UNCLASSIFIED
COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT
Fortinet FortiGate 6000 Series w/ FortiOS 5.6
Fortinet, Inc.
29 July 2020
383-4-491
V1.0
UNCLASSIFIED
2
FOREWORD
This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security
Establishment (CSE).
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS). This
certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian CC Scheme,
and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This report,
and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other
organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product
by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its
associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.
If your department has identified a requirement for this certification report based on business needs and would like more
detailed information, please contact:
Contact Centre and Information Services
Edward Drake Building
contact@cyber.gc.ca | 1-833-CYBER-88 (1-833-292-3788)
UNCLASSIFIED
3
OVERVIEW
The Canadian Common Criteria Scheme provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of
Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Evaluation
Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.
A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a
significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, the General Requirements
for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security
requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in
addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCEF.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are listed on the Certified Products list (CPL) for
the Canadian CC Scheme and posted on the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common
Criteria Project).
UNCLASSIFIED
4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 6
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation ........................................................................................................... 7
1.1 Common Criteria Conformance.......................................................................................................................... 7
1.2 TOE Description................................................................................................................................................. 7
1.3 TOE Architecture ............................................................................................................................................... 8
2 Security Policy......................................................................................................................................... 9
2.1 Cryptographic Functionality ............................................................................................................................... 9
3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ......................................................................................................10
3.1 Usage and Environmental Assumptions.............................................................................................................10
3.2 Clarification of Scope .......................................................................................................................................11
4 Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................................................12
4.1 Documentation.................................................................................................................................................12
5 Evaluation Analysis Activities....................................................................................................................13
5.1 Development....................................................................................................................................................13
5.2 Guidance Documents........................................................................................................................................13
5.3 Life-Cycle Support ............................................................................................................................................13
6 Testing Activities ....................................................................................................................................14
6.1 Assessment of Developer tests.........................................................................................................................14
6.2 Conduct of Testing...........................................................................................................................................14
6.3 Independent Functional Testing ........................................................................................................................14
6.3.1 Functional Test Results.................................................................................................................................14
6.4 Independent Penetration Testing.......................................................................................................................15
6.4.1 Penetration Test results................................................................................................................................15
7 Results of the Evaluation ..........................................................................................................................17
7.1 Recommendations/Comments..........................................................................................................................17
8 Supporting Content..................................................................................................................................18
8.1 List of Abbreviations.........................................................................................................................................18
8.2 References.......................................................................................................................................................18
UNCLASSIFIED
5
LIST OF FIGURES
TOE Architecture..................................................................................................................................................8
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: TOE Identification ................................................................................................................................................7
Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation(s).........................................................................................................................9
UNCLASSIFIED
6
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Fortinet FortiGate 6000 Series w/ FortiOS 5.6 (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from Fortinet,
Inc. , was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. A description of the TOE can be found in Section 1.2. The results
of this evaluation demonstrate that the TOE meets the requirements of the conformance claim listed in Table 1 for the
evaluated security functionality.
Lightship Security is the CCEF that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 29 July 2020 and was
carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the
intended environment for TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that
their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the
comments, observations and recommendations in this Certification Report.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as the Certification Body, declares that this evaluation meets all the conditions of
the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product is listed on the Certified Products
list (CPL) for the Canadian CC Scheme and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common
Criteria Project).
UNCLASSIFIED
7
1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:
Table 1: TOE Identification
TOE Name and Version Fortinet FortiGate 6000 Series w/ FortiOS 5.6
Developer Fortinet, Inc.
1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 4, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
The TOE claims the following conformance;
 collaborative Protection Profile for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls (FWcPP), Version 2.0 + Errata 20180314;
 Network Device collaborative Protection Profile Extended Package - VPN Gateway (VPN_EP), Version 2.1; and
 collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices/collaborative Protection Profile for Stateful Traffic Filter
Firewalls Extended Package for Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS_EP), Version 2.11
1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION
The TOE is a firewall that includes Virtual Private Network (VPN) and Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) capabilities. Industry
terms for this TOE type include Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW) and Unified Threat Management (UTM)
UNCLASSIFIED
8
1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE
A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:
TOE Architecture
UNCLASSIFIED
9
2 SECURITY POLICY
The TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security functional classes:
 Security Audit
 Cryptographic Support
 Residual Data Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE Access
 Trusted Path/Channels
 Stateful Traffic and Packet Filtering
 Intrusion Prevention
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST) referenced in
section 8.2.
2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONALITY
The following cryptographic implementations have been evaluated by the CAVP and are used by the TOE:
Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation(s)
Implementation Certificate Number
Fortinet FortiOS SSL 6K series Cryptographic Library v5.6 C644
Fortinet FortiOS RBG 6K series Cryptographic Library v5.6 C613
Fortinet FortiOS FIPS 6K series Cryptographic Library v5.6 C599
Fortinet CP9 Cryptographic Library v5.6 C531
UNCLASSIFIED
10
3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the
product’s installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.
3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:
 The firewall device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not subject to physical
attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere with the firewall’s physicalinterconnections and correct
operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the firewall and the data it contains. As a result, the
cPP will not include any requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP
will not expect the product to defend against physical access to the firewall that allows unauthorized entities to
extract data, bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the firewall
 The firewall device is assumed to provide networking and filtering functionality as its core function and not provide
functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For example the firewall device should
not provide computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking/filtering functionality).
 The Security Administrator(s) for the firewall device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of
security for the organization. This includes being appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance
documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy
and to lack malicious intent when administering the firewall. The firewall device is not expected to be capable of
defending against a malicious Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the firewall
device.
 The firewall device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an Administrator on a regular basis in
response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
 The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the firewall are protected by the host platform on which
they reside
 The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g.
cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on firewall equipment when the equipment is discarded
or removed from its operational environment.
 It is assumed that the TOE is connected to distinct networks in a manner that ensures that the TOE security policies
will be enforced on all applicable network traffic flowing among the attached networks.
UNCLASSIFIED
11
3.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
The TOE incorporates CAVP-validated cryptography and was not subjected to CMVP (FIPS-140) validation.
The FortiGate appliances are capable of a variety of functions and configurations which are not covered by the FWcPP and
associated Eps(Extended packages). As such, the following features have not been examined as part of this evaluation:
a) High-Availability
b) FortiExplorer client
c) Anti-spam
d) Anti-virus
e) Content filtering
f) Web filtering
g) Use of syslog
h) FortiToken and FortiSSO Authentication
i) Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP), BGP, RIP and DHCP protocols
j) Usage of the boot-time configuration menu to upgrade the TOE
k) Policy-based VPN
l) SSL VPN
m) Virtual domains (vdoms)
n) Use of NTP
o) Use of FortiCloud
UNCLASSIFIED
12
4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:
The TOE firmware (FortiOS 5.6 Version 5.6.6 Build 4265) running on the following hardware platforms;
 FG-6300F
 FG-6301F
 FG-6500F
 FG-6501F
With support from the operating environment for;
 Audit server (Fortianalyzer)
 IPsec VPN endpoints
 CRL web server
4.1 DOCUMENTATION
The following documents are provided to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:
a) FortiOS 5.6 and FortiGate NGFW Appliances FIPS 140-2 and Common Criteria Technote, 01-567-535352-20190122,
July 14, 2020
b) FortiOS Handbook - CLI Reference version 5.6.10, 01-5610-498240-20190729
c) FortiOS Log Reference Version 5.6.8, Doc No. 01-568-414447-20190131
d) FortiOS Handbook version 5.6.11, Doc No. 01-5611-497911-20190820
e) Custom IPS and Application Control Signature - Syntax Guide, Version 3.6, 43-360-453749-20200225
f) FortiOS Handbook – FortiGate-6000, Version 5.6.7, 01-567-465651-20190416
g) FortiGate-6000F System Guide, 01-545-464766-2018052
UNCLASSIFIED
13
5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process dealing with
Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.
5.1 DEVELOPMENT
The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design completely and
accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF implements the security functional
requirements. The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected
against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.
5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it
sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use
and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance, and determined
that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.
Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.
5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT
An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators
found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all of the procedures required to
maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.
UNCLASSIFIED
14
6 TESTING ACTIVITIES
Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent functional tests, and
performing penetration tests.
6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and
reviewing their test results, as documented in the Evaluation Test Report (ETR). The correspondence between the tests
identified in the developer’s test documentation and the functional specification was complete.
6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING
The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The
detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are
documented in a separate Test Results document.
6.3 INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining design and guidance
documentation.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and
results. The following testing activities were performed:
a. PP Assurance Activities: The evaluator performed the assurance activities listed in the claimed PP; and
b. Cryptographic Implementation Verification: The evaluators verified that the cryptographic implementation claimed
is present in and used by the TOE.
6.3.1 FUNCTIONAL TEST RESULTS
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance that the TOE
behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.
UNCLASSIFIED
15
6.4 INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING
The penetration testing effort focused on 4 flaw hypotheses;
 Public Vulnerability based (Type 1)
 Technical community sources (Type 2)
 Evaluation team generated (Type 3)
 Tool Generated (Type 4)
The evaluators conducted an independent review of all evaluation evidence, public domain vulnerability databases and
technical community sources (Type 1 & 2). Additionally, the evaluators used automated vulnerability scanning tools to
discover potential network, platform and application layer vulnerabilities (Type 4). Based upon this review, the evaluators
formulated flaw hypotheses (Type 3), which they used in their penetration testing effort.
6.4.1 PENETRATION TEST RESULTS
The following sources of public vulnerabilities were considered in formulating the specific list of flaws to be investigated by
the evaluators. Hypothesis sources for public vulnerabilities were:
 Fortinet security advisories (https://fortiguard.com/psirt)
 NIST National Vulnerabilities Database (can be used to access CVE and USCERT databases identified below):
https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search
 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: http://cve.mitre.org/cve/ ;https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-
search.php
 Community (Symantec) security community: https://www.securityfocus.com/
 US-CERT: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/html/search
 Tenable Network Security http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search
 Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories
 Offensive Security Exploit Database: https://www.exploit-db.com/
 Rapid7 Vulnerability Database: https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities
 OpenSSL Vulnerabilities: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html
 Google
UNCLASSIFIED
16
Type 1 Hypothesis searches were conducted on July 6, 2020 and included the following search terms:
 Fortinet;
 FortiGate;
 FortiOS;
 Firewall;
 VPN Gateway;
 Intrusion Detection System;
 TCP
 TLS;
 IPSec;
 SSH;
 Linux Kernel;
 OpenSSL;
 OpenSSH;
 Apache;
There are no type 2 hypotheses identified for the NDcPP. The evaluation team developed Type 3 & 4 flaw hypotheses in
accordance with Sections A.1.3, A.1.4, and A.2. The independent penetration testing did not uncover any residual
exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating environment.
UNCLASSIFIED
17
7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Table 1. The overall verdict for this
evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS). This
certification report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme and the
conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This is not an
endorsement of the IT product by CCCS or by any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, and no
warranty of the IT product by CCCS or by any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, is
expressed or implied.
7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS
It is recommended that all guidance outlined in Section 4.1 be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
This product is a complex UTM. Administrators are expected to be competent and trained in the concepts demanded by this
product. Administrators are expected to understand X.509 certificates (and associated PKI requirements) and understand
the security of those components. The custom IPS syntax should be properly tested before deploying. It is possible that
administrators could benefit from product-specific training
UNCLASSIFIED
18
8 SUPPORTING CONTENT
8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Term Definition
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCEF Common Criteria Evaluation Facility
CM Configuration Management
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE Communications Security Establishment
CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GC Government of Canada
IT Information Technology
ITS Information Technology Security
PP Protection Profile
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
8.2 REFERENCES
Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September
2012.
Security Target Fortinet FortiGate 6000 w/ FortiOS 5.6, 28 July 2020, v1.3
Evaluation Technical Report Fortinet FortiGate 6000 w/ FortiOS 5.6, 29 July 2020, v1.4
Assurance Activity Report Fortinet FortiGate 6000 w/ FortiOS 5.6, 29 July 2020, v1.5