BSI-DSZ-CC-1140-2021
for
SMAERS for a.sign TSE Online Version 1.2.0
from
A-Trust Gesellschaft für Sicherheitssysteme im
elektronischen Datenverkehr GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.41
BSI-DSZ-CC-1140-2021 (*)
Fiscalization
SMAERS for a.sign TSE Online
Version 1.2.0
from A-Trust Gesellschaft für Sicherheitssysteme im
elektronischen Datenverkehr GmbH
PP Conformance: Security Module Application for Electronic-keeping
Systems (SMAERS) Version 1.0, 28 July 2020, BSI-
CC-PP-0105-V2-2020
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_LCD.1, ALC_CMS.3
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 11 November 2021
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1140-2021
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1140-2021 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks..................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure.............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..............................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result...............................................................................8
6. Publication..................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary..................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE...........................................................................................14
Identification of the TOE by the User (TSS developer)............................................16
3. Security Policy..........................................................................................................16
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope...................................................................16
5. Architectural Information...........................................................................................19
6. Documentation.........................................................................................................20
7. IT Product Testing.....................................................................................................20
8. Evaluated Configuration...........................................................................................21
9. Results of the Evaluation..........................................................................................21
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................22
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................23
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................23
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................23
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................25
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................27
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................28
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1140-2021
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1140-2021 Certification Report
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1140-2021
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SMAERS for a.sign TSE Online, Version 1.2.0 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product SMAERS for a.sign TSE Online, Version 1.2.0 was
conducted by SRC. The evaluation was completed on 4 August 2021. SRC is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: A-Trust Gesellschaft für
Sicherheitssysteme im elektronischen Datenverkehr GmbH.
The product was developed by: A-Trust Gesellschaft für Sicherheitssysteme im
elektronischen Datenverkehr GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 11 November
2021 is valid until 10 November 2029. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1140-2021 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
4. to conduct a reassessment after 5 years in order to assess the robustness of the
product against new state-of-the-art attack methods. This has to be done on the
developer‘s own initiative and at his own expense. As evidence a report regarding a
reassessment or a re certification according to the regulations of the BSI
certification scheme shall be provided.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product SMAERS for a.sign TSE Online, Version 1.2.0 has been included in the BSI
list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
A-Trust Gesellschaft für Sicherheitssysteme im elektronischen Datenverkehr GmbH
Landstraßer Hauptstraße 1b, E02
1030 Wien
Österreich
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1140-2021
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1140-2021 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Target of evaluation is the A-Trust SMAERS for a.sign
TSE Online provided by A-Trust Gesellschaft für Sicherheitssysteme im elektronischen
Datenverkehr GmbH.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a Security Module application implemented as software.
A-Trust SMAERS for a.sign TSE Online is a software library that implements the client-
server architecture running on a platform supporting secure storage of assets after being
integrated into a separate CTSS Software of the developer (‘a.sign TSE Online’ TSS).
The TOE relies on an Utimaco CryptoServer CSPLight Version 1.0.0 (BSI-DSZ-CC-1145-
2021) as a Cryptographic Service Provider Light (CSPL), located in the A-Trust Datacenter
secure environment, for all cryptographic operations except for the TOE sided
implementation of the trusted channel which is implemented using the Password
Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) protocol [19] by the TOE itself. This
CSPL is not part of this TOE.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security Module Application for Electronic-keeping Systems (SMAERS)
Version 1.0, 28 July 2020, BSI-CC-PP-0105-V2-2020 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 2
augmented by ALC_LCD.1, ALC_CMS.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.GenLM
Generation of Log messages
The TOE generates audit records for the following auditable
events:
• startup and shutdown
• system operation commands as specified in [13]
• reaching of the threshold of unsuccessful
authentication
• failure with preservation of secure state
• setting of the version number of the UCP and upgrade
of stored data
TOE allows manual export of audit trail by the CSP role using
the function exportAuditTrail retrieving the audit log messages
from CSPL and exports them. Upon successful export the
messages are cleared using the function clearAuditTrail.
SF.ImpExp
Import of Transaction Data from and
Export of Log mes-sage to CTSS
interface component
The TOE imports Transaction Data (only if the TOE is in CTSS
and CSP role) from the ERS and establishes a trusted
channel with the CSPL using the PACE protocol. The TC uses
only the signature key. TOE is responsible for the import of
audit records. Import and export of data is per-formed
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1140-2021
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
according to [13] and [14].
SF.IAA
Identification of external entities and
authentication of Administrators
TOE is delivered in an uninitialized state, the administrator
has to set a new password. This password is used to
authenticate the Administrator when the TOE acts on behalf of
Administrator. Authentication reference data is verified using
the secure platform mechanism.
The administrator is able to reset this Authentication Data
Record using unblockUser.
The TOE starts in the Unidentified User role. The TOE tests
the ERS and CSP Identity. Only if all tests of external entities
and self-tests are successful, the TOE enables the CTSS
interface and CSP role. A user is only associated with the
Administrator role after successful authentication. After 10
unsuccessful attempts, the Administrator role gets blocked
until it gets successfully unblocked using a valid PUK.
SF.SecMan
Security management
The TOE maintains the following roles which are associated to
users: unidentified user, administrator, CTSS interface role
and CSP role. The TOE restricts the security management of
TSF and TSF data to authenticated Admin-istrators. The TSF
prevents management of the Transac-tion Number generation.
Security Management functions can only be used after
successful authentication of an administrator.
Only administrators are allowed to determine and modify the
behavior of the function.
The last transaction number is incremented by TOE and is
stored on the secure platform. No one is allowed to specify
alternative initial values for the transaction number.
Only administrator is able to delete and reset this
Authentication Data Record.
The TOE enforces strong passwords and changing the initial
password.
SF.TEE
Test of external entities
After ERS loads the TOE, it is in the secure state with the
Unidentified User role. The TOE tests the ERS and CSP
Identity. Only if all tests of external entities and self-tests are
successful, the TOE leaves the secure state and enables the
CTSS interface and CSP role.
At startup and during operation the TOE ensures that the
transaction number is strictly monotonically increasing and
only registered client_Ids are allowed to use the according
signing key and that the version number is only increasing
after a successful update
Only the role administrator is allowed to use the function
password authentication, define a transaction timeout, use the
management functions and modify their behaviour in case of
failure regarding testing of external entities and select the
auditable events and the automatic export of audit trails.
SF.TST
Self-test and secure state
A-Trust provides cryptographic checksums of the TOE, user
can verify the integrity. Furthermore the client component is
signed which can be verified by platforms supporting code
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1140-2021 Certification Report
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
signing.
The TOE performs self-tests on startup, shutdown and
periodically during operation. If one of the self-tests fails, it
enters a secure state. The TOE also enters the secure state if
the test of the electronic record-keeping systems fails, or the
test of cryptographic service provider fails.
User data is stored on the secure platform including a version
number, hence illegal modification can be detected. The digital
signature of the UCP is verified by the SMAERS platform
during the platforms native installation process. After an
update and on every startup the TOE verifies that the version
number of the user data is not modified and no unauthorized
downgrade attempt was made.
Security attributes are unambiguously associated with the
exported user data, because they are stored in the secure
platform including a version number.
SF.SecUCP
Secure download and authorized use of
Update Code Package
The TOE is updated7
using Update Code Packages which are
signed by an authorized entity.
Only Administrator is allowed to import received UCP if the
digital signature of the UCP is successfully verified by the
platform. Furthermore the version number of the UCP has to
be equal or greater than the current version.
User data is stored with its associated version number, which
is validated after a successful update. In case of an
unsuccessful update a log message is generated.
The TOE ensures that any previous information content of a
resource is made unavailable upon the deallocation of the
resource after successful upgrade previous code and data is
deleted.
SF.ImpExpUCP
Secure Import and Export of User Data
During every export of user data, the version number of user
data is included. On every import the TOE verifies that the
version number of the user data is not modified and no
unauthorized downgrade attempt was made.
SF.SecCommCSP
Secure communication between TOE
and CSP
The TOE and the CSPL are physically separated components
and thus there is a trusted channel between the TOE and the
CSPL. The protocol used for the trusted channel is PACE
according to [12]. CSPL is authenticated using this PACE
channel. Keys for the key agreement are gener-ated. A PACE
PIN is used by TOE to establish the trusted channel to CSPL.
Transmitted data in the secure channel is authenticated using
a MAC. As soon as keys are not needed any more, they are
deleted.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.2 - 3.4.
7
The update process itself is an automatic process, that is also realized in part by non-TOE components.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1140-2021
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
SMAERS for a.sign TSE Online, Version 1.2.0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW A-Trust SMAERS for a.sign
TSE Online
SHA256:
6CD72990D3B1586935D86
7C6E533845F84F92B4C34
C39A2ADEEB8DB0575648
9E
Version 1.2.0 Delivered as a software module
(library).
2 DOC Operational user guidance -
SMAERS for a.sign TSE
Online, A-Trust Gesellschaft
für Sicherheitssysteme im
elektronischen Datenverkehr
GmbH
SHA256:
A2D941F56DE711818461B
9FE5C08D24ED-
BEC1A1049A42C06E2CE3
4FC17839149
Version: 1.0.3,
Date: 26.07.2021
Delivered as a PDF
3 DOC Functional Specification –
SMAERS for a.sign TSE
Online, A-Trust Gesellschaft
für Sicherheitssysteme im
elektronischen Datenverkehr
GmbH
SHA256:
BE20682CDFD4D94015FC
E6157BFFAD68AF0EA14F
CA3CDCF4190F00456E8C
4FA7Version: 1.0.2, Date:
26.07.2021,
Version: 1.0.2,
Date:
26.07.2021,
Delivered as a PDF
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1140-2021 Certification Report
The TOE is available for download by the TSS developer (A-Trust itself) on the internal
GitLab Server. From there the TSS developer can download the package and verify the
detached the signature. The signature can only be verified with the public PGP key that is
sent directly to the TSS developer by the key owner. The verification of the public key
finger print must be performed either over the phone or in person.
The TOE developer also requires the TSS developer to provide the end costumer all
relevant information in order to verify that the TSS uses the correct TOE.
The verification procedures are defined by the developer in [10], chapter 8 (“Acceptance
Procedures”).
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1140-2021
Identification of the TOE by the User (TSS developer)
The TOE is delivered in form of a service and the accompanying documentation
The certified version of TOE is signed by A-Trust before delivery, allowing the developer to
ensure that this TOE is a version published by A-Trust using the following steps:
1. download the package and the detached signature from the A-Trust GitLab Server
2. verify the signature using the following command which is shown below as a
generic example:
gpg --verify .\smaers-1.0.0.zip.asc
The TOE itself provides the at_get_version command which returns the TOE Version as a
string identifier as Version “1.2.0” (Output string of at_get_version: “status:0;data:smaers-
service: 1.2.0”).
Since the taxpayer needs to verify the version of the TOE, the functions of TOE (especially
at_get_version) need to be made accessible to the taxpayer. Furthermore the TOE needs
to be included in the TSE without modifications and installed according to [11].
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The TOE implements a role-based access control policy to control administrative access to
the system. In addition, the TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security
functional classes:
• Security Management
• User Identification and Authentication
• User data protection
• Protection of the TSF
• Security Audit
• Update Code Package
• Trusted Channel to CSPLight
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security functions can be found in chap. 6
of the Security Target, [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1140-2021 Certification Report
Security Objectives
for the operational
environment defined
in Security Target
Description according to [6] Reference to
Guidance
OE.ERS
Trustworthy Electronic
Record-Keeping System
The taxpayer shall correctly use an
electronic record-keeping system that
provides separately, correctly, completely
and in real time all transaction data that
are legally required for the generation of
log messages to the TOE. The electronic
record-keeping system shall support
testing its presence and identity as an
external entity by the TOE. The electronic
record-keeping system shall produce
receipts including not only the
transaction data, but also the points in
time whenever a transaction is started,
completed or terminated, as well as the
transaction number provided by the
certified security device.
[10] sec. 2.3.1
OE.SMAERSPlatform
Secure platform storage
The platform that executes the TOE has
to ensure the integrity of the TOE itself
and to provide secure storage which
protects the integrity and confidentiality
of stored security relevant objects as
required. The platform verifies and
installs the UCP.
[10] sec. 2.3.2
OE.CSP
Cryptographic Service
Provider Component
A CSP is remotely accessible via a
trusted channel to the TOE (client-server
architecture) and certified as compliant to
[20] running on hardware that meets
Appendix: Operational Requirements for
CSPLight.
The CSP exports audit records in form of
audit logs meeting [13].
This OE may be
fulfilled by the
Utimaco
CryptoServer
CSPLight (BSI-
DSZ-CC-1145-
2021) as a
remote CSPL in
client-server
architecture. The
CSPL manu-
facturer has to
provide evi-
dences about
the platform
hardware certi-
fication and the
TSS developer
running the
CSPLight in its
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1140-2021
premises has to
provide evidence
about being
compliant re-
garding to the
Security Audit
requirements as
mandated in [8],
sec. “Appendix:
Operational
Requirements
for CSPLight”.
OE.CSPPlatform
CSP as a Secure
Platform of the TOE
In case of the platform architecture, the
CSP provides a secure execution
environment and security services for the
TOE running on top.
This OE is not
applicable and
can be seen as
fulfilled, since
the TOE uses a
client-server
architecture and
implements the
trusted channel
package
functionality
OE.Transaction
Verification of
Transaction
The operational environment shall verify
the validity of log message sequences by
verification of the corresponding digital
signatures, shall verify the transaction
numbers as being consecutive without
gaps, and shall verify the points in time
when the transaction starts as being
consecutively increasing with increasing
transaction numbers, and consider the
log messages. The taxpayer shall ensure
that the cryptographic service provider
holds digital signature creation data and
a corresponding valid certificate. The
certificate shall be securely distributed to
the tax inspector.
[10] sec. 2.3.3
OE.SecOEnv
Secure Operational
Environment
The operational environment shall
protect the integrity of the communication
between the electronic record-keeping
system and the TOE. The administrator
shall act in a trustworthy way and is
assumed to be the manufacturer or
integrator. The administrator must be
independent of the taxpayer.
[10] sec. 2.3.4
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O.SecCommCSP
Secure communication
between TOE and CSP
The security target shall claim the
package trusted channel to protect the
integrity of the communication between
the TOE and the CSP in the client-server
architecture. In case of the platform
architecture, the operational environment
protects the integrity of the
communication between the TOE and
the cryptographic service provider.
Since the TOE
implements the
client-server
architecture and
this is a part of
the TSF. It is
listed here for
the sake of
completeness
(since it is an OE
in the Base part
of the [8]).
OE.SUCP
Signed Update Code
Packages
The manufacturer issues digitally signed
update code packages together with its
security attributes.
[10] sec. 2.3.5
OE.SecUCP
Secure download and
authorized use of Update
Code Package
The platform verifies the authenticity of
received update code packages and
installs only authentic update code
packages.
UCP runs
automatically, no
interaction by
user and
administrator is
required.
Table 3 Security Objectives for the operational environment
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a software binary (32bit) running on Windows 10. It is used as a library for the
product “a.sign TSE Online” of the developer A-Trust and must be integrated into the TSS
Software by the TSS developer. TOE runs as a service and communicates with TSS using
named pipes. The TOE runs as service in its own process. In order to call the TOE
functions a TSS has to communicate with the service using an interprocess
communication (IPC) protocol. The TOE implements this IPC using a server client
architecture using a named pipe.
The TOE is the A-Trust SMAERS for a.sign TSE Online which is a part of the ‘a.sign TSE
Online‘ TSS. It implements the client-server architecture running on a platform supporting
secure storage of assets and relies on an Utimaco CryptoServer CSPLight Version 1.0.0
as a Cryptographic Service Provider Light (CSPL).
The SFR-enforcing subsystems of the TOE are:
• Initialization and Update (IU)
• State and Role Management (SRM)
• Transaction (TRANS)
• Crypto (CRYPTO)
• Secure Platform (SP)
• Authentication (AUTH)
• Self Test (ST)
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• Audit Trail (AT)
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
Test Summary
The developer tested all TOE Security Functions. For all commands and functionality tests,
test cases are specified in order to demonstrate its expected behavior. Repetition of
developer tests were performed during the independent evaluator tests.
The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against basic attack potential during
their penetration testing results.
The achieved test results correspond to the expected test.
TOE Test configuration
Tests are performed on a TOE installed in a virtual machine running on a physical
dedicated non-TOE hardware platform owned by the developer. The tested TOE version
was 1.2.0.
The configuration respectively the version of the TOE can be retrieved from the test
environment via the IPC call at_get_version().The retrieved version number of the TOE
was 1.2.0.
Testing approach and coverage
Developer Testing
The developer tests are performed on a TOE installed in a virtual machine running on a
physical Platform owned by the developer. Access to this virtual machine is restricted to
remote users with previously exchanged credentials.
The test environment is configured by the developer and does not need any actions by the
evaluator to run the tests. This means that all necessary configuration is done by the
developer.
The developer tests TSFIs by sending the respective command to the external IPC
interface of the TOE. The tests consist of 124 distinct test cases and include positive and
negative tests in the form of wrong or missing prerequisites and wrong or missing
parameters.
All TSFI API test cases were executed successfully and ended up with the expected result.
Independent Testing
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The tests are performed remotely on a virtual machine running in a test environment of the
developer. The environment includes the TOE virtual machine and all necessary resources
to repeat and conduct tests.
All developer tests were repeated by the evaluator and several independent tests were
performed using the resources of the test environment. As the developer tests did not
cover all of the interfaces of the TOE, the evaluators tested the missing interfaces in the
independent test cases.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
Penetration Testing
The penetration testing was carried out in the evaluation lab on the test client which
connects remotely to the TOE in the developer’s test environment. The overall test result is
that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results; moreover,
no attack scenario with the attack potential “Basic” was actually successful.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The TOE test configuration is defined by the notation:
• A-Trust SMAERS for a.sign TSE Online, Version 1.2.0, installed on the dedicated
Remote VM implementing the SMAERS component in a client-server architecture
that relies on the Utimaco CryptoServer CSPLight Version 1.0.0
• The guidance documentation:
◦ Operational user guidance – SMAERS for a.sign TSE Online [10]
◦ Functional Specification – SMAERS for a.sign TSE Online [15]
Tests are performed on a TOE installed in a virtual machine running on a physical
dedicated non-TOE hardware platform owned by the developer. The tested TOE version
was 1.2.0.
The configuration respectively the version of the TOE can be retrieved from the test
environment via the API call at_get_version(). The retrieved version number of the TOE in
the environment was 1.2.0. The version stated in the [6] is 1.2.0.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 2 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
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● The components ALC_LCD.1, ALC_CMS.3 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security Module Application for Electronic-keeping Systems
(SMAERS) Version 1.0, 28 July 2020, BSI-CC-PP-0105-V2-2020 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_LCD.1, ALC_CMS.3
In the course of the evaluation the assurance refinements in [8], sec. 6.2.1 have been
assessed for the TOE.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
All cryptographic functionalities are described in detail in the Crypto Disclaimer. The
strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation
procedure.
In general, for all applicable entries of cryptographic algorithms listed in the table below,
the Security Level provided is greater than 100 bit.
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Standard of
Application
Comments
1 Authentication
Trusted
Channel
Key Generation
(ephemeral and
session keys)
Key Agreement
(ECDH)
PACE with brain-
poolP256r1
[12], Section 4.4 256 [8] FCS_CKM.1
2 Integrity
Authenticity
AES-256 CMAC [17] (AES)
[18] (CMAC)
256 [8] FCS_COP.1
3 Cryptographic
Primitive
Random Number
Generation: hybrid
deterministic RNG
class DRG.3
[16] n/a [8] FCS_RNG.1
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
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Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
• The CTSS shall be installed according to [11]. For this the [11] shall be delivered to
the user installing the CTSS as required in [10] chap. 8.1.4 together with the CTSS
that integrates the TOE.
• The evaluators have acknowledged the manufacturer's environmental protection
concept [11]. The environmental protection concept is a procedural guide with steps
for setting up the environmental platform for the TOE. This conceptual guide is not
intended to be used as a guidance in the sense of Common Criteria requirements. It
addresses the (SMAERS) administrators in the context of the assumption A.Admin
and the Security Objectives for the Operational Environment OE.SecOEnv as well
as OE.SMAERSPlatform and OE.SecUCP, c.f. [6]. The (SMAERS) administrator
role is to be considered trustworthy and trained, so that it can be assumed that they
can check, evaluate and execute the steps in the environmental protection concept
in order to provide the intended secure runtime environment of the TOE. Thus, the
(SMAERS) administrator role mentioned [6] and in [11] is solely responsible to
ensure that the platform is set up securely according to the concept depicted in [11].
In addition to the Guidance [10], the manufacturer is obliged to provide the
(SMAERS) administrator the environmental protection concept authentically
together with the delivery of the TOE and to instruct the (SMAERS) administrator
role to comply to it accordingly.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
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BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CSPL Cryptographic Service Provider Light
CTSS Certified Technical Security System
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ERS Electronic Record-keeping Systems
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IPC Interprocess Communication
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SMAERS Security Module Application for Electronic-keeping Systems
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSE Technische Sicherheitseinrichtung
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UCP Update Code Packages
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
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Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1140-2021, SMAERS for a.sign TSE Online, Version:
1.0.3, 26.07.2021, A-Trust Gesellschaft für Sicherheitssysteme im elektronischen
Datenverkehr GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report - Summary, Version 1.8, 29.07.2021, SRC Security
Research & Consulting GmbH, (confidential document)
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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[8] Security Module Application for Electronic-keeping Systems (SMAERS) Version 1.0,
28 July 2020, BSI-CC-PP-0105-V2-2020
[9] Configuration list for the TOE, Included in Chapter 3 of Lifecycle Support –
SMAERS for a.sign TSE Online, Version 1.0.7, Date: 28.07.2021, A-Trust
Gesellschaft für Sicherheitssysteme im elektronischen Datenverkehr GmbH
(confidential document)
[10] Operational user guidance - SMAERS for a.sign TSE Online, Version: 1.0.3, Date:
26.07.2021, A-Trust Gesellschaft für Sicherheitssysteme im elektroni-schen
Datenverkehr GmbH
[11] Umgebungskonzept - SMAERS for a.sign TSE Online 1.0.0, Version: 0.5, Date:
March 15 2021, A-Trust Gesellschaft für Sicherheitssysteme im elektronischen
Datenverkehr GmbH
[12] ICAO, Machine Readable Travel Documents, ICAO Doc9303, Part 11: Security
Mechanisms for MRTDSs, seventh edition, 2015
[13] Technical Guideline BSI TR-03151 Secure Element API (SE API), Version 1.0.1, 20.
Dezember 2018
[14] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03153 Technische Sicherheitseinrich-tung für
elektronische Aufzeichnungssysteme, Version 1.0.1, 20. De-zember 2018
[15] Functional Specification – SMAERS for a.sign TSE Online, Version: 1.0.2, Date:
26.07.2021, A-Trust Gesellschaft für Sicherheitssysteme im elektronischen Da-
tenverkehr GmbH
[16] Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, AIS20, Version 3, 15.05.2013, Bundesamt für Sicherheit
in der Informationstechnik
[17] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197 (FIPS PUB 197),
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), 2001
[18] NIST Special Publication 800-38B Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication May 2005
[19] BSI, Technical Guideline TR-03110 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token – Part 2 - Protocols for electronic
IDentification, Authentication and trust Services (eIDAS), Version 2.21, 2016
[20] Protection Profile-Module CSPLight Time Stamp Service and Au-dit – Clustering,
Version 1.0, registered under BSI-CC-PP-0113-2020, Federal Office for Information
Security
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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Note: End of report
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