National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
416 Maetan-3dong, Yeongtong-gu, Suwon-si, Gyeonggi-do,
443-742 Korea
Samsung Galaxy Note 7
on
Android 6
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10764-2016
Dated: October 14, 2016
Version: 0.2
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
Samsung Galaxy Note 7 on Android 6 Validation Report Version 0.2, October 5, 2016
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Stelios Melachrinoudis
The MITRE Corporation
Jerome Myers
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
James Arnold
Tammy Compton
Katie Sykes
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
Samsung Galaxy Note 7 on Android 6 Validation Report Version 0.2, October 5, 2016
iii
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 2
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 4
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 5
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 5
4.1 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 5
4.2 User data protection ............................................................................................ 6
4.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 6
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 6
4.5 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 6
4.6 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 7
4.7 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 7
5 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..................................................................... 7
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 8
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 8
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 9
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 9
8 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................. 9
9 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 9
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE).......................................................... 10
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)............................................................ 10
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................... 10
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ................................... 10
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 11
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 11
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 11
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 11
11 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 12
12 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 13
13 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 13
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 13
Samsung Galaxy Note 7 on Android 6 Validation Report Version 0.2, October 5, 2016
1
1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Samsung Galaxy Note 7 on Android 6 solution
provided by Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. It presents the evaluation results, their
justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of
the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either
expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in October 2016. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria
Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Samsung Galaxy Note 7 on Android 6.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Samsung Electronics
Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Note 7 on Android 6 (MDFPP20) Security Target, Version 0.3,
October 3, 2016 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate
products against Protection Profile containing Assurance Activities that are interpretation of
CEM work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
Samsung Galaxy Note 7 on Android 6 Validation Report Version 0.2, October 5, 2016
2
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE: Samsung Galaxy Note 7 on Android 6
Protection Profile Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 2.0, 17 September
2014
ST: Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Note on Android 6 (MDFPP20)
Security Target, Version 0.3, October 3, 2016
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Samsung Galaxy Note 7 on Android 6, version
0.2, October 5, 2016
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Developer Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators Stelios Melachrinoudis: Lead Validator
Jerome Myers: Senior Validator
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
Samsung Galaxy Note 7 on Android 6 Validation Report Version 0.2, October 5, 2016
3
The TOE is a mobile device based on Android 6.0.1 with modifications made to increase the
level of security provided to end users and enterprises. The TOE is intended to be used as
part of an enterprise messaging solution providing mobile staff with enterprise connectivity.
The TOE includes a Common Criteria mode (or “CC mode”) that an administrator can invoke
through the use of a Mobile Device Management System (MDM) or through a dedicated
administrative application (see the Guidance for instructions to obtain the application). The
TOE must meet the following prerequisites in order for an administrator to transition the
TOE to CC mode.
 Require a screen lock password (swipe, PIN, pattern, or facial recognition screen
locks are not allowed).
 The maximum password failure retry policy should be less than or equal to ten.
 Device encryption must be enabled or a screen lock password required to decrypt
data on boot.
 Revocation checking must be enabled.
 External storage must be encrypted.
 Password recovery policy must not be enabled.
 Password history length must not be set.
When CC mode has been enabled, the TOE behaves as follows.
 The TOE sets the system wide Android CC mode property to “Enabled” if all the
prerequisites have been met.
 The TOE performs power-on self-tests.
 The TOE performs secure boot integrity checking of the kernel and key system
executables.
 The TOE prevents loading of custom firmware/kernels and requires all updates occur
through FOTA (Samsung’s Firmware Over The Air firmware update method)
 The TOE uses CAVP approved cryptographic ciphers when joining and
communicating with wireless networks.
 The TOE utilizes CAVP approved cryptographic ciphers for TLS.
 The TOE ensures FOTA updates utilize 2048-bit PKCS #1 RSA-PSS formatted
signatures (with SHA-512 hashing).
The TOE includes a containerization capability, KNOX Workspace, which is part of the
KNOX platform. This container provides a way to segment applications and data into two
separate areas on the device, such as a personal area and a work area, each with its own
separate apps, data and security policies. For this effort the TOE was evaluated both without
and with a KNOX Workspace container created (and to create a KNOX Workspace
container, one must purchase an additional license). Thus, the evaluation includes several
KNOX-specific claims that apply to a KNOX Workspace container when created.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
This evaluation tested the following Galaxy Note 7 devices:
Samsung Galaxy Note 7 on Android 6 Validation Report Version 0.2, October 5, 2016
4
Device
Name
Model
Number
Chipset/CPU Build
Arch/ISA
Android
Version
Kernel
Version
Build
Number
Galaxy
Note 7
SM-
N930F
Exynos 8890 A64 6.0.1 3.18.14 MMB29K
Galaxy
Note 7
SM-
N930V
Qualcomm
MSM8996
A64 6.0.1 3.18.20 MMB29M
The devices include a final letter or number at the end of the name that denotes that the device
is for a specific carrier (for example, V = Verizon Wireless and A = AT&T, which were used
during the evaluation). The following list of letters/numbers denotes the specific models
which may be validated:
V – Verizon Wireless,
P - Sprint,
R4 – US Cellular,
S – SK Telecom,
L – LG Uplus,
K - KT, Korea Telecom
A – AT&T,
T – T-Mobile,
C/I/F – International
For each device there are specific models which are validated. This table lists the specific
carrier models which have the validated configuration.
Device Name Base Model
Number
Carrier Models
Galaxy Note 7 (Qualcomm) SM-N930 T, P, R4, V, A
Galaxy Note 7 (System LSI) SM-N930 F, S, K, L
Where “None” is listed that means a device without a carrier model designation suffix can
also be placed into the validated configuration.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE combines with a Mobile Device Management solution that enables the enterprise
to watch, control and administer all deployed mobile devices, across multiple mobile service
providers as well as facilitate secure communications through a VPN. This partnership
provides a secure mobile environment that can be managed and controlled by the
environment and reduce the risks that can be introduced through a Bring-Your-Own-Device
(BYOD) model.
Data on the TOE is protected through the implementation of Samsung On-Device Encryption
(ODE) which utilizes a CAVP certified cryptographic algorithms to encrypt device storage.
This functionality is combined with a number of on-device policies including local wipe,
remote wipe, password complexity, automatic lock and privileged access to security
configurations to prevent unauthorized access to the device and stored data.
Samsung Galaxy Note 7 on Android 6 Validation Report Version 0.2, October 5, 2016
5
The Samsung Enterprise Software Development Kit (SDK) builds on top of the existing
Android security model by expanding the current set of security configuration of options to
more than 600 configurable policies and including additional security functionality such as
application whitelisting and blacklisting.
KNOX provides the ability to enhance the BYOD model by creating a separate container for
the Enterprise. Within this container, the Enterprise can provision separate applications and
ensure they are kept separate from anything the user may do outside the KNOX Workspace
container. The Enterprise can use policy controls to manage the device as a whole or the
KNOX Workspace container specifically, as needed by the organization.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is a multi-user mobile device based on Android (6.0.1) that incorporates the
Samsung Enterprise SDK. The TOE does not include the user applications that run on top of
the operating system, but does include controls that limit application behavior. When the
TOE is used within an enterprise environment, the enterprise can manage the configuration
of the mobile device through a compliant device management solution.
The TOE communicates and interacts with 802.11-2012 Access Points and mobile data
networks to establish network connectivity, and the through that connectivity interacts with
MDM servers that allow administrative control of the TOE.
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security Audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. User data protection
4. Identification and authentication
5. Security Management
6. Protection of the TSF
7. TOE access
8. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The TOE is designed to be able to generate logs for a range of security relevant events. The
TOE stores the logs locally so they can be accessed by an administrator or they can be
exported to an MDM.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes a cryptographic module with CAVP certified algorithms for a wide range
of cryptographic functions including: asymmetric key generation and establishment,
symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing and keyed-hash
message authentication. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation,
key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key
Samsung Galaxy Note 7 on Android 6 Validation Report Version 0.2, October 5, 2016
6
and protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to
implement security protocols such as TLS, IPsec, and HTTPS and also to encrypt the media
(including the generation and protection of data, right, and key encryption keys) used by the
TOE. Many of these cryptographic functions are also accessible as services to applications
running on the TOE.
4.3 User data protection
The TOE is designed to control access to system services by hosted applications, including
protection of the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE is designed to protect user
and other sensitive data using encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data
remains protected. The functionality provided by a KNOX Workspace container enhances
the security of user data by providing an additional layer of separation between apps and data
while the device is in use.
4.4 Identification and authentication
The TOE supports a number of features related to identification and authentication. From a
user perspective, except for making phone calls to an emergency number, a password (i.e.,
Password Authentication Factor) must be correctly entered to unlock the TOE. Also, even
when the TOE is unlocked the password must be re-entered to change the password.
Passwords are obscured when entered so they cannot be read from the TOE's display and the
frequency of entering passwords is limited and when a configured number of failures occurs,
the TOE will be wiped to protect its contents. Passwords can be constructed using upper and
lower cases characters, numbers, and special characters and passwords between 4 and 16
characters are supported.
The TOE can also serve as an 802.1X supplicant and can use X509v3 and validate certificates
for EAP-TLS, TLS and IPsec exchanges.
4.5 Security management
The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions identified
throughout this Security Target as well as other functions commonly found in mobile
devices. Many of the available functions are available to users of the TOE while many are
restricted to administrators operating through a Mobile Device Management solution once
the TOE has been enrolled. Once the TOE has been enrolled and then un-enrolled, it removes
all MDM policies and disables CC mode.
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features designed to protect itself to ensure the reliability
and integrity of its security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as
cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible or exportable. It also provides its own
timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log
accountability). It enforces read, write, and execute memory page protections, uses address
space layout randomization, and stack-based buffer overflow protections to minimize the
Samsung Galaxy Note 7 on Android 6 Validation Report Version 0.2, October 5, 2016
7
potential to exploit application flaws. It is also designed to protect itself from modification
by applications as well as to isolate the address spaces of applications from one another to
protect those applications.
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking
so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any of the self-tests fail, the
TOE will not go into an operational mode. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of
the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring
that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE. Digital
signature checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their installation.
4.7 TOE access
The TOE can be locked, obscuring its display, by the user or after a configured interval of
inactivity. The TOE also has the capability to display an advisory message (banner) when
users unlock the TOE for use.
The TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.
4.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports the use of 802.11-2012, 802.1X, EAP-TLS, TLS and IPsec to secure
communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.
5 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the Protection
Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 2, 17 September 2014 (MDFPP). That
information has not been reproduced here and the MDFPP should be consulted if there is
interest in that material.
6 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile and
performed by the evaluation team).
 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
Samsung Galaxy Note 7 on Android 6 Validation Report Version 0.2, October 5, 2016
8
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the MDFPP and applicable Technical Decisions. Any
additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this
evaluation.
7 Documentation
The following documentation was used as evidence for the evaluation of the Samsung
Galaxy S7:
 Samsung Android 6 on Galaxy Devices Guidance Documentation, version 2.5,
October 4, 2016
 Samsung Android 6 on Galaxy Devices User Guidance Documentation, version 2.5,
October 5, 2016
Any additional customer documentation delivered with the product or available through
download was not included in the scope of the evaluation and hence should not be relied
upon when using the products as evaluated.
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report (MDFPP20) for
Samsung Galaxy Note 7 Devices on Android 6, version 0.2, October 3, 2016 (DTR), and
summarized in the Assurance Activity Report (MDFPP20) for Samsung Galaxy Note 7 on
Android 6, version 0.3, October 3, 2016 (AAR), which is publically available.
The following diagrams depict the test environments used by the evaluators.
Figure 1 Evaluator Test Setup 1
Ubuntu
Linux
Windows
TOE Device
USB Connection
Network – Putty
Connection 10.0.0.144 (16.04)
or
10.0.0.12 (14.10)
10.0.0.58
Samsung Galaxy Note 7 on Android 6 Validation Report Version 0.2, October 5, 2016
9
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the Galaxy Devices Guidance
Documentation, version 2.5, October 4, 2016 and Samsung Android 6 on Galaxy Devices
User Guidance Documentation, version 2.5, October 5, 2016 documents and ran the tests
specified in the MDFPP.
9 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the Samsung Galaxy Note 7 devices.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in Galaxy Devices Guidance Documentation, version 2.5, October 4, 2016 and
Samsung Android 6 on Galaxy Devices User Guidance Documentation, version 2.5, October
5, 2016.
10 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
Figure 2 Evaluator Test Setup 2
Linux
RADIU
S
Backtrack
Wireshark
Linux
Windows
Network – Putty
Connection
USB Connection
USB Connection
TOE Device
TOE Device
Evaluator Sniffing Configuration
Evaluator Direct Connect
Configuration
Access Point
Samsung Galaxy Note 7 on Android 6 Validation Report Version 0.2, October 5, 2016
10
version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Samsung
Galaxy Note 7 Devices on Android 6 TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs
contained in the MDFPP.
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Samsung Galaxy Note 7 on Android 6
products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function
descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the MDFPP related to the examination of the
information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
Samsung Galaxy Note 7 on Android 6 Validation Report Version 0.2, October 5, 2016
11
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the MDFPP and recorded the results in a Test
Report, summarized in the Assurance Activities Report.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
proprietary Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability
analysis includes a public search for vulnerabilities including the following terms: Samsung
Note 7, Galaxy Note 7, Note 7, Samsung, Knox, and Android. The public search for
vulnerabilities did not uncover any residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) with the following search terms: "Samsung Note 7", "Galaxy
Note 7", "Note 7", "Samsung", "Knox", "Android".
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The evaluated configuration requires that software updates to the TOE be restricted to FOTA.
The evaluators were unable to directly exercise this mechanism since it would have involved
Samsung Galaxy Note 7 on Android 6 Validation Report Version 0.2, October 5, 2016
12
placing invalid updates on the live public servers that are currently in use by present
customers. Hence, the evaluators had to take the products out of the evaluated configuration
to test the update features.
The validators encourage the consumers of these products to understand the relationship
between the products and any functionality that may be provided via Mobile Device
Management solutions. This evaluation does not cover, nor does it endorse, the use of any
particular MDM solution and only the MDM interfaces of the products were exercised as
part of the evaluation. In practice, the Samsung MDM is not available, though its settings
could be managed via a suitable MDM and corresponding agent. Alternatively, Samsung has
developed an application that can be downloaded to put the device into CC mode –
CCMode.apk (https://www.samsungknox.com/en/sso/login). The Samsung Android 6 on
Galaxy Devices Guidance Documentation contains instructions on how the application can
be acquired. As of the conclusion of this evaluation, an administrator can login to the site
above and follow the instructions in the administrator guide and website to obtain the
application.
The validators suggest that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated
configuration of the device(s). In particular, the products must be configured into Common
Criteria mode as directed in the Samsung Android 6 on Galaxy Devices Guidance
Documentation, version 2.5, Sec 4.3.2.2 in order to be in the evaluated configuration.
The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the Security Target, and only the functionality implemented by the SFR’s within
the Security Target was evaluated. All other functionality provided by the devices, to include
software that was not part of the evaluated configuration, needs to be assessed separately and
no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
When a user exceeds a specific number of password attempts allowed, a warning message
will appear stating that the user has a specific number of “attempts left before the phone is
reset to factory default settings and all data is erased.” Although the corresponding
FIA_AFL_EXT.1 requirement only mandates that protected data is wiped, the device wipes
all user data, which includes all protected data, in addition to performing a factory reset, once
the maximum number of password attempts has been exceeded. Thus, this requirement is
satisfied as protected data is part of the data that is wiped. After the wipe, the device has to
be initialized.
Furthermore, the evaluation includes several KNOX-specific claims that apply to a KNOX
Workspace container when created, which requires purchase of an additional license.
12 Annexes
Not applicable
Samsung Galaxy Note 7 on Android 6 Validation Report Version 0.2, October 5, 2016
13
13 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Samsung Galaxy Note 7 (MDFPP20) Security Target,
Version 0.3, October 3, 2016.
14 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
15 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
Samsung Galaxy Note 7 on Android 6 Validation Report Version 0.2, October 5, 2016
14
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2102
[4] Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 2.0, 17 September 2014
[5] Samsung Galaxy Note 7 (MDFPP20) Security Target, Version 0.3, October 3, 2016
(ST)
[6] Assurance Activity Report (MDFPP20) for Samsung Galaxy Note 7 on Android 6,
Version 0.3, October 3, 2016 (AAR)
[7] Detailed Test Report (MDFPP20) for Samsung Galaxy Note 7 Devices on Android
6, Version 0.2, October 3, 2016 (DTR)
[8] Evaluation Technical Report for Samsung Galaxy Note 7 Devices on Android 6,
Version 0.2, October 5, 2016 (ETR)