

Certification Report

NXP SN300 B2 Series - Secure Element version SN300_SE B2.1.001 JB

Sponsor and developer: ***NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH***
Beiersdorfstraße 12
22529 Hamburg
Germany

Evaluation facility: ***TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH***
Am TÜV 1
45307 Essen
Germany

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Author(s): **Jordi Mujal**

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Foreword

The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.

Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.

An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and testing laboratories”.

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.

The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the (site) security target.

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Recognition of the Certificate

Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating nations.

International recognition

The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.

For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>.

European recognition

The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS MRA in December 2010.

For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see <https://www.sogis.eu>.

1 Executive Summary

This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the NXP SN300 B2 Series - Secure Element version SN300_SE B2.1.001 JB. The developer of the NXP SN300 B2 Series - Secure Element version SN300_SE B2.1.001 JB is NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.

The TOE is a Security Integrated Circuit Platform for operating systems and applications with high security requirements.

The TOE incorporates a high frequency clocked ARM Cortex M33 processor augmented with its dedicated coprocessor for symmetric cryptography (SYM-lite), a secure copy machine (SMA), a Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) coprocessor, and a random number generator.

On-chip memories are Flash memory, ROM and RAMs. The ROM contains the IC dedicated software for factory testing, program upload, and the flash memory drivers.

In addition, the hardware embeds sensors which ensure the proper operating conditions of the device. Integrity protection of data and code involves error correction and error detection codes, EMFI detector, light sensing and other security functionality. Memory encryption and masking mechanisms are implemented to preserve the confidentiality of the stored data. The IC hardware is shielded against physical attacks. And the “lockstep” (redundant) CPU provides protection against faults in the CPU.

The TOE was evaluated initially by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH located in Essen, Germany and was certified on 14 June 2023. The re-evaluation of the TOE has also been conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH and was completed on 19 November 2024 with the approval of the ETR. The re-certification procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].

This second issue of the Certification Report is a result of a “recertification with major changes”.

The major changes are:

- Updates regarding the TOE involved sites

The security evaluation reused the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up-to-date vulnerability analysis has been made, as well as renewed testing.

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the NXP SN300 B2 Series - Secure Element version SN300_SE B2.1.001 JB, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the NXP SN300 B2 Series - Secure Element version SN300_SE B2.1.001 JB are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.

The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]¹ for this product provide sufficient evidence that the TOE meets the EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures), ALC_FLR.1 (Basic flaw remediation), ASE_TSS.2 (TOE summary specification with architectural design summary), and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).

The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).

TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the product as evaluated.

¹ The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not available for public review.

2 Certification Results

2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the NXP SN300 B2 Series - Secure Element version SN300_SE B2.1.001 JB from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany.

The TOE is comprised of the following main components:

Delivery item type	Identifier	Version
Hardware	NXP SN300 B2 Series - Secure Element	B2.1.001 JB
IC dedicated software in ROM	FactoryOS	2.4.4
	BootOS	2.4.2
	Flash Driver Software	2.4.5

To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the NXP SN300 B2 Series - Secure Element version SN300_SE B2.1.001 JB. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.

For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 1.3.3.

2.2 Security Policy

The TOE maintains:

- the integrity and confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories;
- the different CPU modes with the related capabilities for configuration and memory access;
- the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security functionality provided by the TOE.

This is ensured by the construction of the TOE and its security functionality.

The TOE provides a hardware platform for an implementation of a smartcard application with:

- hardware to perform computations on multi-precision integers, which are suitable for public-key cryptography
- hardware to perform symmetric encryption
- hardware to provide True Random Numbers
- memory management control;
- an ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface with UART.
- Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI)
- 2x I2C interfaces
- I3C interface (shared pins with second I2C interface)
- SPMI Interface
- GPIO interface by use of Special Function Registers

2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

2.3.1 Assumptions

The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.2 of the [ST].


2.3.2 Clarification of scope

The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security functions of the product.

The secure operation of cryptographic functionality in 2.2 requires a Cryptographic Library which is not part of this TOE. Therefore, Security Services and Security Features using this cryptographic functionality need to be evaluated in the composite product together with Cryptographic Library as part of the Security IC Embedded Software. As a consequence, for the Cryptographic Functionality, the scope of this evaluation is confined to protection against physical manipulation.

2.4 Architectural Information

The following diagram represents the TOE architecture:



2.5 Documentation

The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:

Identifier	Version
SN300_SE B2 Information on Guidance and Operation	0.3
SN300V2, R2; Single Chip Secured (NFC) controller, Product data sheet	1.6

SN300V2 TOE Identification (for B2.1.001), Data sheet addendum,	0.2
SN300_SE Programmer's Manual (for revision B0 to B2), Application Note AN12729	0.5
ARM® Cortex®-M33 Processor Technical Reference Material	r1p0

2.6 IT Product Testing

Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the developer's testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities.

2.6.1 Testing approach and depth

The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and SFR-enforcing module level. All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The testing was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were used extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values.

The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations, because the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation requirements are met.

For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and a test environment. The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases designed by the evaluator.

2.6.2 Independent penetration testing

Based on a list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational environment created during vulnerability analysis the evaluators devised the attack scenarios for penetration tests when they were of the opinion, that those potential vulnerabilities could be exploited in the TOE's operational environment. While doing this, also the aspects of the security architecture were considered for penetration testing.

Source code reviews of the provided implementation representation accompanied the development of test cases and were used to find input for testing. The code inspection also supported the testing activities because they enabled the evaluator to verify implementation aspects that could hardly be covered by test cases.

The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 19 days. During that test campaign, 37% of the total time was spent on Perturbation attacks, 37 on side-channel testing, and 26% on logical tests.

2.6.3 Test configuration

The configuration of the sample used for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was the same as described in the [ST].

2.6.4 Test results

The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.

The developer's tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.

No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.

The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.

The algorithmic security level exceeds 100 bits for all evaluated cryptographic functionality as required for high attack potential (AVA_VAN.5).

The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities.

For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRFc] for details.

2.7 Reused Evaluation Results

This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been reused, but vulnerability analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.

There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and production of the TOE, by use of multiple site certificates and Site Technical Audit Reports.

No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.

2.8 Evaluated Configuration

The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number NXP SN300 B2 Series - Secure Element version SN300_SE B2.1.001 JB.

2.9 Evaluation Results

The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to [COMP] a derived document [ETRFc] was provided and approved. This document provides details of the TOE evaluation that must be considered when this TOE is used as platform in a composite evaluation.

The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “**Pass**”.

Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the NXP SN300 B2 Series - Secure Element version SN300_SE B2.1.001 JB, to be **CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant**, and to meet the requirements of **EAL 5 augmented with ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.1, ALC_DVS.2, and AVA_VAN.5**. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].

The Security Target claims strict conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].

2.10 Comments/Recommendations

The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.

In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols and implementations: none.

3 Security Target

The NXP SN300 B2 SE - Security Target, Version 0.9, 9 May 2023 [ST] is included here by reference.

Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and verified according to [ST-SAN].

4 Definitions

This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:

IT	Information Technology
ITSEF	IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL	Joint Interpretation Library
NFC	Near-Field Communication
NSCIB	Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT security
PP	Protection Profile
RNG	Random Number Generator
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SMB	Secure Mailbox
TOE	Target of Evaluation

5 Bibliography

This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this report.

[CC]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM]	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP]	Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[ETR]	EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY), 8122254433 / NSCIB-CC-2200030-02, version 2, 18 November 2024
[ETRFIC]	EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR COMP), 8122254433 / NSCIB-CC-2200030-02, version 2, 18 November 2024
[JIL-AAPS]	JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2.1, February 2024
[JIL-AMS]	Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.5, May 2022 (sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB]	Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6, 02 August 2022
[PP]	Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, Version 1.0, 13 January 2014
[ST]	NXP SN300 B2 SE - Security Target, Version 0.9, 9 May 2023
[ST-lite]	NXP SN300 Series – Secure Element, Security Target Lite, Rev. 0.9, 09 May 2023
[ST-SAN]	ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004, April 2006

(This is the end of this report.)