National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
KeyW Corporation
7880 Milestone Parkway, Suite 300
Hanover, MD 21076 USA
KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at
Rest, Version 1.2.2.1
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10801-2017
Dated: August 10, 2017
Version: 0.4
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest Validation Report Version 0.4, August 10, 2017
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Meredith Hennan
Jerome Myers
Aerospace Corporation
Columbia, MD
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Tammy Compton
Raymond Smoley
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest Validation Report Version 0.4, August 10, 2017
iii
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 4
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 5
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 6
4.1 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 6
4.2 User data protection ............................................................................................ 6
4.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 6
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 6
4.5 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 6
4.6 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 7
5 Assumptions................................................................................................................ 7
6 Clarification of Scope ................................................................................................. 7
7 Documentation............................................................................................................ 8
8 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 8
8.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 8
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 8
9 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................. 8
10 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 9
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)............................................................ 9
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV).............................................................. 9
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ................................................. 9
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ................................... 10
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 10
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 10
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 11
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 11
12 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 11
13 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 11
14 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 11
15 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 12
KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest Validation Report Version 0.4, August 10, 2017
1
1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest,
Version 1.2.2.1 solution provided by KeyW Corporation. It presents the evaluation results,
their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an
endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no
warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and
was completed in August 2017. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria
Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the
Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.2, 22 April 2016 (ASPP12) and
Application Software Protection Profile (ASPP) Extended Package: File Encryption:
Mitigating the Risk of Disclosure of Sensitive Data on a System, Version 1.0, 10
November 2014 (ASFEEP10).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest, Version
1.2.2.1.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). This Validation Report applies only to the
specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results
are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the KeyW BlackBerry
Suite B Data at Rest (ASPP12/ASFEEP10) Security Target, Version 1.0, August 7, 2017
and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest Validation Report Version 0.4, August 10, 2017
2
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation.
Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated
Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest, Version 1.2.2.1
Protection Profile
(Specific models identified in Section 3.1)
Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.2, 22 April 2016 (ASPP12)
and Application Software Protection Profile (ASPP) Extended Package: File
Encryption: Mitigating the Risk of Disclosure of Sensitive Data on a System,
Version 1.0, 10 November 2014 (ASFEEP10)
ST KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest, Version 1.2.2.1 Security Target, Version
1.0, August 7, 2017
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest, Version
1.2.2.1, Version 0.3, August 7, 2017
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
Developer KeyW Corporation
KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest Validation Report Version 0.4, August 10, 2017
3
Item Identifier
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators Meredith Hennan
Jerome Myers
Aerospace Corporation
Columbia, MD
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest application (i.e., the TOE) is a file encryption
tool that runs on a BlackBerry 10.3 mobile device. The BlackBerry Advanced Data at Rest
Protection (ADARP) relays all operations on files within the BlackBerry work space to the
TOE which encrypts or decrypts the file contents automatically. The TOE runs as a
BlackBerry required application, meaning the BlackBerry operating system will ensure that
the mobile device features are available only when the TOE is running.
The TOE utilizes the BlackBerry 10.3 operating system for storage of passwords, keys and
for Deterministic Random Bit Generation (DRBG). However, the TOE implements its
own encryption, decryption, and keyed-Hashing functions, which have been certified
through CAVP.
The KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest TOE is also known as KEYWprotect. The
TOE provides an AES-based Data at Rest (DAR) encryption model that is used to encrypt
the BlackBerry work space data when BlackBerry 10.3 mobile devices are unlocked
including encrypting data received when the BlackBerry work space is locked. The TOE is
an application on the BlackBerry 10.3 mobile device.
The TOE utilizes BlackBerry Advanced Data at Rest Protection (ADARP) features to relay
all file operations within the BlackBerry work space when the BlackBerry 10.3 mobile
device is in the unlocked and locked states. When the BlackBerry 10.3 mobile device is
unlocked, all BlackBerry work space data created by other applications is automatically
encrypted by the TOE and stored in the BlackBerry work space via the BlackBerry File
System (FSYS) Relay API feature. When the BlackBerry 10.3 mobile device is locked, all
BlackBerry work space data received by other applications is automatically encrypted by
the TOE and stored in the BlackBerry work space via the BlackBerry Data Lock Queue
(DLQ) Relay API feature. Encrypted work space data is decrypted as needed only after a
user presents valid authentication factors. Therefore, no clear text is ever written to the
BlackBerry work space file system.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
The evaluated configuration consists of the following models:
KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest Validation Report Version 0.4, August 10, 2017
4
Device Processor
Classic Qualcomm S4 (MSM8960)
Passport Qualcomm Snapdragon 801
Leap Qualcomm S4 (MSM8960)
Z30 Qualcomm S4 (MSM8960)
Q10 Porsche Qualcomm S4 (MSM8960)
Q10 Qualcomm S4 (MSM8960)
Z10 Porsche Qualcomm S4 (MSM8960)
Z10 Qualcomm S4 (MSM8960)
3.2 TOE Architecture
KEYWprotect is an application that is installed as a required application when the
BlackBerry device is provisioned for use. Being a required application, the BlackBerry
10.3 platform ensures that the TOE is running prior to presenting the home screen to the
user, and prevents all actions, which could uninstall the TOE. The TOE provides its own
cryptographic functionality, which has been FIPS validated through CAVP certifications.
All attempts to create new files within the BlackBerry work space are relayed to the TOE
by Blackberry ADARP and the TOE encrypts these files before they are written to the work
space file system. Therefore, no clear text version of the file is ever created on the work
space file system.
The TOE generates and stores the following keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
for the File System Relay:
 The TOE generates and stores a 256-bit SALT in the BlackBerry Certificate
Manager.
 The TOE derives a 256-bit HASH Key Encryption Key (KEK) from the user's
password and 256-bit SALT using PBKDF and stores this KEK in the BlackBerry
Certificate Manager.
 The TOE generates and stores a 256-bit Master KEK encrypted by the 256-bit
HASH KEK in the BlackBerry Certificate Manager using AES Key Wrap.
 The TOE generates and stores a File Encryption Key (FEK) and a File
Authentication Key (FAK) encrypted by the 256-bit Master KEK in the associated
metadata of each encrypted file using AES Key Wrap.
 The TOE generates and stores a Message Authentication Code (MAC) immediately
following each ciphertext block in each encrypted file.
The TOE generates and stores the following keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
for the Data Lock Queue Relay:
 The TOE generates and stores a static 521-bit ECC DLQ Master encryption keypair
in the BlackBerry Certificate Manager.
 The TOE generates and stores the following keys and CSPs for each open/write of a
file or after crossing the 1 megabyte Anchor Point boundary, which represents a
KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest Validation Report Version 0.4, August 10, 2017
5
starting point position in the file for encrypting data and therefore also the position
where data will be decrypted:
o The TOE generates an ephemeral 521-bit ECC Anchor Point keypair.
o The TOE computes a shared secret using ECC CDH Primitive from the 521-
bit ECC DLQ Master encryption keypair and ephemeral 521-bit ECC
Anchor Point keypair.
o The TOE derives a 256-bit Root Encryption Key (REK) from the shared
secret using SHA.
o The TOE derives an ephemeral 521-bit ECC DLQ keypair, static 521-bit
ECC Anchor Point keypair, 36-byte Nonce, and a 128-bit IV from the REK
using a KBKDF.
 The TOE stores the 128-bit IV in the Anchor Point context contained
in volatile memory.
 The TOE stores the compressed ephemeral 521-bit ECC Anchor
Point in the associated metadata of the Anchor Point.
o The TOE computes a 256-bit MAC key, a 256-bit Key Encryption Key
(KEK), a 256-bit Data Encryption Key (DEK), and a 256-bit MAC tag using
ECC KAS.
 The TOE stores the 256-bit KEK in the Anchor Point context
contained in volatile memory when processed as the Master Anchor
Point context.
 The TOE stores the 256-bit DEK in the Anchor Point context
contained in volatile memory where the DEK is encrypted by a 256-
bit Master Anchor Point context KEK for only decrypt operations.
 The TOE stores the 256-bit MAC key encrypted by the REK using
AES Key Wrap, and the 256-bit MAC tag in the associated metadata
of the Anchor Point.
 The TOE chains forward the 256-bit DEK and 128-bit IV for each 4 kilobytes of
file data using a KBKDF where the DEK is encrypted by a 256-bit Master Anchor
Point context KEK for only decrypt operations.
 The TOE stores the chain counter in the Anchor Point context contained in volatile
memory.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The physical boundary of the TOE is the physical perimeter of the evaluated device
(BlackBerry 10.3) on which the TOE resides.
KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest Validation Report Version 0.4, August 10, 2017
6
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security Management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE operates on a BlackBerry 10.3 mobile device and uses features provided by the
platform for key storage, user credential storage, and Deterministic Random Bit Generation
(DRBG). The TOE implements its own algorithms for AES, Key Wrapping, key-based
and password-based Key Derivation, Key Establishment, cryptographic hashing and keyed-
hashing.
4.2 User data protection
The TOE protects user data by providing an integrated file encryption and file data
authentication capability that automatically encrypts new files and decrypts files upon user
demand. The TOE utilizes 256-bit AES encryption for confidentiality and HMAC-SHA-
384 for file data integrity.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE authenticates a user by requiring a password before any file data decryption
operation is initiated. Without the correct password, the user is unable to decrypt the keys
necessary to obtain clear text data from the BlackBerry work space file system.
4.4 Security management
The TOE supports encryption while in the locked state, but does not allow decryption or
integrity operations until the user authenticates to the device upon first use of the TOE.
The TOE allows the user to change their password for management purposes.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE relies on the physical boundary of the evaluated platform as well as the
BlackBerry 10.3 operating system for the protection of the TOE’s application components.
Updates to the TOE are handled by the BlackBerry Enterprise Services (BES) management
software.
KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest Validation Report Version 0.4, August 10, 2017
7
4.6 Trusted path/channels
The TOE does not transmit any data between itself and another network entity. All of the
data managed by the TOE resides on the evaluated platform (BlackBerry 10.3).
5 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
 Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.2, 22 April 2016 (ASPP12)
and Application Software Protection Profile (ASPP) Extended Package: File
Encryption: Mitigating the Risk of Disclosure of Sensitive Data on a System,
Version 1.0, 10 November 2014 (ASFEEP10)
That information has not been reproduced here and the ASPP12/ASFEEP10 should be
consulted if there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
ASPP12/ASFEEP10 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality
included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality
provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be
drawn about their effectiveness.
6 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and
clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the Application Software Protection Profile with File
Encryption Extended Package and performed by the evaluation team).
 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the ASPP12/ASFEEP10 and applicable Technical
Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were
not covered by this evaluation.
KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest Validation Report Version 0.4, August 10, 2017
8
7 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
 KeyW BB10 Suite B Data at Rest v1.2.2.1 User Guide, Version 1.1, July 21, 2017
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the Detailed Test Report (ASPP12/ASFEEP10) for
KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest, Version 0.3, August 7, 2017 (DTR).
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the ASPP12/ASFEEP10 including the tests
associated with optional requirements.
The following depicts a diagram of the test environment used by the evaluators:
Figure 1: Test Setup
9 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the following series and models:
Device Processor
Classic Qualcomm S4 (MSM8960)
Passport Qualcomm Snapdragon 801
Leap Qualcomm S4 (MSM8960)
Z30 Qualcomm S4 (MSM8960)
Q10 Porsche Qualcomm S4 (MSM8960)
Q10 Qualcomm S4 (MSM8960)
Z10 Porsche Qualcomm S4 (MSM8960)
KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest Validation Report Version 0.4, August 10, 2017
9
Z10 Qualcomm S4 (MSM8960)
10 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to
the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon
CC version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the
BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest, Version 1.2.2.1 TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet
the SARs contained in the ASPP12/ASFEEP10.
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest,
Version 1.2.2.1 products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product
security function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the ASPP12/ASFEEP10 related to the
examination of the information contained in the TOE Summary Specification (TSS).
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and
testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest Validation Report Version 0.4, August 10, 2017
10
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that
the TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the ASPP12/ASFEEP10 and recorded the
results in a proprietary Test Report, and summarized in the AAR, which is publically
available.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover
any residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) with the following search terms: “KeyW, KeyWProtect,
KeyW Protect, BlackBerry, and BES”.
Additionally, the evaluator ran a virus scanner against the TOE’s files and did not find any
viruses.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest Validation Report Version 0.4, August 10, 2017
11
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations
All validator comments have been addressed in the Assumptions and Clarifications of
Scope sections.
12 Annexes
Not applicable
13 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest
(ASPP12/ASFEEP10) Security Target, Version 1.0, August 7, 2017.
14 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims
made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common
Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is
complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor
or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest Validation Report Version 0.4, August 10, 2017
12
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or
an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
15 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2102.
[4] Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.2, 22 April 2016 (ASPP12)
and Application Software Protection Profile (ASPP) Extended Package: File
Encryption: Mitigating the Risk of Disclosure of Sensitive Data on a System,
Version 1.0, 10 November 2014 (ASFEEP10)
[5] KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest (ASPP12/ASFEEP10) Security Target,
Version 1.0, August 7, 2017 (ST)
[6] Assurance Activity Report (ASPP12/ASFEEP10) for BlackBerry Suite B Data at
Rest, Version 0.3, August 7, 2017 (AAR)
[7] Detailed Test Report (ASPP12/ASFEEP10) for BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest,
Version 0.3, August 7, 2017 (DTR)
[8] Evaluation Technical Report for KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest, Version
0.3, August 7, 2017 (ETR)
KeyW BlackBerry Suite B Data at Rest Validation Report Version 0.4, August 10, 2017
1