TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
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Version
2021-06
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Certification Report
HUAWEI MA5800 Software Management Component
V100R020C10SPC301
Sponsor and developer: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Huawei Industrial Base Bantian, Longgang, Shenzhen
518129, People’s Republic of China.
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0351844-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 0351844
Author(s): Andy Brown
Date: 09 December 2021
Number of pages: 13
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 8
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 9
2.6.3 Test configuration 10
2.6.4 Test results 10
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 10
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 10
2.9 Evaluation Results 10
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 10
3 Security Target 12
4 Definitions 12
5 Bibliography 13
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the
HUAWEI MA5800 Software Management Component V100R020C10SPC301. The developer of the
HUAWEI MA5800 Software Management Component V100R020C10SPC301 is Huawei Technologies
Co., Ltd. located in Shenzhen, China and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and
certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the
suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is the management component of the Versatile Routing Platform (VRP) that runs on the
control board of the MA5800 series.
The MA5800 series (MA5800-X17, MA5800-X15, MA5800-X7 and MA5800-X2) are aggregation
Optical-Line-Terminal (OLT) with a distributed architecture and with different user access interfaces
such as Gigabit-capable-Passive-Optical-Network (GPON), 10-Gigabit-capable- Passive-Optical-
Network (10G PON), and 10/1G Ethernet (10GE/1GE) protocols.
The MA5800 supports deployment on Fiber-To-The-Home (FTTH), Fiber-To-The-Door (FTTD), Fiber-
To-The-Building (FTTB), Fiber-To-The-Cabinet (FTTC), and Distributed-Converged-Cable- Access-
Platform (D-CCAP) networks.
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft. The evaluation was completed
on 09 December 2021 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been conducted
in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT
Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the HUAWEI MA5800 Software Management
Component V100R020C10SPC301, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation
assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of
the HUAWEI MA5800 Software Management Component V100R020C10SPC301 are advised to verify
that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the
comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.2 (Flaw Reporting
Procedures).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the HUAWEI MA5800 Software Management
Component V100R020C10SPC301 from Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. located in Shenzhen, China.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Software
HUAWEI MA5800 Software Management
Component
V100R020C10SPC301
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the HUAWEI MA5800
Software Management Component V100R020C10SPC301. For details, see section 2.5
“Documentation” of this report.
2.2 Security Policy
To counter the security threats listed in the [ST], the TOE provides the following security features:
 Identification and authentication of administrative users
o Users are identified by a username and authenticated by password prior to accessing
services of the TOE. The TOE is accessed via CLI (console and SSH). The TOE
provides local authentication and remote authentication via RADIUS.
 Authorization
o The TOE maintains multiple administration roles. There are in total 4 hierarchical
access levels ranging from 0 ~ 3. The bigger the number, the higher is the privilege.
Only authenticated users can execute commands of the TOE.
 Auditing
o The TOE generates audit records for security-relevant management actions. All audit
records contain not only the information on the event itself but also a timestamp and –
if applicable – additional information like user ID, source IP, etc. Audit records are
writing to local flash storage. The TSF deletes the oldest log files if the audit trail
exceeds the size of the storage device
 Communication security
o The TOE provides communication security by implementing the SSHv2 protocol. To
protect the TOE from eavesdrop and to ensure data transmission security and
confidentiality, SSHv2 provides:
 Authentication of client by password or RSA public key;
 AES encryption algorithms;
 HMAC integrity verification algorithms;
 Secure cryptographic key exchange.
 Management traffic flow control
o For administration of the TOE, network packages have to be sent to the TOE from the
management network. When a network packet reaches the TOE from the
management network, the TOE applies an information flow security policy in the form
of Access Control Lists (ACLs) to the traffic before processing it. Network packets on
Layer 3 from the management network arriving at a network interface of the TOE are
checked to ensure that they conform to the configured packet filter policy.
 Security functionality management
o The TOE provides the following management functionalities:
 Management of user accounts and user attributes, including user credentials.
 Management of authentication failure policy.
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 Access control management, including the association of users and
corresponding privileged functionalities.
 Enabling and disabling trusted channels for local and remote access to the
TOE’s management interfaces.
 Management of ACLs and ACL attributes and parameters like IP addresses
or address ranges.
 Configuration of network addresses for services used by the TOE, like NTP,
SYSLOG, SSH.
 Management of the TOE’s time.
 All security management functions (i.e. commands related to security
management) require sufficient user level for execution.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE is the management component of the Versatile Routing Platform (VRP) that runs on the
control board of the MA5800 series.
The MA5800 series (MA5800-X17, MA5800-X15, MA5800-X7 and MA5800-X2) are aggregation
Optical-Line-Terminal (OLT) with a distributed architecture and with different user access interfaces
such as Gigabit-capable-Passive-Optical-Network (GPON), 10-Gigabit-capablePassive-Optical-
Network (10G PON), and 10/1G Ethernet (10GE/1GE) protocols.
The MA5800 supports deployment on Fiber-To-The-Home (FTTH), Fiber-To-The-Door (FTTD), Fiber-
To-The-Building (FTTB), Fiber-To-The-Cabinet (FTTC), and Distributed-Converged-CableAccess-
Platform (D-CCAP) networks.
The logical architecture, originating from the Security Target [ST] of the TOE can be depicted as
follows:
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The VRP is responsible for managing and controlling the whole MA5800 software, communication,
and security features in MA5800. The VRP is relying on the underlying OS. The OS is responsible for
processes scheduling management, file system management, memory management, IPC module
(Inter Process communication), and drivers etc. The security features of the TOE are all provided by
the VRP.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
SmartAX MA5800 Product Documentation Issue 02
Huawei MA5800 Series V100R020C10SPC301
Software – Preparative Procedures
V1.0
Huawei MA5800 Series V100R020C10SPC301
Software - Operational User Guidance
V1.0
Huawei MA5800 Series V100R020C10SPC301
Software - Configuration and Reference
V1.0
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer focused on functional testing and manually tested all of the defined test cases. The
developer grouped the 25 executed test cases into the following logical security functions:
 Authentication
 Authorization
 Auditing
 Access control
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 Reliable time stamps
 Communication security
Each defined test case ran independently. There is no sequence dependency between test cases.
The developer tested all the TSFIs.
Differences between the MA5800 series models are due to non-security affecting hardware. The
TOE’s Security Functional Requirements are independent of the hardware differences of the various
models. The developer executed their test plan on a Huawei MA5800-X17 chassis with control board
H901MPLB, as a representative sample, running V100R020C10SPC301. Figure 2 and Figure 3
shows the test configurations used by the developer.
Figure 2 test configuration 1
Figure 3 test configuration 2
The evaluator repeated 6 of the developer’s test cases.
In addition, the evaluator devised 12 additional independent evaluator tests to further complement the
coverage.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
To identify potential vulnerabilities the evaluator performed the following activities:
 Focused analysis
o An analysis of the evidence with the aim of identifying any potential vulnerabilities evident
through the contained information. This analysis has been done throughout the assurance
classes and recorded in evaluation evidence.
 Public domain analysis
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o The evaluator performs a public domain vulnerability search for TOE specific items (TOE
name, TOE-type, secure libraries, etc.)
 Network scanning tools
o The evaluator runs vulnerability-scanning tools to identify potential vulnerabilities.
The evaluator devised penetration tests to verify that the TOE met the assurance requirements. The
total test effort expended by the evaluators was 1 week. During that test campaign, 100% of the total
time was spent logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The configuration of the samples used for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was
the same as described in the [ST].
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of 3 Site Technical Audit Reuse reports.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number HUAWEI MA5800 Software
Management Component V100R020C10SPC301.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the HUAWEI MA5800 Software
Management Component V100R020C10SPC301, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
and to meet the requirements of EAL 4 augmented with ALC_FLR.2. This implies that the product
satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
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The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: none.
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3 Security Target
The HUAWEI MA5800 Series Software Management Component V100R020C10 – Security Target,
Version 1.1, 06 December 2021 [ST] is included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
CC Common Criteria
CCRA Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of IT
Security CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
D-CCAP Distributed-Converged-Cable- Access-Platform
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FTTC Fiber-To-The-Cabinet
FTTD Fiber-To-The-Door
FTTH Fiber-To-The-Home
IPC Inter Process communication
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT security
OLT Optical-Line-Terminal
PON Passive-Optical-Network
PP Protection Profile
SSH Secure Shell
TOE Target of Evaluation
VRP Versatile Routing Platform
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR] Huawei MA5800 Software Management Component V100R020C10SPC301 –
Evaluation Technical Report EAL4+, 21-RPT-367, Version 3.0, 07 December
2021
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,
28 March 2019
[ST] HUAWEI MA5800 Series Software Management Component V100R020C10 –
Security Target, Version 1.1, 06 December 2021
(This is the end of this report.)