + ADV_FSP.3 and ALC_FLR.3
have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Applus Laboratories assigns the
“PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the
evaluation level EAL2 + ADV_FSP.3 and ALC_FLR.3, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R5 and
the CEM v3.1 R5.
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COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM
Next, recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided. These have been
collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be considered when using the product.
• To follow the security guidance’s of the TOE strictly.
• To keep the TOE under personal control and set all other security measures available from
the environment.
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product Strong Customer Authentication for Apple Pay, on MacBook Air 2022 with M2 running
macOS Ventura 13.3.1, a positive resolution is proposed.
GLOSSARY
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
OC Organismo de Certificación
TOE Target Of Evaluation
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the product:
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
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[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Version 3.1, R5 Final,
April 2017.
[ST] Strong Customer Authentication for Apple Pay on MacBook Air 2022 with M2 running macOS
Ventura 13.3.1: Security Target, version 1.11
SECURITY TARGET
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is available in the
Certification Body:
• Strong Customer Authentication for Apple Pay, on MacBook Air 2022 with M2 running
macOS Ventura 13.3.1, Security Target (version: 1.11, November 16, 2023).
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RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under
certain conditions was agreed.
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It
defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at
higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL
4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For "Smartcards and similar devices" a
SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical
Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common
Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The current list of
signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the
agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this
agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common
Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers
CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on
assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation
(ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates based on CCRA-
2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of CCRA-
2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification procedures and for Assurance Continuity
(maintenance and re-certification) of old certificates a transition period on the recognition of
certificates according to the rules of CCRA-2000 (i.e., assurance components up to and including
EAL 4 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
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As of September 2014, the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government representatives from
the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the
United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the
website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this
certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under CCRA for all assurance components selected.