IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series (Non-CAC Models)
Security Target
Version 1.1
2022-03-08
Prepared for:
15365 Barranca Pkwy,
Irvine, CA 92618
Prepared by:
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive
Columbia, Maryland 21046
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Revision History
Version Author Modifications
0.1 Leidos Initial Version
0.2 Leidos Revisions based on vendor and evaluation reviews
0.3 Leidos Updates for validator check-in comments
1.0 Leidos Minor updates for evaluator comments
1.1 Leidos Updates for validator check-out comments
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Table of Contents
1 Security Target Introduction.................................................................................................................1
1.1 Security Target, Target of Evaluation, and Common Criteria Identification..................................1
1.2 Conformance Claims.......................................................................................................................2
1.3 Conventions....................................................................................................................................3
1.3.1 Terminology ............................................................................................................................3
1.3.2 Acronyms.................................................................................................................................5
2 TOE Description ....................................................................................................................................7
2.1 Product Overview...........................................................................................................................7
2.2 TOE Overview .................................................................................................................................7
2.3 TOE Architecture ............................................................................................................................7
2.3.1 Physical Boundary .................................................................................................................11
2.4 Logical Boundary ..........................................................................................................................12
2.4.1 Security Audit........................................................................................................................13
2.4.2 User Data Protection.............................................................................................................13
2.4.3 Identification and Authentication.........................................................................................13
2.4.4 Security Management...........................................................................................................13
2.4.5 Protection of the TSF.............................................................................................................13
2.4.6 TOE Access ............................................................................................................................14
2.5 TOE Documentation .....................................................................................................................14
3 Security Problem Definition................................................................................................................15
4 Security Objectives .............................................................................................................................16
4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment .................................................................16
5 IT Security Requirements....................................................................................................................17
5.1 Extended Requirements...............................................................................................................17
5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements (PSD, MOD_AO_V1.0, MOD_KM_V1.0).........................18
5.2.1 Security Audit (FAU)..............................................................................................................19
5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP)...................................................................................................20
5.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA).................................................................................24
5.2.4 Security Management (FMT).................................................................................................25
5.2.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)....................................................................................................25
5.2.6 TOE Access (FTA)...................................................................................................................26
5.3 TOE Security Functional Requirements (DP Models) ...................................................................27
5.3.1 User Data Protection (FDP)...................................................................................................27
5.4 TOE Security Functional Requirements (H Models) .....................................................................28
5.4.1 User Data Protection (FDP)...................................................................................................28
5.5 TOE Security Functional Requirements (D Models) .....................................................................29
5.5.1 User Data Protection (FDP)...................................................................................................29
5.6 TOE Security Assurance Requirements ........................................................................................30
6 TOE Summary Specification................................................................................................................31
6.1 Security Audit (FAU_GEN.1) .........................................................................................................31
6.2 User Data Protection....................................................................................................................32
6.2.1 FDP_AFL_EXT.1 – Audio Filtration.........................................................................................32
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6.2.2 FDP_APC_EXT.1 (All Iterations); FDP_UDF_EXT.1/AO – Unidirectional Data Flow (Audio
Output); FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM – Unidirectional Data Flow (Keyboard/Mouse); FDP_UDF_EXT.1/VI –
Unidirectional Data Flow (Video Output);..........................................................................................32
6.2.3 FDP_CDS_EXT.1 – Connected Displays Supported................................................................33
6.2.4 FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM – Device Filtering (Keyboard/Mouse); FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM – Authorized
Connection Protocols (Keyboard/Mouse) ..........................................................................................33
6.2.5 FDP_PDC_EXT.1 – Peripheral Device Connection; FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO – Peripheral Device
Connection (Audio Output); FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM – Authorized Devices (Keyboard/Mouse);
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI – Peripheral Device Connection (Video Output).................................................34
6.2.6 FDP_PUD_EXT.1 – Powering Unauthorized Devices.............................................................35
6.2.7 FDP_RIP.1/KM – Residual Information Protection (Keyboard Data), FDP_RIP_EXT.1 –
Residual Information Protection and FDP_RIP_EXT.2 – Purge of Residual Information....................35
6.2.8 FDP_SWI_EXT.1 – PSD Switching; FDP_SWI_EXT.2 – PSD Switching Methods; FDP_SWI_EXT.3
– Tied Switching..................................................................................................................................36
6.2.9 TOE Video Security Function.................................................................................................36
6.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA_UAU.2/ FIA_UID.2).........................................................38
6.4 Security Management ..................................................................................................................38
6.4.1 FMT_MOF.1 – Management of Security Functions Behavior...............................................38
6.4.2 FMT_SMF.1 – Specification of Management Functions .......................................................38
6.4.3 FMT_SMR.1 – Security Roles.................................................................................................39
6.5 Protection of the TSF....................................................................................................................39
6.5.1 FPT_FLS_EXT.1 – Failure with Preservation of Secure State.................................................39
6.5.2 FPT_NTA_EXT.1 – No Access to TOE .....................................................................................40
6.5.3 FPT_PHP.1 – Passive Detection of Physical Attack and FPT_PHP.3 – Resistance to Physical
Attack 40
6.5.4 FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps .........................................................................................40
6.5.5 FPT_TST.1 – TSF Testing and FPT_TST_EXT.1 – TSF Testing..................................................40
6.6 TOE Access....................................................................................................................................42
6.6.1 FTA_CIN_EXT.1 – Continuous Indications.............................................................................42
7 Protection Profile Claims ....................................................................................................................44
8 Rationale.............................................................................................................................................46
8.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale .........................................................................................46
Appendix A Letter of Volatility....................................................................................................................48
List of Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Simplified Block Diagram of a 2-Port KVM TOE ...........................................................................10
Figure 2: Representative IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch TOE Model in its environment..............................12
Table 1: IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch TOE Models........................................................................................1
Table 2: Terms and Definitions .....................................................................................................................3
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Table 3: Acronyms.........................................................................................................................................5
Table 4: IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Console Interfaces and TOE Models..................................................8
Table 5: IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Computer Interfaces and TOE Models ..............................................9
Table 6: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment..................................................................16
Table 7: TOE Security Functional Components...........................................................................................18
Table 8: Audio Filtration Specifications ......................................................................................................20
Table 9: TOE Security Functional Components (DP Models)......................................................................27
Table 10: TOE Security Functional Components (H Models)......................................................................28
Table 11: TOE Security Functional Components (D Models)......................................................................29
Table 12: Assurance Components...............................................................................................................30
Table 13: Supported protocols by port.......................................................................................................34
Table 14: DP Models ...................................................................................................................................36
Table 15: H Models .....................................................................................................................................37
Table 16: D Models .....................................................................................................................................37
Table 17: SFR Protection Profile Sources...................................................................................................44
Table 18: Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping...........................................................................46
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1 Security Target Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE) identification, ST
conventions, ST conformance claims, and the ST organization. The TOE is IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch
Series (Non-CAC Models) provided by IOGEAR.
The Security Target contains the following additional sections:
• TOE Description (Section 2)
• Security Problem Definition (Section 3)
• Security Objectives (Section 4)
• IT Security Requirements(Section 5)
• TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)
• Protection Profile Claims (Section 7)
• Rationale (Section 8)
1.1 Security Target, Target of Evaluation, and Common Criteria Identification
ST Title: IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series (Non-CAC Models) Security Target
ST Version: Version 1.1
ST Date: 2022-03-08
Target of Evaluation (TOE) Identification: IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series (Non-CAC Models)
TOE Versions: The following table identifies the model numbers per configuration. The firmware version
for all models is v1.1.101.
Table 1: IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch TOE Models
Configuration 2-Port 4-Port 8-Port
DisplayPort
Single Head GCS1412TAA4 GCS1414TAA4 GCS1418TAA4
Dual Head GCS1422TAA4 GCS1424TAA4 GCS1428TAA4
HDMI
Single Head GCS1312TAA4 GCS1314TAA4 N/A
Dual Head GCS1322TAA4 GCS1324TAA4 N/A
DVI
Single Head GCS1212TAA4 GCS1214TAA4 GCS1218TAA4
Dual Head GCS1222TAA4 GCS1224TAA4 GCS1228TAA4
The TOE includes a wired remote controller: Remote Peripheral Selector (RPS) that is available to
customers as an additional purchase. This device has the same firmware version as the models above.
TOE Developer: IOGEAR
Evaluation Sponsor: IOGEAR
CC Identification: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017.
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1.2 Conformance Claims
This ST and the TOE it describes are conformant to the following CC specifications:
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security Functional
Components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
• Part 2 Extended
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security Assurance
Components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
• Part 3 Conformant
This ST and the TOE it describes claim exact conformance to the following PP-Configuration: PP-
Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device, Analog Audio Output Devices, Keyboard/Mouse Devices,
and Video/Display Devices, 19 July 2019 (CFG_PSD-AO-KM-VI_V1.0)
This PP-Configuration includes the following components:
• Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, Version 4.0, 19 July 2019 (PP_PSD_V4.0) or
[PSD]
o including the following optional and selection-based SFRs: FAU_GEN.1, FDP_RIP_EXT.2,
FDP_SWI_EXT.2, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2, FMT_MOF.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FPT_PHP.3,
FPT_STM.1, and FTA_CIN_EXT.1.
• PP-Module for Analog Audio Output Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July 2019 (MOD_AO_V1.0).
• PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July 2019 (MOD_KM_V1.0)
o including the following optional and selection-based SFRs: FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM,
FDP_RIP.1/KM, and FDP_SWI_EXT.3.
• PP-Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July 2019 (MOD_VI_V1.0)
o including the following selection-based SFRs: FDP_CDS_EXT.1, FDP_IPC_EXT.1,
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP(DP), FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DVI-I(D), and FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI(H).
The following NIAP Technical Decisions are applicable to the claimed Protection Profile and Modules:
• TD0593 – Equivalency Arguments for PSD
• TD0586 – DisplayPort and HDMI Interfaces in FDP_IPC_EXT.1
• TD0585 – Update to FDP_APC_EXT.1 Audio Output Tests
• TD0584 – Update to FDP APC_EXT.1 Video Tests
• TD0583 – FPT_PHP.3 modified for PSD remote controllers
• TD0557 – Correction to Audio Filtration Specification Table in FDP_AFL_EXT.1
• TD0539 – Incorrect Selection Trigger in FTA_CIN_EXT.1 in MOD_VI_V1.0
The TOE does not fit the Combiner Use Case and so the specific assignment required by the VI Module
does not apply.
• TD0518 – Typographical Error in Dependency Table
• TD0514 – Correction to MOD_VI FDP_APC_EXT.1 Test 3 Step 6
• TD0507 – Clarification on USB Plug Type
• TD0506 – Missing Steps to Disconnect and Reconnect Display
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1.3 Conventions
The Security Functional Requirements included in this section are derived from Part 2 of the Common
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, with additional extended
functional components.
The CC defines operations on Security Functional Requirements: assignments, selections, assignments
within selections, iterations, and refinements. This document retains all operations completed by the PP
author (i.e. selections/assignments they already filled out). These are formatted as italicized text.
This document uses the following font conventions to identify iterations, extended SFRs and operations
performed by the ST author:
• Refinement operation (denoted by bold text and underline) is used to add details to a requirement,
and thus further restricts a requirement.
• Selection (denoted by italicized bold text): is used to select one or more options provided by the
[CC] in stating a requirement. Selection operations completed in the PP are shown in brackets.
• Assignment operation (denoted by bold text) is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified
parameter, such as the length of a password. Showing the value in square brackets indicates
assignment. Assignments within Selections are denoted by italicized bold text).
• Iteration operation is identified with a slash (‘/’) and an identifier (e.g. “/KM”). Additional iterations
made by the ST author are defined with a reference in parentheses to the specific TOE models they
apply to, e.g. “(DP)” indicates the SFR only applies to DisplayPort models. Though technically not an
iteration FDP_IPC_EXT.1, also uses this convention to clarify that this requirement only applies to
certain models.
• Extended SFRs are identified by having a label “EXT” after the SFR name.
1.3.1 Terminology
Table 2: Terms and Definitions
Term Definition
Aligned Detected and accepted the connection by the KVM.
Assurance Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs.
Authorized Peripheral A Peripheral Device that is both technically supported and administratively
permitted to have an active interface with the PSD.
Combiner (multi-viewer) A PSD with video integration functionality that is used to simultaneously display
output from multiple personal computers (PCs).
Common Criteria (CC) Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM)
Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation.
Computer Interface The PSD’s physical receptacle or port for connecting to a computer.
Configurable Device
Filtration (CDF)
A PSD function that filters traffic based on properties of a connected peripheral
device and criteria that are configurable by an Administrator.
Connected Computer A computing device connected to a PSD. May be a personal computer, server,
tablet, or any other computing device.
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Term Definition
Connected Peripheral A Peripheral that is connected to a PSD.
Connection A physical or logical conduit that enables Devices to interact through respective
interfaces. May consist of one or more physical (e.g., a cable) or logical (e.g., a
protocol) components.
Connector The plug on a Connection that attaches to a Computer or Peripheral Interface.
Device An information technology product. In the context of this PP, a Device is a PSD, a
Connected Computer, or a Connected Peripheral.
Display A device that visually outputs user data, such as a monitor.
Interface A shared boundary across which two or more Devices exchange information
through a Connection.
KM A type of PSD that shares a keyboard and pointing device between Connected
Computers. A KM may optionally include an analog audio device.
KVM A type of PSD that shares a keyboard, video, and pointing device between
Connected Computers. A KVM may optionally include an analog audio device and
user authentication device.
Letter of Volatility A letter issued by the manufacturer outlining whether onboard memory can store
data when the device is powered off (non‐volatile) or not (volatile).
Monitoring The ability of a User to receive an indicator of the current Active Interface.
Non-Selected Computer A Connected Computer that has no Active Interfaces with the PSD.
Peripheral Interface The PSD’s physical receptacle or port for connecting to a Peripheral Device.
Peripheral/Peripheral
Device
A Device with access that can be Shared or Filtered by a PSD.
Protection Profile (PP) An implementation‐independent set of security requirements for a category of
products.
Remote Controller Remote component of the PSD that extends the controls and indications through
a cable.
Secure State An operating condition in which the PSD disables all connected peripheral and
connected computer interfaces when the correctness of its functions cannot be
ensured.
Security Assurance
Requirement (SAR)
A requirement to assure the security of the TOE.
Security Functional
Requirement (SFR)
A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE.
Security Target (ST) Implementation‐independent documentation that describes a TOE, its
Operational Environment, and its claimed security functionality.
Selected Computer A Connected Computer that has Active Interfaces with the PSD.
Supported Peripheral A Peripheral Device that is technically supported by the PSD.
Target of Evaluation(TOE) A product or component, consisting of hardware, software, and/or firmware, that
claims to implement certain security functionality in a specific and well-defined
manner.
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Term Definition
TOE Security Functionality
(TSF)
The combined hardware, software, and firmware capabilities of a TOE that are
responsible for implementation of its claimed SFRs.
TOE Security Functionality
Interface (TSFI)
Any external interface between the TOE and its Operational Environment that has
a security‐relevant purpose or is used to transmit security‐relevant data.
TOE Summary Specification
(TSS)
Documentation contained within the Security Target that provides the reader
with a description of how the TOE implements the claimed SFRs.
User A person that interacts with a PSD (or a process or mechanism acting on behalf of
a person).
User Authentication Device A Peripheral Device that is used to affirm the identity of a User attempting to
authenticate to a computer (e.g., smart card reader, biometric authentication
device, proximity card reader).
User Data Information that the User inputs to the Connected Computer or is output to the
User from the Connected Computer (and including user authentication and
credential information)
1.3.2 Acronyms
Table 3: Acronyms
Acronym Definition
ARC Audio Return Channel
AUX Display Port Auxiliary Channel
CAC Common Access Card
CDF Configurable Device Filtering
CEC Consumer Electronics Control
DVI Digital Visual Interface
EDID Extended Display Identification Data
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
HD High Definition
HDCP High‐bandwidth Digital Content Protection
HDMI High Definition Multimedia Interface
HEAC HDMI Ethernet Audio Control
HEC HDMI Ethernet Channel
HID Human Interface Device
HPD Hot Plug Detect
IT Information Technology
KVM Keyboard, Video, and Mouse
LED Light-Emitting Diode
MCCS Hot Plug Detect
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Acronym Definition
PC Personal Computer
PSD Peripheral Sharing Device
RPS Remote Port Selector
SFP Security Function Policy
USB Universal Serial Bus
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2 TOE Description
2.1 Product Overview
The TOE is the IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series (non CAC Models). Each of the sixteen models identified
in Section 1.1 is a Peripheral Sharing Device that include console ports and computer ports. The console
ports are used to connect a single set of peripherals, including a mouse, keyboard, speaker, and one or
two video displays (depending on specific device type) to the TOE. The TOE’s computer ports are
connected to up to 2, 4, or 8 separate computers (again depending on specific device type). The user can
then securely switch the connected console peripherals between any of the connected computers while
preventing unauthorized data flows or leakage between computers. The TOE supports manual port
switching using a press and release a port selection push button (on the switch, or on the Remote Port
Selector (RPS) if connected and aligned) to bring the KVM focus to the computer attached to its
corresponding port.
2.2 TOE Overview
The TOE is the IOGEAR Secure Switch series of products without CAC. The TOE allows users to connect a
single set of peripherals to its console ports to interact with multiple computers that are connected to it
via its computer ports. Controls on the TOE chassis or on the RPS allow the user to select which of the
connected computers is ‘active’ such that the peripherals connected to the console can be used to interact
with the selected computer.
The TOE’s console ports support USB keyboard and mouse, analog audio out (speakers), and depending
on model, DisplayPort, HDMI or DVI-I display.
The TOE’s computer ports support USB keyboard and mouse, analog audio, and depending on model,
DisplayPort, HDMI, or DVI-I display.
The TOE includes multiple models, all with the same basic functionality. The differences between models
are:
• The type of display interface supported on the console ports (DisplayPort, HDMI or DVI-I)
• The type of display interface supported on the computer ports (DisplayPort, HDMI, or DVI-I)
• The number of sets of computer ports, which determines how many computers can be connected to
the TOE at one time (up to 2, 4, or 8)
2.3 TOE Architecture
The IOGEAR Secure KVM series are KVM switches with the following characteristics:
• 2/4/8 port USB DisplayPort single and dual display for DisplayPort (6 devices)
• 2/4 port USB HDMI single and dual display for HDMI (4 devices)
• 2/4/8 port USB DVI single and dual display for DVI (6 devices).
The Secure KVM Switch products allow for the connection of a mouse, keyboard, and one or two video
displays (depending on specific device type) to the Secure KVM Switch, which is then connected to 2, up
to 4, or up to 8 separate computers (again depending on specific device type). The user can then switch
the connected peripherals between any of the connected computers using a push button on the front of
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the device or on the RPS. The selected device is always identifiable by a bright orange LED associated with
the applicable selection button.
To interface with connected computers, the Secure KVM Switch products support analog audio output
and USB connections for the keyboard/mouse device. Depending on model, they support DisplayPort,
DVI-I, or HDMI for the computer video display interface. The switched peripherals on the console side are
analog audio output, USB keyboard and mouse, and DisplayPort, HDMI or DVI-I video output (depending
on model).
Separate USB cables are used to connect the keyboard/mouse combination to the connected computers.
The Secure KVM Switch products supporting DisplayPort convert the DisplayPort video signal to HDMI.
The HDMI signal inside the KVM will be converted again to DisplayPort signal for output to the connected
video display(s) and the AUX channel is monitored and converted to EDID. The Secure KVM Switch
products also support audio output connections from the computers to a connected audio output device.
Only speaker connections are supported and the use of an analog microphone or line-in audio device is
prohibited. The tables below identify the interfaces of the Secure KVM console and computer ports
according to model number.
Table 4: IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Console Interfaces and TOE Models
Model No.
Console Video Output
Interface
Console
Keyboard
Console
Mouse
Console Audio
output
DisplayPort HDMI DVI-I USB 1.1/2.0 USB 1.1/2.0
3.5mm Analog
Audio output
(Speaker)
GCS1412TAA4 • • • •
GCS1422TAA4 • • • •
GCS1312TAA4 • • • •
GCS1322TAA4 • • • •
GCS1212TAA4 • • • •
GCS1222TAA4 • • • •
GCS1414TAA4 • • • •
GCS1424TAA4 • • • •
GCS1314TAA4 • • • •
GCS1324TAA4 • • • •
GCS1214TAA4 • • • •
GCS1224TAA4 • • • •
GCS1418TAA4 • • • •
GCS1428TAA4 • • • •
GCS1218TAA4 • • • •
GCS1228TAA4 • • • •
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Table 5: IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Computer Interfaces and TOE Models
Model No.
Computer Video Input
Interface
Computer
Keyboard / Mouse
Computer Audio
Input
DisplayPort HDMI DVI-I
USB
1.1/2.0
3.5mm Analog
Audio Input
(Speaker)
GCS1412TAA4 • • •
GCS1422TAA4 • • •
GCS1312TAA4 • • •
GCS1322TAA4 • • •
GCS1212TAA4 • • •
GCS1222TAA4 • • •
GCS1414TAA4 • • •
GCS1424TAA4 • • •
GCS1314TAA4 • • •
GCS1324TAA4 • • •
GCS1214TAA4 • • •
GCS1224TAA4 • • •
GCS1418TAA4 • • •
GCS1428TAA4 • • •
GCS1218TAA4 • • •
GCS1228TAA4 • • •
The IOGEAR Secure KVM products implement a secure isolation design for all models to share a single set
of peripheral components. Each peripheral has its own dedicated data path. USB keyboard and mouse
peripherals are filtered and emulated. DisplayPort video from the selected computer is converted
internally to HDMI, then back to DisplayPort for communication with the connected video display and the
AUX channel is monitored and converted to EDID.
The Secure KVM Switch products are designed to enforce the allowed and disallowed data flows between
user peripheral devices and connected computers as specified in [PSD]. Data leakage is prevented across
the TOE to avoid compromise of the user's information. The Secure KVM Switch products automatically
clear the internal TOE keyboard and mouse buffers.
Figure 1 shows the data path design using a 2-Port KVM as an example.
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Figure 1: Simplified Block Diagram of a 2-Port KVM TOE
As shown in Figure 1 above, the internal components of the KVM consist of switches, emulators, USB host
controllers, processors, and embedded with non-updateable firmware v1.1.101. The internal hardware
components are identified in Appendix A and include the manufacturer and the part number. The data
flow of USB keyboard/mouse is controlled by the host controller for console HID keyboard and pointing
devices. Details of the data flow architecture are provided in the proprietary Secure KVM Isolation
Document. All keyboard and mouse connections are filtered first, and only authorized devices will be
allowed. The TOE emulates data from authorized USB keyboard and mouse to USB data for computer
sources.
The TOEs proprietary design ensures there is no possibility of data leakage from a user’s peripheral output
device to the input device; ensures that no unauthorized data flows from the monitor to a connected
computer; and unidirectional buffers ensure that the audio data can travel only from the selected
computer to the audio device. There is no possibility of data leakage between computers or from a
peripheral device connected to a console port to a non-selected computer. Each connected computer has
its own independent Device Controller, power circuit, and EEPROM. Additionally, keyboard and mouse
are always switched together.
All Secure KVM Switch components including the RPS, feature hardware security mechanisms including
tamper-evident labels, always active chassis-intrusion detection, and tamper-proof hardware
construction, while software security includes restricted USB connectivity (non-Human Interface Devices
(HIDs) are ignored when switching), an isolated channel per port that makes it impossible for data to be
communicated between computers, and automatic clearing of the keyboard and mouse buffer.
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A detailed description of the TOE security features can be found in Section 6 (TOE Summary Specification).
2.3.1 Physical Boundary
The TOE includes the RPS and hardware models identified in Section 1.1 along with embedded firmware
v1.1.101 and corresponding documentation identified in Section 2.5 below.
An optional KVM cable set (not supplied with the TOE) is available as a separate purchase. The KVM cable
sets are built for the KVM connection to the PCs, providing better compatibility. Users can connect the
KVM and PCs using their own cable sets as long as the protocols are compatible but the vendor KVM cable
sets are recommended. The TOE was tested using the cable sets mentioned above and the following
adapters:
• G2LU3CHD02 (USB-C to HDMI cable)
• G2LU3CDP12 (USB-C to DP cable)
• GDPHD4KA (Active DP-to-HDMI adapter)
• GDPDVI4KA (Active DP-to-DVI adapter)
While the cable sets and adapters were supplied, they were not included in the evaluation because they
are considered part of the operational environment, along with the switched PCs, peripheral devices,
DisplayPort / HDMI / DVI-I monitors, USB keyboard, USB mouse, 3.5mm audio output (e.g. speakers) and
the host computers.
The following figure shows a representative TOE and its environment. In particular, it shows a four port,
single-head KVM and its connections.
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Figure 2: Representative IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch TOE Model in its environment
The IOGEAR Secure KVM devices do not include any wireless interfaces. The IOGEAR Secure KVM devices
have been tested and found to comply with the radio frequency emissions limits for a Class A digital
device, pursuant to Part 15 of the Federal Communications Commission rules. If not installed and used in
accordance with the guidance instructions, the device may cause harmful interference to radio
communications. This evaluation did not test for RFI leakage of information.
2.4 Logical Boundary
This section summarizes the security functions provided by the TOE:
• Security Audit
• User Data Protection
• Identification and authentication
• Security Management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE Access
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2.4.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates audit records for the authorized administrator actions. Each audit record records a
standard set of information such as date and time of the event, type of event, and the outcome (success
or failure) of the event.
2.4.2 User Data Protection
The TOE controls and isolates information flowing between the peripheral device interfaces and a
computer interface. The peripheral devices supported include USB keyboard; USB mouse; audio output;
and (depending on device type) DisplayPort, DVI-I, or HDMI video. Some TOE models accept DisplayPort
signals at the computer interface and internally convert the signals to HDMI signals and then convert back
to DisplayPort for output to the console interface.
The TOE authorizes peripheral device connections with the TOE console ports based on the peripheral
device type.
The TOE ensures that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the
deallocation of the resource from a TOE computer interface immediately after the TOE switches to
another selected computer and on start-up of the TOE.
The TOE provides a Reset to Factory Default function allowing authenticated authorized Administrators
to remove all settings previously configured by the Administrator (such as USB device whitelist/blacklist).
Once the Reset to Factory Default function has been completed, the Secure KVM will terminate the
Administrator Logon mode, purge keyboard/mouse buffer, and power cycle the Secure KVM
automatically.
2.4.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE provides an identification and authentication function for the administrative user to perform
administrative functions such as configuring the keyboard/mouse device filtering blacklist. The
authorized administrator must logon by providing a valid password.
2.4.4 Security Management
The management functions are restricted to the authorized administrator and allow the TOE to be
configured to reject specific USB keyboard/mouse devices using CDF blacklist parameters. Additionally,
the TOE provides security management functions to Reset to Factory Default and to change the
administrator password.
2.4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE runs a suite of self-tests during initial startup and after activating the reset button that includes
a test of the basic TOE hardware and firmware integrity; a test of the basic computer-to-computer
isolation; and a test of critical security functions (i.e., user control and anti-tampering). The TOE provides
users with the capability to verify the integrity of the TSF and the TSF functionality.
The TOE resists physical attacks on the main TOE enclosure as well as the RPS enclosure for the purpose
of gaining access to the internal components or to damage the anti-tampering battery by becoming
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permanently disabled. The TOE preserves a secure state by disabling the TOE when there is a failure of
the power on self-test, or a failure of the anti-tampering function.
The TOE provides unambiguous detection of physical tampering that might compromise the TSF. The TSF
provides the capability to determine whether physical tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements
has occurred.
2.4.6 TOE Access
The TOE displays a continuous visual indication of the computer to which the user is currently
connected, including on power up, and on reset.
2.5 TOE Documentation
There are several documents that provide information and guidance for the deployment and usage of
the TOE. In particular, the following guides reference the security-related guidance material for all
devices in the evaluated configuration.
Guidance Documentation:
• IOGEAR 2/4/8-Port USB DVI/HDMI/DisplayPort Single/Dual View Secure KVM Switch Administrator’s
Guide, Version 1.03, 2021-5-5
• IOGEAR Single/Dual View Secure KVM Switch User Manual 2/4/8-Port USB DVI/HDMI/DisplayPort,
Version 1.03, 2021-5-5
• IOGEAR 2/4/8-Port USB DVI/HDMI/DisplayPort Single/Dual View Secure KVM Switch Admin Log
Audit Code, Version 1.03, 2021-5-5
TOE Documentation:
• PP4.0 Secure KVM Isolation Document, Version 1.1 (Proprietary)
o Note: The PP4.0 Secure KVM Isolation Document is proprietary as permitted by PSD 4.0 Annex
D.1 Isolation Document and Assessment.
o The isolation document supplements the security target Section 6 TOE Summary Specification in
order to demonstrate the TOE provides isolation between connected computers. In particular,
the isolation document describes how the TOE mitigates the risk of each unauthorized data flow
listed in PSD 4.0 Annex D and Evaluation Activities specified in the PP v4.0 and modules.
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3 Security Problem Definition
This security target includes by reference the Security Problem Definition from the [PSD],
[MOD_AO_V1.0], and [MOD_VI_V1.0]. The Security Problem Definition consists of threats that a
conformant TOE is expected to address and assumptions about the operational environment of the TOE.
In general, the [PSD] has presented a Security Problem Definition appropriate for peripheral sharing
devices. The IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series supports KVM (USB Keyboard/Mouse, analog audio (out),
DisplayPort, DVI-I and HDMI video) peripheral switch functionality by combining a 2/4/8 port KVM switch,
and an audio output port. As such, the [PSD] Security Problem Definition applies to the TOE.
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4 Security Objectives
Like the Security Problem Definition, this Security Target includes by reference the Security Objectives
from the [PSD], [MOD_VI_V1.0], [MOD_AO_V1.0], and [MOD_KM_V1.0].
The [PSD], [MOD_AO_V1.0], and [MOD_VI_V1.0] security objectives for the operational environment are
reproduced below, since these objectives characterize technical and procedural measures each consumer
must implement in their operational environment.
In general, the [PSD] has presented a Security Objectives statement appropriate for peripheral sharing
devices. Consequently, the [PSD] security objectives are suitable for the TOE.
4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Table 6: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Objective Description
OE.NO_MICROPHONES (from
[MOD_AO_V1.0])
The operational environment is expected to ensure that
microphones are not plugged into the TOE audio output interfaces.
OE.NO_SPECIAL_ANALOG_CAPABILITIES
(from [MOD_VI_V1.0])
The operational environment will not have special analog data
collection cards or peripherals such as analog to digital interface,
high performance audio interface, or a component with digital signal
processing or analog video capture functions.
OE. NO_TEMPEST (from [PSD]) The operational environment will not use TEMPEST approved
equipment.
OE.NO_WIRELESS_DEVICES (from [PSD]) The operational environment will not include wireless keyboards,
mice, audio, user authentication, or video devices.
OE.PHYSICAL (from [PSD]) The operational environment will provide physical security,
commensurate with the value of the PSD and the data that transits
it.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN (from [PSD]) The operational environment will ensure that trusted PSD
Administrators and users are appropriately trained.
OE.TRUSTED_CONFIG (from [PSD]) The operational environment will ensure that administrators
configuring the PSD and its operational environment follow the
applicable security configuration guidance.
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5 IT Security Requirements
This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements
(SARs) that serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to
scope the evaluation effort.
The SFRs have all been drawn from the Protection Profile: [PSD] and the modules: [MOD_AO_V1.0],
[MOD_KM_V1.0], and [MOD_VI_V1.0], and include some of the optional and selection-based SFRs. As a
result, refinements and operations already performed in that PP and modules are not identified (e.g.,
highlighted) here, rather the requirements have been copied from that PP and any residual operations
have been completed herein. Of particular note, the [PSD] and modules made a number of refinements
and completed some of the SFR operations defined in the CC and that PP should be consulted to identify
those changes if necessary.
The SARs are the set of SARs specified in [PSD].
5.1 Extended Requirements
All of the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the [PSD] and the modules:
[MOD_AO_V1.0], [MOD_KM_V1.0], and [MOD_VI_V1.0]. The [PSD] and modules define the following
extended SFRs and since they are not redefined in this ST, the [PSD] and associated modules should be
consulted for more information in regard to those CC extensions.
• FDP_AFL_EXT.1 – Audio Filtration
• FDP_APC_EXT.1 – Active PSD Connections
• FDP_CDS_EXT.1 – Connected Displays Supported
• FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM – Device Filtering (Keyboard/Mouse)
• FDP_IPC_EXT.1(DP) – Internal Protocol Conversion
• FDP_PDC_EXT.1 – Peripheral Device Connection
• FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO – Peripheral Device Connection (Audio Output)
• FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM – Authorized Devices (Keyboard/Mouse)
• FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI – Peripheral Device Connection (Video Output)
• FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM – Authorized Connection Protocols (Keyboard/Mouse)
• FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(DP) – Authorized Connection Protocols (DP Models)
• FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(H) – Authorized Connection Protocols (H Models)
• FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(D) – Authorized Connection Protocols (D Models)
• FDP_PUD_EXT.1 – Powering Unauthorized Devices
• FDP_RIP_EXT.1 – Residual Information Protection
• FDP_RIP_EXT.2 – Purge of Residual Information
• FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP(DP) – Sub-Protocol Rules (DisplayPort Protocol)
• FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DVI-I(D) – Sub-Protocol Rules (DVI-I Protocol)
• FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI(H) – Sub-Protocol Rules (HDMI Protocol)
• FDP_SWI_EXT.1 – PSD Switching
• FDP_SWI_EXT.2 – PSD Switching Methods
• FDP_SWI_EXT.3 – Tied Switching
• FDP_UDF_EXT.1/AO – Unidirectional Data Flow (Audio Output)
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• FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM – Unidirectional Data Flow (Keyboard/Mouse)
• FDP_UDF_EXT.1/VI – Unidirectional Data Flow (Video Output)
• FPT_FLS_EXT.1 – Failure with Preservation of Secure State
• FPT_NTA_EXT.1 – No Access to TOE
• FPT_TST_EXT.1 – TSF Testing
• FTA_CIN_EXT.1 – Continuous Indications
5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements (PSD, MOD_AO_V1.0, MOD_KM_V1.0)
This section identifies the TOE Security Functional Requirements for the PSD 4.0, and modules
[MOD_AO_V1.0], [MOD_KM_V1.0]. Section 5.3 identifies the requirements for the Video/Display Device
Module.
Tables 7, 9, 10 and 11 identify the SFRs that are satisfied by the TOE.
Table 7: TOE Security Functional Components
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FAU: Security Audit FAU_GEN.1 – Audit Data Generation
FDP: User Data Protection FDP_AFL_EXT.1 – Audio Filtration
FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO – Active PSD Connections (Audio Output)
FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM – Active PSD Connections (Keyboard/Mouse)
FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI – Active PSD Connections (Video/Display)
FDP_CDS_EXT.1 – Connected Displays Supported
FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM – Device Filtering (Keyboard/Mouse)
FDP_PDC_EXT.1 – Peripheral Device Connection
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO – Peripheral Device Connection (Audio Output)
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM – Authorized Devices (Keyboard/Mouse)
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI – Peripheral Device Connection (Video Output)
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM – Authorized Connection Protocols (Keyboard/Mouse)
FDP_PUD_EXT.1 – Powering Unauthorized Devices
FDP_RIP.1/KM – Residual Information Protection (Keyboard Data)
FDP_RIP_EXT.1 – Residual Information Protection
FDP_RIP_EXT.2 – Purge of Residual Information
FDP_SWI_EXT.1 – PSD Switching
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Requirement Class Requirement Component
FDP_SWI_EXT.2 – PSD Switching Methods
FDP_SWI_EXT.3 – Tied Switching
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/AO – Unidirectional Data Flow (Audio Output)
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM – Unidirectional Data Flow (Keyboard/Mouse)
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/VI – Unidirectional Data Flow (Video Output)
FIA: Identification and
Authentication
FIA_UAU.2 – User Authentication Before Any Action
FIA_UID.2 – User Identification Before Any Action
FMT: Security Management FMT_MOF.1 – Management of Security Functions Behavior
FMT_SMF.1 – Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 – Security Roles
FPT: Protection of the TSF FPT_FLS_EXT.1 – Failure with Preservation of Secure State
FPT_NTA_EXT.1 – No Access to TOE
FPT_PHP.1 – Passive Detection of Physical Attack
FPT_PHP.3 – Resistance to Physical Attack
FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps
FPT_TST.1 – TSF Testing
FPT_TST_EXT.1 – TSF Testing
FTA: TOE Access FTA_CIN_EXT.1 – Continuous Indications
5.2.1 Security Audit (FAU)
5.2.1.1 Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1)
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable
events:
a. Start‐up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b. All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and
c. [administrator login, administrator logout, self‐test failures, peripheral
device acceptance and rejections, [modification of the TOE keyboard,
mouse filtering blacklist, Reset to Factory Default, view audit logs,
change password]].
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
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a. Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if
applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b. For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of
the functional components included in the PP/ST, [no other
information].
5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP)
5.2.2.1 Audio Filtration (FDP_AFL_EXT.1)
FDP_AFL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall ensure outgoing audio signals are filtered as per [Audio Filtration
Specifications table1
].
Table 8: Audio Filtration Specifications
Frequency (kHz) Minimum Attenuation (dB) Maximum Voltage After
Attenuation
14 23.9 127.65 mV
15 26.4 95.73 mV
16 30.8 57.68 mV
17 35.0 35.57 mV
18 38.8 22.96 mV
19 43.0 14.15 mV
20 46.0 10.02 mV
30 71.4 0.53 mV
40 71.4 0.53 mV
50 71.4 0.53 mV
60 71.4 0.53 mV
5.2.2.2 Active PSD Connections (Audio Output) (FDP_APC_EXT.1/AO)
FDP_APC_EXT.1.1/AO The TSF shall route user data only from the interfaces selected by the user.
FDP_APC_EXT.1.2/AO The TSF shall ensure that no data or electrical signals flow between connected
computers whether the TOE is powered on or powered off.
FDP_APC_EXT.1.3/AO The TSF shall ensure that no data transits the TOE when the TOE is powered off.
FDP_APC_EXT.1.4/AO The TSF shall that no data transits the TOE when the TOE is in a failure state.
Application Note: This SFR is originally defined in the Base-PP but is refined and iterated to apply
to the audio output interface per section 5.1.2 of the Audio Output PP-Module.
1
TD0557 modified the Maximum Voltage After Attenuation for 30-60 kHz to 0.53 mV in Table 8.
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5.2.2.3 Active PSD Connections (Keyboard/Mouse) (FDP_APC_EXT.1/KM)
FDP_APC_EXT.1.1/KM The TSF shall route user data only to the interfaces selected by the user.
FDP_APC_EXT.1.2/KM The TSF shall ensure that no data or electrical signals flow between connected
computers whether the TOE is powered on or powered off.
FDP_APC_EXT.1.3/KM The TSF shall ensure that no data transits the TOE when the TOE is powered off.
FDP_APC_EXT.1.4/KM The TSF shall that no data transits the TOE when the TOE is in a failure state
Application Note: This SFR is originally defined in the Base-PP but is refined and iterated to apply
to the keyboard/mouse interface per section 5.1.2 of the Keyboard/Mouse PP-
Module.
5.2.2.4 Active PSD Connections (Video/Display) (FDP_APC_EXT.1/VI)
FDP_APC_EXT.1.1/VI The TSF shall route user data only from the interfaces selected by the user.
FDP_APC_EXT.1.2/VI The TSF shall ensure that no data or electrical signals flow between connected
computers whether the TOE is powered on or powered off.
FDP_APC_EXT.1.3/VI The TSF shall ensure that no data transits the TOE when the TOE is powered off.
FDP_APC_EXT.1.4/VI The TSF shall that no data transits the TOE when the TOE is in a failure state.
Application Note: This SFR is originally defined in the Base-PP but is refined and iterated to apply
to the video interface per section 5.1.2 of the Video/Display PP-Module.
5.2.2.5 Connected Displays Supported (FDP_CDS_EXT.1)
FDP_CDS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall support [one connected display for TOE models beginning with
GCS141, GCS131, GCS121, multiple connected displays for all other TOE models]
at a time.
5.2.2.6 Device Filtering (Keyboard/Mouse) (FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM)
FDP_FIL_EXT.1.1/KM The TSF shall have [configurable] device filtering for [keyboard, mouse]
interfaces.
FDP_FIL_EXT.1.2/KM The TSF shall consider all [PSD KM] blacklisted devices as unauthorized devices
for [keyboard, mouse] interfaces in peripheral device connections.
FDP_FIL_EXT.1.3/KM The TSF shall consider all [PSD KM] whitelisted devices as authorized devices for
[keyboard, mouse] interfaces in peripheral device connections only if they are
not on the [PSD KM] blacklist or otherwise unauthorized.
5.2.2.7 Peripheral Device Connection (FDP_PDC_EXT.1)
FDP_PDC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall reject connections with unauthorized devices upon TOE power up
and upon connection of a peripheral device to a powered‐on TOE.
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FDP_PDC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall reject connections with devices presenting unauthorized interface
protocols upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a
powered‐on TOE.
FDP_PDC_EXT.1.3 The TOE shall have no external interfaces other than those claimed by the TSF.
FDP_PDC_EXT.1.4 The TOE shall not have wireless interfaces.
FDP_PDC_EXT.1.5 The TOE shall provide a visual or auditory indication to the User when a
peripheral is rejected.
5.2.2.8 Peripheral Device Connection (Audio Output) (FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO)
FDP_PDC_EXT.2.1/AO The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices as defined in [Appendix
E of the AO Module] and [
• authorized devices and functions as defined in the PP‐Module for
Keyboard/Mouse Devices,
• authorized devices as defined in the PP‐Module for Video/Display Devices,
] upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a powered-
on TOE.
FDP_PDC_EXT.2.2/AO The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices presenting authorized
interface protocols as defined in [Appendix E of the AO Module] and [
• authorized devices presenting authorized interface protocols as defined in
the PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices,
• authorized devices presenting authorized interface protocols as defined in
the PP‐Module for Video/Display Devices,
] upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a powered-
on TOE.
5.2.2.9 Authorized Devices (Keyboard/Mouse) (FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM)
FDP_PDC_EXT.2.1/KM The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices and functions as
defined in [Appendix E of the KM Module] and [
• authorized devices as defined in the PP‐Module for Audio Output Devices,
• authorized devices as defined in the PP‐Module for Video/Display Devices,
] upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a powered-
on TOE.
FDP_PDC_EXT.2.2/KM The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices presenting authorized
interface protocols as defined in [Appendix E of the KM Module] and [
• authorized devices presenting authorized interface protocols as defined in
the PP‐Module for Audio Output Devices,
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• authorized devices presenting authorized interface protocols as defined in
the PP‐Module for Video/Display Devices,
] upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a powered-
on TOE.
5.2.2.10 Peripheral Device Connection (Video Output) (FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI)
FDP_PDC_EXT.2.1/VI The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices as defined in [Appendix
E of the VI Module] and [
• authorized devices as defined in the PP‐Module for Audio Output Devices,
• authorized devices and functions as defined in the PP‐Module for
Keyboard/Mouse Devices,
] upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a powered-
on TOE.
FDP_PDC_EXT.2.2/VI The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices presenting authorized
interface protocols as defined in [Appendix E of the VI Module] and [
• authorized devices presenting authorized interface protocols as defined in
the PP‐Module for Audio Output Devices,
• authorized devices presenting authorized interface protocols as defined in
the PP‐Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices,
] upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a powered-
on TOE.
5.2.2.11 Authorized Connection Protocols (Keyboard/Mouse) (FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM)
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.1/KM The TSF shall have interfaces for the [USB (keyboard), USB (mouse)] protocols.
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.2/KM The TSF shall apply the following rules to the supported protocols: [the TSF shall
emulate any keyboard or mouse device functions from the TOE to the connected computer].
5.2.2.12 Powering Unauthorized Devices (FDP_PUD_EXT.1)
FDP_PUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall not provide power to any unauthorized device connected to the
analog audio peripheral interface.
5.2.2.13 Residual Information Protection (Keyboard Data) (FDP_RIP.1/KM)
FDP_RIP.1.1/KM The TSF shall ensure that any keyboard data in volatile memory is purged upon
switching computers.
5.2.2.14 Residual Information Protection (FDP_RIP_EXT.1)
FDP_RIP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that no user data is written to TOE non‐volatile memory or
storage.
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5.2.2.15 Purge of Residual Information (FDP_RIP_EXT.2)
FDP_RIP_EXT.2.1 The TOE shall have a purge memory or restore factory defaults function
accessible to the administrator to delete all TOE stored configuration and
settings except for logging.
5.2.2.16 PSD Switching (FDP_SWI_EXT.1)
FDP_SWI_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that [switching can be initiated only through express user
action].
5.2.2.17 PSD Switching Methods (FDP_SWI_EXT.2)
FDP_SWI_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that no switching can be initiated through automatic port
scanning, control through a connected computer, or control through keyboard
shortcuts.
FDP_SWI_EXT.2.2 The TSF shall ensure that switching can be initiated only through express user
action using [console buttons, wired remote control].
5.2.2.18 Tied Switching (FDP_SWI_EXT.3)
FDP_SWI_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall ensure that [connected keyboard and mouse peripheral devices]
are always switched together to the same connected computer.
5.2.2.19 Unidirectional Data Flow (Audio Output) (FDP_UDF_EXT.1/AO)
FDP_UDF_EXT.1.1/AO The TSF shall ensure [analog audio output data] transits the TOE unidirectionally
from [the TOE analog audio output computer] interface to [the TOE analog
audio output peripheral] interface.
5.2.2.20 Unidirectional Data Flow (Keyboard/Mouse) (FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM)
FDP_UDF_EXT.1.1/KM The TSF shall ensure [keyboard, mouse] data transits the TOE unidirectionally
from the [TOE [keyboard, mouse]] peripheral interface(s) to the [TOE [keyboard,
mouse]] interface.
5.2.2.21 Unidirectional Data Flow (Video Output) (FDP_UDF_EXT.1/VI)
FDP_UDF_EXT.1.1/VI The TSF shall ensure [video] data transits the TOE unidirectionally from the [TOE
computer video] interface to the [TOE peripheral device display] interface.
5.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
5.2.3.1 User Authentication Before Any Action (FIA_UAU.2)
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each administrator to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF‐mediated actions on behalf of that administrator.
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5.2.3.2 User Identification Before Any Action (FIA_UID.2)
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each administrator to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF‐mediated actions on behalf of that administrator.
5.2.4 Security Management (FMT)
5.2.4.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior (FMT_MOF.1)
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify the behavior of] the functions [TOE
keyboard and mouse filtering blacklist, Reset to Factory Default, view audit
logs, change password] to [the authorized administrators].
5.2.4.2 Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TOE shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
[modify TOE keyboard and mouse filtering blacklist, Reset to Factory Default,
view audit logs, change password].
5.2.4.3 Security Roles (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [administrators].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
5.2.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.2.5.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State (FPT_FLS_EXT.1)
FPT_FLS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
failure of the power‐on self‐test and [failure of the anti-tamper function].
5.2.5.2 No Access to TOE (FPT_NTA_EXT.1)
FPT_NTA_EXT.1.1 TOE firmware, software, and memory shall not be accessible via the TOE’s
external ports, with the following exceptions: [the Extended Display
Identification Data (EDID) memory of Video TOEs may be accessible from
connected computers; the configuration data, settings, and logging data that
may be accessible by authorized administrators].
5.2.5.3 Passive Detection of Physical Attack (FPT_PHP.1)
FPT_PHP.1.1 The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering that might
compromise the TSF.
FPT_PHP.1.2 The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical tampering
with the TSF’s devices or TSF’s elements has occurred.
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5.2.5.4 Resistance to Physical Attack (FPT_PHP.3)
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist [a physical attack for the purpose of gaining access to the
internal components, to damage the anti‐tamper battery, to drain or exhaust
the anti‐tamper battery] to the [TOE enclosure and any remote controllers] by
the attacked component becoming permanently disabled.
5.2.5.5 Reliable Time Stamps (FPT_STM.1)
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
5.2.5.6 TSF Testing (FPT_TST.1)
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self‐tests [during initial start‐up and at the conditions
[upon reset button activation]] to demonstrate the correct operation of [user
control functions and [active anti‐tamper functionality]].
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity
of [TSF data].
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity
of [TSF].
5.2.5.7 TSF Testing (FPT_TST_EXT.1)
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall respond to a self‐test failure by providing users with a [visual]
indication of failure and by shutdown of normal TSF functions.
5.2.6 TOE Access (FTA)
5.2.6.1 Continuous Indications (FTA_CIN_EXT.1)
FTA_CIN_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall display a visible indication of the selected computers at all times
when the TOE is powered.
FTA_CIN_EXT.1.22
The TSF shall implement the visible indication using the following mechanism:
easily visible graphical and/or textual markings of each source video on the
display, [a button, a panel with lights].
Application Note: The refined text: “easily visible graphical and/or textual markings of each
source video on the display”, is added per the Video/Display Devices Module.
2
TD0539 clarifies that the mandatory selection (refined by the VI-Module) applies if the TOE fits the
Combiner Use Case selecting “multiple connected displays” in FDP_CDS_EXT.1.1. The TOE does not fit
the Combiner User Case but rather selects “multiple connected displays” because some models support
dual-displays from a single source video feed. Therefore, the selection does not apply.
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Application Note: The selected computer is indicated with a panel with lights that corresponds to
the computer selection buttons. Each port has its own Port LED.
FTA_CIN_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that while the TOE is powered the current switching status
is reflected by [multiple indicators which never display conflicting information].
Application Note: As indicated in FTA_CIN_EXT.1.2, the TOE has a light panel that shows the selected
computer. There is no situation in which the selected computer will be indicated
with the light panel and a different computer will be indicated with the selection
button.
5.3 TOE Security Functional Requirements (DP Models)
The following table identifies the [MOD_VI_V1.0] SFRs that are satisfied by DP Models, which include
the following:
• GCS1412TAA4,
• GCS1414TAA4,
• GCS1418TAA4,
• GCS1422TAA4,
• GCS1424TAA4, and
• GCS1428TAA4.
Table 9: TOE Security Functional Components (DP Models)
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FDP: User Data Protection FDP_IPC_EXT.1(DP) – Internal Protocol Conversion
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(DP) – Authorized Connection Protocols (DP Models)
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP(DP) – Sub-Protocol Rules (DisplayPort Protocol) (DP
Models)
5.3.1 User Data Protection (FDP)
5.3.1.1 Internal Protocol Conversion (FDP_IPC_EXT.1(DP))
FDP_IPC_EXT.1.1(DP) The TSF shall convert the [DisplayPort] protocol at the [DisplayPort computer
video interface] into the [HDMI] protocol within the TOE.
FDP_IPC_EXT.1.2(DP) The TSF shall output the [HDMI] protocol from inside the TOE to [peripheral
display interface(s)] as [DisplayPort protocol].
5.3.1.2 Authorized Connection Protocols (Video Output) (DP Models)
(FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(DP))
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.1/VI(DP) The TSF shall have interfaces for the [DisplayPort] protocols.
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FDP_PDC_EXT.3.2/VI(DP) The TSF shall apply the following rules to the supported protocols: [the
TSF shall read the connected display EDID information once during
power‐on or reboot].
5.3.1.3 Sub-Protocol Rules (DisplayPort Protocol) (DP Models) FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP(DP))
FDP_SPR_EXT.1.1/DP(DP) The TSF shall apply the following rules for the [DisplayPort] protocol:
• block the following video/display sub‐protocols:
o [CEC,
o EDID from computer to display,
o HDCP,
o MCCS]
• allow the following video/display sub‐protocols:
o [EDID from display to computer,
o HPD from display to computer,
o Link Training].
5.4 TOE Security Functional Requirements (H Models)
The following table identifies the [MOD_VI_V1.0] SFRs that are satisfied by H models which includes the
following:
• GCS1312TAA4,
• GCS1314TAA4,
• GCS1322TAA4, and
• GCS1324TAA4.
Table 10: TOE Security Functional Components (H Models)
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FDP: User Data Protection FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(H) – Authorized Connection Protocols (H Models)
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI(H) – Sub-Protocol Rules (HDMI Protocol) (H Models)
5.4.1 User Data Protection (FDP)
5.4.1.1 Authorized Connection Protocols (Video Output) (H Models)
(FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(H))
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.1/VI(H) The TSF shall have interfaces for the [HDMI] protocols.
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.2/VI(H) The TSF shall apply the following rules to the supported protocols: [the
TSF shall read the connected display EDID information once during
power‐on or reboot].
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5.4.1.2 Sub‐Protocol Rules (HDMI Protocol) (H Models) (FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI(H))
FDP_SPR_EXT.1.1/HDMI(H) The TSF shall apply the following rules for the [HDMI] protocol:
• block the following video/display sub‐protocols:
o [ARC,
o CEC,
o EDID from computer to display,
o HDCP,
o HEAC,
o HEC,
o MCCS]
• allow the following video/display sub‐protocols:
o [EDID from display to computer,
o HPD from display to computer].
5.5 TOE Security Functional Requirements (D Models)
The following table identifies the [MOD_VI_V1.0] SFRs that are satisfied by D models which includes the
following:
• GCS1212TAA4,
• GCS1214TAA4,
• GCS1218TAA4,
• GCS1222TAA4,
• GCS1224TAA4, and
• GCS1228TAA4.
Table 11: TOE Security Functional Components (D Models)
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FDP: User Data Protection FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(D) – Authorized Connection Protocols (D Models)
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DVI-I(D)– Sub-Protocol Rules (DVI-I Protocol) (D Models)
5.5.1 User Data Protection (FDP)
5.5.1.1 Authorized Connection Protocols (Video Output) (D Models)
(FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(D))
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.1/VI(D) The TSF shall have interfaces for the [DVI‐I] protocols.
FDP_PDC_EXT.3.2/VI(D) The TSF shall apply the following rules to the supported protocols: [the TSF
shall read the connected display EDID information once during power‐on or
reboot].
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5.5.1.2 Sub‐Protocol Rules (DVI‐I Protocol) (D Models) (FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DVI-I(D))
FDP_SPR_EXT.1.1/DVI-I(D) The TSF shall apply the following rules for the [DVI‐I] protocol:
• block the following video/display sub‐protocols:
o [ARC,
o CEC,
o EDID from computer to display,
o HDCP,
o HEAC,
o HEC,
o MCCS]
• allow the following video/display sub‐protocols:
o [EDID from display to computer,
o HPD from display to computer].
5.6 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements for the TOE are included by reference from the [PSD].
Table 12: Assurance Components
Requirement Class Requirement Component
Security Target (ASE) Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL.1)
Extended Components Definition (ASE_ECD.1)
ST Introduction (ASE_INT.1)
Security Objectives (ASE_OBJ.2)
Derived Security Requirements (ASE_REQ.2)
Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1)
TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS.1)
Development (ADV) Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Guidance Documents (AGD) Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Life Cycle Support (ALC) Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
Tests (ATE) Independent Testing – Conformance (ATE_IND.1)
Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1)
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6 TOE Summary Specification
This chapter describes the following security functions:
• Security Audit
• User Data Protection
• Identification and authentication
• Security management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE Access
6.1 Security Audit (FAU_GEN.1)
The TOE logs security events such as start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; power cycle events,
self‐test failures; peripheral device acceptance and rejections; and administrator actions (login, logout,
blacklist/whitelist configuration, password changes, and Reset to Factory Default events). Start-up and
shutdown of the audit functions occurs with startup and shutdown of the product. The audit function
cannot be started or stopped separately from the product. After a successful Administrator Logon, the
logs can be viewed in the text editor by entering the command [LIST].
The event logs are divided into two types: critical and non-critical. The Log Data Area displays the critical
and non-critical Log data. Each logged event is recorded with Date, Time, a code that indicates the type
of event and the outcome (success or failure) of the event. The critical audit events recorded and
identified in the code include:
• administrator logon events (login failed, last login ok),
• administrator actions (password changes, Reset to Factory Default),
• KVM locked due to Administrator’s failed attempts to login,
• peripheral device rejections,
• all failed self-tests except button jam.
Non-critical audit events include:
• power-cycle events,
• administrator logon ok and logout,
• configuration of the whitelist/blacklist,
• peripheral device acceptance,
• button jam test failure, and
• all passing self-tests.
During normal operation, the TOE provides administrator access to all audit records. IOGEAR's assistance
is required to read audit records from an inoperable switch.
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The logs are stored on EEPROM on the KVM PCBoard component of the TOE. The logs can be extracted
by the authorized administrator by entering Administrator Logon mode, logging on, and then issuing the
command [LIST]. The TOE extracts the log data and displays them using the text editor. The administrator
can view the logs but cannot erase or delete any of the information. The TOE stores the critical event logs
only for the most recent occurrence of events. The TOE stores a maximum of thirty-two critical events.
The logging feature can accommodate a maximum of thirty-two non-critical audit events. A new non-
critical log entry will overwrite the oldest one (for example, the thirty-third log entry will overwrite the
first log).
6.2 User Data Protection
The TOE enforces data isolation and the User Data Protection SFP on TOE computer interfaces and TOE
peripheral device interfaces by controlling the data flow and user data transiting the TOE.
The TOE supports the following types of devices: USB Keyboard and Mouse, analog audio speakers, and
depending on model, DisplayPort, HDMI or DVI-I display. All other devices are rejected. The TOE accepts
DisplayPort signals at the computer interface, internally converts it to HDMI and then converts the signals
back to DisplayPort for output to the console interface. Refer to the two interface tables in Section 2.2 for
details on TOE computer peripherals and connected computer port interfaces for each specific TOE model.
The TOE ensures that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the
deallocation of the resource from the TOE computer interfaces immediately after a TOE switch to another
selected computer and on start-up of the TOE.
The Appendix A Letter of Volatility in Appendix A provides assurance that no user data remains in the TOE
after power down.
6.2.1 FDP_AFL_EXT.1 – Audio Filtration
The TOE’s audio function implementation filters the audio passing through the TOE in accordance with
Table 8: Audio Filtration Specifications above.
6.2.2 FDP_APC_EXT.1 (All Iterations); FDP_UDF_EXT.1/AO – Unidirectional Data Flow
(Audio Output); FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM – Unidirectional Data Flow (Keyboard/Mouse);
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/VI – Unidirectional Data Flow (Video Output);
The TOE routes audio and video data only from the selected computer to the attached peripherals and
routes the keyboard and mouse data only to the selected computer from the attached peripherals.
Each supported peripheral (i.e. video signals and input data (i.e. HID data)) has its own dedicated data
path implemented in circuitry. This ensures the data is isolated and only routed in the correct direction.
When the read/write transactions are finished, the micro-controller disables the EDID switch. This ensures
there will be no unauthorized data flow from the monitor to a connected computer.
For audio data output, the unidirectional buffers make sure that the audio data can travel only from the
selected computer to the audio device.
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All Keyboard and Mouse connections are filtered first, and only the authorized devices pre-defined in the
TOE’s whitelist will be allowed. The data input by the authorized USB Keyboard and Mouse will be
emulated by TOE to USB data for computer sources.
No data or electrical signals flow between connected computers at any time. Each connected computer
has its own independent Device Controller, power circuit, and EEPROM.
No data transits the TOE when the TOE is powered off or when the TOE is in a failure state.
6.2.3 FDP_CDS_EXT.1 – Connected Displays Supported
The TOE supports connected displays from a single source video feed (either single-head or multi-head).
Because of this, the single selected source video feed is always the same channel and indication of the
selected channel is through the channel selection LEDs on the TOE chassis.
The DisplayPort models GCS1412TAA4, GCS1414TAA4, and GCS1418TAA4 each support one connected
display. While GCS1422TAA4, GCS1424TAA4, and GCS1428TAA4 each support two connected displays at
a time.
The HDMI models GCS1312TAA4 and GCS1314TAA4 each support one connected display. While
GCS1322TAA4 and GCS1324TAA4 each support two connected displays at a time.
The DVI models GCS1212TAA4, GCS1214TAA4, and GCS1218TAA4 each support one connected display.
While GCS1222TAA4, GCS1224TAA4, and GCS1228TAA4 each support two connected displays at a time.
6.2.4 FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM – Device Filtering (Keyboard/Mouse); FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM –
Authorized Connection Protocols (Keyboard/Mouse)
The TOE supports authorized USB keyboard and mouse peripherals as defined in Table 13: Supported
protocols by port below. Keyboard/mouse peripherals are filtered and emulated. Device filtering for
keyboard/mouse interfaces is configurable. Keyboard/mouse blacklisted devices are unauthorized
devices. Whitelisted devices are authorized devices for the keyboard/mouse interfaces in peripheral
device connections. The TOE does not define any whitelisted devices that are also blacklisted devices. The
KVM includes a built in allowed list (whitelist) for the USB Keyboard/ Mouse Ports. Only the default-
authorized devices can be blacklisted by the administrator for the USB Keyboard/Mouse Ports. The USB
Keyboard/Mouse Ports do not support a “whitelist” function.
The configurable HID device function enables authorized administrators to assign a blacklist for HID
devices. To blacklist a keyboard/mouse device, the admin connects the HID device that they want
blacklisted directly to the Mouse Port (do not connect it to the KVM via a USB hub), and performs the
configuration via administrator functions. After configuration, the blacklisted HID device will be rejected
by both Keyboard/ Mouse Ports. The Reset KVM to Default function will clear the blacklist created by the
Secure KVM administrator functions.
The TOE emulates data from authorized USB Keyboard and Mouse protocol interfaces to USB connected
computers.
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6.2.5 FDP_PDC_EXT.1 – Peripheral Device Connection; FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO – Peripheral
Device Connection (Audio Output); FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM – Authorized Devices
(Keyboard/Mouse); FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI – Peripheral Device Connection (Video Output)
The TOE allows the authorized devices and protocols for the PSD Console Ports as identified in the table
below upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a powered-on TOE. The console
USB keyboard and mouse ports are interchangeable, meaning you can connect a keyboard to the mouse
port and vice versa. For optimal operation, the User Manual suggests connecting the USB keyboard to
console’s USB keyboard port and the USB mouse to console’s USB mouse port.
The DisplayPort-interfaced TOE models convert DisplayPort supported protocols (version 1.1 or higher
with filtration) to the HDMI protocol. Since the TOE converts DisplayPort signals at the computer interface
to HDMI signals at the console interface, DisplayPort is not identified as an authorized protocol for the
PSD console port.
TOE models with HDMI source are capable of embedding digital audio into digital video data transmission.
DisplayPort-interfaced TOEs support digital audio embedded in the video. The DisplayPort signal is
converted to HDMI, and both digital audio and Video is allowed to monitor. Digital audio embedded in
DisplayPort Video will be kept with HDMI video. DVI Secure KVM Models do not have the ability to embed
digital audio into digital video data transmission.
The TOE does not allow any other user data transmission to or from any other external entities including
wireless devices. The TOE only recognizes those peripherals with an authorized interface type as described
below and all other peripherals will be denied both upon TOE power up and upon connection of a
peripheral device to a powered‐on TOE. Peripheral LEDs (one per port) are located on the front (except
video LEDs are located on the back) and provide a continuous visual indication of the status of the function
associated with that port. The LED flashes when a connected peripheral is rejected.
Specifically the TOE supports the following peripherals on the console interfaces:
Table 13: Supported protocols by port
PSD Console Port Authorized Devices Authorized Protocol
Keyboard Standard 108 key wired keyboard and keypad USB 1.1/2.0
Display Display, Video or KVM extender DisplayPort, HDMI, DVI-I
Mouse/Point Device Standard 2-button, 3-button, and 5-button
wired mouse or trackball
USB 1.1/2.0
Audio Out Analog amplified speakers, digital audio
embedded inside the video
Analog audio output,
HDMI
Additionally, the KVM has interfaces for AC power, reset (button), and LED indicators. The LEDs consist of
Video, Num Lock, Caps Lock, Scroll Lock, power LEDs, and Port LEDs. For dual-display models there are
two LEDs. Video LED(s) light green when the video connection(s) are up and running. The Video LEDs flash
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when a non-qualified monitor is connected. The Num Lock LED, Caps Lock LED, and Scroll Lock LED on the
keyboard are disabled. The Port LEDs indicate Port selection/connection status. All LEDs are located on
the RPS and on the front panel of the main KVM except the Video LED(s) that are located on the back
panel. The TOE does not allow any other user data transmission to or from external entities.
Non-HID functions of a composite USB device; internal Hub; docking protocols; and analog microphone
or audio line inputs are not supported by the TOE. During KVM operation, non-standard keyboards with
integrated USB hubs and/or other USB-integrated devices may not be fully supported due to the strict
security standards and policy for the IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch. If supported, only basic (HID) keyboard
operations will function.
6.2.6 FDP_PUD_EXT.1 – Powering Unauthorized Devices
The TOE does not supply power to any device connected to the analog audio output interface.
6.2.7 FDP_RIP.1/KM – Residual Information Protection (Keyboard Data), FDP_RIP_EXT.1
– Residual Information Protection and FDP_RIP_EXT.2 – Purge of Residual Information
No user data is written to TOE non‐volatile memory or storage. User keyboard data is purged and not
available to the next connected TOE computer interface when the TOE is switched to a different computer.
The data input by the authorized keyboard/mouse will be kept in the console authorized keyboard/mouse
buffer (in the microcontroller). Once the TOE is power cycled, reset, or port switching is detected, the data
in the console authorized keyboard/mouse buffer will be deleted immediately, and not processed for
emulation. Please refer to the Proprietary Isolation Document for more detail.
The TOE provides two functions to delete TOE stored configuration and settings.
After logging in, authorized administrators can use the Reset to Factory Default management function
(not to be confused with the front panel reset button). When a successfully authenticated authorized
Administrator performs Reset to Factory Default, all settings previously configured by the Administrator
(such as USB device blacklist) will be cleaned and reset to factory default settings. Once the Reset to
Factory Default function has been completed, the Secure KVM will terminate the Administrator Logon
mode, purge keyboard/mouse buffer, and power cycle the Secure KVM automatically. After a successful
self-test, the KVM port focus will be switched to Port 1. Audit logs are retained and a log is generated for
Reset to Factory Default.
The TOE also provides non-administrative users a front panel Reset button allowing the user to delete
TOE stored configuration and settings. Performing the reset function by pressing the Reset button for
more than 5 seconds, purges the Keyboard/Mouse buffer; and the switch performs a self-test and
switches to Port 1. CDF configured by Administrator, logs, Administrative tasks, or other secure functions
are not affected by the front panel Reset function.
The Letter of Volatility is provided in Appendix A identifies the TOE components that have non-volatile
memory and provides details of the memory and its use.
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6.2.8 FDP_SWI_EXT.1 – PSD Switching; FDP_SWI_EXT.2 – PSD Switching Methods;
FDP_SWI_EXT.3 – Tied Switching
The keyboard, mouse, video, and audio ports are always switched together to the same connected
computer using a push button on the front of the device or the wired PSD remote control. As such, the
keyboard and mouse are always switched together and there are no options to switch peripherals
independently from the keyboard and mouse. When the PSD is attached to a 2-Port Secure KVM Switch,
only pushbuttons numbered 1 and 2 will be detected and functional. When the PSD is attached to a 4-
Port Secure KVM Switch, only pushbuttons numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4 will be detected and functional. When
the PSD is attached to an 8-Port Secure KVM Switch, all eight pushbuttons will be detected and functional.
The TOE does not allow switching to be initiated through automatic port scanning, control through a
connected computer, or control through keyboard shortcuts.
6.2.9 TOE Video Security Function
In addition to the Base-PP SFRs and SFRs related to the Video Function described above, the TOE video
input and output features in this section are also implemented in the TOE video subsystem (depending on
the video protocols supported by the model).
The TOE video auxiliary channel (AUX) path blocks information flows other than the minimal set required
to establish the video link. Unauthorized DisplayPort transactions are prevented by disassembling the
DisplayPort AUX channel transactions to block all unauthorized transactions. The TOE video function filters
the AUX channel by converting it to EDID only. DisplayPort video is converted into HDMI video stream.
Monitor’s EDID is, through EDID channel, read, filtered, and sent to Port’s EDID EEPROM for EDID
emulation.
All AUX channel threats are mitigated through the conversion from DisplayPort to HDMI protocols. All
types of traffic not authorized by the referenced PP are blocked by this TOE function, as the emulated
EEPROM would only support valid EDID read requests from connected computers.
6.2.9.1 DP Models
The following TOE models support DP 1.2 video input and output, and one or two displays.
Table 14: DP Models
Configuration 2-Port 4-Port 8-Port
DisplayPort
Single Head GCS1412TAA4 GCS1414TAA4 GCS1418TAA4
Dual Head GCS1422TAA4 GCS1424TAA4 GCS1428TAA4
These models accept DisplayPort for the computer video display interface. The TOE will convert the DP
signal to HDMI inside the TOE and then back to DisplayPort for output to the console display(s). The TOE
rejects communication of EDID information from computer to display, as well as CEC, HDCP, and MCCS
communications. The TOEs video EDID read procedure is activated once during power‐on or reboot in
order to read the connected display EDID information.
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EDID from display to computer, HPD from display to computer, and Link Training are allowed for the
DisplayPort interface. The TOE blocks CEC, EDID from computer to display, HDCP, and MCCS
video/display sub‐protocols.
The DP Models satisfy the following SFRs:
• FDP_IPC_EXT.1(DP) – Internal Protocol Conversion
• FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(DP)- Authorized Connection Protocols (Video Output) (DP Model)
• FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP(DP) – Sub-Protocol Rules (DisplayPort Protocol) (DP Module)
6.2.9.2 H Models
The following TOE models support HDMI video input/output, and one or two displays.
Table 15: H Models
Configuration 2-Port 4-Port 8-Port
HDMI
Single Head GCS1312TAA4 GCS1314TAA4 N/A
Dual Head GCS1322TAA4 GCS1324TAA4 N/A
The TOEs video EDID read procedure is activated once during power‐on or reboot in order to read the
connected display EDID information.
EDID from display to computer, and HPD from display to computer are allowed for the HDMI interface.
The TOE blocks ARC, CEC, EDID from computer to display, HDCP, HEAC, HEC and MCCS video/display sub‐
protocols.
The H Models satisfy the following SFRs:
• FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(H)- Authorized Connection Protocols (Video Output) (H Model)
• FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI(H) – Sub-Protocol Rules (HDMI Protocol) (H Module)
6.2.9.3 D Models
The following TOE models support DVI-I video input/output, and one or two displays.
Table 16: D Models
Configuration 2-Port 4-Port 8-Port
DVI
Single Head GCS1212TAA4 GCS1214TAA4 GCS1218TAA4
Dual Head GCS1222TAA4 GCS1224TAA4 GCS1228TAA4
The TOEs video EDID read procedure is activated once during power‐on or reboot in order to read the
connected display EDID information.
EDID from display to computer, and HPD from display to computer are allowed for the DVI-I interface. The
TOE blocks ARC, CEC, EDID from computer to display, HDCP, HEAC, HEC and MCCS video/display sub‐
protocols.
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The D Models satisfy the following SFRs:
• FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(D)- Authorized Connection Protocols (Video Output) (D Models)
• FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DVI-I(D) – Sub-Protocol Rules (DVI-I Protocol) (D Models)
6.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA_UAU.2/ FIA_UID.2)
Authentication is required to perform administrator functions such as configuring the keyboard/mouse
device filtering (i.e. CDF) blacklist. The authorized administrator is identified and authenticated through
the logon function. The authorized administrator logs on by entering the Administrator Logon mode as
described in the administrator guide and providing a valid password. The administrator guide states that
the administrator must change the password after the first successful logon.
6.4 Security Management
The TOE provides management functions to configure the keyboard/ mouse filtering (i.e. CDF), to return
the device to factory setting, to view audit logs and to change the administrator password; and restricts
access to these management functions to the authorized administrator.
6.4.1 FMT_MOF.1 – Management of Security Functions Behavior
The TOE restricts the management functions such as the ability to modify the HID device filtering blacklist
to the authorized administrator. The authorized administrator must successfully authenticate by
providing a valid password. There is no login name parameter for the login function. Customers are
provided with a default password. The administrator guide states that the administrator must change the
password after the first successful logon. The password is case sensitive and new passwords must contain
at least 1 lower case letter, at least 1 upper case letter, at least 1 numeric character, and at least 1 special
character. The supported special characters are: !"#$%&' ()*+,-./ :;<=>? @ [\]^_ ` {|}~ (including “space”).
Additionally, the password length must be at least 8 characters but no longer than 22 characters. With
three failed attempts to log in, the administrator logon mode will be terminated and locked for 15
minutes. With nine failed log in attempts, the Secure KVM Switch will become permanently inoperable.
There is no mechanism to restore a lost/forgotten password.
6.4.2 FMT_SMF.1 – Specification of Management Functions
The TOE provides security management functions to configure the keyboard/mouse device filtering (i.e.
CDF), to return the device to factory setting, to view audit logs and to change the administrator password.
The TOE provides the authorized administrator with the ability to assign blacklist definitions for keyboard/
mouse devices. Once successfully authenticated, the Administrator can choose to add a device to the
keyboard/ mouse devices blacklist.
If a device is on the whitelist, the TOE considers the device as authorized. Otherwise, if the device is on
the blacklist or is not on any list it is considered unauthorized. If a device is on both blacklist and whitelist,
the USB device will be considered a blacklisted device.
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The TOE provides a security management function to Reset to Factory Default3
(not to be confused with
the front panel reset button). When a successfully authenticated authorized Administrator performs
Reset to Factory Default, settings previously configured by the Administrator (such as USB
keyboard/mouse device blacklist) will be cleaned and reset to factory default settings. Once the Reset to
Factory Default function has been completed, the Secure KVM will terminate the Administrator Logon
mode, purge keyboard/mouse buffer, and power cycle the Secure KVM automatically. After a successful
self-test, the KVM port focus will be switched to Port 1.
The Reset to Factory Default does not affect or erase Log data nor does it affect the previously changed
Administrator password.
6.4.3 FMT_SMR.1 – Security Roles
The TOE maintains a single administrator role. All other users are non-administrative users. A properly
authenticated administrator has the ability to view audit records, Reset to factory defaults, change
password, and configure keyboard/ mouse filtering (i.e. CDF). Users without an administrator role cannot
use these function and are not required to authenticate.
6.5 Protection of the TSF
In order to mitigate potential tampering and replacement, the TOE is designed to ensure that any
replacement may be detected, any physical modification is evident, and any logical modification may be
prevented. Access to the TOE firmware, software, or its memory via its accessible ports is prevented. No
access is available to modify the TOE or its memory. To mitigate the risk that a potential attacker will
tamper with a TOE and then reprogram it with altered functionality, the TOE software is contained in one-
time-programmable read-only memory permanently attached (non-socketed) to a circuit assembly. The
TOE’s operational code is not upgradeable through any of the TOE external or internal ports.
The TOE’s KVM has two tamper-evident labels printed with the TOEs unique product serial number and
the vendor’s specific design. One label is applied to the side of the device and the other to the bottom of
the chassis, over the screw used to secure the front-top cover to the enclosure. The side-label is clearly
visible to the user operating the TOE and the other label can be clearly seen when the device is turned
over. The optional Remote Port Selector (RPS) includes its own tamper-evident tape to provide visual
indications of intrusion to the RPS enclosure. Any attempt to open the KVM or RPS enclosures sufficient
to gain access to internal components will change the labels to a tampered state.
6.5.1 FPT_FLS_EXT.1 – Failure with Preservation of Secure State
The TOE preserves a secure state by disabling the TOE when the following types of failures occur: failure
of the power on self-test and failure of the anti-tampering function. The behavior as described below for
FPT_PHP.1 and FPT_PHP.3 will occur if the Secure KVM Switch self-test fails or its security function detects
a breach.
3
Vendor guidance documents also refer to this as ‘Reset KVM to Default’.
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6.5.2 FPT_NTA_EXT.1 – No Access to TOE
The TOE firmware, software, and memory is not accessible from the TOE’s external ports, with the
following exceptions:
• the Extended Display Identification Data (EDID) memory for Video is accessible from connected
computers;
• the configuration data, settings, and logging data is accessible by authorized administrators.
6.5.3 FPT_PHP.1 – Passive Detection of Physical Attack and FPT_PHP.3 – Resistance to
Physical Attack
The TOE becomes permanently inoperable and all front panel or RPS LEDs (except for Power LED) flash
constantly when a chassis intrusion, such as removal of the device cover, is detected. These indications
cannot be turned off by the TOE user and the guidance documentation instructs the user to stop using
the TOE, remove it from service and contact IOGEAR.
The KVM and RPS contain internal batteries with a minimum lifetime of five years, are non-replaceable,
and cannot be accessed without opening the device enclosure. The TOE’s anti-tampering function is
triggered when the battery is damaged or exhausted, permanently disabling the switch. See Section 6.5.5
for additional details. The admin guide instructs users to never attempt to replace the battery or open the
switch or RPS enclosure.
If a mechanical intrusion is detected on the switch, the switch (without RPS connected) will be
permanently disabled and all the front panel LEDs (except the Power LED) will flash continuously. A
mechanical intrusion is detected by a pressure switch that trips when the enclosure is opened. If a
mechanical intrusion is detected by the RPS (connected with the switch and aligned), this will permanently
disable both the RPS itself and the switch, and all LEDs (on RPS) and the front panel LEDs except the Power
LED (on switch) will flash continuously. To disable the KVM in the event of an aligned RPS, the RPS will
send a "tampering command" to the KVM.
6.5.4 FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps
The TOE includes its own time clock to provide reliable time stamps for its auditing functions and for
measuring the lockout duration following three failed authentication attempts. The developer sets the
time to UTC (Coordinated Universal Time) during manufacturing.
6.5.5 FPT_TST.1 – TSF Testing and FPT_TST_EXT.1 – TSF Testing
The Secure KVM Switch TOE self-tests include memory tests, firmware integrity tests, and tests of push-
button functioning. The TOE executes self-tests during boot (after a power-on, Reset to Factory Default,
or the reset button is pressed). The self-test function runs independently at each one of the TOE micro-
controllers following power up. The KVM performs self-tests first before enabling the peripheral switching
function. Before self-tests have completed successfully, the data paths between peripherals and
connected computers are blocked and no data flow is allowed.
The following details the particular self-tests:
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• Firmware integrity: the TOE validates the integrity of firmware by calculating the checksum of the
firmware binary file and comparing to a pre-calculated value that is stored in the TOE. Upon a
failure, the TOE will be in a failure state (permanently inoperable).
• Accessibility of internal memory of the micro-controller: the TOE writes a block of predefined data
to SRAM and then reads the block out to compare if it is identical. TOE. Upon a failure, the TOE will
be in a failure state (permanently inoperable).
• Computer interfaces isolation functionality: the TOE validates correct functionality of isolation by
generating data flow on one port and checking that it is not received on another port. TOE. Upon a
failure, the TOE will be in a failure state (permanently inoperable).
• Key stuck test (KVM front panel Push button jam test): the TOE will check that the status of all
button values in the micro-controller to ensure the push buttons are operational. Upon a test
failure, the TOE does not shut down, and the front panel Port LED of that jammed button port will
flash. The TOE will resume operable once after the key stuck is fixed and power cycled.
• Anti-tampering mechanism test: the TOE will verify if the tamper detection switch is triggered
(includes KVM and RPS battery is damaged or exhausted tests). Upon a test failure, the TOE will be
in a failure state (permanently inoperable).
• RPS connection self-tests. Upon a test failure, the TOE does not shut down.
The anti-tampering self-tests include the correct operation and tampering of the internal KVM and RPS
batteries.
• A KVM detecting tampering during normal operation will trigger the KVM inoperable.
• A connected and aligned RPS detecting tampering (including damaged or exhausted battery) during
normal operation will trigger the RPS inoperable and also directly trigger the KVM inoperable in
parallel.
• A damaged or exhausted KVM battery will be detected during self-test will trigger the KVM
permanently inoperable.
RPS Connection test failure results from the following:
• Connecting a “tampered” RPS to KVM (before KVM power-up) → This RPS was already tampered
before connecting to KVM, and therefore the RPS will not be detected and aligned with the KVM →
The TOE does not shut down.
• Connecting a RPS with battery damaged or exhausted to KVM (before KVM power-up) → This RPS
will not be detected and aligned with the KVM → The TOE does not shutdown.
• Connecting any other cable, RPS from other vendors, etc. → will not be detected by KVM → TOE does
not shutdown.
Though the RPS Connection test failures do not result in a TOE shut down, this does not affect the TSF
because the TOE can function normally without a remote control connected and the TSF does not
interface with the remote control while it is in a failure state. This means that a compromised remote
control cannot be used as a vector to operate the TOE maliciously.
Connecting a normal (non-tampered) and functional RPS, before KVM power-up, will be detected and
aligned with KVM after KVM boots up and results in RPS connection self-test PASS.
The status indicators on the KVM are as follows:
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• For a Key stuck test failure, the front panel Port LED of that jammed button port will flash.
• For all other Self-test failures (Firmware integrity, Accessibility of internal memory of the micro-
controller, Computer interfaces isolation functionality, Anti-tampering mechanism) all front panel
LEDs (except for Power LED) flash.
The RPS LEDs flash indicators operate as follows:
• Connecting a “tampered” RPS before KVM power-up → The KVM will detect that the RPS is
tampered and reject the connection with RPS → The RPS LEDs flash.
• Connecting a RPS with battery damaged or exhausted to KVM before KVM power-up → The KVM
will detect the RPS battery status and reject the connection with RPS → The RPS LEDs flash.
• A connected and aligned RPS will flash all LEDs when it is tampered during normal operation.
A Push button jam self-test failure may be recoverable if the button jam is temporary. Guidance
documentation instructs the user to verify the KVM installation, push buttons, and power cycle the
Secure KVM Switch in order to attempt to recover. This is the only self-test that may be recoverable. If
the button jam is permanent (for example, the push button is broken and truly stuck), the KVM remains
disabled since it fails the button jam self-test.
Users can verify the integrity of the TOE by triggering a self-test (e.g. by powering on or rebooting the
TOE) and examining the front panel LEDs for self-test failures as identified above.
The TOE performs self-tests as described above to demonstrate the correct operation of active anti‐
tamper functionality (see also 6.5.3 FPT_PHP).
6.6 TOE Access
The TOE display a continuous visual indication of the computer to which the user is currently connected,
and displays the indicator on power up, and on reset.
6.6.1 FTA_CIN_EXT.1 – Continuous Indications
The TOE displays continuous visual indicators of the computer to which the user is currently connected
at all times when the TOE is powered.
The Port LEDs on the Secure KVM Switch are located on the front panel (of the switch) and the upper-left
side of each push button (of the RPS) provide a continuous visual indication of the selected Port and
corresponding selected computer (bright orange) and the connection status of all other connected
computers (dim orange indicates the connected computer is running). If a RPS is detected and aligned
with KVM, the status of KVM will reflect on both the KVM front panel LEDs and RPS front panel LEDs.
On power up and reset, Port 1 is selected by default.
The TOE supports connected displays from a single source video feed (either single-head or multi-head).
Because of this, the single selected source video feed is always the same channel as all other peripherals,
and indication of the selected channel is indicated through the channel selection LEDs on the TOE chassis.
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The TOE has a reset button that resets the switch to the default settings when pressed. The switch is then
powered up and behaves as described above.
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7 Protection Profile Claims
This ST is conformant to the Protection Profile [PSD], including the following optional and selection-based
SFRs: FAU_GEN.1, FDP_RIP_EXT.2, FDP_SWI_EXT.2, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2, FMT_MOF.1, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1, FPT_PHP.3, FPT_STM.1, and FTA_CIN_EXT.1.
The ST is also conformant to the following PP-Modules
• PP-Module for Analog Audio Output Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July 2019 [MOD_AO_V1.0].
• PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July 2019 [MOD_KM_V1.0], including the
following optional and selection-based SFRs: FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM, FDP_RIP.1/KM, and
FDP_SWI_EXT.3
• PP-Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July 2019 [MOD_VI_V1.0], including the
following selection-based SFRs: FDP_CDS_EXT.1, FDP_IPC_EXT.1(DP), FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP(DP),
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DVI-I(D), and FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI(H)
As explained in Section 3, the Security Problem Definition of the [PSD] and modules have been included
in this ST by reference.
As explained in Section 4, Security Objectives, the Security Objectives of the [PSD] and modules have
been included by reference in this ST.
The following table identifies all the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) in this ST, drawn from the
[PSD]. The only operations performed on the SFRs drawn from the [PSD] are assignment and selection
operations.
Table 17 identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by the TOE.
Table 17: SFR Protection Profile Sources
Requirement Class Requirement Component Source
FAU: Security Audit FAU_GEN.1: Audit Data Generation [PSD]
FDP: User Data
Protection
FDP_AFL_EXT.1 – Audio Filtration [MOD_AO_V1.0]
FDP_APC_EXT.1 – Active PSD Connections [PSD]
FDP_CDS_EXT.1 – Connected Displays Supported [MOD_VI_V1.0]
FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM – Device Filtering (Keyboard/Mouse) [MOD_KM_V1.0]
FDP_IPC_EXT.1(DP) – Internal Protocol Conversion [MOD_VI_V1.0]
FDP_PDC_EXT.1 – Peripheral Device Connection [PSD]
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO – Peripheral Device Connection (Audio
Output)
[MOD_AO_V1.0]
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM – Authorized Devices (Keyboard/Mouse) [MOD_KM_V1.0]
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI – Peripheral Device Connection (Video Output) [MOD_VI_V1.0]
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM – Authorized Connection Protocols
(Keyboard/Mouse)
[MOD_KM_V1.0]
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Requirement Class Requirement Component Source
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(DP) – Authorized Connection Protocols (Video
Output) (DP Models)
[MOD_VI_V1.0]
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(H) – Authorized Connection Protocols (Video
Output) (H Models)
[MOD_VI_V1.0]
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(D) – Authorized Connection Protocols (Video
Output) (D Models)
[MOD_VI_V1.0]
FDP_PUD_EXT.1 – Powering Unauthorized Devices [MOD_AO_V1.0]
FDP_RIP.1/KM – Residual Information Protection (Keyboard Data) [MOD_KM_V1.0]
FDP_RIP_EXT.1 – Residual Information Protection [PSD]
FDP_RIP_EXT.2 – Purge of Residual Information [PSD]
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP(DP) – Sub-Protocol Rules (DisplayPort
Protocol) (DP Models)
[MOD_VI_V1.0]
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DVI-I(D) – Sub-Protocol Rules (DVI-I Protocol) (D
Models)
[MOD_VI_V1.0]
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI(H) – Sub-Protocol Rules (HDMI Protocol) (H
Models)
[MOD_VI_V1.0]
FDP_SWI_EXT.1 – PSD Switching [PSD]
FDP_SWI_EXT.2 – PSD Switching Methods [PSD]
FDP_SWI_EXT.3 – Tied Switching [MOD_KM_V1.0]
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/AO – Unidirectional Data Flow (Audio Output) [MOD_AO_V1.0]
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM – Unidirectional Data Flow
(Keyboard/Mouse)
[MOD_KM_V1.0]
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/VI – Unidirectional Data Flow (Video Output) [MOD_VI_V1.0]
FIA: Identification and
Authentication
FIA_UAU.2 – User Authentication Before Any Action [PSD]
FIA_UID.2 – User Identification Before Any Action [PSD]
FMT: Security
Management
FMT_MOF.1 – Management of Security Functions Behavior [PSD]
FMT_SMF.1 – Specification of Management Functions [PSD]
FMT_SMR.1 – Security Roles [PSD]
FPT: Protection of the
TSF
FPT_FLS_EXT.1 – Failure with Preservation of Secure State [PSD]
FPT_NTA_EXT.1 – No Access to TOE [PSD]
FPT_PHP.1 – Passive Detection of Physical Attack [PSD]
FPT_PHP.3 – Resistance to Physical Attack [PSD]
FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps [PSD]
FPT_TST.1 – TSF Testing [PSD]
FPT_TST_EXT.1 – TSF Testing [PSD]
FTA: TOE Access FTA_CIN_EXT.1 – Continuous Indications [PSD]
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8 Rationale
This security target includes by reference the [PSD], [MOD_AO_V1.0], [MOD_KM_V1.0], and
[MOD_VI_V1.0] Security Problem Definitions, Security Objectives, and Security Assurance Requirements.
The security target makes no additions to the [PSD] or listed modules assumptions. The [PSD] and listed
module’s security functional requirements have been reproduced with the Protection Profile operations
completed. Operations on the security requirements follow [PSD] and the module’s application notes and
assurance activities. Consequently, [PSD] and the module’s rationale applies but is incomplete. The TOE
Summary Specification rationale below serves to complete the rationale required for the security target.
8.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
Each subsection in Section 6, the TOE Summary Specification, describes a security function of the TOE.
Each description is followed with rationale that indicates which requirements are satisfied by aspects of
the corresponding security function. The set of security functions work together to satisfy all of the
security functions and assurance requirements. Furthermore, all of the security functions are necessary
in order for the TSF to provide the required security functionality.
This Section in conjunction with Section 6, the TOE Summary Specification, provides evidence that the
security functions are suitable to meet the TOE security requirements. The collection of security functions
work together to provide all of the security requirements. The security functions described in the TOE
summary specification are all necessary for the required security functionality in the TSF. Table 18
demonstrates the relationship between security requirements and security functions.
Table 18: Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping
Specifications
Security
Audit
User
Data
Protection
Identification
and
Authentication
Security
Management
Protection
of
the
TSF
TOE
Access
FAU_GEN.1 X
FDP_AFL_EXT.1 X
FDP_APC_EXT.1 X
FDP_CDS_EXT.1 X
FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM X
FDP_IPC_EXT.1(DP) X
FDP_PDC_EXT.1 X
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/AO X
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM X
FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI X
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM X
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Specifications
Security
Audit
User
Data
Protection
Identification
and
Authentication
Security
Management
Protection
of
the
TSF
TOE
Access
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(DP) X
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(H) X
FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(D) X
FDP_PUD_EXT.1 X
FDP_RIP.1/KM X
FDP_RIP_EXT.1 X
FDP_RIP_EXT.2 X
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP(DP) X
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DVI-I(D) X
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI(H) X
FDP_SWI_EXT.1 X
FDP_SWI_EXT.2 X
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/AO X
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM X
FDP_UDF_EXT.1/VI X
FIA_UAU.2 X
FIA_UID.2 X
FMT_SMF.1 X
FMT_SMR.1 X
FPT_FLS_EXT.1 X
FPT_NTA_EXT.1 X
FPT_PHP.1 X
FPT_PHP.3 X
FPT_STM.1 X
FPT_TST.1 X
FPT_TST_EXT.1 X
FTA_CIN_EXT.1 X
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Appendix A Letter of Volatility
Item
No.
Component type,
Manufacturer, and
Part number
Memory
Type
Memory Size Memory
Technology
User Data
1 System Controller
Host Controller
ATEN SICG8021A
Embedded
RAM (1)
Undisclosed Volatile May contain
user data
2 Host Controller
Device Emulators
ATEN SICG8022A
Embedded
RAM(1)
Undisclosed Volatile May contain
user data
3 System EEPROM
ATMEL
AT24C512
EEPROM(2)
512K bits Non-volatile No user data
4 System Flash
EON
EN29LV040A
Flash(3)
512K Bytes Non-volatile No user data
5 EDID Emulator
ROHM
BR24G02-3
EEPROM(4)
256 Bytes Non-volatile No user data
6 DP Video Controller
Flash MXIC
MX25L4006E
Flash(5)
4 Mbits Non-volatile No user data
7 HDMI2.0 Switch Embedded 32K Bytes Volatile No user data
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ITE IT66354 RAM (6)
Remarks
(1) The Embedded RAM may contain user data.
The Embedded RAM is cleared and user keyboard/mouse data is purged when the Secure KVM
powers-off or power-cycles, after switching ports, after a KVM reset (reboot), or a trigger of the
tamper-proof mechanism is detected.
(2) The EEPROM does not contain user data. User settings, Secure KVM configuration, and audit records
are kept in EEPROM. The user settings and the Secure KVM configuration will be reset to KVM
default settings after a Reset to Factory Default. but the audit records remain unchanged after a
Reset to Factory Default, KVM reset (reboot), or power-cycle.
(3) The Flash does not contain user data. Firmware code is stored in the Flash and cannot be updated or
rewritten. The firmware code remains unchanged after a Reset to Factory Default, KVM reset
(reboot), or power-cycle.
(4) The EDID ROM does not contain user data. It is for PC Read EDID ROM. The EDID data will be cleared
after a KVM reset (reboot) or power-cycle.
(5) (DisplayPort models only) The Flash does not contain user data. The firmware code for the HDMI to
DP Converter used is stored in the Flash, remaining unchanged after a Reset to Factory Default, KVM
reset (reboot), or power-cycle.
(6) The switch’s internal EDID RAM does not contain user data. It is for PC Read EDID.
The EDID data will be cleared after a KVM reset (reboot) or power-cycle.
All components are powered by the Secure KVM only.