National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Aruba Mobility Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11345-2023
Dated: June 23, 2023
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, SUITE: 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jenn Dotson
Randy Heimann
Lisa Mitchell
Linda Morrison
Lori Sarem
Chris Thorpe
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Sean Bennett
Eric Isaac
Greg McLearn
Wasif Sikder
Kevin Steiner
Lightship Security USA, Inc.
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2. Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3. Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 4
3.1. TOE Evaluated Configuration.......................................................................... 4
3.2. Physical Boundary............................................................................................ 4
3.3. Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software, and Firmware................................. 4
4. Security Policy............................................................................................................ 6
4.1. Security Audit................................................................................................... 6
4.2. Cryptographic Support ..................................................................................... 6
4.3. Identification and Authentication..................................................................... 6
4.4. Secure Management ......................................................................................... 6
4.5. Protection of TSF.............................................................................................. 6
4.6. TOE Access ...................................................................................................... 6
4.7. Trusted Path/Channels...................................................................................... 7
5. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..................................................................... 8
5.1. Assumptions ..................................................................................................... 8
5.2. Clarification of Scope....................................................................................... 8
6. Documentation............................................................................................................ 9
7. IT Product Testing .................................................................................................... 10
7.1. Developer Testing........................................................................................... 10
7.2. Evaluation Team Independent Testing........................................................... 10
7.3. Test Configuration.......................................................................................... 10
8. Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 11
8.1. Evaluation of Security Target (ASE).............................................................. 11
8.2. Evaluation of Development Documentation (ADV)...................................... 11
8.3. Evaluation of Guidance Documents (AGD)................................................... 12
8.4. Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)....................................... 12
8.5. Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)................... 12
8.6. Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)..................................................... 12
8.7. Summary of Evaluation Results ..................................................................... 13
9. Validator Comments................................................................................................. 14
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10. Annexes..................................................................................................................... 15
11. Security Target.......................................................................................................... 16
12. Glossary .................................................................................................................... 17
13. Acronym List ............................................................................................................ 18
14. Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 19
List of Tables
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers............................................................................................ 2
Table 2: TOE models.......................................................................................................... 4
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1. Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) Validation team of the evaluation of Aruba Mobility Conductor with ArubaOS
8.10 provided by Aruba, A Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company. It presents the evaluation
results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report (VR) is
not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the U.S.
government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Lightship Security USA Common Criteria
Laboratory (CCTL) in Baltimore, MD, United States of America, and was completed in
June 2023. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical
Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Lightship Security (LS). The
evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part
3 Conformant and meets the assurance requirements of the collaborative Protection Profile
for Network Devices Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020.
The TOE is the Aruba Mobility Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10. The TOE identified in this
VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved CCTL using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This VR applies only to the specific version of
the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and
the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence
provided.
The Validation team monitored the activities of the Evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The Validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated
in the Security Target (ST). Therefore, the Validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results
are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the
evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Aruba Mobility
Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10 Security Target, Version 1.2, June 2023, and analysis
performed by the Validation Team.
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2. Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The TOE: the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The ST, describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme
United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme
TOE Aruba Mobility Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10
Sponsor and Developer
Aruba, A Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company
6280 America Center Dr.
San Jose, CA 95002
CCTL
Lightship Security USA, Inc.
3600 O’Donnell St., Suite 2
Baltimore, MD 21224
CC Version
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
CEM
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation: Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5,
April 2017.
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Item Identifier
Protection Profile
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, v2.2e, 23
March 2020
ST
Aruba Mobility Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10 Security Target,
Version 1.2, June 2023
Evaluation Technical
Report
Aruba Mobility Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10 Evaluation
Technical Report, Version 0.7, June 2023
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Evaluation Personnel
Sean Bennett, Eric Isaac, Greg McLearn, Wasif Sikder, Kevin
Steiner
CCEVS Validators
Jenn Dotson, Randy Heimann, Lisa Mitchell, Linda Morrison,
Lori Sarem, Chris Thorpe
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3. Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Aruba Mobility Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10.
The Aruba Mobility Conductor simplifies the management of multiple Aruba controllers
running ArubaOS 8 or later. Key features include a centralized dashboard to easily see
and manage controllers deployed in multiple sites, a hierarchical configuration tool to
pre-stage network deployments, and the ability to perform live firmware and feature
upgrades during active user sessions. The addition of licensing pools simplifies the
transfer of licenses between different controllers to quickly address expanded deployment
needs.
3.1. TOE Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is a network device that provides centralized management of multiple Aruba
Mobility Controllers.
The TOE interfaces are as follows:
a) CLI. Administrative CLI via direct serial connection or SSH.
b) GUI. Administrative web GUI via HTTPS/TLS.
c) RADIUS/TACACS+. Authentication with a remote server via IPsec.
d) Logs. Logs are sent to an external syslog server via IPsec.
e) NTP. Time synchronization with an NTP server via IPsec.
f) Mobility Controller. Management of Aruba Mobility Controllers via IPsec.
3.2. Physical Boundary
The physical boundary of the TOE includes the appliance models shown in Table 2
executing ArubaOS 8.10 software.
Table 2: TOE models
Model CPU Software Notes on Differences
MCR-HW-1K-F1 Intel Xeon E5-2609v4 (Broadwell) ArubaOS
8.10
Difference in the number of
managed nodes/ supported
devices, clients, and
controllers due to the
licenses applied.
MCR-HW-5K-F1 Intel Xeon E5-2620v4 (Broadwell)
MCR-HW-10K-F1 Intel Xeon E5-2650v4 (Broadwell)
3.3. Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software, and Firmware
The TOE operates with the following components in the environment:
a) Audit Server. The TOE is capable of sending audit events to a Syslog server.
b) NTP Server. The TOE synchronizes time with an NTP server.
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c) Authentication Server. The TOE can utilize RADIUS and TACACs+ servers to
authenticate users.
d) Mobility Controllers. The TOE manages Aruba controllers running ArubaOS 8 or
later. Note: The TOE security functions are not reliant on the presence of Mobility
Controllers.
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4. Security Policy
This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE:
4.1. Security Audit
The TOE generates logs of security relevant events. The TOE stores logs locally and is
capable of sending log events to a remote syslog server. Log events are sent in real-time
via IPsec.
4.2. Cryptographic Support
The TOE implements a cryptographic module. In the evaluated configuration, the TOE is
in FIPS mode to support the cryptographic functionality. The TOE implements
cryptographic protocols such as SSH, TLS, HTTPS, and IPsec.
4.3. Identification and Authentication
The TOE requires users who connect to the TOEs administrator interfaces (direct serial
connection, remote CLI, and GUI) to authenticate prior to being granted access to any
TOE functionality. The TOE supports the use of authentication servers via IPsec.
4.4. Secure Management
The TOE enables secure management of its security functions, including:
Local and remote administration
Access banners
Session inactivity and termination
TOE updates
Management of critical security functions and data
Protection of cryptographic keys and passwords
4.5. Protection of TSF
The TOE prevents reading of private keys and plaintext passwords by any user. The
TOE synchronizes with an external time source. This date and time are used as a
timestamp that is part of each audit record generated by the TOE. The TOE ensures the
authenticity and integrity of software updates through digital signatures. The TOE
performs a suite of self-tests to ensure the correct operation and enforcement of its
security functions.
4.6. TOE Access
The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after configurable period. The TOE can also
display specified banner on the local and remote CLI interfaces prior to allowing any
administrative access to the TOE. The TOE allows users to manually terminate an
established management session with the TOE.
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4.7. Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE protects the integrity and confidentiality of communications via the following
TOE interfaces: CLI via SSH; Administrative web GUI via HTTPS/TLS; authentication
with a remote server via IPsec; external syslog server via IPsec; NTP server via IPsec;
and management of Aruba Mobility Controllers via IPsec.
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5. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
5.1. Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, v2.2e, 23 March 2020
(CPP_ND_V2.2E)
That information has not been reproduced here and the CPP_ND_V2.2E should be
consulted if there is interest in that material.
5.2. Clarification of Scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in
CPP_ND_V2.2E as described for this TOE in the ST. Other functionality included in the
product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the
devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about
their effectiveness.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made in accordance with the evaluation activities
specified in CPP_ND_V2.2-SD and performed by the Evaluation team
• This evaluation only covers the software version and platform versions identified
in this document and referenced in the Aruba Mobility Conductor with ArubaOS
8.10 Security Target, Version 1.2, June 2023, and not any earlier or later versions
released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guides identified in Section 6, additional customer
documentation for the specific software version and platform versions was not
included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon when
configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the CPP_ND_V2.2E and applicable Technical Decisions.
Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered
by this evaluation.
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6. Documentation
The following guidance documents are provided with the TOE upon delivery in accordance
with the PP:
• ArubaOS 8.10.0.0 User Guide, Revision 02, 2022
• ArubaOS 8.10 Getting Started Guide, Revision 01, 2022
• ArubaOS 8.x Command-Line Interface Reference Guide, 2023
• ArubaOS 8.10.0.0 Syslog Reference Guide, Revision 01
• Aruba OS 8.10 Supplemental Guidance (Common Criteria Configuration
Guidance for Aruba Mobility Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10-FIPS), Version 2.6,
June 2023
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be installed and
configured as specified in ArubaOS 8.10 Supplemental Guidance (Common Criteria
Configuration Guidance for Aruba Mobility Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10-FIPS).
This document provides references to other documentation for specific steps in to
place the TOE into its the evaluated configuration and these documents are provided
on the NIAP website.
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7. IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the Evaluation team. It is derived from
information contained in Aruba Mobility Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10 Assurance
Activity Report (AAR), Version 0.11, June 2023, and the proprietary Aruba Mobility
Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10 NDcPP 2.2E Test Plan, Version 0.5, June 2023 and Aruba
Mobility Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10 NDcPP 2.2E Test Results, Version 0.4, June
2023.
7.1. Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the SARs or Evaluation Activities for this
product.
7.2. Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The Evaluation team conducted independent testing at Lightship Security USA in
Baltimore, MD from December 2023 until June 2023. The Evaluation team configured the
TOE according to vendor installation instructions and as identified in the Security Target.
The Evaluation team confirmed the technical accuracy of the setup and installation guide
during installation of the TOE. The Evaluation team confirmed that the TOE version
delivered for testing was identical to the version identified in the ST.
The Evaluation team used the Protection Profile test procedures as a basis for creating each
of the independent tests as required by the Evaluation Activities.
Each Evaluation Activity was tested as required by the conformant Protection Profile and
the evaluation team verified that each test passed.
7.3. Test Configuration
The TOE testing environment components are identified in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Testing Environment Overview
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8. Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: Aruba Mobility Conductor with
ArubaOS 8.10 NDcPP 2.2E Test Plan, Version 0.5, June 2023, Aruba Mobility
Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10 NDcPP 2.2E Test Results, Version 0.4, June 2023, and
Aruba Mobility Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10 Evaluation Technical Report, Version 0.7,
June 2023. The reader of this document can assume that all activities and work units
received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to
the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon
CC Version 3.1 Revision 5 and CEM Version 3.1 Revision 5 and the specific evaluation
activities specified in CPP_ND_V2.2-SD.
The Evaluation determined the TOE satisfies the conformance claims made in the Aruba
Mobility Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10 Security Target, Version 1.2, June 2023 of Part 2
extended and Part 3 conformant. The Validation Team reviewed all the work of the
Evaluation team and agreed with their practices and findings.
8.1. Evaluation of Security Target (ASE)
The Evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains an ST introduction, TOE overview, TOE description, description of the
environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security requirements
claimed to be met by the Aruba Mobility Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10 that are consistent
with the claimed Protection Profile, and product security function descriptions that support
the requirements.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.2. Evaluation of Development Documentation (ADV)
The Evaluation team performed each ADV assurance activity and applied each
ADV_FSP.1 CEM work unit. The Evaluation team assessed the evaluation evidence and
found it adequate to meet the requirements specified in the claimed Protection Profile for
design evidence. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the ST and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Evaluation Activities related to the examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The Validation reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
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8.3. Evaluation of Guidance Documents (AGD)
The Evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the Evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.4. Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The Evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The Evaluation team found that
the TOE was appropriately labeled with a unique identifier consistent with the TOE
identification in the evaluation evidence and that the TOE references used are consistent.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.5. Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The Evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ran the set
of tests specified by the Test Evaluation Activities and recorded the results in a Test Report,
summarized in the AAR.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.6. Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in
the Aruba Mobility Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10 Vulnerability Assessment, Version 0.4,
June 2023, report prepared by the Evaluation team. The vulnerability analysis includes a
public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities conducted on June
16, 2023, did not uncover any residual vulnerability.
The Evaluation team searched:
• NIST National Vulnerabilities Database: https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/
search
• Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures:
o http://cve.mitre.org/cve/
o https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-search.php
• US-CERT: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/html/search
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• Tenable Network Security: https://www.tenable.com/cve
• Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative: http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories
• Offensive Security Exploit Database: https://www.exploit-db.com/
• Rapid7 Vulnerability Database: https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities
The Evaluation team performed a search using the following keywords:
• Aruba Mobility Conductor
• Aruba OpenSSL Module
• Aruba Crypto Module
• Aruba Bootloader Module
• ArubaOS 8.10
• MCR-HW-1K-F1
• MCR-HW-5K-F1
• MCR-HW-10K-F1
• MM-HW-1K-F1
• MM-HW-5K-F1
• MM-HW-10K-F1
• Intel Xeon E5-2609v4
• Intel Xeon E5-2620v4
• Intel Xeon E5-2650v4
• FreeRADIUS
• Ntp.org
• Mocana
• OpenSSH
• OpenSSL
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
8.7. Summary of Evaluation Results
The Evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The Validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the Evaluation team is that
it demonstrates that the Evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM and
performed the Evaluation Activities in CPP_ND_V2.2-SD, and correctly verified that the
product meets the claims in the ST.
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9. Validator Comments
The Validation team suggests that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated
configuration of the TOE. As stated in the Clarification of Scope, the evaluated
functionality is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the
ST, and the only evaluated functionality was that which was described by the SFRs claimed
in the ST. All other functionality provided by the TOE needs to be assessed separately and
no further conclusions can be drawn about its effectiveness.
The Validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE
being configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in ArubaOS 8.10
Supplemental Guidance (Common Criteria Configuration Guidance for Aruba Mobility
Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10-FIPS). As noted in Section 6, consumers are encouraged to
download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is
configured as evaluated. No versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or later were
evaluated.
Any additional customer documentation, not listed in Section 6, provided with the product,
or that which may be available online, was not included in the scope of the evaluation and
therefore should not be relied upon to configure or operate the TOE as evaluated.
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10. Annexes
Not applicable.
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11. Security Target
The ST for this product’s evaluation is Aruba Mobility Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10
Security Target, Version 1.2, June 2023.
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12. GLOSSARY
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL): An IT security evaluation
facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program
(NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common
Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance: The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation: The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using
the Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the
claims made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the
Common Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the
Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a
statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence: Any tangible resource (information) required from the
sponsor or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature: Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE): A group of IT products configured as an IT system,
or an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security
evaluation under the CC.
• Threat: Means through which the ability or intent of a threat agent to adversely
affect the primary functionality of the TOE, facility that contains the TOE, or
malicious operation directed towards the TOE. A potential violation of security.
• Validation: The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body: A governmental organization responsible for carrying out
validation and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common
Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme.
• Vulnerabilities: A vulnerability is a hardware, firmware, or software flaw that
leaves an Automated Information System (AIS) open for potential exploitation. A
weakness in automated system security procedures, administrative controls,
physical layout, internal controls, and so forth, which could be exploited by a threat
to gain unauthorized access to information or disrupt critical processing.
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13. Acronym List
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP)
CCEVS Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
CCIMB Common Criteria Interpretations Management Board
CCTL Common Criteria Testing Laboratories
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
LS Lightship Security USA CCTL
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MFD Multi-Function Device
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NSA National Security Agency
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program
OS Operating System
OSP Organizational Security Policies
PCL Products Compliant List
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
VR Validation Report
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14. Bibliography
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1 Revision 5,
April 2017
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security functional requirements, CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5,
April 2017
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security assurance requirements, CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5,
April 2017
4. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2017-04-004, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April
2017
5. collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, v2.2E, 23-March-2020
6. Aruba Mobility Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10 Security Target, Version 1.2,
June 2023
7. Aruba OS 8.10 Supplemental Guidance (Common Criteria Configuration
Guidance for Aruba Mobility Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10-FIPS), Version
2.6, June 2023
8. ArubaOS 8.10.0.0 User Guide, Revision 02, 2022
9. ArubaOS 8.10 Getting Started Guide, Revision 01, 2022
10. ArubaOS 8.x Command-Line Interface Reference Guide, 2023
11. ArubaOS 8.10.0.0 Syslog Reference Guide, Revision 01
12. Aruba Mobility Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10 Evaluation Technical Report,
Version 0.7, June 2023
13. Aruba Mobility Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10 Assurance Activity Report
(AAR), Version 0.11, June 2023
14. Aruba Mobility Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10 NDcPP 2.2E Test Plan, Version
0.5, June 2023,
15. Aruba Mobility Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10 NDcPP 2.2E Test Results,
Version 0.4, June 2023
16. Aruba Mobility Conductor with ArubaOS 8.10 Vulnerability Assessment,
Version 0.4, June 2023